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

Samuel Davies Cochran.

THE MORAL SYSTEM AND THE ATONEMENT.

By REV. SAMUEL DAVIES COCHRAN, D. D.

OBERLIN, OHIO.
EDWARD J. GOODRICH.
1889.

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Dedication.

DURING all my labors on this Work, there has been one who, in constant sympathy, has, in all practicable ways, favored me in them—one fully appreciative of its transcendent theme, and competent, by scholarship and knowledge concerning it, to perceive and weigh the validity and bearing of the successive positions and stages in treating the subject, and to express valuable judgments and suggestions respecting them.

. . . . A Faithful Wife, ...

she has shared with me in the grievous trials amidst which most of the Work was wrought out. To her, therefore, I dedicate it; and, if it shall find a useful place in the literature of the Church, I wish it to bear in its front, wherever it goes or abides, the name,

. . Ermina Day Cochran, . .

as worthy of the honoring regards of all women and all men of the Church and the world.

SAMUEL DAVIES COCHRAN.

Normal, Illinois.

EXPLANATORY PREFACE.

Somewhat over twenty-one years ago, I received, through another, an invitation from Prof. E. A. Park, D. D., of Andover, to write one or more Articles on the Atonement for the Bibliotheca Sacra, with special reference to Dr. Bushnell's Work entitled "Vicarious Sacrifice," which I accepted. Writing on the subject increased insight of its grounds and rootings in the nature of the moral system, and unfolded comprehension of "what is the breadth and length and height and depth" both of the "love of Christ which passeth knowledge," and of the relations of His atonement to God and His universal society for the salvation of man. About two-thirds of Part I. and some of Part II. were written at Grinnell, Iowa, during some more than two years before April, 1869, when, in an evil hour, I resigned my Pastorship there to undertake the founding of a College at Kidder, Missouri. That enterprise so absorbed my time that this Work was almost wholly suspended, till in June, 1874, when, being wronged out of my College, I resumed and prosecuted it as persistently as possible, amidst numerous hindrances, until in the early part of 1878, when, about twelve years after it was begun, I wrote *Finis*. Before I left Grinnell, I decided to write a Book, instead of the Article or Articles at first designed; and if I had remained there, the Work would have been completed within three or four years from that time.

From the time of its completion in 1878, till near the close of 1880, in the beginning of which year I moved to this place to be Pastor of a small Church here, the Work lay dormant. Meanwhile I decided to revise it thoroughly. The task thus assumed, which proved nearly equal to the first writing of the whole, I began in the latter part of that year, supposing it would require about a year, in which I was much mistaken. I remained Pastor over two years after resuming it; but could work at it only as Pastoral duties permitted, and mainly while others slept. I closed the Pastor-

ship in the Spring of 1883; and, from that time, except from September of 1885 to October of 1886, which time I spent in writing another Work, I devoted myself to it, when not prevented by necessary interruptions, till, on the evening of April 15, 1887, at 9:27 o'clock, I again wrote Finis under its last sentence. I wrote Chapters I. and V. almost entirely new, and rewrote nearly all the rest, putting in, leaving out, and altering paragraphs, sections, sentences, clauses, and terms, and re-examined every position and point with utmost care. No one, I think, can suppose I have written the Work of so many solid years for money. Those years and labors have been spent on it for the sake of the truth, of God, of Christ, and of the souls of my fellow-men. I greatly need money, and if this book shall bring me any, it will be thankfully welcomed; but, if it essentially aids in vindicating and confirming the truth among men "according to the glorious Gospel of the blessed God," the supreme end and aspiration of my heart in the whole process of writing the Work will be realized with joy, connected with humble gratitude to God for having, as my constant persuasion has been, called or constrained me to undertake it, preserved my life and overruled its conditions so long, that I might prosecute it, given me tenacity of purpose and patience in it, and guided me in executing it to its end. In writing it, I have in spirit and feeling been preaching on the fundamental facts and truths of Christianity, and on those involved in and conditioning these—thus on the foundations and essentials of the total Scriptural revelation and Christian System; and while there are some places in the Work perhaps too abstract and abstruse for common readers, not versed in such discussions, they do not probably exceed a tenth or twelfth of it, so that far the most of it can easily be understood by readers generally. By looking at the Contents and Index, they can readily find any particular Chapter, Section, topic, or point, which they may have an interest in or reason to read or examine; and they will be surprised to find how great a proportion there are of such, after passing all they may deem unsuited to them. It would be a great mistake to suppose the book only fitted for theologians. I have sometimes quoted Hebrew and Greek, and also Latin words and expressions; but I have so given their meanings, that no careful reader can fail to understand these, though unlearned in those languages, so that none need be deterred rom the book by seeing them in it.

The main subject of this Work has been a chief study of mine from my youth; and all along I have read all the Works and Arti-

cles concerning it which have come in my way. In my writing upon it, I have taken nothing on trust, followed no leader, school, or symbol, examined all points for myself, and striven only to ascertain the truth, as God has revealed it in moral natures and the inspired Scriptures. I have quoted and referred to only a limited number of the writers on this theme with whom I am familiar or that I have consulted. My Work was not designed to be a history of the doctrine of the atonement, but a presentation of the truth concerning it; and, whatever of controversial it contains, I have conscientiously aimed to deal fairly with the views opposed, desiring only to vindicate and maintain the truth of the Gospel as given to men in the living Oracles. The Work is large beyond my wish, chiefly on account of the expositions I have felt constrained to include in it of the Levitical Law of Sacrifices; of the related parts of the Epistle to the Hebrews; of Is. 53; and of the Epistle to the Romans, 5:12–19; 8:18–23; and 9:7–18. As my object has been the presentation of the revealed truth concerning the atonement, I have connected with it an exhibition of the essential facts and truths of the whole redemptive measure, because many objections to it are thus in advance forestalled and extinguished. Hence the attention I have devoted to the Scriptural teachings of the Trinity, of the Incarnation of Christ, of the peculiar relations of Adam and Christ to our race, of the plans of creation and redemption, and of God's foreknowledge, purpose, election, and predestination. In short, this Work is on the lofty range of the law and the universal moral society and system it constitutes, of retributions, of moral government, and of the whole scheme of redemption and grace, having the atonement as its highest peak, its most sublime and awful grandeur.

That there are points in the Work on which sincere and able Christian thinkers and theologians will disagree I anticipate; and, if important errors shall be shown in it, I will do what I may to correct them. Our times are tumultuous with discussions, denials, and defenses of the essential doctrines I have canvassed; and, if this Work shall contribute important aid to defenders of the truth against its adversaries, my great object in writing it will be achieved.

In giving the Work a larger scope than was at first designed, one aim has been to meet the objections and assumptions of infidels against the atonement and Christianity generally, as well as those of all deniers of it or of any essetial truth involved in it. If Part I. is valid, there is no salvation for sinners possible, except on its basis. If it is not valid, moral reason and conscience in all are false; law,

justice, obligation, duty, responsibility, accountability, natural and moral rights and dues, good- and ill-deserts, righteousness, benevolence, and, with all these, mercy and grace are mere inventions and impostures of men, having no basis in moral natures. Instead of all these, all so-called morality is only selfishness, and this with all its offspring of vices, crimes, antagonisms and anarchies, is truly natural, and mankind are only the highest grade of mere ferine natures. Praying the Great Head of the Church to accept and bless this fruit of my long labors, I now offer it to the public.

SAMUEL DAVIES COCHRAN.

Normal, Ill., December 20, 1888.

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PART I.

THE MORAL LAW AND SYSTEM.

CHAPTER I.

The Law of God as given in consciousness by Moral Reason. A clear understanding of it necessary to that of the Atonement; and its characteristics.

§ 1. ORIGIN OF THE DIVINE LAW.

The law of God declared in the Bible is in and from universal moral reason. It is in every rational nature, as instinct is in every animal nature; and it issues from it as, in classic fable, Minerva, the goddess of wisdom, sprung armed, chaste, and beautiful from the cloven head of Jupiter. It is thus in and from the Mind of God from all eternity; and it is thus in and from all created rational minds ever onward from their first waking to consciousness. In other words, it is necessarily, not merely thought, but authoritatively affirmed or dictated by the rational nature of all moral beings in all worlds; and it is called LAW, because it is thus in and springs from them, not as an idea, like that of space or time, but as an *authoritative rule* for their social action, which by it is ethical or moral. It is thus the ground and source in them of all sense of duty, of justice and injustice, of right and wrong, of holiness and unholiness, of moral beauty and deformity, of moral good and evil, of merit and demerit, of responsibility and accountability, of rewards and punishments, of all proper human government, and of all ethics and religion; and it is necessarily recognized as "holy, just, and good". It is thus that, as the great Apostle of the Gentiles declares, mankind are "a law unto themselves; in that they show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness therewith, and their thoughts one with another accusing or else excusing them." It is

of course as permanent and immutable as the nature of God and of all other moral beings. As it is not originated by will, Divine or created, it is irrepealable and unchangable by will; and all moral beings, simply by being such, are necessarily in an everlasting moral society and system, as all the material worlds, from greatest to least, are in a physical system. Such is the law of God, obedience to which alone constitutes all right character and secures all moral good and blessedness in any moral being in any world.

§ 2. RELATION OF KNOWLEDGE OF IT TO THAT OF THE ATONEMENT.

The worst fact in the universe, the source of all others that are evil, is, that a vast proportion of created moral beings have violated this law by sin, and have thus incurred the *natural*, and made themselves liable to the *penal*, consequences of their apostacy. Among these are all responsible mankind; and it is to them that the atonement, if there is one, relates as a measure of God to retrieve them from the necessity of suffering the penal part of these consequences, and to provide for arresting those which are merely natural. In order to understand the reasons for, and the nature of, that measure, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the law, and of the penal part of the consequences of its violation as distinguished from those which are merely natural. Thus only can any scientific knowledge of this transcendent subject be attained, and all the objections and inventions of rejecters of it be exposed and expelled from intelligent acceptance by any. The question of the atonement is intrinsically one of moral science, of moral philosophy, no less than of Scripture; for it is rooted in the question concerning moral nature itself and the law in and from it; and it directly relates to the law and its application to men as sinners, and to God as administrator of that law to them and all intelligent creatures, and so to all such creatures forevermore. Whether there is a universal and eternal moral system constituted by universal moral nature, having the law in and from it, as indicated, and, if one, what it necessarily involves respecting human sinners as related to God and all other moral beings in that system, and as He and they are related to them, are the questions upon the right answers to which those concerning the atonement, the necessity for and the design and nature of it, necessarily depend. As the law in all moral natures is essentially the same, all the questions concerning it and a universal moral system and society, which, in the nature of the case, must be eternal, are identical; so that the fundamental question between the maintainers

and the rejecters of an atonement is simply—"what is the truth concerning the law?" Our first business, then, is to ascertain the true answer to this question as given by its only competent teachers, the consciousness of man and the inspired Revelation of God to man. Thus only can we find and show which of the two sides, that of belief in, or that of denial of, an atonement, stands on solid moral ground, and which on sandy non-moral assumptions and speculations. As this method of procedure is unprecedented, and as all the questions involved in it are of such profound importance, the prosecution of it must be thorough, and cannot be brief. It will require several chapters, which will constitute the first part of this work. To this task we now proceed, designing to accomplish it with as much brevity as possible, consistent with making it throughout clear and as level to all understanding as such a disquisition can be made. Most of it we are sure will be easily understood by all intelligent readers, and should be well pondered by all. According to our method, we must begin by showing the essential characteristics of the law attested by consciousness.

§ 3. FIRST CHARACTERISTIC OF THE LAW, THUS ATTESTED.

1. As already stated, it springs into consciousness, not as an *idea* of any kind, but as an *authoritative rule of action.* It comes as an *imperative or mandate* to each one's self to will, and act for, the real good of its objects, always involving and imposing a conscious obligation to obedience; and it thus constitutes all obedience to it *moral action*, and all disobedience to it, not merely *non-moral, but immoral action.* Because it comes with this imperative or mandatory character, and imposes this obligation to obedience on each one's self, whether we say, *the imperative* or *the mandate* of the law is wholly immaterial, as both these terms express precisely the same thing; but, for certain reasons, we shall probably use the former more than the latter of them to indicate the binding authority with which the law is given in each one's consciousness.

§ 4. SECOND CHARACTERISTIC, THE MATTER OF THE LAW.

2. The action enjoined by the law is its *matter.* It consists in *pure moral love or good will,* which always carries with it naturally correlated emotions and harmonious intellectual action. Towards all *purely good beings,* it is without modification and perfect in measure according to their several natures and general or special relations. Towards God, it is consummately full and perfect, far sur-

passing its utmost measures to any creatures; towards angels, it is perfect according to knowledge of them and their relations; and towards "the spirits of just men made perfect," is unmodifiedly perfect according to the same knowledge of them. But, towards all other known moral beings, self included, if human, it is not full, but modified in quality to all who are objects of it at all, according to knowledge or belief respecting their several moral characters and relations to God and their fellow beings. In a qualified sense, it is towards some species of irrational animals. By the constitution of a moral nature, the emotions correlated to pure good-will are necessarily evoked from the sensibility, and maintained and cherished in it by that good-will, and, though without moral quality in themselves, as all mere emotions are, are, by this will-action, incorporated into the consistence of true moral love to the morally lovable of all grades. Towards the good, even not free from faults, this love includes cherished complacency, gratitude when due, rewarding favor and fit honor, and to some reverence. Towards the evil of our race, yet hopefully redemptible, it includes only shadows of these in some civil, social, or domestic sense, connected with pity, sorrow, and an impulse to mercy, and often with indignation, anger, and other emotions of aversion against them for their evil deeds, crimes, or persistent wickedness. Towards self, it includes moral self-love, but excludes selfishness, or preference of self-gratification in any mode to the perceivable good of any of its objects. Both it and selfishness, its opposite, are *voluntary*, whatever emotions are correlated to them.

§ 5. THIRD CHARACTERISTIC OF THE LAW, WHICH IS ITS END.

3. The *end* of the law is the complete good of God and all holy beings, and the greatest *practicable* good of mankind as they stand related to Him and to each other by their nature, sinful character, and deserts. The opposed *end* is self-gratification in any conflicting form or degree. No other opposed end is possible, and moral beings never act morally, except in choosing one or the other of these ends, and in executive action to secure or attain them. When they consciously sin, they know the latter to be their end just as they do the former when they obey. These two fundamental ends draw after and divide between them the universe of moral beings, and are in irreconcilable, eternal conflict. The moral love which is the matter of the law is choosing the former; the selfishness prohibited by it is choosing the latter; and these two radical moral choices, like their ends, are everlastingly antagonistic.

§ 6. FOURTH CHARACTERISTIC OF THE LAW.

4. The law is *concrete and social.* By *concrete* is meant that it is never given as an abstraction, whether called *the idea of right*, or by any other name, but always as an *imperative rule of action in its subject* to render its matter of moral love to its *objects, present or thought of*, unmodified or modified according to the known or supposed good or bad character and deserts of each. By *social* is meant, in addition, that its matter of moral love is enjoined by its imperative *as owed by and due from its subject to its objects*, as that to which they have a *right* by nature, unless they have forfeited it by sin, and, if righteous, also by character. It is thus a concrete and social bond, of which one end is, so to say, livingly inwrought by creative art into the immortal nature of every created moral being, assimilating it to God's, and the other end is projected by the imperative in that nature to every like one, *present or thought of*, and fastened to it as having the right or rights mentioned to the love it enjoins, if not forfeited; and, if forfeited, is even then fastened to it as an object of good-will, however modified, as far and as long as it is capable of good, or not utterly lost—that is, while its gracious probation lasts. The whole rational universe is thus interbound into one society, with God as its Center and Head, as all the unnumbered worlds and parts of the material universe are interbound by the physical force of attraction with its law, as if it were concrete and social, in their relations to each other and their vast center. As the marriage law binds the pair united by it to render constant, pure, faithful love to each other, as that to which each has a sacred right in their relation, thus intertying them to perfect reciprocity of natural and moral debts and dues, so this law of laws in all moral beings, by its concrete and social character, spiritually intermarries them all, as it were, to each other and to God, and Him to them. Its bond is essentially the same between each one and himself *objectized* to himself, tying him to render its matter of moral love to himself, as if owed by and due to himself, as if another. How unspeakably grand and beautiful is this social, moral, immortal constitution of the natures of the ever-augmenting, intelligent universe! How it surpasses that of the whole material creation.

§ 7. FIFTH CHARACTERISTIC OF THE LAW.

5. The *obligation* to obey the law is imposed by its imperative, which never comes as a mere "It is right," or "It is not right," "It ought," or "It ought not to be done," which is the verdict of con-

science concerning action done or contemplated according to or against it, but always as a "You must," or "You must not"—"Do," or "Do not"—"You shall," or "You shall not." *The* GROUND *of the obligation in each is his moral nature, having moral reason to impose it by its imperative, and related sensibility to feel it as a bond upon its will to comply with it; and the* CONDITION *of the imposing imperative is always the presence in fact or in thought of one or more of like nature, or of self objectized;* such presence always *occasioning an intuition* that he or each of them has a *natural* right, unless forfeited by sin, and, if obedient, a *moral* one also, to the love enjoined by it. Because they have the natural right to it, unless forfeited, the obligation is purely one of *ethical justice.* The additional obligation imposed by the imperative to render to every one thus present who manifests the character of obedience, the love of cherished complacency added to that due him by right of nature is also one of *ethical justice,* because by this manifestation he acquires a *moral right,* additional to the natural, to receive it from all cognizant of his character. There is another obligation, so imposed, to render the love of gratitude to a benefactor, because, by being such, he acquires a moral right, additional to both the preceding, to this kind of love; and this also is one of *ethical justice.* There are many other specific obligations of ethical justice, including that to veracity to and concerning others, to which all have a natural right, unless forfeited by sin, and may also have a moral one—that to just and honorable dealings in business—that to obey and uphold rightful human government and authority—that on all administrators of law and government of every kind to be righteous, honest, and humane —and that to be true to all trusts. Whenever the object of an imperative has *a right* of nature, character, conduct, contract, or relations of any sort to the moral love or action it enjoins, the obligation it imposes is, by that right, one of *ethical justice.* But, in principle, the radical obligation first indicated is the foundation of, and includes, all the others of this justice specified and existing.

§ 8. SIXTH CHARACTERISTIC OF THE LAW.

6. Besides all this kind of obligations, there is another species imposed by the law's imperative, which is to exercise *benevolence* to fellowmen, even when by criminality they have forfeited all right to it, and to some merely sentient creatures *simply for the sake of their good;* and the obligation, therefore, is not one of ethical justice to

them. As those intended have forfeited their natural right, and their moral, too, if they had any, the benevolence is not *due* to them, and on no ground of justice can they accuse any one of injustice, who does not exercise it to them. As this obligation respects such men, it is subordinate to and restricted by those of ethical justice to others, being limited by their rights, interests, and concerns, and by the demands of retributive, punitive justice against them. As it respects merely sentient creatures, it is restricted by their relations and subserviency to the surmounting good of human natures. Within these limits, benevolence both to them and to the men indicated is willing their good *simply for what it is to them* as far as they are concerned; and the basis of the obligation to it is the fellow-feeling or natural sympathy of moral beings with their kind, and with lower natures as far as they are seen to have homogeneous qualities.

§ 9. SEVENTH CHARACTERISTIC OF THE LAW.

7. While it is true that sin forfeits all *rights*, natural and moral, to the love of God, so that there is *no obligation of justice* on Him *to* any sinner to render love to him, and all the love He does exercise to any must be *pure mercy and grace alone*, the case is different as it respects mankind in this world. They are all sinners, but on a gracious probation during life under a gracious dispensation, that they may return to obedience and be saved, if they will. During it, the administration of law and government is, to a great degree, *modified*, and their condition and relations to each other, to God, and to all the holy society under Him are correspondingly *anomalous*. Had they all been perfectly obedient, there could have been no such probation and no obligation to mercy to them on God, angels, or themselves mutually. Their condition and relations would have been like those of the holy society in heaven. But, as they are, they are not utterly subverted and lost, as the apostate angels are, and are still capable of partial conformity to God's moral system in this world. There is an obligation of justice on, and, in various degrees, commonly recognized among them in their ordinary relations, especially where they have received the teachings of God's inspired revelation, to render moral love to each other according to the modified rights they have of nature and of character and conduct, as mutually *owed and due*. This is a direct obligation on each and all *to* each, who has not wholly forfeited his rights by criminality. But, there is an obligation of justice on all, even in relation to those who have thus forfeited them, to love them

with merciful benevolence like God's to themselves—that is, to love their nature and its true good, despite their evil character and deeds, and their consequent relations to God and His universal, everlasting, holy society. This is not an obligation *to* them, because they have forfeited their rights to any love, but it is one *to* God respecting them, who imposes it by *commanding* this love, which He has an absolute natural and moral right to do, and which, therefore, all are naturally and morally bound to obey. Besides this, there is the obligation, not of justice, to will their good, as shown under No. 6.

§ 10. EIGHTH CHARACTERISTIC OF THE LAW.

8. It is manifest from what we have said under these numbers, that *justice* is an intrinsic quality of the law, and constitutes it the all-binding intertie of moral beings. If men had never sinned, they would have perfectly obeyed the law by fulfilling all its obligations of justice. But, because this quality of it is of such radical importance in ethical science, and to a correct understanding of the atonement, and because it is so much overlooked, misunderstood, and even denied in these times, it is especially necessary in such a work as this to devote a somewhat extended consideration to it. Hence, although in place here, we pass it till after we have given attention to the only other characteristic of the law which we will now notice, when we will make it the subject of a chapter.

§ 11. NINTH CHARACTERISTIC OF THE LAW.

9. That characteristic is, that this law is given in the consciousness of all moral agents as *the law of God, and of His government over them;* and besides it He has never had any other. The decalogue, declared to Israel at Sinai through Moses, is only ten special applications of it; and all the temporal ordinances and sanctions connected with these were made for them *as sinners,* were designed to bring them to Christ, and were all to pass away when their purpose should be fulfilled.* The Theocratic government, constituted by that law, was confined to them, and was only for the time stated; but His moral law and government are over all mankind and all moral beings, and are endless. He did not give this law and institute this government at Sinai, but when He created moral beings with the law *in* and to be declared *to them* by their moral reason, and attested and enforced by their conscience; and He thus instituted His government for them, *not as sinners, but as such beings.* Hence, from

(*) Rom. 5:20; 7:6-13. Gal. 3:19, 23, 24. I. Tim. 1:9, 10.

their first moral consciousness they are knowingly under His government, and can no more escape from it than from themselves. A more fantastic notion has never been invented than that of a law *before* government, *impersonal*, and having only the natural consequences of obedience or disobedience to it for retributions.* Although in his subsequent work on Forgiveness and Law, Dr. Bushnell, in a qualified way, retracted this prodigious invention, never seen with the eyes nor heard of with the ears of psycology, yet I notice it here, because I design to show that the notion he assumed in it, that *the idea of right* is a law apart from and independent of the social law, and the only form in which moral reason gives the law, is as totally visionary as the rest of the invention. He calls this imagined law *impersonal!* As well talk of thought without a thinker, a creature without a creator, or an effect without a cause; for what conception of law remains, if it is not an authoritative rule of moral action, declared and administered by an authoritative person? No such law is possible; there can be none but the one social moral law; and however faintly it may be recognized in minds sunk in selfish perversion and its darkness from their first moral action, *it has always stood in consciousness and been attested by conscience as the law of God, or whatever men have substituted for Him—that is, as His imperative legislation declared to the inner ear of the spiritual nature, as if He were enthroned in or speaking through it.* The Sinai, from which He gave the Theocratic law to Israel, was doubtless designed to symbolize this incomparably greater Sinai in every moral being, from which He declares to it His eternal law; and it was this inward legislation that rendered that people capable of receiving that outward legislation with a sense of moral obligation to obey it. All men, the most barbarous scarcely *seemingly* excepted, have recognized and manifested this law in them, with such applications of it as they have made or received from their progenitors, as from God or their gods, and have believed that He or they will certainly uphold and vindicate it by positive rewards and punishments.† Any view of the love of

(*) See Bushnell's Vicarious Sacrifice, Part III., chaps. 1 and 2.

(†) Note. See "Theology of the Greek Poets," by Prof. W. S. Tyler. Homer's views of laws, as all of Jupiter, p. 180. Those of Æschylus, p. 220, that law is from the goddess Themis, etc. Compares Hooker's oft-cited personification of law. Gives several instances of appeal by Sophocles to the fundamental laws of justice and morality as those of God or the gods; one on p. 298 from the Tragedy of Ajax (line 1343 sqq), which warns against "contemning Heaven's eternal laws"; and on p. 320 the very remarkable passage in Antigone (line 450 sqq) which he quotes, translated:—

angels or of saints made perfect, which assumes it to be *above* or *different from obedience to this law*, and incompatible with being forever under this government, is as insubstantial as a dream.‡ It arises partly from confounding moral love with mere emotional affection, and partly from confounding God's universal, eternal law and government, founded in all rational natures by the imperative which must be *forever* in them, with His Theocratic law declared, and government instituted, at Sinai, through Moses, for Israel in this world.

We close this chapter with the famous passage with which Hooker ended the first book of his Ecclesiastical Polity. "Wherefore that here we may briefly end: Of Law there can be no less acknowledged, than that her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world; all things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very least as feeling her care, and the greatest as not exempted from her power: both angels and men and creatures of what condition soever, though each in different sort and manner, yet all with uniform consent, admiring her as the mother of their peace and joy."

No student of moral science should fail to read thoroughly this first book of the work of that great author, so eminent in scholarship, vast learning, and intellectual insight and power. This book especially is replete with the combined products of these surpassing qualities in relation to the eternal, immutable Law of God, making it full of instruction and suggestion. This commendation does not mean that there are not some important deficiencies in his views of the Law, nor that all his inferences and applications as he proceeds are to be accepted, but is confined to his unfoldings of the great essentials of the subject which he sets forth.

"Ne'er did eternal Jove such laws ordain,
Or Justice, throned amid the Infernal Powers,
Who on mankind these holier rites imposed.
Nor can I deem thine edict armed with power
To contravene the firm unwritten laws
Of the just gods; thyself a weak, frail mortal!
These are no laws of yesterday: they live
Forevermore, and none can trace their birth."

On p. 338, he gives a translated quotation from the Oedipus Tyrannus (lines 863-872), which is a vindication by the chorus of eternal truth and eternal law:—

"Oh, be the lot forever mine
Unsullied to maintain,
In act and word, with awe divine,
What potent laws ordain.
Laws spring from purer realms above:
Their father is the Olympian Jove.
Ne'er shall oblivion veil their front sublime.
The indwelling god is great, nor dreads the waste of time.

The assurance of positive retributions from God or the gods is often and powerfully expressed by all these ancient poets.

To these quotations from this author, I add two, specially remarkable and important, from Cicero: Est quidem vera lex recta ratio, naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quae vocet ad officium iubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat, quae tamen neque probos frustra iubet aut vetat, nec improbos iubendo aut vetando movet. Huic legi nec obrogari fas est neque derogari ex hac aliquid, licet neque tota abrogari potest, nec vero aut per senatum aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus, neque est quaerundus explanator aut interpres eius alius, nec erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac, sed et omnes gentes et omni tempore una lex et sempiterna et immutabilis continebit, unusque erit communis quasi magester et imperator omnium deus: ille legis huius inventor, disceptator, lator, cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet ac naturam hominis aspernatus hoc ipso luet maximas poenas, etiam si caetera supplicia, quae putantur, effugerit. De Republica, Lib. III., Cap. xxii., § 33.

M. Hanc igitur video sapientissimorum fuisse sententiam, legem neque hominum ingeniis excogitatam, nec scitum aliquod esse populorum, sed aeternum quiddam, quod universum mundum regeret, imperandi prohibendique sapientia. Ita principem legem illam et ultimam mentem esse dicebant, omnia ratione aut cogentis aut vetantis dei: Ex qua illa lex, quam di humano generi dederunt, recte est laudata. Est enim ratio mensque sapientis, ad iubendum et ad deterrendum idonea. Q. * * * M. A parvis enim, Quinte, didicimus SI IN IUS VOCAT ITO et eius modi leges alias nominare. Sed vero intelligi sic oportet, et hoc et alia iussa ac vetita populorum vim habere ad recte facta vocandi et a peccatis avocandi, quae vis non modo senior est quam aetas populorum et civitatum, sed aequalis illius caelum atque terras tuentis et regentis dei. Neque enim esse mens divina sine ratione potest nec ratio divina non hanc vim in rectis pravisque sanciendis habere, nec, quia nusquam erat scriptum, ut contra omnes hostium copias in ponte unus adsisteret a tergoque pontem interscindi iuberet, idcirco minus Coclitem illum rem gessisse tantam fortitudinis lege atque imperio putabimus, nec, si regnante L. Tarquinio nulla erat Romae scripta lex de stupris, idcirco non contra illam legem sempiternam Sex. Tarquinius vim Lucretiae, Tricipitini filiae, attulit. Erat enim ratio profecta a rerum natura et ad recte faciendum impellens et a delicto avocans, quae non tum denique incipit lex esse, quum scripta est, sed tum, quum orta est: orta autem est simul cum mente divina. Quam ob rem lex vera atque princeps apta ad iubendum et ad vetandum ratio est recta summi Iovis. Q. * * * M. Ergo ut illa divina mens summa lex est, item, quum in homine est perfecta, est in mente sapientis." De Legibus, Lib. II., Cap. 4, 5.

This fundamental view of the source of the Divine law is frequently presented by Cicero, and his splendid mind realized and exulted in its sublime truth and importance. It embodies the views and teachings of Plato and his followers in Greece, and of the ablest and best of the theistic and ethical philosophers generally before Cicero's time. Chrysippus, a Stoic, said: "For it is not possible to find any other principle or origin of Justice than Jupiter and universal nature; for there we must always begin when we design to treat of Good and Evil."

(‡) Bushnell's Vicarious Sacrifice, pp. 256, 322.

CHAPTER II.

Ethical justice an intrinsic quality of the law, and of the love it enjoins to all having rights to it. Ideas of this quality and of right. How this quality has always been estimated by mankind.

§ 12. NINE POSTULATES RESPECTING JUSTICE AS A QUALITY OF BOTH THE LAW AND THE LOVE IT ENJOINS TO ALL HAVING RIGHTS TO IT.

We now revert to the position stated under Sec. 10, page 8, that justice is an intrinsic quality of the law, and constitutes it the all-binding intertie of moral beings. In a subsequent place, we will consider it as *retributive*, but here only as *ethical*. Is it, as ethical, an intrinsic quality of the law? Does the imperative or mandate in each impose on him an *obligation of justice*, as already explained, to render to every one, present in fact or in thought, the love it enjoins as his *due* by natural right, if not forfeited, and by moral right also, if he has acquired it by obedience? The answer, to be valid, must accord with all the essential postulates related to it; and these we must notice.

1. Mankind, by their spiritual natures, are moral beings. Their reason is both *speculative and moral or practical*. As moral, when necessary conditions exist, it is at once *intuitive and affirmative* of all fundamental moral relations, truths, and obligations, is imperatively legislative, and, in conscience, is judicial of moral action and character. Allied to it, they have what we may call a *moral sensibility*, especially when it imposes *obligation and in conscience;* and they have power of will to determine or arbitrate their moral choices and executive actions, free from any necessitating compulsion of motives before, or influences upon, them. The functions of reason, as moral, are as clear and self-certified as those of it as speculative; and, by it and the other faculties mentioned, mankind are generically distinguished from, and immeasurably exalted above, all irrational creatures—vastly more than by reason as speculative, notwithstanding all its grandeur as such.

2. They become *moral actors or agents* by the first conscious issuance of the imperative of the law within them. This, with the obligation it imposes, *compels* them to act morally in obeying or disobeying, though free in choosing which to do; and such agents or actors they must remain, not only during their gracious probation, but, in some sense, forever. Even if siezed by insanity in this life, at death, if not before, its dread eclipse must pass away forever from all incapacitated by its obscuration, leaving them as if it had not been.

3. Every human moral agent has direct knowledge, *by intuition of his moral reason*, of the spiritual nature and its essential qualities of every other moral being, present or thought of, as the same in kind as his own. He sees the bodies of others, hears their voices, and touches them; but he neither sees, hears, nor touches their spiritual natures; yet, without an instructor or any process of reasoning, and not by instinct, by which irrational creatures have their kind of knowledge of each other and of man, but by this intuition, he knows what instinct never could, the *moral nature* and its essential qualities of every person he meets or thinks of, how he ought to act morally, what character he ought to possess, that he has in him the same imperative law which is in himself, that this law is the one only standard of right or wrong action or character for him as for himself, and even for God, and that he is equally as responsible and accountable as himself.

4. He has the same kind of intuitional knowledge, connected with the obliging imperative in him, that he and every other one has *a right by his nature, if not forfeited*, to the love enjoined on each as the matter of the law, by which it is naturally *due* to him and every other one from every one in perfect reciprocity. He thus knows that this right belongs even to children, not yet moral agents, and to idiots; and so, that every one is bound by an *obligation of justice* to render this love to every other one as his *due*, unless he has forfeited this right by sin.

5. He knows, in the same way, that obedience to the law, or true moral love, creates an *additional right* in its actor to the same love from all others cognizant of it, augmented by cherished complacency, and by gratitude for it as in itself benefaction, as well as for special benefits also, if he has conferred any. Thus the same love of every cognizant one is *due* him by both his right of nature and his acquired moral right or rights. His radical moral right, created by obedience, is his *good-desert* by it—that is, his *intuitively*

affirmed desert of a reward in kind at least from all cognizant of it, God included, and of favors besides. It is by intuition alone that men know that pure obedience, or moral love, creates this desert or right, and that all aware that one renders it *owe* him such reward. We will see farther on that this intuitive affirmation and knowledge extend even to *natural love or affection consistent with moral*, though exercised by those void of the moral.

6. If one has never failed to render the love to God and man enjoined by the law, his desert of, or moral right to, their moral love, including cherished complacency, in full proportion is perfect; and from men at least gratitude for it, as also benefaction, is perfectly due to him. From God, he deserves the reward of complete favor and all communicable good with protection against all enemies and injury from them, unless he voluntarily subjects himself to them and it for a sufficiently worthy end, which he has a perfect right, and may have an obligation, to do, in which case he deserves from God a much greater reward. From men, he deserves whatever they can confer consistently with their obligations to God and one another, which is fitting. As both this right and the natural one relate to God, they stand or fall, live or die, together. The obedience which creates this, preserves that; and, if this should be arrested by sin, that would expire with it. For, by intuitive affirmation, sin creates a desert directly opposite to that of obedience—that of punishment from God, and thus both forfeits the natural right to His love and slays the moral. To say that one deserves punishment from God, and yet retains either of these rights to His love is a contradiction. Whatever love God exercises to any sinner while such, is exercised, not because it is due to him by either of these rights, that is, by any obligation of justice, but as pure mercy alone for the sake of his good and that of all others connected with him. If, on the contrary, all men had always perfectly obeyed the law, they, like the holy angels, would all have had both these rights to the love of God, angels, and each other. There has been but one in all time, "Jesus Christ the righteous," who has done this, and thus deserved, or acquired an absolute moral right, in addition to his natural one, to the greatest possible reward from God, angels, and men.*

7. Have those of mankind who, by Divine grace, have been renewed to obedience or moral love, though imperfect, any moral

(*) See Is. 53:10-12; Phil. 2:5-11; Ps. 45:6, 7, with Heb. 1:8, 9. All passages which speak of His exaltation to power, honor, glory, and universal dominion signify His reward for His obedience.

right to the love of God and other beings? We answer that, as sin does not change essential moral nature, the law is still in and from it, the one immutable rule of right moral action, so that there can be no such action which is not obedience to it, and no sin not disobedience to it. Nor, as moral reason in conscience attests, can there be any real obedience which does not deserve or create a right to a proportional reward, nor any real disobedience or sin which does not alienate all natural and moral right to God's love and create a desert of proportional retributive punishment. Nor does the fact that the moral love of the renewed is always exercised under the power of God's grace conflict with the fact that, by the intrinsic principle of the law, it deserves, *while exercised*, from God the reward stated, and from men according to their knowledge of it. So Scripture plainly teaches.* "Love is of God," as are created moral natures with the law in and from them which enjoins it; and He recognizes every exercise of it in the renewed, nourishes and cherishes it, constantly forgives its fractures on the ground of Christ's atonement and for his sake, and rewards all there is of it according to the principle of His law that obedience deserves a proportional reward.

8. As hinted under No. 5, even natural love or affection consistent with moral, though exercised by those void of moral, is intrinsically benefaction to its objects, and its exerciser always *deserves*, not from God, but from *them*, a reward in kind at least. This principle extends to all real or apparent actions, courses, and manifestations of good-will to or regard for others—for their welfare, honor, interest, or assumed legitimate pleasures. We speak here of the principle as commonly recognized and consented to among mankind in their present state, which, as we have said, is abnormal and anomalous, being that of sinners put on a gracious probation. We speak of it as recognized in reference, not only to those who have moral love to God and man, but to those without it, many of whom are openly immoral and wicked, some even criminal. Not only do we see multitudes of such preserving and exercising their natural affections and discharging their family, social, and civil duties more or less commendably, and, beyond the ordinary exercises of affection and renderings of duty in these relations, making

(*) Ps. 19:11; 58:11; Prov. 11:18; 23:18; 24:14; Mat. 5:12; 6:1, 4, 18; 10:41, 42; 16:27; Mark 9:41; Luke 6:23, 35; 14:14; Rom. 2:6-11; I. Cor. 3:8, 14; Col. 3:24; Heb. 10:35; 11:6, 26; II. John 8; Rev. 11:18; 22:12. See also the many passages which assert the rule of the final judgment to be, that every one shall receive according to his deeds, his works, and what he has done, good or bad.

the greatest sacrifices, even to giving up their lives, for those to whom they are tenderly related, but often in their social and civil relations voluntarily devoting themselves to most strenuous and persistent labors of body and mind; to vast self-denials, self-sacrifices, and struggles against difficulties and dangers of fearful odds and menace; to losses of possessions, positions, reputation, friendships, and all commonly held most dear in this world; to greatest hazard and often certainly of appalling deaths in emergencies of fires, floods, shipwrecks, railroad collisions, or other disasters, epidemics or other contagious diseases, patriotic wars and battles; to actions and courses, with foresight that they would more probably result to them in imprisonment, exile, confiscation, or death in some terrible form than in success; and to do, brave, and suffer in such ways, not for themselves, but for others of whatever number, very frequently entire strangers, or for themselves only when so related to others that whatever they do for them is also for themselves. Besides these, very many confer vast benefits on communities, cities, a state, or a whole country by providing and bestowing upon them institutions, public works, and other benefactions of great value and utility. There is no end to the number and variety of such self-devotements and benefactions, bursting out of the still existing moral nature of human sinners, thick and bright as the stars in the clear midnight heaven. They attest what that nature was originally designed to be, and is yet capable of becoming, if morally and religiously rectified. Such affections are always beautiful, and such generosities, actions, and courses are always noble, heroic, and often sublime; but, since they are exercised and acted alike by those who do, and those who do not, love or obey God, by the best and often the worst of mankind, it is plain that, *in themselves*, they are not real obedience to His law and *do not deserve or create a right to a reward of any kind* FROM HIM. But the case is different between them and their fellow men, because the actions and courses we are considering, like all manifestations of love, not only moral, but natural, consistent with moral, are benefactions to their objects, and therefore create the rights of desert in their actors to rewards of gratitude and its manifestations, and, in most cases, to rewards of complacency and honor *from them* fittingly expressed or shown. The rewards are due them from those benefited by obligations of justice, which, although *impairable*, can scarcely be *cancelled* by immoralities, crimes, or enormities perpetrated by the actors to whom the rewards are due. These rights and

dues, obligations and debts, are known by mankind by intuitional affirmations of moral reason, just as those created by obedience to the law and those merely natural are. Human laws can neither create, abolish, change, nor enforce them; and, if rulers or others should deny or decry their reality, or attempt to nullify regard for them, they would incur the condemnation of all intelligent mankind. It is certainly among the foremost obligations on mankind in their domestic, social, and civil relations to recognize and duly reward all real benefactors, even though without real obedience to the law, immoral, wicked, and deserving nothing from God, but punishment for their sins.

9. God has an aggregate of rights to the supreme moral love of all His intelligent creatures—that by His infinite nature; that by His all-perfect character; that by creating, preserving, and constantly lavishing benefits upon them; that, specially related to mankind, by all He has done and is doing for them in the unspeakable gift of His Son to be their Saviour; and others by the numerous other gifts clustering around this supreme one. The wrong of not rendering to Him the love to which he has all such rights in absolute degree is immeasurably greater than any they do to any other being. He demands it as, in His regard, the one priceless due and good from them, which, if they do not render, their very being becomes valueless. He thus regards it, because He is a Being of holy love, called Love because His whole heart is love; and love always longs and calls for reciprocation as the supreme reward of its actor. How well nigh unparalleled, then, is the shallow absurdity of him who says, that, because God is infinite and approachless by men to benefit Him materially, or to assassinate or injure Him, He has none of the rights indicated to their utmost love and service; they are under no obligations to Him, and cannot benefit, wrong, nor affect Him in a moral sense in any way or degree; and therefore they need not regard nor concern themselves about Him, but should care only about their fellow men, whom they can reach and benefit or injure, can treat rightly or wrongly! As if God were not a moral Being having a conscience and a heart of infinite sensibility, and were not necessarily correspondingly susceptible of gratification or grief, complacent pleasure or a sense of being wronged according as men do or do not regard and treat Him as all His rights, natural and moral, and as His due from them by all His boundless deserts of the rewards of their perfect good-will, complacency, gratitude, and all honoring and glorifying recog-

nitions and manifestations demand. These rights of God to the supreme love and service of all men, which make all these due to Him from them, and their corresponding obligations and debts of justice to Him are intuitional affirmations of moral reason, just as those between men are. They are first truths of ethical science, and can only be denied as all such truths are, by denying the foundations under them, either, in respect to men, that they are moral beings, or, in respect to God, that He is such a Being, or that He exists. But whoever denies these foundations and these rights, denies the possibility of a moral system and of any real moral action, as will appear more distinctly in the sequel. Such deniers are as superficial as corks on the surface of water, never going below it, much less to its bottom, but floating and bobbing around upon it.

§ 13. WHAT THE LOVE MUST BE TO ALL HAVING RIGHTS TO IT.

Now, with these postulates in mind as grounds and directories, the question comes, what must the love enjoined by the law be to all who have these rights, in proportion as they have them?

Mankind, nature-taught, spontaneously and constantly assume and appeal to these postulates, and specially to these natural and moral rights and dues on one side, and to the correlative obligations and debts on the other, as the interbinding grounds and reasons of their mutualities of duty; and they have always, *natura duce*, substantially agreed in defining ethical justice as rendering to all their dues—all to which they have a right and claim by nature or otherwise. Cicero says—*Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas suum cuique tribundi.* Understanding by *suum cuique* that which is due to every one by right of nature, desert, or any honest title, his definition is essentially true. Because men have these ideas or intuitional affirmations of all natural and moral rights and dues, and of all expressed by the terms, obligations, owing, paying, deserving, rewarding, wages, debts, claims, and equity, the imperative of the law in each of them is to render pure good-will or moral love to all others, present or thought of, in all regard and treatment of them in their relations, according to all their known rights and dues. To say that the terms named, wages excepted, when used to express moral and religious truths, are used figuratively, and are derived from the market and human courts is to reverse the order of facts. The market and courts have derived them and their meanings from the source of them both, which is the quality of ethical justice in

the law given by moral reason. These and other like terms in all languages express the same ideas, those of the natural and moral rights and duties of men, and attest their recognition of these ideas as involved in, and the basis of, all business transactions and mutualities of treatment. They express the ideas all men have of either the great primary principle of ethical justice in the law, that of the mutual due and debt of moral love, or special applications of that principle to men in particular relations of business or of a directly moral or religious kind. They express these normally or literally as the only terms by which they can be expressed, and are therefore in origin and common use utterly independent of all markets and courts. They are no more figurative when one speaks of the *due* or *debt* of love, gratitude, honor, respect, obedience, or any like action or treatment, or of *owing* or *paying* any of these, or of *deserving* or having a *claim* to a *reward*, or of *paying* a penalty, or of getting his *pay*, using these terms in a moral or religious sense, than when he uses them in business or in courts. If they are figurative, thus used, what terms could express the same ideas of most of them normally or literally?

§ 14. THE LOVE ENJOINED ON EACH TO GOD, AND ALL HAVING RIGHTS TO IT IS JUST LOVE.

The love therefore enjoined upon each one by the imperative of the law to God, and to other moral things, present or thought of, who have not forfeited their right or rights to it by sin, is *just love—just good-will both in quality and in end, because it is a will to render them all their dues according to all the rights they have.* This discloses clearly the concrete and social nature of the law and of moral beings. For, if they have a right by their common nature to each other's moral love, by which it is mutually due and owed, it is, on this ground alone, simple ethical justice in each to render it to each, and positive injustice not to do so; and if, in addition, they have, by obedience or right action, the moral right or rights of good-desert, or desert of reward in kind at least, to each other's love, so that it is morally as well as naturally due to each from each, it is, by such addition, also purely ethical justice in each to render it to each, and additional positive injustice not to render it to him, because not rendering it is doing the opposite. This does not show that justice is love, but that it is an essential quality of the law, of all action by it towards others who have rights, and of all moral nature, the bond inherent in all these which ties all to render such

love to God and each other. And, since by this bond every one is thus tied to render this as due from him to each and all, *he cannot really render it to any, if not in principle and spirit to all—to God, if not to man—to man, if not to God—to any number of men, if not to all as due by the manifested character and deserts of each.* Rendering it to one because it is his due by right or rights involves doing the same in principle and spirit to all, and is therefore *justice* to all; and doing the opposite to any number involves the same universality of principle and spirit, and is therefore *injustice*, not to that number only, but potentially to all moral beings. As, by this quality of justice, the law is impartial and universal, so must the love be which it requires; and so must the injustice be of withholding it from any as entitled to receive it. Conscience has always taught mankind that selfishness or injustice against one is potentially against all, and the involved contrary, that true moral love to one is potentially to all, as it proves a heart to love all and to wrong none.

§ 15. HOW THE INTUITION OF THIS QUALITY OF JUSTICE IN THE LAW AND IN OBEDIENCE HAS LED MEN TO CHARACTERIZE THEM.

It is this quality of justice in the law, ever clear and immutable in all conscious minds, which has caused mankind in all ages to characterize it as a *straight line*, (orthos, rectus, recht, right)—obedience to it as having the quality of *straightness*, or of being *straight* action, (righteousness, rectitude)—disobedience to it as *crooked* or *twisted* action, (wrong)—and the character formed by disobedience to it as not *straight, lacking straightness*, (unrighteousness)—also the character formed by obedience as *uprightness*, as if the law were a perpendicular *straight line*, and disobedience as *departure* or *deviation* (sin), and as *going across* a straight line, (transgression). These conceptions are not consciously invented images or figures. They are given by moral reason just as that of a geometrical straight line is by speculative reason. But the conception or idea of *straight or right* is never given as either the law itself, or action or character conformed to it, but only as an inherent quality or characteristic of it. But it is important to note that it is almost always action or character, done or thought of, and very seldom the law itself, that men characterize as *straight* or *right*. The law in them is the standard by which they spontaneously, and generally even unconsciously, discern and pronounce action or character right or wrong, straight or crooked; and it is its *quality of justice*, not its *matter of love*, that constitutes it this standard.

Hence, when action or character is pronounced right, straight, it is not the matter of either of them that is intended, but its ethical quality of justice as conformed to this standard; just as an extended material object is called straight because seen to be conformed to a geometrical straight line. Hence, it is of no importance whether the term *right* be used as an *adjective* or as a *noun*, whether respecting the law, or action or character conformed to it, as it never expresses the actual fact or matter of either of them, but simply its possession of this quality of justice; and Kant speaks truth when he says—"The conception of *straight* contains nothing of quantity, but only a quality." If I say, that is an oak tree, the term oak does not signify the matter of the tree, which is wood, but only its peculiar quality as of the species of trees called oak; and, if I say, an oak is hard, tough, or strong, I do not in the least change the qualitative meaning of the term *oak* by thus using it as a noun. It designates the peculiar kind of tree or wood it is by expressing its quality.

§ 16. THE FUNCTIONS OF REASON, AND "THE IDEA OF RIGHT."

Readers not versed in discussions of intellectual and moral philosophy can pass this section and the one following without detriment to their understanding of what follows, as they have reference to Dr. Bushnell's notion of a law before government.

Reason has two generic functions, one called *speculative*, the other *practical* or *moral*. The *ideas* of space, of time, or of cause are intuitional affirmations by reason, *as speculative*, of the unconditioned and necessary existence of the objects of those ideas. The objects cannot even be thought to be mere *qualities* of other things. They are affirmed as real *entities* in and of themselves, and their names are *nouns* Such intuitional affirmations are the primary, underlying truths of all the mathematical and really natural sciences. None of them have any moral quality; and they are universal immutable, and eternal. It is one distinct function of reason to give these ideas; and, in it, it is called *speculative*.

Its function as *moral* divides into two, clearly distinct. Of these, one consists in *affirming* the one only law or rule for all moral action, as shown in Chapter I. In this, it is entirely *legislative*, its business being, not to give any ideas, except as involved in or directly connected with the law, but to issue or affirm it as the only standard for the action of the will, and to enjoin or forbid special actions and courses executive or violative of its mandates. Thus, with its per-

sistent "You must," or "must not;" "You shall," or "shall not;" "Do," or "do not;" it legislates in all from their first moral consciousness, as if it were the deputy and very mouth of God, putting each under an absolute bond of obligation to obey Him, from which he can never be released. The law thus given, however developed in any mind, is identical with that of Scripture, and the only standard of right moral action.

The other function of reason as *moral* is *judicial* respecting moral action, done or thought of, and moral character As it is in the composite faculty of conscience, it peculiarly acts in this function respecting each one's own action and character; but also in a modified way respecting the action and character of others of any number or relations, and of even fictitious persons, necessarily issuing its intuitional decisions or judgments respecting them as according to or against the law given by it, or any of its known or supposed applications. If approved by it, as according to this standard, they are characterized by it as *right* or *straight;* if disapproved, they are characterized by it as *wrong* or *crooked;* and, in all these decisions, these terms, like *just* and *unjust,* are *adjectives,* expressing the moral quality of the action or character. This must be so, because both action and character are phenomena or products of the will, the one direct, the other a consequence of that, so that they are things of experience and observation, and not of intuition at all. But the moral quality of each is a thing which moral reason alone, *as judicial or in conscience,* can see and affirm. When either of the terms, right or wrong, qualifies the noun character, this noun is expressed; but when it does the noun action, this noun is commonly not expressed, but understood, because it is essentially implied in it, as follows:—The idea of right or wrong [action]; Do right, or do not wrong [action]; It is, or it is not right or wrong [action]; He will, or will not, do right or wrong [action]. So, either of these terms is used to qualify any noun which involves the meaning of moral action, such as intention, choice, course, conduct, walk, talk, or any other; and this usage seems common to all languages. The fact, that these terms, so used, always signify the *moral quality* of action, done or thought of, and just as much when that noun is understood, as if it were expressed, shows that they are always *adjectives* qualifying that noun or any other involving its meaning, though understood.

It may aid to clear the matter to look at it in a series of propositions and conclusions:—1. Reason, *as legislative,* contains and

gives the law, as the sole rule and standard of moral action—2. All such action either agrees or disagrees with this only rule and standard in all—3. No action is, *in itself*, an object of intuition—4. The function of reason, *as judicial, or in conscience*, relates solely to such action as this one law enjoins or forbids; and it is wholly acted in intuitional decisions or judgments respecting the *moral quality* of the action, or of the actor in it, (for it belongs to the actor's *intention or aim* in the action), as agreeing or disagreeing with that one standard or law—5. Since reason, as moral, intuitively characterizes its law as *straight or right*, it, in like manner, characterizes action according to it as *straight or right;* and, if not, as *wrong*, *crooked*, un*right*eous—6. Hence, these two terms always express opposite decisions or judgments of moral reason respecting the moral quality of action, or of the actor in it—7. The certain conclusion from all these propositions is, that, whenever these words, right and wrong, relate to moral action, they, like the terms just and unjust, express nothing whatever but qualities of action, done or thought of, or of its actor in it, as accordant with or violative of the law in and from reason, and are necessarily only adjectives. These intuitive decisions or judgments of reason, as judicial, respecting actions as right or wrong, give us our knowledge of them as *moral*. They primarily relate to the intention, aim, design, or spirit of the actor in his action, but are also continually given as decisions on the agreement or disagreement of the domestic, social, civil, or other actions of others in all relations and of all times with the law, or with recognized special applications of it, or with even the principles of mere formal morality. In giving them, the moral reason of mankind, as judicial, with such light as they have here or there, now or then, especially as they have any where received from the Scriptures, constitutes the one great tribunal of judgment for all, which never adjourns. It is in this function, that it decides what *ought* or *ought not* to have been, or to be, *should* or *should not* have been or be, done—that is, what is or is not *owed* or obligatory by the law—8. The fact, that the law is the only standard of moral action, adds verification to the position that these two terms, when used in reference to moral action, cannot be nouns; for there is no need, use, nor place for another law or rule more than for another atonement. There is none for a duplicate of that which all men have; and certainly none for one contrary to it. Besides, the term right cannot be a noun, because, as we shall see further on, there could be nothing of law or obligation in its meaning.

All thus shown respecting these terms in our language is equally true of the corresponding terms in Greek, Latin, German, and other languages. It is clear that, when used with nouns signifying moral action, they always express, not action only, but action having one or the other of the qualities signified by them as pertaining to it, and no intellectual abstractions, entities, or objects separate from it. Hence, the decisions or judgments of moral reason, as judicial, respecting the qualities of moral action expressed by these terms, are the only *ideas of right and of wrong action* which men have, or, for the reasons shown, can have; and, as qualities exist only because the entities or objects do to which they belong, so neither these qualties nor these terms which express them would ever have been thought of, but for the antecedent, *conditioning* knowledge of the law in and given by moral reason, *as legislative*, and of the action enjoined by it and of that which violates it. The fact that the intuitional decision or judgment of moral reason, as judicial, that this or that action is, or has the quality of being, right or wrong, follows the knowledge of the action done or thought of as quick as a lightning flash conflicts in no way with this position; for, in all its radical intuitions and action, reason "takes no note of time." As the law given by it as the only rule and standard of moral action is characterized by it as *straight, right*, so its intuitional decision respecting the quality of such action, as agreeing or disagreeing with that rule and standard, is, if it agrees, that it does and is *straight* or *right;* if it does not, that it does not and is *crooked, wrong*, un*right*eous. We repeat, then, for all the reasons shown, our conclusion, as firmly true, that these intuitional decisions or judgments of moral reason, *as judicial*, respecting moral action are men's only *ideas of right and wrong*, (for there is an idea of wrong as well as of right).

If this conclusion is rejected, and the use, in Greek, of *orthon* with the article, and, in Latin, of *rectum, as if* nouns, is adduced against it, we defend it as follows:—The use of the article with the Greek neuter adjective in no way converts this into a noun in meaning, more than its use with an infinitive verb converts it into one, or than the use, in English, of the definite article with the adjectives, true, beautiful, and good converts them into nouns in meaning. As both the Greek and the Latin adjectives named relate to moral action, they necessarily express its intuitional quality as *straight, right*, according to the law as *straight*. Suppose, then, we abstract *in thought* this quality from the action, and make it an object, as much as possible, in itself, so as to use the adjective expressing it

as if a noun, how, we ask, can these mental operations, not intuitional, change any of the following facts?—the *fact* that the quality remains precisely as before?—or the *fact* that an intuition or idea of it would never have been had, but for the prior knowledge or thought of the conditioning action as related to the law?—or the *fact* that, as this quality is conditioned for its origin, upon the knowledge or thought of the action, the intuition or idea of it must also be conditioned?—or the *fact* that, as from its nature, the moral quality of an action cannot possibly be changed, neither can the adjective that expresses it in any language be changed into a noun, unless in a *quasi way*, or into anything else than an adjective with a noun of action understood after it, which it qualifies?

§ 17. BUSHNELL'S NOTION OF, AND INFERENCES FROM, THE IDEA OF RIGHT ABSURD.

We therefore reject, as both psycologically and Scripturally untrue, the notion of an idea of right, if right is taken as a noun signifying any intuitional entity or object, which is neither a quality of the law nor of moral action according to it, but apart from both, or as not an adjective expressing the quality of such moral action. We can scarcely think of any specimens of that notion more objectionable than the following:—"In the same way is developed the grand, all-regulative Moral Idea of Right; which to simply think is to be put in everlasting obligation. For it is the distinction of this idea, that it is the Monarch Principle of the Soul. It puts all moral natures under an immediate, indefeasible bond of soverignty. They become moral natures because they are set before this idea of right." (Bushnell's "Vicarious Sacrifice," p. 236.) "All moral beings, united thus in their homages to right, will be united also in love; love to each other, and love to the law, by which they are set in society and everlasting chime together, as in ways of mutual right-doing. Indeed, the necessary and absolute law of right, thus accepted, is very nearly answered by the relational law of love; so that any realm of being, compacted in right, will certainly be unified in love, etc.," (p. 240). "The two principles, right and love, appear to exactly measure each other. One is the law absolute or ideal, commanding the soul, even if it were to exist in solitude; the other is the law relational, grounded on the sense of relationship to other beings, who may be socially affected by our acts. * * * The law of love appears to be, in some sense, a law of revelation, as the law of right is not," (p. 306). "God then does not make the law

of love, or impose it upon us by His own mere will. It is with Him an eternal, necessary, immutable law, existing in logical order before His will, and commanding, in the right of its own excellence, His will and life. This being given, all His plans, decrees, creations, and executory statutes are built to it, as the heavens by the eternal laws of geometry. And so, all government being cast in this mold, God is united to creatures, creatures to God and each other, by one common term, which interprets and unifies all. Were there any being, whether Creator or creature, who had a different kind of law, prescribing a different kind of virtue, he would be unintelligible to the others, and practically unrelated to them," (pp. 308, 309).

Now, we agree, of course, with much in these quotations, and entirely with the last of them. But we make them to show the real confusion which this notion of a "Moral Idea of Right," distinct from what this author calls the relational law of love and from action conformed to it, inevitably causes. Look at it. 1. It makes *two laws*, one not an imperative rule of action at all, but an idea of some strange, abstract, non-descript entity called right, who knows what? 2. This, Jonah-like, has to be pitched overboard to give a safe voyage and fit haven to the real and only law of moral love, as set forth in the last quotation, by which the possibility of another is utterly excluded. 3. But how, we ask, can an *idea* be a law or authoritative rule of action? If this idea of right is an idea of it as distinct from, and not a quality of, the relational law, nor of obedience to it, and is not itself relational, in what possible way or sense can *thinking* it put the thinker in everlasting or any obligation, since obligation is always relational, is always *to* one or more present or thought of, or *to* self objectized? Obligation then to *whom?*—to *what*, if not to render moral love or good-will and its executive acts to others or to self? Is an idea an imperative or mandate, or does it include one, to constitute obligation?—especially if it is not relational? How, then, can it, by any possibility, be a "law absolute or ideal," or a law or authoritative rule of action at all?—how "all-regulative," if not relational?—how "the Monarch Principle of the Soul," or any Principle at all in the sense intended? In that sense, what can it be, but as groundless a fiction as any in the Arabian Nights? In that sense, it is not identical with, but exclusive of, the idea of justice; for justice is always purely relational, or properly *social*, and the idea of it as a quality of the law by its imperative is just that which constitutes the law the one social inter-

tying bond of the universe of moral beings. They do not "become such because they are set before this idea of right," but are such by creation, thus having the law in, and enjoined upon, them by the imperative of their practical reason, and sanctioned and enforced by the whole action of their conscience. It is this quality of justice in the law by its imperative that makes the love enjoined by it universally mutually *owed* and mutually *due*, and not restrictable to any number of selected objects. Rendering this love is the only *ethical justice*, and, within the whole circle of the obligations of justice, is the only real *right action*, so that, within that circle, justice and right are absolutely identical, and the true idea of either of them is the same of the other—that of an essential quality of the law and of the love which is its matter and fulfills it. 4. Out of this circle, there is moral action which is right in a different sense, but cannot be called just *to its objects*. Merciful or gracious action is not just *to them*, because it is not according to any obligation of justice to them, but it is right, because there is an imperative to it, when consistent with justice, which it is right to obey. In brief, all moral action conformed to the law is right; but only that which is conformed to the obligations of justice imposed by the law is just; and so far right and just are identical. But, when we say of merciful or gracious action, it is *right*, this term has plainly an essentially different meaning from what it has when we say of action demanded by any obligation of justice, it is *right*. The former meaning is not concerned in the inquiry respecting its meaning in the expression, *the idea of right*. In this, is its meaning different from, or identical with that of justice? I maintain their identity, and that the idea of it is not, like the geometrical idea of a point or a straight line, unrelational, but is always and necessarily relational identically with the law—that is, it is an idea of moral action obligatory upon its subject, to be rendered by him to others or to God as their or His due, and of just that kind which the law requires. The distinction between reason *as speculative* and *as practical or moral* is a very old one, not first made by Kant, who recognized it as fundamentally true, and necessary in order to the possibility of any ethical or religious law or system. According to it, *ideas of reason as speculative* are not relative, and have nothing to do with morality or religion, while *those of it as practical or moral* are all relative, all exclusively related to moral law and moral action, which are always relational to others, to God, or to self objectized. Wrong is the antithesis of right, and there is an *idea of wrong* equally as of right,

and equally one of practical reason. But, as there is only this one law, right is the quality or character of it, or of action conformed to it, not to an abstract idea of right apart from it, and wrong or sin is the quality or character of action transgressing or violating *it*, not *that idea;* and neither that, nor either of these can be a rule of action, because *there is nothing of law or obligation in an idea*, as it never comes as an imperative to action of any kind, which is the fundamental characteristic of the law as practical reason gives it Hence, the ideas of right and wrong are nothing else than ideas *or intuitional affirmations of reason as judicial respecting* the agreement or disagreement of moral action, *thought of or done*, with the law, which, from the moment when practical reason first gives it in any mind, remains in it, consciously or unconsciously, the fixed, indeflectible, everlasting standard of all such action. That is, they are simply and only ideas of the qualities of such action, and always necessarily of it as relational because it always is relational. Thus the whole fabric of a law before government, called the idea of right, having only the natural consequences of doing the impossibility of obeying it or not, because it is no law, for retributions, collapses and vanishes; and *the law of just or righteous love* is the only law of reason as of Scripture. *Not love, which is its matter, but justice, which is its essential quality or character, constitutes it the mighty, eternal bond which ties the intelligent universe together.* "Were there any being, whether Creator or creature, who had a different kind of law, prescribing a different kind of virtue, he would be unintelligible to the others, and practically unrelated to them." 5. In this review of the quotations from Dr. Bushell's "Vicarious Sacrifice," I have characterized the law as *relational* because he did. But this is a defective designation of its real character, since a connection of any kind, good, bad, or indifferent, is a relation. Its only proper designation is, that it is *social*, because its justice, and, by it, its matter of moral love are social; so that, by its intrinsic nature, as it is in and from the practical reason of all moral beings, they are naturally set in a universal society with God and each other, to which they are everlastingly bound and responsible, and from which, though they should take the wings of the morning and fly farther than comet ever flew, even beyond "the flaming walls of the universe," they can never be released as long as they *think* of God or other moral natures.

§ 18. THE LAW NOT AN IDEA OF ANY KIND, AND DISTINCT FROM THOSE CONNECTED WITH IT.

Whatever men may hold respecting the idea of right, it is certain that the law is not an idea in any applicable sense of that manifoldly ambiguous term, from the Plantonic to the last,* but is an absolutely *unique* and mateless thing among all the phenomena of mind, being neither an idea nor an intuition, although both ideas and intuitions are connected with it. It is law in the true sense of an authoritative rule for moral action; the law of God in each moral agent alike, given in and through his moral reason as legislative; the only real moral law in the universe; the sole radical rule of all *right* or *straight* moral action in and by any moral agent in any place, world, or age. Reason, as speculative, gives ideas or intuitions not connected with the law; as practical or moral, the moral law; and this law is as authentic, necessary, absolute, and self-certified as those ideas or intuitions, having its ground and source in the nature of the immortal spirit. Besides the idea of its essential quality of justice, there are others and intuitions which, like satellites, attend both it and the action it enjoins or forbids. We have indicated some of the intuitions in the postulates stated,† and need not specify more. To inventory them all is probably beyond created power; but the radical distinction between all ideas and intuitions and the law is, that none of them comes as it does, as an imperative or mandate in its subject to act thus and not otherwise, as having a subject and an object, a matter and an end, and the connected intuitional affirmations of obligations, debts, dues, deserts, good and ill, and retributions of reward for obedience and punishment for disobedience.

§ 19. CONFIRMATIONS THAT JUSTICE IS AN ESSENTIONAL QUALITY OF THE LAW.

There are other confirmations of the truth that justice is not a matter distinct from the law, but an essential quality of it, among which are the following:—If it is not of, but distinct from it, then *ethical justice* is not required by the law and can be no part or quality of obedience to it, as obedience can include nothing not required by it, and consequently doing injustice cannot be sin. What meaning would there be in calling the law the law of right? Even the love to God and others enjoined by it could not be *owed* nor *due* to them, because they could have no *right* or claim to it, so

(*) See Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton. Note on Ideas, pp. 200–203.

(†) § 12.

that, if any one should withhold it, or act any selfishness or crime against Him or them, neither He nor they could charge him with any injustice or wrong to them. If there could, (as there certainly could not), be an obligation on each to love others, it could concern only himself and have no *social* character, and would be really non-moral. Nor could God have a *right* to institute a government requiring justice and forbidding injustice; for He cannot, by mere will and institution, make any action either just or unjust, right or wrong, obligatory or not, if not so by the law itself as it applies to moral agents in their relations to Him and each other. He can neither make nor unmake justice or injustice by will or at all, but can only make moral natures, having moral reason with its imperative or mandate to render to each other the moral love or matter of the law which is ethical justice. Having made such natures, He cannot, by will or institution, violate them and treat them arbitrarily and capriciously. Hence, to deny that justice is in, or a quality of, the law and moral nature which gives it, is to deny that it is in God's government, and to make it an arbitrary imposition in any government, Divine or human. But there can be none without it; and it is no creation of Divine will or institution at all, as Cudworth* and many others have demonstrated, and as Conscience universally attests. For, being in God's mind, it is as uncreated, eternal, and immutable as His mind; being in the law as it is in all rational minds, it is as immortal and unchangeable as they are; and, being thus grounded in universal moral nature, it makes the law the eternal basis of order and society in all worlds, the constitution of a universal moral system. It is not the love enjoined by the law, but its quality of justice, by which it binds all to render that love to God and each other, as their due by natural right, unless forfeited, and by moral also, if they are obedient, which is the universal, everlasting *vinculum* that binds and clamps all together. To the question why each ought to exercise this moral love towards all others, it is not the whole answer to say, because it is enjoined as the matter of the law; nor that he was constituted to exercise it, and that it alone accords with his nature and secures his own self-approval and happiness; nor that all others, who know that he does, will approve him and receive benefit from him. Beyond all this, the answer includes that, by the common nature, the objects of the love required have *a natural right to it,* so that it is *due* to them, and

(*) See Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, bound with his Intellectual System of the Universe, Vol. II., p. 367 to end.

rendering it to them is simply doing them ethical justice. It is therefore justice in the law, and not the love it requires, that constitutes its "relational" or *social* character. As this natural right to others' love is universal, except as any may have forfeited it by sin, the justice of the law binds and holds each to render the love to all as their due, and so as *ethical justice.*

§ 20. THE ESTIMATE PLACED BY MANKIND UNIVERSALLY ON ETHICAL JUSTICE.

That justice is thus essentially in the law is demonstrated by the transcendent estimate which mankind universally, by force of their moral nature, place upon it. Although void of the love for God and each other required by the law, they still, with utmost tenacity, claim and demand it as *due*, as that to which they have an absolute right, as the matter of *justice* from each other. *Justice, justice* is the universal cry. All assert, eulogize, vociferate it, and denounce, deprecate and rage against injustice. They spend treasures, contend, war, die for it, as the one thing of supreme value, the consummate, all-binding tie, by which all order is conserved, all human good shielded, fortified and secured, the very basis of all worth living for. The more they defy and outrage the imperative of the law in them to render moral love *to* each other, they seem so much the more to demand it as their supreme due *from* each other by natural right. They thus insist on justice, severed from love, till it ceases to be the Divine bond which ties each to render love to all, and becomes the perverted excuse for and cause of more intense selfishness—wild, exacting, exorbitant, inexorable—the *summum jus* which is the *summa injuria.* More than any other cause, this loveless demand for justice impels families, neighbors, societies, communities, states and nations into hostile parties with relentless hates and conflicts. Possessing nations like a demoniac frenzy, it precipitates them into intestine convulsions, wars, and revolutions, or into struggles with each other, carried on in either case with all the horrors of battles, ravages, and enormous destructions, till the earth reeks with human gore, is drenched with tears, and is blighted with devastations, the air is filled with sighs, groans, and lamentations, and the noise and rage, commingled with prayers and more numerous curses, rising from camps, marches, battlefields, and involved populations, swell up to heaven. Such is the appalling power in human souls of the demand for justice when the love that meets it is not paid—a demand which never dies nor sleeps, but, immortal

as they, lives on ever active and potent to work blight and ruin in and around them, unless they become restored to love while they may.

Proofs are endless of the measureless importance mankind ascribe to justice, and of its power over them. It is their natural conviction that Providence ever sides with it, and will not fail to give it triumphant vindication and success—in the future world certainly, if not in this. The saying of Napoleon, that "God is always on the side of the strongest battalions," has shocked the world from the day he spoke it as well nigh blasphemous, and as destructive of all hope of redress for the wrongs and outrages inflicted by and on such multitudes of our race. This hope is the last support and solace of all such sufferers who believe in a righteous God. But, in addition to these, why do the leaders of nations, or of parties in civil strife, when about to plunge into war, always endeavor to show that justice is on their side? Why do they seek to justify their resort to arms, and declare their expectation of success, on this ground? Why do they thus turn mankind into a court to judge their cause, and plead it before them? Why do they appeal to God and supplicate His aid on the ground that their cause is just? Why, if victorious, do they ascribe the victory to His helping intervention because justice is on their side, and throng His temples with thanksgivings and praises for it? What nation, party, or person would dare to say or think that God would give triumph to or aid the side of injustice, even though believing that, for His own wise ends, He might permit temporary success to attend it? Why do historians commonly endeavor, in setting forth the causes of wars and revolutions, to show on which side justice stood, and how it was vindicated or crushed? Why have the great poets of the world, in their epics, tragedies, odes, and peans, always founded their representations on the ground of justice, and depicted successes and failures as determined by its principle and power, supported by the hand of Omnipotence working with and for it? Could Dante or Milton have written their immortal poems on any other basis? and could these poems have had their stupendous sublimity, grandeur and power over generations of readers with any other? Could the the great tragedies of Shakspeare so thrill and master human souls, if constructed on any other? The same principle lies at the bottom of many of the greatest works of fiction. How are readers of any work pained to distress or anguish, if they find in it that the actors of great wrongs and crimes against others, especially if virtuous or

innocent, have escaped retribution and prospered by their villainy, while their victims have either died by it, or lived on for a time in wretchedness and desolation! What satisfaction, even joy, do readers receive from the record or representation of swift and condign punishment upon the actors of crimes as vindication at least of the wronged, if no other restoration is made! If, on the contrary, the wronged go unvindicated and their injurers or murderers unpunished by men in this world, to whom, unperverted by some theory at war with moral nature, moral law, and the voices of all ages and nations, is it not profoundly gratifying to believe that the balance will be evened in the world to come? What but this fundamental matter of justice was the basis and burden of the predictions of the old prophets in proclaiming such terrible and often exterminating dooms on their own people and others around? And how appallingly have they been fulfilled! The threatening predictions of Christ and His Apostles all rest on the same eternal basis, and have been, and are being, fulfilled to the very letter. In view of all such facts, how can we fail to recognize the certainty that justice belongs to the very essence of all moral natures, and can no more be rationally denied and discarded than those natures themselves? It is because of its manifest power and consequent high estimation in all men, that it was the tenet and teaching of the philosophers of Greece, followed by those of Rome, who recognized virtue at all, that justice is the sum and substance of all virtue, although they held and taught that it involves the *duty* of loving all mankind.

The relation of justice to violators of the law will be considered in the progress of this work.

CHAPTER III.

Distinction between the natural and the retributive consequences of obedience and of disobedience, and what the real retributive consequences are, with special proofs and several implications of all shown in Chapter I. and in this.

§ 21. THE NATURAL CONSEQUENCES OF OBEDIENCE AND DISOBEDIENCE.

Since the law is in and from the nature of moral beings, obedience to it is action according to, and disobedience is action against, their nature; and each infallibly produces certain *natural consequences* Obedience, unmarred by fall or flaw, must preserve perfect order and harmony between all the mental faculties—the will being yielded in pure moral freedom to reason's rule and approved by conscience, while easily controlling all the desires of the sensibility. Inward disorders, perturbations, agitations, self-condemnations, evil passion, uncontrolled desires or appetites, guilty fears, and all kindred experiences are unknown by a mind untouched by disobedience. It is a spiritual Paradise, whose walls inclose all personal good and debar all personal evil. No bad habit of will, intellect, or sensibility is formed in it; but all good ones are, and are constantly strengthened towards complete confirmation. Its natural affections and sympathies are all kept pure and increasingly enriched and sublimated. Conscience, along with its approval and plaudit, is ever assuring it of Divine rewards and cherishing, thus giving it a consciousness of dignity, of deserving the complacency of God and all good beings, and of sacred and blissful fellowship with them, and is itself preserved quick and efficient to sit central in the mind as guardian of its rectitude. The intelligence is kept open to all holy truth and light, as a pure diamond is to the radiance of the sun, and possesses all vigor, clearness, and promptness to percieve, think, remember, imagine, reason, and know all accessible sacred truths and facts, with exemption from all the deceptions, delusions, and countless errors induced by a selfish will. Thus the obedience of all minds which have never

sinned must make their existence a constant delight, and their belief in immortality a perpetual joy; and must in every way secure perfect personal well-being and blessedness, besides urging to all the good done to others, and all the glory to God wrought by them. In minds in sin, such consequences of their action are never found, nor can be. In renovated human minds, they are only meagerly experienced in this life, and are often intermixed with their opposites, induced by past or current sins, though sufficiently to demonstrate what they must be in perfect beings.

Disobedience, on the contrary, sets all the mental faculties at odds, and causes internal disorders, commotions and conflicts, which often jar and convulse the whole nature. Omniscience alone could furnish a complete catalogue of its baneful results in a single mind. What, then, must the sum and variety of them be in all fallen minds? No creature can ever know them all; for even the final judgment can only disclose them in part, and eternity will be developing and disclosing them endlessly. But, as experienced and manifested in time, they and their propagations are a chief constituent of all history, poetry, and literature, except the purely scientific, philosophic, and didactic, and of the conversation of mankind; and they constitute the staple elements and exhibitions of the stupendous drama ever acted by the successive generations on the theater of the world. But even of those of them patent to all we can here indicate only the following:—

Moral Reason is deposed from sovereignty, and the Sensibility of the mind enthroned in its stead with its desires substituted for law. The Will, the author of this revolution, has lost power to resume right action, and has sunk into abject vassalage to the false ruler it has raised to the throne. This vassalage is caused, perpetuated, and constantly increased by the law of Habit, by which all the action of the mental faculties *reacts* upon them and effects in them a *proneness* or *bent* to repeat or continue it. Repetition or continuance constantly adds to this proneness or bent, both impelling and holding the actor increasingly to comply with it; and, if he does, the habit sooner or later acquires all the force of nature, and is fittingly called a second nature. This law is one of the most important, as well as most wonderful, of the qualities of moral natures. It is the basis of all training, education, culture, character, and every kind of skill. It specially acts on the Will in respect to its *radical* moral or religious choice, rapidly confirming it, if good, but at once *setting* it, if evil, so that Divine influence alone avails in any case to effect a change from

an evil choice to a good one; and, if this does not avail within a limited time, as far as mankind at least are concerned, the evil one is fixed forever beyond change. As this radical wrong choice determines the moral quality of all actions executive of it, sways the thinking, reasoning, imagining, and viewing of the Intelligence in relation to its end, and occasions and stimulates the corresponding feelings and desires of the Sensibility, so the habit of it, by strengthening it, serves to induce the special habits of all these kinds of resultant action. Each of these special habits, constantly strengthening, binds the faculty it is in to the specific action of which it is the habit. They all co-operate to render the radical choice and the habit of it more and more unyielding, so that it cannot be very long before these become fully confirmed and as invincible as fate. While a wrong radical choice with the habit of it is continued by any mind, a right one with the habit of it and the resultant subordinate habits is prevented; and thus disobedience to the law and all the anarchy and convulsion it produces, having begun in a mind, must, unless seasonably arrested by the gracious power of God, infallibly go on from bad to worse forever. The way of sin is a down grade ever growing increasingly declined till comparatively soon it becomes utterly precipitous. So fearful is the power of the law of habit in disobedient minds! What prospect does it furnish or permit of a continuance of probation after this life, and of the repentance and restoration of sinners after death?

But there are other natural consequences of disobedience which aggravate the whole condition of its actors, among which are the following:—It obscures the light and sight of moral reason, perverts the moral judgment, and renders the understanding gross and dull respecting spiritual and moral truth and realities. It renders "the desires of the flesh and of the mind" abnormal and imperious, and generates and fosters evil passions, those combinations of inflamed desires and cherishing will, till they become of gigantic power, and impel to all the enormities of vice, injustice, and crime which darken the world. The sensibility of conscience is blunted and often well nigh paralyzed; and yet a sense of guilt and of desert of punishment pervades the mind, and often fills it with remorse, regret, fearful forebodings, shrinking shame, dread of God, and not seldom with terror and torture. Hence spring a dislike of God and to retain Him in knowledge, aversion to obliging, condemning, or alarming truth and its asserters, and a strong attraction to opposing errors. All true spiritual and moral relations to God and other moral natures, which

depend on rectitude, are prevented; all holy aims and aspirations are discarded; those aims whose ends are in time only, or which are intrinsically insignificant, or base, or vicious are adopted; and the results are conscious or unconscious unworthiness of the complacency of God and all good beings, dissatisfaction, discontent, moral debasement, often vices and crimes, not seldom the riot of men in despair. If the guilty mind tenants a body, it renders that more tempting and fills it with disorder, disease, pain, and seeds of death. Thus the entire being becomes perverted, thrown into discord, robbed of happiness, and often racked and tormented to utter misery and loathing of existence.

Beyond all such personal results, an evil influence is shed, often most damagingly on nearest and dearest relatives, but also on others, it may be on millions and successive generations, luring or impelling them to downward ways, or worst depravities, or even appalling crimes and courses—often into utter apostacy from God and His truth. How often, by the bad influence of one, is another, a whole family, a cluster of families, a whole community, a great population, numbers beyond count, plunged into incalculable evil in this world and ruin in that which is to come! While many of these consequences, both personal and social, are peculiar to mankind, and to them in this life, they are mainly experienced by all sinners in the universe. Those of them peculiar to the spiritual nature of mankind in this life plainly grow worse and worse in all who persist in sin, becoming in multitudes confirmed conditions of existence, and making it certain that, when probation ends, they will be such conditions in all, and will, if possible, go on growing worse and worse forever. How vast the difference between a universe of moral beings, all standing in perfect conformity to the law and in full experience of the natural consequences of obedience, and the actual one, of which such incalculable numbers fall into sin, and are blighted and cursed by its whole dire progeny of natural consequences! God alone can see and measure all the stupendous contrast.

§ 22. WHY WE CALL THESE CONSEQUENCES NATURAL.

We call these consequences *natural*, because they are not produced by any agency outside of moral natures themselves, but by these as affected by each kind of their action. Since obeying is acting according to their true nature, and so maintains its integrity and harmony and fulfills its ends, how could any other than all *happy consequences* result? and since disobeying is acting against that nature,

and so disrupting its integrity and harmony and defeating its ends, how could any other than *unhappy consequences* result? Can a nature jar and grate, when acting as it was constituted to act? or not do so, when acting as it was not constituted to act, thus violating itself? We say reverently, that even God could not prevent these consequences of each kind of action, except by annihilating moral natures; and that, provided they could still exist, if He were annihilated or utterly withdrawn from them, these would be, in kind, if not in degree, precisely what they universally have been and are. It is therefore only misleading and preventive of a right understanding of any questions involving these consequences, to call the qualities of moral natures from which they spring "*retributive causes set in these natures*," as if these qualities did not necessarily belong to such natures so intrinsically that, without them, they could not be such. We only know what a moral nature is from what we know of our own; and we thus know that reason, conscience, will, and sensibility are essential attributes of it, and so involved in moral action that the natural consequences indicated necessarily result from each kind of it. These, therefore, are simply *natural* or *constitutional;* and it is only in a figurative way, fit for poetry, romance, and loose rhetoric, but not for science or exact statement of truth, that they can be called *retributive*, or that the natural qualities from which they spring can be called *retributive causes*. All that can warrantably and truly be said of these consequences is, that, being purely *natural*, they indicate and foreshadow those which are properly *retributive*, and are in some respects *analogous* to them; and also that the existence of moral natures necessarily constitutes a moral system. Additional reasons why these consequences of each kind of action cannot be properly retributive, or more than we have stated, will appear as we proceed.*

§ 23. THE RETRIBUTIVE CONSEQUENCES OF OBEDIENCE AND SIN

What are these? The answer is given by Conscience in all human consciousness. While approving the well-doer or condemning the ill-doer, this wonderous faculty ever points to God, *however recognized*,

(*) See, for the notion that all the penalty or retribution of sin is its natural consequences only, and springs entirely from retributive causes, forces, or laws, or a retributive principle, of nature, incorporated into it by the Creator, Bushnell's Vacarious Sacrifice, 1866, pp. 274, 276, 282, 284, 285, 287, 297, 326, 328, 329, 345, 353, 354, 359, 360, 361. See also, and reconcile with these places, who can, pp. 238, 252. The latter positions are certainly true; the preceding as certainly false in any proper sense of the terms, *retributive*, *penal*, *retribution*. See also Young's "Life and Light of Men," 1866, pp. 84, 85-98, 111-120, 130-133, 140, 141, and often in other pages. The miscalled "Moral View of the Atonement" demands this theory, and excludes positive retributions.

and, with judicial sentence, declares to the former that He also approves and will reward him according to his good desert, and to the latter that He also condemns and will punish him according to his ill-desert; and it is from this action of this faculty in approving or condemning, and in attesting that God does the same and will reward or punish, attending the moral action of mankind from its outset, that they have their ideas of good-desert and ill-desert, and of Divine retributions. So far are even those natural consequences of each kind of moral action, which consist in or are produced by this action of conscience, such as self-approval, peace and joy, or self-condemnation, guilty fear and remorse, from being those presignified by it, or even among them, that they are merely *effects* produced by it in the spiritual nature. It would be no more absurd to mistake the *effects* produced *in* persons before a human court by the acquitting or condemning verdict of the jury and the decision of the judge for that verdict and decision, and the reward or punishment announced in the decision, than to mistake the *effects* produced in the spiritual nature by the approving or condemning verdict and decision of conscience for these and the positive retributions presignified in the decision to come from the hand of God. The mistake is a confusion of cause and effect, and of the effects of different causes—of the *natural effects* of each kind of action, which conscience *never presignifies*, and the *retributive consequences* of each from the hand of God or men, which alone it does presignify. *It never presignifies any of its own effects, happy or unhappy, but always positive, social Divine rewards or punishments. In the proper sense, therefore, retributions are positive rewards and punishments administered by God Himself, and different from all the mere natural consequences of obedience and of sin.* Among these, doubtless, are *confirmation* of the obedient in holiness and its natural results, and *abandonment* of the wicked to sin and its natural results, both everlasting conditions of existence.

So answers conscience in all ages to the question, what are real retributions; and this answer has always been recognized and attested alike by Pagans and Mahometans, Jews and Christians, by civilized and uncivilized, in all the world. So pronounced and clear has it always been, that we may well wonder that they should fail to receive it as final; and more, that, in defiance of it, any should assert the wild conceit, that the law is *automatic*, and universally executes its retributions in natural consequences from the moment it is obeyed or disobeyed.* The law executes nothing. It is the nature which gives it that exe-

(*) See references to Bushnell and Young in a previous note, p. 38.

cutes, as well as experiences or unconsciously receives, all these consequences, which are in no proper sense retributions at all. Well, too, in view of what we have shown, may it excite astonishment, that, in order to clear the ground for these chimerical positions, their asserters should tell us, that the reason why the doctrine of positive retributions from God has been so commonly held, not only by the main body of the Church from its beginning with its shining succession of the foremost minds of the race, but by the race generally, is that they have been led to adopt it by the analogy of human governments! As well say, that men have been led to adopt the geometrical doctrines of squares, triangles, circles, and straight lines by the analogies of figures which they have made or seen! The exact reverse is the truth. When we read our own consciousness, and add to its teachings the common consent of mankind, which shows that theirs is the same as ours, and find both attesting that the verdicts and appointments to Divine retributions by conscience are as have been shown, we are forced to adhere to the tenet of the race, that God will administer both positive rewards and positive punishments. Without them, it is certain that there can be no real moral government in heaven or on earth, no moral system, no harmony with the nature of moral beings, no moral order, nothing but eternal anarchy. In adopting them, therefore, in human governments, legislators, rulers, subjects, all mankind have only followed a fundamental demand of their moral nature, just as bees follow the impulse of their natural instinct in constituting their well-ordered commonwealths.

§ 24. SPECIALLY PROVED BY THE SENSE OF GUILT.

This fundamental truth has impregnable fortifications in the action of every sinner's own conscience, in the action of the consciences of others respecting him, and in the rights, dues, interests, and concerns of the universal society constituted by the common moral nature having the law in it, which no theory of automatic law or mere naturalism can ever demolish or enter to destroy it and to exclude God from immediate connection with and government over mankind.

We have seen that the law is *social*, so that the love it requires is *naturally due* from each to God and his fellows, except to such as may have forfeited the right to it by sin; so that rendering it is simply *paying*, and doing the contrary is *robbing* both Him and them of, this radical due. But equally from reason and as certain is the correlative truth, and every actor of this robbery or radical wrong *thereby*

creates another due from himself to God and them, the due of penal suffering, which he owes as really, though not as absolutely during probation, as he does that of moral love. One of these impregnable fortifications is his sense of owing this, commonly called *the sense of guilt*, which is a sense of desert of and liability to punishment for his wrong-doing. It is wholly involuntary in its beginning and continuance, and inexpugnable by his will. It is an immediate natural consequence of conscious commission of wrong, always more or less disturbing the actor; but, if he has committed some *enormity* of sin or crime, and is not hardened and blinded to moral stupidity, it distresses and even torments him, often to agony. It springs, like a Divine arrest and judicial sentence, from his spiritual nature, in which conscience sits as the vice-gerent of God. It consists of two elements, corresponding to the twofold nature of conscience—one, a positive intuitive attestation by moral reason in conscience, that he deserves and is liable to punishment from God, and perhaps also from man; the other a connected agitation of the sensibility of conscience by peculiar feelings of unworthiness, condemnation, and fear of punishment. Unless this sensibility has been indurated by previous enormities of sin, these feelings are, as said above, always painful, and not seldom intolerably tormenting, constituting remorse, and often causing despair; and, because sinners are vastly more conscious of these feelings than of the rational attestation with which they are inseparably connected, men have called them and it together the *sense of guilt.*

§ 25. OTHERS COGNIZANT OF ANY ONE'S WRONG-DOING HAVE A CORRELATIVE SENSE OF HIS GUILT.

Not only has *he* this sense of guilt, but all *others* cognizant of his wrong-doing have a correlative sense that he is guilty—that is, that he deserves and is liable to punishment from God, from man, or from both, and that his suffering it is *due to them* for that doing. As in him, so in them, this sense, like the law, is *social.* And be it noted, that there is nothing in or connected with it in him, or in them respecting it or him, which implies or allows that the natural consequences of his, or of any sin, itself included, are the deserved punishment or any part of it. They are all constitutionally evolved *in him,* while the punishment signified by it as deserved from and owed to God and others by him is a positive retributory infliction *upon him* by God, or man, or both. Nor is this sense appeased or abated in him by any experience he may have of these consequences, itself included, however poignant they may be, although the more keen it is, the more

aggravated some of them become. Hence, from the days of Adam and Cain until now, it has been the common endeavor of mankind to justify or extenuate their transgressions or crimes in order to disprove or diminish their ill-desert for them, and to avert or mitigate the punishment for them from God, or man, or both. They have *never* put forth this endeavor with the design to remove or abate the natural consequences of their sins or crimes; and, if they have petitioned either God or man for pardon, it has *never* been for exemption from these consequences, but *always* for release from the positive punishment deserved from Him or man. So strong is the social force of this sense of guilt, that very often in the course of the world persons have been impelled by it to divulge their hidden crimes, and to solicit, and even to rejoice in receiving from their fellow men, the punishment assigned for them. Its power in them overcomes all opposing considerations. On the other hand, mankind have always expressed what their sense of the guilt of criminals teaches them, when contemplating their endurance of positive punishment, by saying—"They have got their *desert*, or *reward*, or *pay*, or *wages;* or they have *paid* the *penalty*, or *debt*, which they *owed*, or which was *due*." Thus this sense of guilt, or of desert of punishment, both in the wrong-doer and in others, corresponds perfectly with the justice, end, and whole social nature of the law, and with the presignifications of conscience that Divine, penal retributions will be inflicted on sinners in addition to all the natural consequences of sin, unless God shall rescue them from them by some redemptive measure, adequate to meet the demands of the law against them.

If this attestation of conscience is truth, what can be more certain than that God will inflict such retributions upon all the incorrigibly wicked for their sins in this life? There is not a truth more firmly set in nature, nor one to which its theoretic deniers give more frequent and positive undesigned consent. For who of them is there, who, if he receives, or observes, or learns that others receive, some decided wrong, especially a great one, does not have this sense of the guilt of the perpetrator, this inward verdict and feeling that he deserves and ought to be correspondingly punished? and who, if he sees him escape, or likely to escape, punishment from man, does not say with emphasis—"Well, God is just, and He will punish him?" And all who hear respond, "Amen." Nor do they ever mean by this, that God will simply leave him to the natural consequences of his criminality. Are not this *demand* of the common conscience for retributive justice, and this solacing hope that it will be met, as gen-

uine products of moral nature as sympathetic feeling? Are they as likely to be from perversion of nature as it is? Shall we, by calling this common demand of the conscience of mankind the spirit of revenge, envelop our minds with a *nimbus* of indiscriminate sympathy with the guilty, which hides the radical moral difference between them and the upright, between sin and obedience, between good-desert and ill-desert, and, in treatment, puts them all on par? The notion that God's love is merely sympathetic, sentimental, or affectional is the bane alike of theology and morality—the great Comus of our time, who "hurls

> His dazzling spells into the spongy air,
> Of power to cheat the eye with blear illusion.
> And give it false presentments;"

and with "well-placed words—

> Baited with reasons not unplausible,
> Winds him into the easy-hearted man,
> And hugs him into snares."

§ 26. THE DEMAND FOR POSITIVE PUNISHMENT OF WRONG-DOERS, AND THE SATISFACTION IT GIVES, ADDITIONAL PROOFS THAT IT IS THE ONLY REAL RETRIBUTION.

Although we pointed to this demand and this satisfaction of mankind in the preceding paragraph, we did not show that the demand is essentially different from their sense of the *guilt* of wrong-doers, as it certainly is; for, in these, the sense of their guilt is that of their *deserving* and being *liable* to punishment from God, man, or both. It *causes* and is constantly attended by *fear* of the punishment; and this *effect*, like its cause, comes from conscience. But, in the sufferers of wrong and all others cognizant of it, while their sense of the guilt of its doer is, like his, that he deserves and is liable to punishment from God, man, or both, it causes and is attended in them by a persistent *demand* for his subjection to it; and they have satisfaction in knowing that it is, or in expecting that it will be, met. This demand is wholly involuntary, and purely one of moral reason in conscience; and this satisfaction is of this reason and the sensibility connected with it in conscience. In the disordered condition of man's moral nature, this demand is often attended by the passion of anger, which may, and not seldom does, impel to cruelty and at times to frightful enormities; but, in itself, it is as real and righteous as that for ethical justice, and one of the chief demands of archetypal moral nature, or of holy reason in conscience. This demand, and the satisfaction of having it met, are therefore two additional proofs that all wrong-doing, all sin, deserves and will bring upon its actors retrib-

utive punishment from God, unless He rescues them from it by a redemptive measure adequate to satisfy the demand and restore them to obedient harmony with Himself and with all other holy beings.

§ 27. WHAT TRUE, ACCORDINGLY, OF RENDERING OR NOT THE LOVE REQUIRED BY THE LAW.

From all preceding, it is perfectly manifest that rendering this moral love to God and all others is simply *paying* Him and them this *due*, while doing the contrary is *robbing* Him and them of it. Hence, whether any one renders or withholds it is their supreme concern and interest, as rendering it has the pleasure and glory of God and the full real good of all others for its *end*, its tendencies being to promote these to the utmost forever; and as withholding it has mere self-gratification for its end, its tendencies being to hinder and destroy the true end wherever it spreads its baneful contagion and influence in the worlds. The tendencies of both these kinds of moral action spring from *the social nature of moral beings*—from their amazing susceptibility to be affected by each other's example and influence by all they know of each other's character, conduct, experiences, and whole history—from the law of habit and the natural consequences of each kind of action—from their desires and impulsions urging to each kind—from their different degrees of knowledge or ignorance of God and His treatment of the actors of each kind—and from all their relations to Him and each other. How stupendous, then, and surpassing the comprehension of finite minds must the bearings of each kind of action be upon the character and destinies of moral beings forever throughout the universe! How must each draw after it through the ages a measureless comet-like train, the one of good and glory, the other of evil and ruin! What a direct relation, too, must each of them and of their actors have to the honor and government of God! He and all His rational creatures being the *objects*, and His pleasure and glory and their good the *end* of the kind of action enjoined by the law, *its matter and end, and obedience to it all pertain immediately to Him and them, and disobedience to it is direct wrong and injury to Him and them; so that whether the law is or is not obeyed by even* ONE *moral agent is the supreme, universal, and endless concern and interest of God and all like natures, existing and to exist in the everlasting future.* How much more is it so, whether it is or is not obeyed by *many*, by a *race*, by ever-augmenting myriads! How then can the mere natural consequences of each kind of action,

which are necessarily purely *personal* in origin and relation, be any expression of the concern, interest, rights, dues, and good of God and all others, as affected by each one's action? How, for instance, do those of obedience express the complacency towards its actor, the estimation in which he is held, and the sense of his good-desert, which are in the minds of God and all good beings? and how do those of disobedience express the displeasure towards its actor, the sense of his ill-desert for the wrong and injury he has done against God and all moral beings, and the proper regard for the law and the good obedience to it secures, which He and they must have? They do not express any of these, because neither are the former class *conferred*, nor the latter *inflicted* by God for Himself and all others, but both classes of them are *produced* wholly by the nature of the actors, so that they merely show the *effects* of each kind of action in the nature of each actor, and are purely *personal*. If, therefore, God, as Ruler of the whole moral society, does not administer real retributions of reward and punishment beyond these, there are none consistent with the matter and end of the law and expressive of His and their interest and concern respecting either these or obedience to it as *due* to, and disobedience to it as wrong and injury *against Him and them*. As the social nature of moral beings and of the law in and from it has thus no recognition by God in His dealings with them, He has no moral government nor moral system, and universal conscience is palpably a false witness concerning Him. This nature of them and of the law, equally with the presignifications of conscience, demands *social retributions* from God—that is, positive rewards for obedience and positive punishments for disobedience. These the natural consequences of each cannot be, because they are not social, but merely personal; and because they are not *administered* by God, as demanded by the interest, concern, claims, and rights of Himself and all in the moral society and system by reason of their nature, the law in and from it, and all their inter-relationship, but are products of their own constitutions, and are substantially what they would be if there were no God, or if, like the lazy god of Epicurus, He neither disturbs nor is disburbed by them, provided only that they could continue to exist!

Thus this notion of retributions, like that of the materialists, that the laws of nature are a self-operating reticulation of all-controlling physical forces so fateful that even God, if there is one, cannot interfere with them for any purpose, virtually "untenants creation of its

God" by excluding Him from administering all real governmental functions over His intelligent creatures—even those of a Father!

§ 28. THE END OF JUSTICE THAT OF MORAL LOVE, AND RETRIBUTIVE PUNISHMENT EQUALLY AS REWARD DEMANDED BY CONSCIENCE.

The *end* of the law, of its justice equally as of its matter of moral love, is the complete, everlasting good of moral beings *in* their Divinely constituted society. The good of each created one in it is balanced by that of every other one, and that of them all is infinitely exceeded by that of God, its Head. As this transcendent good of God and this balanced good of all others is the one aggregate end of the love enjoined by the law upon each as owed by him to, and due to him from, every other one by its justice, they are all interwoven by the sacred reciprocity of rendering the love into an absolutely perfect and blessed ethical and religious society or solidarity. I say *and religious*, because all true ethics or morality must be essentially religious, as the whole moral system is.

If all had continued in this reciprocity, each would have received from God, beyond the mere natural consequences of his obedience, a positive reward according to his good-desert; and by this reward justice, as retributive to the obedient, would have been fully *met and satisfied*. None would ever have objected to this retribution, because universal conscience would have pronounced it deserved and just, and would have condemned withholding it as treating them contrary to their desert, and purely unjust. But the entrance of sin into the universal society changed the relations of all its actors to God and all the persistently obedient, just as, in a nation, rebellion and crime change those of their actors to its ruler and loyal people. All guilty of it have forfeited their natural right, and their moral too, if they had one, to the love of God and all others *in* the holy society; and, by their sin, they deserve retributive punishment, and justice demands its infliction upon them to the measure of their desert, unless its *end*, which is that of the law in relation to the loyal society, can be equally secured in some other way. It demands this, just as it does, that God shall favor the innocent and reward the perfectly obedient. Precisely as the conscience of mankind affirms that the perfectly obedient deserve a positive retributive reward, and would condemn withholding it and treating them as if they did not deserve it as injustice, it affirms that sinners deserve positive retributive punishment, and would condemn withholding it and treating them as if deserving the reward of obedience

as injustice, unless the end of that punishment can be at least equally secured in their behalf in some other just way. Any objection, therefore, to the positive retributive punishment of sinners is equally to the positive retributive rewarding of the sinlessly obedient—is equally nugatory. Retributive justice, whether in rewarding or in punishing, is, in principle, the same as ethical, which consists in rendering to all who have rights according to them, and to all who have deserts according to them—to the perfectly obedient according to both—to sinners who have forfeited all their rights, natural and moral, if they ever had such, according to their desert of punishment. *Punishing by God or any rightful human ruler is as much ethical justice to all the loyal and Himself over them, as rewarding, or any other just action towards the obedient is to them.* As there is but one law, having but one matter and one end, and, as justice is an essential quality of that law, *there can be but one justice*, however it may be varied in its applications to moral beings, according to their rights, when they have any, and according to their characters and deserts, good or evil, and their consequent relations to God and each other.

§ 29. REFUSING TO RENDER TO GOD AND ALL OTHERS THEIR DUE OF MORAL LOVE CREATES A CORRELATIVE DUE TO THEM OF RETRIBUTIVE SUFFERING.

We have already said* that it is just as certain as the facts concerning what the law requires, that whoever does not render to God the love which it enjoins as due to Him by all His rights, and to men the balanced love which it enjoins as due to them by whatever rights they may have, and which it is due to God to render to them, because He commands it as He has an absolute right to do, *thereby creates another due from him to God and them, which he owes them as really, though not as absolutely till probation ends, as he does the love—that is, the due of suffering the retributive punishment he deserves.* The proofs of this, already indicated, are the sense of guilt or ill-desert—the dooming by conscience to retributive punishment from God—the common endeavor of mankind to justify or extenuate their sins or crimes so as to nullify or palliate them—their prayers for mercy or pardon from God—the frequent cases of voluntary confession of hidden crimes and even solicitation of punishment for them—men's spontaneous ideas of the justice and benevolence of legitimate human laws and governments with their sanctions—the language they have ever used respecting the suffering of penal retri-

(*) § 24, p. 34.

butions by evil-doers, expressing the intuitive affirmations of their consciences, that they have paid or are paying a *debt*, *what they owed* and is *due* from them, and that they have received or are getting their *reward*, their *wages*, and their deserts—and the hope so often expressed by wronged ones and others respecting those who have perpetrated the wrongs or crimes, and escaped just punishment from men, that they will not escape, but will suffer it from God. Proofs superabundant. This *due* to God and other moral beings, this *debt* to them of penal suffering is solely by justice in the law, and as independent of mere imposition by Divine will or institution as the law and the mutual due and debt of moral love by it are; and it can no more be disregarded by God than these can without disregarding the law in His own and all other moral natures. *This penal suffering is the naturally demanded substitute, in case of sin, for the love required by the law, refused and violated, besides which the sinner can* PAY BACK *no other*. Consequently, unless it can be paid for him by another according to Divine arrangement, it must be infallibly exacted from him. If it be not so paid for him, and yet is not exacted from him, the law, and with it the nature of moral beings in and from which it is, is violated and outraged; their right and claim to mutual moral love, which make it ethical justice, are practically disregarded and nullified, and with them and this justice constituted by them, this love is no longer social, but a mere personal matter, which, if not exercised by any one, no others have any right or reason to blame him; good-desert or ill-desert there can be none recognized, because these are social and grounds of justice; man's conscience is made an enormous liar in all its affirmations of ill-desert and presignification of retributive punishment from God; its lie is His, since He so constituted mankind that it speaks as for Him; His character is thus darkened as void of veracity; His justice, benevolence, and holiness are fictions, or metamorphosed to their opposites; all ground of confidence in and love for Him is swept away; and selfishness with all its Titanic progeny of special outbreaks of wrong, villainy, vice, and crime is licensed to raid and ravage the world and the universe at will, except as the knowledge of its comparatively puny natural consequences may, for a time, slightly retard its ruinous sweep and devastation. All this, and worse, is the certain alternative, if this debt of penal suffering is not paid either by sinners themselves, or by a Divinely appointed and accepted substitute. We have abundantly shown that the natural consequences of sin cannot possibly be this

retributive suffering, since they are not social, as the law is, but merely constitutional and personal, and would be essentially the same, provided created moral natures could continue to exist if there were no God or He should leave them entirely alone; so that they are not properly retributions at all. They are not what conscience threatens, and express nothing concerning the interests, concerns, claims, and rights of God and His loyal society by the law and their natures. As the rewarding, so the punishing must be *social*, because the due it secures to God and His loyal society, like that of the love enjoined by the law, the law itself and its justice, and the moral nature which contains and issues it are all *social*. In other words, it must be a real *paying back* to the guilty, which will, as far as possible, vindicate the interests, concerns, and rights of God and His loyal society.

§ 30. GOD NECESSARILY RULER, AND MUST RULE ACCORDING TO THE LAW.

As was said in Chapter I., the law is given by each one's moral reason, not as His, but as God's; and conscience, in its sense of good-desert and ill-desert and in its presignifications of reward and punishment, ever announces Him as the Ruler of all and the administrator of these. Hence, as obedience and disobedience to the law are to Him, it is His prerogative to administer retributions for them; and the authority of men to administer them for overt acts in certain relations and circumstances is delegated by Him. As He represents both Himself and His rational creatures, both His own right and that of each of them to the moral love of all others, both His own and their interests and concerns through all ages in having these rights met, and as He alone has adequate qualifications of knowledge, power, benevolence, and all righteousness to administer a perfect government over all the moral beings He has made, it is absolutely certain that He must recognize Himself as under the highest obligation His own infinite nature can impose, either to execute perfect justice in administering rewards and punishments according to the exact deserts of each as he knows them, or to adopt for sinners some measure of substitution which will as perfectly secure what is due to Himself and all the loyal from them as the infliction of punitive retribution on themselves would, so that as many of them as will return to loyalty and rely on that measure for forgiveness will be saved. He cannot deal with any of them as if *dissociated and isolated from the whole society;* for, by their nature

and the law, they all stand interlinked in everlasting social connection and responsibility, and he must deal with each according as this organic union and the greatest good of all require. Hence, He cannot exempt any sinner from the punishment he deserves, even if he should repent, which none ever would do, unless the due from him to Himself and the whole society is secured by some complete substitution for that punishment. And here we must note that, while the law is the same in God's mind as in created minds, there are appendages to it in theirs which are not to it in His. In His, it does not stand as the law of another, binding to obedience and accountability to him, while in theirs it is given as *His*, binding them to obedience and accountability to Him. Nothing, therefore, can be argued from its standing in His in favor of its being impersonal and without sanctions of real retributions in theirs. We might suppose, *a priori*, that He would thus difference it in them.

CHAPTER IV.

Additional objections to the theory that the natural consequences of moral action, good or bad, are its retributions, or of them; and why the notion, that God's government over men and all moral beings is only a natural one, is absurd.

§ 31. WHY THESE CONSEQUENCES ARE DEFECTIVELY KNOWN BY MEN, UNEQUAL, NOT WHAT THEY DESERVE, AND NOT RETRIBUTIONS.

1. The first of these objections is the very defective knowledge of them possessed by mankind. They can be known by them in only three ways—(1), by each one's own experience—(2), by his *observation* of the manifestations of them in and by others—(3), by such *information* concerning them as he may in all ways acquire from others. They are not all developed and apparent at once in any case, especially not the most important and continuous of them. A large proportion of those of obedience, on the one hand, which are like bodily growth from childhood onwards, and of those of sin, on the other, which are like stealthy disease begun in a body, can only be recognized in their advances after somewhat protracted intervals of time. Some, doubtless, of both the best and the worst of them remain unrecognized by their subjects through life; others of them are but slightly, perhaps only occasionally, felt or realized; and none of them are consciously experienced in extreme degrees, or beyond even meager measures, except by comparatively a few, and by them ordinarily very seldom. Then, they are not experienced by all *equally* according to the real desert of each—certainly not in this life, and, for the same reasons, quite surely not in the next. The reasons in the case of mankind are: (1), the natural differences of each from every other one in faculties, temperament, and susceptibilities of mind; (2), in conditions of life and relations to others in the family, community, nation, or tribe; (3), in education, training, and all cultivation or want of it; (4), in true or false, pure or corrupt, Christian or any different, views or practices of morality and

religion; and, (5), in right or wrong, good or bad courses of conduct or action. On account of these and other differencing facts, the degrees to which a large proportion at least of these consequences are experienced by different ones are just as many and various as they. Observation and testimony make it sure that no two persons, even though children of the same parents and in essentially the same environment of good or evil conditions and influences, have them in the same degrees, especially those of wrong action of whatever criminality. The scale of the degrees of natural susceptibility to them in different persons is one of countless grades from lowest to highest. Another fact respecting this susceptibility to them, as far at least as those of sin, vice, and crime are concerned, is, that, whatever its comparative degree in anyone may be, his conscious experience of them, among which are all the workings of conscience and the unhappiness and misery they involve and create, is far the keenest and most distressing in the beginnings and special steps of advance in willful wickedness and enormity. He whose conscience condemned him, and filled him with an appalling sense of guilt, with forebodings of deserved retribution from God, and with deep distress, and even anguish, for his first lie, oath, theft, or any other such breach of obligation to God or man, becomes before long at farthest, by repeating that first offence or committing and practicing others, so hardened and insusceptible of such experiences of the workings of exasperated or irritated conscience, that it is as if wholly or nearly paralyzed to imperturbable apathy. Veterans in vice and crime, especially in flagitious enormities, are commonly as unconscious of such experiences as the lower animals, and often as statues of stone, while novices in them are as commonly distressed, and, in numberless cases, even racked and tortured by the workings of their consciences. Merely to indicate these facts is to expose the preposterous folly of even imagining the natural consequences of moral action capable of being, in any sense, *the* sanctions, or among them, of the everlasting law of the universal and endless society of moral beings under God. Its sanctions are the predeclared retributions according to real desert for obedience and sin, and are thus the motives to the one and against the other. Such all the facts stated demonstrate these consequences wholly inadequate to be, both by their imbecility as motives, and by their lack of every other necessary qualification. If we look at the case in the light of other involved and related facts and principles, the conclusion stated will be made invincibly certain.

§ 32. WHY THEY ARE UNADAPTED AND INCOMPETENT TO BE THE LAW'S SANCTIONS.

2. Not only are these consequences wholly inadequate by their imbecility as motives, for the reasons shown, to be the sanctions of the law, but they are also intrinsically unadapted and incompetent in every respect to be such. What expression are they of the absolute importance of the law as, by its justice, the great social-moral bond of the rational universe, of the holy love which fulfills it, and of the everlasting blessedness of moral beings dependent on its exercise? What expression are they of all the social evil and injury of sin, of its fearfully contagious influence and terrible tendencies, and of all the destruction of happiness and well-being, and existence of misery and ill-being, which it creates and propagates? What expression are they of God's interest in and concern for the true happiness of His intelligent creatures?—of His estimation of the law in His own nature and in theirs, and so of all moral nature itself, as masterful over it universally?—of His corresponding hostility to sin and its effects and tendencies?—of His responsibility to His rational creatures, as their Creator and natural Guardian?—of His benevolent regard for the interests, concerns, rights, and dues of the obedient, invaded and trampled upon by the disobedient?—of His ethical justice and righteousness towards them as in His eternal moral system?—of His veracity in the averments and prophecies of conscience, and in the representations of Scriptures which we have referred to?—and of His whole character? To say that these consequences, as they are or can be known by mankind, constitute any adequate expression of these supreme realities of God and His universe is "pure, heroical defect of thought." How then can they be the sanctions, or among them, of His eternal moral law and government? As we said in a preceding place,* they are simply indications and heraldings in created moral natures of a direct, positive moral government over them; and to make them *the* sanctions, or sanctions at all, of the law is not only mere naturalism, but is to assign to them a function for which they are utterly unadapted by lacking every qualifying characteristic to be such.

§ 33. AS ITS SANCTIONS, WOULD BE IN CONFLICT WITH ITS INTRINSIC NATURE.

3. To make them the sanctions of the law is to conflict with its intrinsic nature, which, by its quality of justice, is, as we have seen,

(*) § 22, p. 37.

the one eternal social bond which ties all moral beings, not revolters against it, into a social-moral society or solidarity. Because it is its quality of justice which makes it this bond, its sanctions are as purely just and social in end and aim as its precept is. It is the proper business of each created moral agent to obey the precept by exercising pure moral love or good-will to God and his fellows, as is due to each by natural or moral right, or as enjoined by God; and if he does, he *deserves* a corresponding reward; if he does not, a corresponding punishment. It is the business of God, as Ruler, to make His law known, and *that He will*, AFTER *the close of each one's probation, administer these retributions exactly according to his actual desert as infallibly known to Him*, except in the cases of all who, having sinned, have been restored and forgiven. In administering rewards, God executes exact ethical justice to their recipients as due from both Himself and the entire society under and represented by Him; but, in administering punishments, He executes exact retributive justice upon their recipients as ethical justice to Himself and the universal society wronged and injured by them demands. That is, retributive justice to sinners is ethical justice to God and the entire and eternal holy society. Thus only can He maintain and carry on the moral system founded in and demanded by His own and all created moral natures; and it is thus manifest that the end of His administration of the sanctions of the law is precisely the same as that of the obedience of moral beings to its precept, to Himself, and to all others than sinners. As, therefore, the precept of the law is perfectly just and thus perfectly morally-social, so necessarily must its sanctions be. They must correspond in every respect, while the natural consequences of moral action do not and cannot in any. Neither are those of right action conferred nor conferrable, nor are those of wrong action inflicted nor inflictable, by God, nor is either class of them preventable by Him. They are the necessary products of each one's own moral nature as affected by his moral action, and would be essentially what they are, provided moral actors could continue to exist and act, if God did not, or took absolutely no notice of or concern about them. Being such, they have no governmental characteristic or quality, no social aim or effect, no adjustment to real desert, good or ill, and therefore no quality of justice in them, either *as ethical* to all or any of the universal society with God in and over it, or *as retributive* to sinners against them and Him. Just because there is no quality of justice in them, with them for sanctions there could be no possible admin-

istration of justice in the intelligent universe, and consequently no moral system, no moral government, no real moral law, but mere advice only, and neither justice, benevolence, nor moral concern or care in Him for them—nothing but numbers numberless of moral beings as unrelated in any governmental sense as sand-grains in a sand heap, each having a conscience attesting that he will receive retribution from God "according to the deeds done in his body, good or bad," or just as he deserves, but lying, as not one of them will receive any from Him. The only rewarder and punisher of each is his own nature; and, since it is a chief and essential part of the function of government to administer the sanctions of the law, and since, according to this naturalistic notion, these consequential products of each one's own nature as affected by sin are the only sanctions, the plain conclusion is, that no one has or can have any moral ruler—that God is not one at all, not even in the sense in which a Father is. Of course, no one can be responsible or accountable to Him in any sense, nor even to himself in a real moral sense, because he has no intelligent, voluntary agency or part in executing these consequences, but his nature executes them all as involuntarily, undesigningly, unknowingly, and necessarily as material nature executes any of its operations. Not only, therefore, is there no correspondence between these consequences, if they are the sanctions of the law, and its social-moral precept, but it is an absurdity to think, and a misnomer to call, them its sanctions in any real, normal sense, or their production by the nature of each actor as affected by his moral action, good or bad, government in any sense of the word, when there is not one single characteristic of government in the case. If God has no positive moral government with positive sanctions which make it such, He must be chargeable with withholding from His intelligent creatures the concern and care which His creative and moral relations to them demand—with indifference to their characters, mutual treatment, rights, dues, deserts, interests, concerns, and destinies—and so with being neither just nor benevolent, but the direct contrary, towards them.

§ 34. FIVE BRIEF OBJECTIONS TO THE THEORY THAT THESE CONSEQUENCES ARE REAL RETRIBUTIONS.

4. This theory, that the natural consequences of moral action are real retributions, and that God will administer no positive ones, is anti-psycological. It contradicts essential phenomena of consciousness and their characteristics concerning the law and retri-

butions. This is manifest from what we have shown respecting the action of conscience in its intuitive affirmation that righteous action deserves reward from God and men, and unrighteous action deserves punishment from Him and them; in its sense of guilt; and in its demand for and presignifications of punitive retributions from God in wrong-doers themselves and in others cognizant of their wrong action. It sets aside the quality of justice in the law as it relates to all wrong-doers; and implies that sin, however great, forfeits nothing.

5. It is a theory of pure *individualism*, entirely at war with the *social* nature and end of the law, and thus with the *social nature* of moral beings and the possibility of a moral system. As these consequences of moral action are all *personal*, what kind of a moral system is possible with them alone? Such individualism is incompatible with the social character of the law; with any right of God and other holy beings to the love of each other or of any one, and so with all justice; with the fact that it is justly their interest and concern whether any do or do not render moral love to them and to all; with all the action of conscience respecting retributions from God; and with all moral accountability and responsibility. The theory makes it solely each one's own concern and interest whether he will love God and his fellow beings, or will be purely selfish, even to the most criminal degree, since in either case these personal consequences are the only retributions he will receive.

6. By thus stripping God of any administration of real retributions, this theory thrusts Him away to the remove from, and indifference to His rational creatures ascribed to Him by Epicurus —seats Him, as it were, in an easy chair in the far off heavens, utterly relieved of all interference with the constitutional machine of every one's nature, and only looking on, if He concerns Himself to do even that, to see how it works out all retributions. It thus eliminates from Him all justice, benevolence, and positive goodness, and leaves Him with only their opposites, or, at best, free from the law and without any moral character.

7. It makes Him speak falsely through conscience in its decisions on ill-desert, in its sense of guilt, and in its presignifications of rewards and punishments from Him, thus implying that both He and conscience lack veracity.

8. It makes all exercise of mercy and grace towards sinners impossible for Him as far as releasing them from any positive or proper punishment is concerned. If the law does not demand, and

He will never inflict punitive retributions on them, how can He exercise mercy and grace in doing anything to rescue them from it, or in forgiving them? Forgiveness, pardon, remission of sins are words without meaning, and prayer, for it absurd, if this theory is true; and a real atonement is impossible. Natural consequences cannot be forgiven, pardoned, nor remitted.

§ 35. AS FAR AS THEY CONSIST IN THE ACTION OF CONSCIENCE, MUST BE COMPARATIVELY SLIGHT, AND, AS MOTIVES, WEAK.

9. As far as these consequences, whether of obedience or of sin, consist in the action of conscience and its effects, they must be exceedingly slight, if there are no positive retributions, compared with what they must be, if there are. Through the wondrous social nature of moral beings, the approval and smile of conscience and the sense of good-desert in the well-doer, and its condemnation and remorse and the sense of ill-desert in the ill-doer, are greatly quickened and energized, and the happiness or unhappiness they constitute are correspondingly augmented, by the expectation or reception of rewards or punishment administered by legitimate authority or government. If this is so, when these are administered by human authority and express the approving or condemning verdict and sense of the conscience of men represented by that authority, how much more must it be so, when they are administered by God and express the approving or condemning verdict and sense of His infinite conscience, and, with it, of all true conscience in the universe? What augmented currents of happiness or unhappiness must the reception, if any shall be, of positive rewards or punishments from God cause the consciences of both the holy and the unholy to pour through their immortal natures forever! On the contrary, we know that, in this world, if the fear of punishment by man in time, or by God in eternity, is removed, the natural consequences of wrong-doing, even of crimes, produced by conscience, are removed or greatly mitigated. Assurance of endless exemption from punishment would infallibly reduce them to comparative trifles; and equal assurance of its permanent infliction would correspondingly aggravate them. And, for obvious reasons, they must always be vastly more aggravated by connection with positive punishment than without it.

10. If these consequences of moral action are its only retributions, the *motives* to obedience and against sin are *incalculably less* than if, beyond these, there are positive ones to be administered by

God. They are less both by the absence of those which are supplied by the knowledge of future positive ones, and by the comparative want of weight in them, just shown, if that knowledge is rejected.

§ 36. THIS THEORY HAS A RUINOUS BEARING ON THE REVEALED CHARACTER OF GOD.

11. This theory has a most damaging bearing on the character of God. When we consider how great the liability of created moral natures must be during their novitiate, especially at its outset, while their intelligence is so weak and their sensibility so susceptible to and urgent for gratification, and before they have any experience of the natural consequences of either kind of moral action, to fall into sin and a current of ruin;—when we consider how sin, begun by one, tends, like an appalling contagion or epidemic, to infect others with ever-extending propagation, as the cases of the fallen angels and of our race demonstrate;—and when we consider what the natural consequences of sin, however defectively realized or lessened by lack of positive punishment, must be and involve wherever it spreads—what can be more certain than that God, the Creator and Continuer of all such natures, must be bound by an infinite obligation, imposed by an imperative of His own nature, to make the *motives* to obedience and against sin just as weighty as He can according to the law, its justice, and its end, which is the real good of such natures secured by obedience? By sparing the first sinning pair and continuing our race, He certainly has assumed this obligation towards it; and He *can* righteously augment the *motives* before mankind and all moral beings in their novitiate immensely by revealing to them that He will administer positive retributions. He can augment them in no other way than by such a revelation; and, if He does not make it, as, according to this theory, he does not, how is it possible to vindicate His character? How is He good, how love, if He does not do what love demands, all He righteously can to conserve His rational creatures, especially our race, by continuing which He has assumed towards it the obligation stated, from ruining themselves by sin and its natural consequences?—how, if He does not augment the motives to right and against wrong moral action to the utmost degree consistent with and demanded by justice? As, during their novitiate, they are unconfirmed in character, good or bad, and must, by their own wills, arbitrate, under the motives before and the influences upon them, what it shall be;

and as obedience to the law must consist in their free choice of the end or ends it prescribes, made under these motives and influences, it is necessary that these should be augmented to the utmost morally possible degree to secure this choice. It is as impossible for God to secure it from them by force, as it is to secure it from stones by motives and influences. The want of adaptation is as total in the one case as in the other. Since, therefore, the motives and influences inciting to sin create such fearful hazard to all created moral natures during their novitiate, especially to the disordered ones of our race, what can be more manifest than that, in order to conserve the unfallen and restore the fallen as far as possible, or to do all possible for those ends, it is necessary that God should make the motives and influences inciting to obedience and against sin just as potential and moving as He can according to the justice and end of the law, and all that is true of them and their relations. He can do this only by revealing to them that He will administer positive retributions; and He has in fact revealed this in the attestations of conscience in the sense of guilt and all its presignifications of Divine punishment, not now to say in His inspired revelation, so effectually that, despite all their conscious fear of this punishment, they have in all ages and nations commonly believed in it as well as in future rewards, have been greatly influenced by it, and have inculcated its vast importance.* Nor can any one prove, or warrantably assume, that God could have set positive retributions before mankind, consistently with the social relations by which they are universally interlinked, any more distinctly, and so as to produce any greater motives, than He has done. The belief in them has always been among the moral and religious *principia* of the race; and men *progress* away from this belief into this theory of natural consequences, or into any other negation of it, only as they do from belief in the natural freedom of the will into a denial of it, or from any essential truth of consciousness into its contrary, by overlooking, or, under some bias of will against it, denying that it is given in consciousness. But all such *progress* is destined to a culprit's fate, as is all in conflict with God, with conscience, with moral nature, and with all essential truth.

(*) See "Theology of the Greek Poets, by Prof. W. S. Tyler," referred to in note on p. 8, § 11. Homer, pp. 197–198. Æschylus, pp. 237–238. Plato, Republic B. X. 6, 13. The philosophers, not atheistic, generally believed in the immortality of souls and future retributions. See numerous places in Warburton's Divine Legation.

To these eleven objections, after some remarks on them, two others, with examinations of Butler's theory of a natural government of God will be added.

§ 37. EACH AND ALL THESE OBJECTIONS FATAL TO THIS THEORY, WHETHER CHRISTIANITY IS TRUE OR FALSE.

Let it be noted, then, that no holder of this theory escapes any of these objections to it by denying Christianity. Every holder of it, believer or infidel, is under a necessity either to discard it as a baneful error, or validly to show that *each* of them is baseless. But, even if he could *apparently* show this, he would not prove, nor be warranted to assume, that there will not be positive retributions; for still the *consentio omnium gentium* is in their favor, even if we could find no other basis for them. This agreement of all nations in believing in them is attested by all ancient literature relative to them, and this goes to show the belief of them coeval with man. There is no record, except that in Gen. 2:17, that it originated in a direct revelation from God, and no evidence that it has been diffused and maintained among all nations merely as a transmitted tradition. The only warranted conclusion is, that, from the first man down, it has been taught to the whole race by conscience, and that, in addition to this inward tuition of it, it has been inculcated upon each successive generation by the preceding. In what sinning soul, not yet in moral stupor, does not conscience, at times at least, stand up and, pointing to God, as recognized, denounce to it—"He will punish you as you deserve?" Besides, God's inspired revelation is thronged with inculcations, which will be adduced farther on, that He will administer retributive punishment to all men who end their present lives in sin according to their deeds done in the body, or their full ill-desert; and all negation of such retribution is thus debarred from acceptance by both the teachings of universal conscience and of Scripture. There never, therefore, can be any other basis for denying positive penal retributions and holding this naturalistic theory, than a *voluntas pro ratione*, a sheer assumption. The old doctrine of retributions is invincible against all assaults, on whatever ground its opponents may choose to make them.

§ 38. POSITIVE RETRIBUTORY PUNISHMENTS OFTEN INFLICTED IN THIS WORLD.

To prevent misapprehension, we here add, that positive retributory punishments are not entirely reserved for the future state.

That they are often inflicted in this life is attested by all history, sacred and profane, and by the common observation of mankind. Often have they fallen on men by direct visitations of God, like bolts from His hand, and often through the instrumentality of human or superhuman agents, good and bad, of irrational creatures, and of inanimate nature—sometimes even through their own agency; and they have been inflicted, not on individuals only, but on communities, states, and nations, and often by these on one another. Of course, atheists, irrational rationalists, deniers of Providence, miracles, and the Scriptural revelation shut their eyes against the evidences, proofs, and authentic facts, demonstrative of the truth of this statement; but neither "the owlet Atheism," nor its mated scepticism, nor all credulous incredulity can abolish the time-long series of authentic facts of such punitive retributions in this world. In the great court of mankind, ever in session, and embracing incomparably the largest proportion of men of highest scholarship, critical capability, fairness of mind, and all qualifications, the decision will be, as it ever has been, that God often administers such retributions in this world. They are distinguished from disciplinary chastisements by the fact that they manifestly have no aim to benefit or work the good of their objects.* The sacred histories of the Bible are replete with examples of these retributions. Among them are the destruction of the race, eight excepted, by the Noachic Deluge—of the cities of the Jordan plain by the tempest of fire and brimstone—of Pharaoh and his hosts by being drowned in the Red Sea—of all, except two, of the Israelites who came out of Egypt, during their wanderings in the desert, when they rebelled and murmured against the Lord, at various times, in various numbers, and by various means—of great numbers of them, by various and numerous inflictions, from their entrance into Canaan down to the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans, and from that time to this —and of all the nations around and connected with them, according to the predictions of God's prophets. Numerous examples of such retributions on individuals are given in these histories, among which are those of Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, of Achan, of Eli and his two sons, of Saul, and of many others in the Old Testament, and of Ananias and Sapphira, of Herod Agrippa I., and of others in the New Testament. Secular history abounds with instances of the same kind. Why have assassins so generally lost their own lives?

(*) NOTE.—On the difference between punishment and chastisement, see Müller "On the Christian Doctrine of Sin," Vol. I., pp. 244-251.

What is the basis of the adage—"Murder will out?" Of course, such temporal, punitive retributions must, in the nature of the case, be imperfect. They are neither univerally inflicted on great criminals, nor evenly on those subjected to their strokes; but they are plainly specimens and assurances of the perfect ones to be inflicted in the future state.*

§ 39. CONFLICT OF THIS THEORY WITH THE SCRIPTURAL DOCTRINE OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT.

9. Another objection to this theory of natural consequences is its antagonism to the Scriptural doctrine of the final judgment of mankind. The time of this judgment is called a day, the appointed day, the last day, the day of the Lord, of Christ, of Jesus Christ, and of the Lord Jesus Christ, the day of God, the day of judgment, the great day of judgment, the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men, the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ, the day when God shall judge the world in righteousness by the man whom He hath ordained, the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God, who will render to every man according to his works, the day when all accepted of Him in time will find His mercy consummated. It is a definite time at the end of the world and of the race. It matters not what judgments, so-called, God may pass and execute in this life upon persons or any number of mankind, however related, they differ essentially in design, mode of execution, and effects from *this final one of our whole race together;* and to ascribe the same specific character to them as to it is to confuse things essentially different. It belongs to the fashion of many in these times, to make judgment mean the same as *crisis* does in English, assuming that, because this term is transferred from the Greek to our language, it had the same meaning in that which it has in ours; which it did not have. The primary meaning of the Greek word is separation, division; and thence it means an opinion formed or expressed, a decision, a sentence; then a judicial judgment, including a sentence of acquital or condemnation, which is its specific meaning in all passages relating

(*) NOTE.—For a forcible presentation of the importance of recognizing the administration of such retributions in this life, see Hengstenberg's Genuineness of the Pentateuch (Ryland's translation), Vol. II., pp. 473-487. He fails, however, to distinguish them from the mere natural consequences of sin and crime. They are produced by God's own agency either directly, or indirectly, and, but for it, would not occur. See also Carlyle's "Frederick the Great," Book III., Chap. VIII.

to the final, general judgment. This is wholly the act of the Judge; and any crisis it causes in the judged is no part of it, but merely one of its effects. But what are its design and end? Not that Christ, the Judge, may acquire any knowledge of the character or deeds of any before Him, for His previous knowledge of them is perfect; nor to increase the self-knowledge of any of them, although in connection with their perfectly revived memory it may have this effect. But the design is to make a perfect "revelation of the righteous judgment of God" in the case of each of all the myriads of mankind and of angels gathered before Him. By this revelation, all the "numbers without number" will perfectly know all "the secrets" of each of them, as well as his works and whole character, and thus precisely why he is judged as he is, whether with merciful and gracious acquital through Christ, or with sentence to just, retributive, positive punishment according to his deeds done in the body. Thus the absolute righteousness of the judgment in every one's case will be universally known and vindicated. It will not make the condemned any more certain of their destiny than they were before, but it will openly declare it and the reasons for it before the universal public; and not only will all holy beings forever perfectly approve it, but every wicked being will certainly do the same in the case of all others than himself at least, and doubtless in his own. After this eternal, unalterable judgment, not a mouth can ever accuse the justice of God. But now, if the natural consequences of sin, which are purely personal and independent of any such judicial judgment and its execution by our Lord, are its only so-called punishment, nothing of all this can be true. It is all excluded by this individually constitutional, naturalistic, self-operating process, which leaves neither place, use, nor reason for any judgment, much less a universal one, such as the Scriptural, social, administrative one demanded by the justice of the law, the whole constitution of the moral system, the Divine character of righteousness, and the rights, interests, and concerns of God and all good beings, and, in a sense, even of bad ones. How could a judgment for such a revelation consist with this theory?

§ 40. FEARFULLY DAMAGES THE CHARACTER OF GOD AS RULER AND AS A MORAL BEING.

10. The last objection I now urge against this theory is that it works fearful damage to the conception of the love of God. Its adopters, instead of recognizing that the love required by the law is

moral and just, and must fundamentally consist in intelligent action of the will, in its radical choice of the end of the law, in pure good-will to God and fellow natures, assume it to be essentially emotional, a merely sympathetic, sentimental affection, feeling, or state of the sensibility, and they never attempt to define or discriminate it. But such love may or may not be connected with a will in harmony with the law. All merely emotional, natural love is as blind as the mythical Cupid, and, in itself, is as void of moral quality and discrimination. It matters not whether it flows towards its objects in steady streams or paroxysmal gushes, it does not flow to them according to their moral character and deserts, good or bad, nor according to their consequent relations to God and the universal society, which demand positive social retributions of reward and punishment, but to them only as creatures susceptible of pleasure and pain, happiness and misery, as sentient rather than moral and accountable natures. With slight or no recognition of the sin, crime, or wickedness its objects are guilty of, or of what they deserve from and owe to God and the universal society of retributive suffering, it expends itself upon these objects simply as suffering or liable to suffer the retributive punishment they deserve. Such is the love ascribed to God by the advocates of this theory of only natural, consequential retributions. They assume that it would be, not only inconsistent with His love to *inflict* positive ones, but wrong and even cruel, doing what he has really no right to do, and what He would deserve the condemnation of his intelligent creatures for doing! They thus found morality and theology, not on practical reason, conscience, will, and Scripture, but on the sensibility. But, if God cannot justly inflict *positive punishment* upon sinners, by the same principle the natural consequences of obedience must be its only deserved and proper reward, so that he cannot confer a *positive one* on the obedient. It is arbitrary to maintain that God is required by the law to be a *positive* rewarder of the obedient, but forbidden by it to be a *positive* punisher of the disobedient. If the law, or properly moral nature, is *automatic* in the case of transgressors, why not in that of obeyers as well? Conscience attests the one as positively as the other. If men deny positive punishment, they must equally positive reward; and as God can have no moral government, nor moral system, *pure naturalism* alone remains, and He is a mere cipher! But the fact is, that, if this theory were true, there could be no desert at all of either reward or punishment by either obedience or sin.

But there is more inconsistency in this notion. Its advocates reject the doctrine that God will inflict positive punishment on incorrigible sinners, because He is love, and inflicting it would be inconsistent with love. When met with the objection, that, according to this, His love excludes Him from having any moral government, any justice, any real regard for His law in and from His own and every other moral nature, and so for that nature and its good in any being, even if obedient, so that He must be utterly indifferent between obedience and its natural consequences and sin and its natural consequences, and therefore the contrary of just and benevolent, they turn round and say—"Oh no; He does really inflict these consequences of sin on sinners as punishments, because, when He made them, He set retributive causes in their nature which produce these, and thus constituted them so, that, if they should sin, these would infallibly follow. He therefore as really causes them as if He should directly inflict them." A sufficient reply is, that, if this is true, and these consequences are, by God's *creative design and arrangement*, as really punishment by Him as direct infliction would be, and will in countless cases go on forever, how are they any more consistent with His love in any sense than such infliction? or how is *it* any more inconsistent with His love in any sense than *they?* If these are *two modes of designed punishment*, the one *indirect or mediate*, the other *direct or immediate*, how is the one in the least either more or less consistent or inconsistent with God's love than the other? But we deny the position. We deny that God could have constituted moral natures so that they could act morally without *essentially* just such consequences of each kind of action, and of course that He set any retributive causes whatever in them for the purpose of producing these. As if such natures could be constituted so that they could act morally without this progeny of consequences, and God must therefore add to them automatic retributive causes to produce it! But the truth is, that a being who could act morally without it is inconceivable. He would lack conscience and the sensibility connected with it, the law of habit as operating with moral action, and who can tell what besides?

But what a strange love this is, which is generally imputed to God by the advocates of this notion. According to it, whether moral beings obey the law or not, render to God and each other the love *due* by it or not, wrong and injure Him and each other or not—whether the influences and tendencies they have started to go on forever have been good or bad—whether they and others through

them have experienced the happy natural consequences of obedience or the unhappy ones of disobedience—whether they have rendered the existence of themselves and others an immortal blessing and glory or an immortal curse and shame—whether they have regarded and promoted God's pleasure and glory or scorned and outraged them—whether they are angels or devils—yet such is His love, that, although moral reason and conscience, fundamental in the nature he gave them, attest that they deserve and will receive retributive treatment from Him according to their works and character, He will not inflict that treatment on the evil, but will leave the natural consequences of sin and crime, however enormous, and these abated by Him as much as possible, to be their only punishment! More still; to give this love full scope towards human sinners, including the very worst, though a vast proportion of them may have lived under the Gospel and persistently rejected its offers of mercy and grace, many adherents of this notion maintain that they will have a new probation indefinitely prolonged after death! God will not, *must* not inflict retributive punishment upon even the worst, because love not only forbids, but demands that He shall enter Himself into their evil condition and woes, the natural consequences of their persistent wickedness, with infinite sympathy and ceaseless endeavor to relieve, help, and restore them! Love! It would be *utterly immoral*, an outrage on the universal, loyal society forever by trampling down all justice, all real moral love, all conscience and moral nature, the law and government of God; and the order and welfare of His everlasting empire. It would debar Him from all activity against the evil in favor of the good, and reduce Him to a moral neuter, neither administering, nor concerning Himself about a moral system; and it would license and invite universal sin and all vice and crime to revel and rage at will forevermore.

The natural consequences of sin its only retributions, and an indefinite future probation for sinners—these dogmas are the legitimate logical offspring of this spurious notion of God's love, and among the chief articles of the creed of many in our times. The former of them has been considered in the preceding pages, and will subsequently be considered further. The latter will be somewhat examined in Chapter VII.

CHAPTER V.

Butler's position, that God has a natural government besides His moral examined and rejected; also positions of Bushnell.

§ 41. DISAGREEMENT WITH BUTLER'S POSITION RESPECTING A NATURAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.

We are aware that what we have maintained in the two Chapters preceding is in collision with the position of Butler in his great masterpiece,* that the natural consequences of men's actions in this life are natural rewards and punishments by God, so that He has a natural government over "His creatures endued with sense and reason," and is a "Natural Governor." He says—"We are at present actually under His government in the strictest and most proper sense"—that "we are under it in the same sense as we are under the government of civil magistrates"—that "the particular final causes of pleasure and pain distributed amongst His creatures prove that they are under His government, what may be called His natural government of creatures endued with sense and reason," which, he says, "implies government of the very same kind with that which a master exercises over his servants, or a civil magistrate over his subjects." The government he means in each of these places is a natural, as opposed to a positive, moral one, as his whole argument, carried on in Chapter III., makes certain. Chalmers, in his Lectures on Butler, endorsed this position, as many others have done; but, for all the reasons we have shown in the two previous chapters, and will show in this, we are compelled to reject it. Our main reasons for canvassing it here are two—one, to forestall objectors to ours from adducing it and the weight of his great authority in opposition; and the other to evince the validity of ours, even though inharmonious with his.

(*) Analogy, Part I., Chap. II., and other places.

In no proper sense can God have two governments over men or moral beings—one natural, or non-moral, the other moral. Since He has but one moral law, which enjoins all action that is or can be moral, the sanctions of which, as we have shown, are not natural, but moral, as this great author correctly holds; and, since God's government entirely consists in declaring and administering this eternal law, His natural government, if He had one, could in no sense be moral or have a moral quality. Of course, there could be no essential *likeness*, and so no *analogy*, between the moral and it. It certainly could be no part of His function *as a Ruler* of moral beings to *create* them, nor, *as their Creator* to *rule* them; for ruling differs totally from creating, and can only begin when that is ended. As therefore the so-called natural government of God consists entirely in their natures, in their natural affirmations of the law and obligation, and in the natural effects to each of them of his moral action, it is really no government at all. The case of God Himself is an illustration. He is absolutely perfect in goodness, and has all the natural consequences of being so. If He should become unrighteous, instead of these, He would have those of that character. Does the one, or would the other, of these classes of consequences furnish a shadow of proof or evidence that, in any normal sense, He has a natural government in Him of any other being who constituted Him or of any kind? No; the one does, and the other would, only prove His eternal essence or being such, that, without any agency of any other being, it necessarily produces each class of them as it is affected by each kind of moral action.

§ 42. NO RETRIBUTIVE CAUSES SET IN MORAL NATURES, AS BUSHNELL HOLDS.

Precisely the same is the case with all moral natures. "God created them in His own image and after His own likeness," rational miniatures of Himself, and therefore susceptible of the very same kind of natural consequences of moral action which He is. Those of their action are just as entirely from their nature, and uncaused by any government of His, as those of His action are from His nature without any other cause. What Dr. Bushnell says of "retributive causes set in moral natures"—that is, by God in creating them—has no valid basis; for no such causes are *set or exist* in created moral natures more than in God's; and the natural consequences of moral action are not retributive, just because, as we are showing, they are not social and are not administered by God gov-

ernmentally or at all. The qualities of moral natures, which he calls such causes, are merely such as essentially belong to them, and without which they, whether creatures or Creator, could not be such natures; for they are in them and Him alike. Who can know or conceive of moral beings created and existing without moral reason and sensibility, which, separate, or in the wondrous combination of conscience, that very center of the moral nature, are so affected by their moral action as to produce nearly all, and the worst of these consequences? Lacking these, they could have no self-approvals nor self-condemnations; no intuitional affirmations of desert of praise or blame, and of reward or punishment from God or fellow-beings; no experienced peace with God, nor sense of guilt; no guilty fear, remorse, shame, self-loathing, despair, callousness of the sensibility of conscience, blinding of reason's moral eye, loss of moral taste, or other kindred effects. What semblace of a moral nature would that be, which lacked all such consequences of its action, and, of course, all the intrinsic qualities or attributes which produce them? Then, how could such a being exist without that other wondrous attribute, which constitutes the law of habit, and is the basis of all education, skill, or increasing tendency to any kind of action, whether of the will or of any other faculty of the mind? It is by it that moral beings grow more and more bent to repeat or continue moral action, right or wrong, generic or special, and increasingly receptive of these consequences of one kind or the other. Without this law, there could be no such tendency in them more than in a ball which has been shot, struck, or thrown, and has come to rest, to rise and fly again, or, not having stopped, to go on forever with increasing speed. To form moral character would be impossible, as there would be no connecting link between any action and others before or after it. One might strike or thrum the keys or chords of a musical instrument for a lifetime, and acquire no more skill by the practice than by the first stroke or trial—that is, no musical character; and no more could one acquire a moral character by a succession of actions or choices, right or wrong, however extended. Then, memory and the faculty of association are so involved in the habit-action of the mind and necessary to the knowledge of all past action of the will, the reason, the sensibility, the conscience, and to the consciousness of even personal identity, that, without them, as well as all these, moral beings would be impossible. In short, who can tell how they could be such, if a single attribute, quality, faculty, or susceptibility which we know belongs to them, *as such*, were left

out of them?—how any of these could be essentially changed, or others essentially different could be added to them, and they still remain such? The plain conclusion is, that God created moral natures in His own image, neither setting any causes or qualities in them which are not necessary to their being as complete in intrinsic likeness to Him as possible consistently with their finiteness and designed subjection to His government; nor leaving out of them any which are essential to their being as like Him as possible consistently with the conditions stated; and consequently there is no government of God or of any other being in their nature more than there is in His, or possible in either Him or them. An automatic law, and an automatic government are preposterous conceits.

§ 43. A NATURAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD OVER MORAL BEINGS A NATURAL IMPOSSIBILITY.

In view of all presented, and of the whole nature of the case, we hold it among the certainties, that, in any true sense of the term, such a government is a natural impossibility. No nature could be created so as to be or to contain one; for there is and can be no real one which has not been voluntarily designed and originated, which is not administered by one or more persons over others subject to it, and which, therefore, is not a purely social institution, consisting of two parties—the one the governing, the other the governed. A moral *nature* is no more voluntary, designing, intelligent, possessed of authority, or administrative of government or its sanctions, in experiencing the natural consequences of the moral action of its will, right or wrong, than material nature is in its various changes of the seasons and of all its phenomena, from the most genial and agreeable to the most opposite, of tempests and cyclones, volcanoes and earthquakes. In the Chapter we are noticing, Butler shows no recognition of the radical difference between the *natural* or personal, and the social, consequences of moral action, but lumps them together indiscriminately, and affirms that they are all alike "appointed by God," and are "by His appointment." But the social are not, as the natural are, in and from the natures of the actors, but are from their fellow-beings to or upon them as returns for, or social results of, their manifested character and their conduct. We hold that they are not retributions from God any more than natural experiences of any kind are, and that they are not "appointed" or "by appointment of God" in any other sense than simply that He created and constituted all of them social-moral natures in His own image, as we have already

shown. They existing and acting morally in their relations, all these consequences follow, of course, without any other appointment of God than His creating them such beings, and the terms "appointed" and "appointment" have no proper application to them. Not only do we reject the notion of a natural government of God as intrinsically impossible, a thing of construction only, but we hold that, if there were one, there could be no essential analogy between it and His moral government on account of both the radical and the specific dissimilarities between them, which have been more than sufficiently shown in Chapters III. and IV., and in this one. There is, to be sure, an analogy between every created moral nature and God's; between its normal moral action and His; and between the natural consequences of such action to it and to Him; but neither its nature, *per se*, nor His is, in any sense, moral government or its administration over any actor or others; and therefore no natural consequences of either its or His moral action can be governmental. If a nature is not a government, how can the necessary natural consequences of moral action be governmental? If told that God, in creating moral natures, set retributive causes in them, as Bushnell says, or annexed and appointed them to them, as Butler says, we have abundantly shown the groundlessness and intrinsic absurdity of this say of the latter in showing them of that of the former, as they mean the same. Only our allegiance, like Butler's, to "the rights of truth" and loyalty to God and the interests of man could impel us thus to express disagreement with this masterful author on this point, that God has two governments, one natural, the other moral, over mankind, and, by implication, over all moral beings. The same allegiance and loyalty impel us to notice his positions some further.

§ 44. WHAT NECESSARY TO CONSTRUCT SUCH A GOVERNMENT; AND MERE PRUDENCE NOT MORAL.

In order to construct a natural government of God over mankind, he found it necessary to do three things—1. To confine it, or attention to it, to them in this life—2. To find or invent for it a kind of *quasi* law, different from the law of God's everlasting moral government, yet somehow obligatory—3. To make the natural consequences of obeying it or not its sanctions, or only retributions. His construction was a misconstruction, because it was built, not on psycological facts respecting "the constitution and course of nature," but on assumptions concerning these and other supposed

ones, not real. We think we have abundantly shown that these consequences cannot be the sanctions or retributions of the law, nor any part of them; and they surely cannot of any other supposed law, when no other is possible. He speaks of "prudence" as if another; but is it? It is far from always having moral quality, being often used about courses or ways of acting to secure ends which have no relish in them of either moral or immoral, and yet have or may have consequences of even great pleasure or pain coupled to them. But, when it is moral, it is moral *wisdom*, and, like all other specific virtues, is required by an application of the law, and is executive of its radical requirement of supreme love to God and equal love to man in a special relation. It consists in choosing and using ways or means which we judge best to achieve or secure the best attainable ends; and its opposite is moral *folly*, which consists in disregarding such ends and such ways and means, and in choosing and using their contraries. Moral prudence, then, is simply obedience to a specific application of the one only law, and moral folly is violating one; and while they have, of course, both natural and social consequences to their actors, which are not governmental, they deserve and must receive, to the measure of the desert, from God, as administrator of His own social-moral law, just reward or punishment, as conscience and Scripture assert and the universal moral system constituted by the law in moral natures absolutely demands.

§ 45. GOD HAS ONLY ONE GOVERNMENT, AND ITS GENERAL RETRIBUTIONS FOLLOW THIS LIFE OF PROBATION.

For all the reasons preceding, and some others, we are compelled to reject the notion of a natural government of God over mankind as a thing of mere construction, intrinsically impossible, and neither of, nor according to, "the constitution and course of nature." God can have but one government over moral beings, and that necessarily a moral one, as there is but one law in and from the moral reason in Himself and in them, the sanctions of which, as both conscience and Scripture declare, are positive retributions to be administered by Him; and besides these, there can be no others. As far as mankind are concerned, all moral agents of them are on a gracious probation or trial during their responsible life, as to whether they will or will not yield themselves to His will as made known to them, in order that He may save all who will so yield from the punitive retribution they deserve; and, of course, *He can in*

no case consistently execute this retribution before death, or till the probation is ended. But the natural consequences of sin are occurring all through it, and therefore are not this retribution, nor of it, neither in this life nor in that which is to come. Accordingly, conscience, like Scripture, always points to retributions as to be awarded by God *after death*, but never to the natural consequences of moral action as either constituting or of them in this world or the next. But, in this probational life, God, as moral Governor, providentially mingles with "the riches of His goodness and forbearance and long-suffering to lead men to repentance" disciplinary dispensations of all kinds and severities in the cups of persons, families, communities, states, nations, races, and generations; and all normally acting conscience ever attests Him in all His interventions of mercy or judgment as manifesting His sovereign sway over the human world. Yes, "we are at present actually under His government in the strictest and most proper sense"—"in the same [positive] sense in which we are under the government of civil magistrates"—not a fictitious natural one, which is impossible, but a real moral one, which is the only one possible for Him on earth, in heaven, or in any world of rational beings.

"The constitution and course of nature" are identical with moral nature and its operations and experiences from its moral action, apart from any Divinely administered governmental retributions; and the whole preceding part of this work is mainly an exposition of this nature and these operations and experiences. It would not be pertinent to our present purpose to trace out and exhibit the analogy between this nature and the natural and social consequences to it in this life of its moral action, and God's universal moral government with its sanctions of reward and punishment to be administered by Him after this life, according to the Scriptural revelation. Although it would vary in no essential respect from that of this inestimable author, it would, we think, have a decided advantage over it for sweeping away all assumed grounds of objection to a universal moral system and the necessary requisite of a universal moral government for its maintenance, and to the redemptive measure and system. Every competent one, so disposed, can trace it out for himself and others; and we thus arrest consideration of this great author's Chapter referred to in his imperishable Analogy. We only add that those, in our times, who hold that God has only a natural government over mankind, are no more accordant with Butler than with psycology and Scripture, and must logically reject

not only his Analogy, but the possibility of a universal moral system. They must deny the existence of the law itself in all moral natures, which, putting them all alike under its clamping reciprocal obligations, responsibilities, accountabilities, influences, and actions, necessarily constitutes them into a universal moral society and system; or they must deny its real character as social-moral, and therefore intrinsically just, both ethically and retributively; and, with these denials, they must deny the whole social-moral nature and character of God, making Him in no sense just or wishing to maintain a universal society and system.

§ 46. WHAT THIS CRUDE NATURALISM MAKES GOD, IF A MORAL GOVERNMENT AND RETRIBUTIONS ARE DENIED.

Thus this crude naturalism makes God a care-nothing, do-nothing spectator of the universe of moral beings, palpably created by Him to be a universal moral society or system, He being, by the nature and the moral necessity and obligation of the case, both in it and its Ruler, yet left by Him without the government absolutely demanded by the social-moral nature of the system; without the momentous motives of its sanctions while on probation, and the justice, both ethical and retributive, of their administration at its close; thus not only without any evidence that He is either just or benevolent towards them, but with demonstration that He is neither in this supreme relation to them; hence, not only without any reason why they should love, regard, or care for Him any more than He does for them, but with supreme reasons why they should not; and thus without any real ground of religion, or for concern about it, as God is indifferent and they all unaccountable to Him. However men may veneer or sugar over this desecrating conception of the character of God with the fancied or figured notion of His natural fatherhood to mankind, versus His governorship, is it one to enamor or to revolt, to delight or to appall us? There is no conflict between the fact that sin has noxious natural consequences, and the fact that it has also governmental consequences; and to deny the latter, despite all the Scriptural teachings referred to in the preceding Chapter, all the attestations of conscience, and all the facts and invincible reasons we have shown why God must have a moral government, as the moral system founded in all moral natures demands, and to assert the former as the only ones, if God is love, is not only mere naturalism of the grossest grade, obnoxious to all the objections we have advanced against it, but is impliedly to

assume that He cannot be trusted to administer a real moral government over moral beings for fear He will abuse His power and act the tyrant in inflicting upon incorrigible sinners the positive retributions they deserve!

§ 47. GOD INFINITELY BOUND TO HAVE A MORAL GOVERNMENT, AND WHAT, IF HE HAS NOT.

Such is this mock-moral, mechanical, naturalistic, anti-psycological, as well as anti-scriptural notion; and, in opposition to it and all its implications, we maintain that, as the Author and natural Guardian of mankind and all created moral beings, God must be infinitely bound by the mandate of His own moral reason and the decisions of His own conscience, echoed by theirs universally, to have and to administer a social-moral government with its positive sanctions over them all, and in it to make the *motives* against sin and to obedience just as great and influential as possible. That is, He must make the punitive retributions of sin exactly equal in every case to the actual measure of ill-desert; and, while He may graciously go indefinitely beyond the good-desert of any in rewarding and blessing the obedient, He must, in every case, equal it. *Moral beings cannot act morally, except under motives;* and the declared sanctions of the law are *its* only motives, besides the intrinsic impulsion of its precept, to secure obedience and to restrain from disobedience to it. Of course, there are other motives in all God's manifestations of beneficence and all goodness, made to all His creatures, and of mercy and grace in the Gospel, made to all of mankind to whom it comes, along with its fuller and clearer annoucements of the law's sanctions. But these announcements are all sanctions of the law as it applies to mankind under the Gospel. Now, if God had not connected and would not administer all its sanctions, as both conscience and the Bible announce them, He would not even approach doing all He could and ought to do to prevent sin with all its dire progeny of natural and social consequences to its actor, and all its terrible tendencies and power of propagation, and to secure obedience with all its benign natural and other consequences to its actor, and its tendencies and power of propagation, and to benefit and bless others forever—that is, to conserve His rational creatures from ruining themselves and each other, and to conduct them to endless perfection, blessedness, and glory. How, then, can He, according to this mechanical notion, be a just, benevolent, good Being? How, not indifferent to the moral

action and character and the welfare of the moral beings He has created? If, to escape these logical results, the reply is given—"Oh, He is a Father!" the matter is neither evaded nor improved by it; for we ask what kind of a Father He is, or can be, if He leaves His children, during their whole probation, unescapably subject to all the temptations in and around them, with motives utterly inadequate to counterpoise these and to avail to conserve them from personal and mutual ruin by yielding to these? and, if He does not, as He certainly can and ought to do, add and declare others just as weighty as He wisely can?—if He does not declare, and, when the time comes, execute, in positively rewarding the obedient and punishing the disobedient, all that the social-moral justice of the law requires? Is He a good Father, or the contrary, if He does not maintain a real moral government over the universal and eternal society of His children with sanctions as weighty as the justice of the law and the holy love it guards demand, that is, as they can be? A wonderfully good Father, indeed, would He be! No; if good, He must treat each of the universe of His so-called children precisely as his social-moral relations, responsibilities, character, and deserts, and as the natural and moral rights, interests, and concerns of all others and of Himself in the whole eternal moral system absolutely demand. Ethical justice to that whole, including Himself, does demand positive rewards from Him to every obedient one according to his actual good desert at the end of his probation, *as He sees it*, and positive retributive punishment to every sinner according to his actual ill-desert at that time, *as He sees it*. To deny this is to deny that it is an intrinsic quality of the law, and thus that it properly exists; hence, that the law is social-moral; hence, that all moral beings are necessarily in an eternal moral system with God, who is its Ruler; hence, to be consistent, that there is such a thing as morality, other than merely conventional; hence, that moral beings have natural, and, if well-deserving, also moral rights, which they are mutually bound by obligations of justice to respect by a reciprocity of love and its special activities; and hence, that there is any real obligation on God or any other being to exercise this love to others of any kind. Then, if there is no demand of justice in the law for the retributive punishment of sinners by God according to their real deserts, and they are not exposed to it, an atonement is, of course, impossible, and, as we have before said, there can be no such thing as pardon, forgiveness, remission of sins, or justification, nor as mercy and grace in God in not inflicting that punishment

upon them, and no reason whatever why they should seek, pray, or concern themselves about escaping it or securing forgiveness. Christ could not have come in the flesh, that men "might be saved from wrath through Him," as they were never in danger of wrath. Thus this notion is a dire eclipse on God's entire moral system, on the law itself, on the object of Christ's mission to earth, on His character, on the whole measure of salvation, on the love of God in it, and on the full-orbed glory of His moral perfections and character as displayed in it towards guilty man on the one side, and the universal and eternal society of holy beings on the other. It is indeed "another Gospel, which is not another," but a very poor travesty of the real one.

We add no more in proof that God is a Moral Governor; for what we have shown demonstrates it, if anything in Theism and ethical science can be demonstrated. It is only to express an *analogy* between a human father and God as Creator, to call Him the Father of mankind, but it is to express an absolute fact, as real as His omnipotence or any other attribute, to call Him the Moral Governor or Ruler of mankind and all other rational creatures; for He is "the only Potentate," "the Lord of lords, and the King of kings," "who doeth according to His will in the army of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth: and none can stay His hand, or say unto Him, What doest thou?" Human rulers are such by right only as they derive authority and power from Him.* The monarchic idea is absolutely realized in Him, and in Him alone. The rational universe is not a democracy, with *universal or any suffrage* by an infinite difference, but a kingdom, a dominion, a monarchy, of which God is, and eternally will be the one never changed nor changeable, all-perfect Ruler, according to His all-perfect, all-binding social-moral law. Nor can the Gospel be truly preached, as it is, by any one who denies that He is thus universal Ruler.

§ 48. THREE CITATIONS RELATING TO POINTS IN THIS CHAPTER, FROM BUTLER, MARTINEAU, AND MATTHEW ARNOLD.

We ask readers to observe, that, in this and the preceding Chapters, we have shown the identity of our positions in the first five of this work with the teachings of Scripture on the same points. This Chapter will close with a few citations, relating to its matter in different ways, without extended remarks upon them, as intelligent readers will readily see their bearing.

(*) Prov. 8:15, 16; Dan. 2:21; 4:25, 32, 35; John 19:11; Rom. 13:1–7; I. Pet. 2:13, 14.

1. Noticing the questions, why God does not make His rational creatures happy without the instrumentality of their own actions, and prevent their bringing any sufferings upon themselves, Butler says—"Perhaps there may be some impossibilities in the nature of things, which we are unacquainted with. Or less happiness, it may be, would, upon the whole, be produced by such a method of conduct, than is by the present. Or perhaps divine goodness, with which, if I mistake not, we make very free in our speculations, may not be a bare single disposition to produce happiness; but a disposition to make the good, the faithful, the honest, happy. Perhaps an infinitely perfect mind may be pleased with seeing His creatures behave suitably to the nature which He has given them; to the relations which He has placed them in to each other; and to that which they stand in to Himself: that relation to Himself, which, during their existence, is even necessary, and which is the most important one of all: perhaps, I say, an infinitely perfect mind may be pleased with this moral piety of moral agents, in and for itself; as well as upon account of its being essentially conducive to the happiness of His creation.* We cite this passage for the deep thought of those who hold that benevolence in either God or man consists in a "bare single disposition to produce happiness," or in willing it to every one alike irrespective in his character and deserts.

2. The second one is from a private letter of Rev. James Martineau to a ministerial friend of mine who had written him for his view of retributive sanctions of rewards and punishments. This he declined to enter upon the discussion of, and then added—"I will only say that, so far as my observation goes, 'the powers of the world to come' over the conscience and affections of mankind have very little to do with the direct anticipation of 'reward or punishment;' but depend rather on the vast enlargement of moral relations and intensified sacredness imparted to the whole contents of life by the belief in its transcendent scale and perpetuity. Yours faithfully, James Martineau." He doubtless intended to say something definite in the last half of the sentence, but who can tell what? His apparent meaning in its first half is, that the facts and truths of, and radically involved in, the matter of the Gospel are so apart from, and independent of, retributive sanctions of future rewards and punishments, specially declared in the Gospel, that their power over the conscience and affections of mankind has very little to do with the direct anticipation of these sanctions. As far as our observation goes, the direct

(*) Analogy, Part I., Chap. II., near beginning.

opposite of this is the truth; and these sanctions denied or disbelieved leave the Gospel an imbecility, for the existence of which there is no adequate reason, and the characteristics of which are mostly abortive. Discarding them is discarding the moral system.

3. The third is from Matthew Arnold's work, entitled "Literature and Dogma," the fit title of a preposterous book, in which it repeatedly occurs as the fundamental thing of its contents. The expression is—"There is an enduring power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness." Sometimes, instead of "enduring power," he says, "an Eternal." This sentence has been much quoted as if it were a golden dictum. To us, it is spurious coin from lack of both the ore and the mintage of golden truth. It is pantheistic, if anything. Every rational mind is, ipso facto, a person, and a person only can be a power, an Eternal, not no-person, but actor, to secure righteousness. The expression, "makes for," is designed to correspond with its impersonal subject, and for evasion not only of the least recognition of a moral government and Governor, but of moral law and a moral system. He ought to know that "conduct" is not synonymous with "righteousness," nor good "literature" with infidel.

CHAPTER VI.

What must be true of the retributory punishment to be inflicted on all incorrigible sinners by God as Ruler of the universal society according to the moral system.

§ 49. IT IS NOT DISCIPLINARY, BUT THE RETRIBUTIVE PENALTY FOR SIN AS INJUSTICE TO GOD'S UNIVERSAL AND ETERNAL SOCIETY.

It is easy to see, from what has been shown, that punitive retribution is never disciplinary, never inflicted by God with any reference to the amendment or benefit of its recipient, but is always and solely punishment for sin. Its end is to secure from sinners the debt of suffering which they owe to God and His loyal society, and thus to meet the demand of moral nature for the punishment of evil-doers, and to protect, uphold, and promote the proper good of God and all in that society, which they have assailed and injured. God does discipline mankind in this world, both impenitent and Christian, by manifold chastisements aimed at the amendment and benefit of their recipients and of others through them; but His strokes are always lighter than their guilt, fall, as a rule, less severely on the ungodly (Ps. 73:3–14) than on those He loves, and are not distributed by any scale of deserts or justice. But retributive punishment proper must be strictly *just*, strictly *distributive*, strictly according to ill-desert in each case as God knows it, so that, *when executed, distributive justice must be its* MEASURE, *while public justice, or the greatest good of the universal loyal society and of God, its Head, must be its* END.

§ 50. THE QUESTION, THAT IT IS INCONSISTENT WITH GOD'S BENEVOLENCE, ANSWERED.

Nor is there any validity in the objection to this exact retributive justice, that it is inconsistent with the benevolence or goodness of God. In Him, as in all moral beings, benevolence is willing and doing precisely what the law requires; and I have shown that this is just what it requires respecting all sinners, unless the same ends can

be at least equally secured by some Divinely provided substitution. The objection, therefore, is really against the law itself, against the nature of moral beings, God's included, which contains and issues the law, and against the benevolence which fulfills it. Besides, it is equally against the natural consequences of sin; for God created the constitution of moral beings, and, if they sin, there is a necessity in it for these, just as there is for the suffering of this social retribution. He is no more chargeable with causing the necessity for the one than for the other. Neither He, nor the constitution made by Him causes either of them. Sin, the supreme monstrosity of the universe, causes both, ever brings them forth as twins—that for the natural consequences as *personal*, that for retributive punishment as *social*. God could not create *moral* beings without natural freedom of will and a necessity, if they would will rightly, of experiencing happy natural consequences, and, if they would will wrongly, of experiencing unhappy ones; nor without a necessity, from the *social* quality of their nature, if they will rightly, of *deserving* positive rewards, and, if wrongly, of *deserving* positive retributions; nor without a moral necessity on Himself of regarding and treating them correspondingly by *conferring* such rewards and *inflicting* such retributions. God's design in constituting them was not that they should sin and suffer either the natural or the retributory consequences of so doing, but it was that they should obey his law and experience the blessed consequences, both natural and remuneratory, of so doing; and He has done all He could, consistently with their nature and relations to keep them from doing and suffering the former, and to induce them to do and experience the latter. It is therefore by their own arbitrament, despite all He has done to prevent it, that all who have sinned have done so, and have experienced the natural consequences of so doing and made it necessary that they should suffer the punitive also, unless retrieved by a Divinely provided substitution and its fulfilled conditions. The whole evil of their condition is their own work; and the great moral poet, Young, admirably presents the case in the following lines—

"Man shall be blest, as far as man permits.
Not man alone, all rationals heaven arms
With an illustrious, but tremendous power
To counteract its own most gracious ends;
And this of strict necessity, not choice;
That power denied, men, angels were no more
But passive engines, void of praise or blame.
A nature rational implies the power
Of being blest or wretched as we please;
Else idle reason would have naught to do;

> And he that would be barr'd capacity
> Of pain, courts incapacity of bliss.
> Heaven wills our happiness, allows our doom;
> Invites us ardently, but not compels;
> Heaven but persuades; almighty man decrees;
> Man is the maker of immortal fates;
> Man falls by man, if finally he falls;
> And fall he must, who learns from death alone
> The dreadful secret that he lives forever."
>
> —*Night, VII., near its close.*

Milton, also, has grandly presented it in Paradise Lost, Book III., near the beginning, but at too great length to quote. The question, then, concerning God's benevolence, as related to either the natural or the retributive consequences of sin, is simply whether He was benevolent in creating moral beings at all, or would have been so, if He had never created any such beings. For, having created them, He is just as benevolent in inflicting deserved punishment upon the guilty, when the rights and infinite interests and concerns of Himself and all the loyal require it, as in rewarding the obedient, or in creating such beings at all. Not to inflict it would be consummate injustice and the direct opposite of benevolence, unless a substitution for it is provided by Him and accepted by sinners in fulfilling its conditions before their gracious probation closes at death.

§ 51. DURATION OF THIS PUNISHMENT, AND ILL-DESERT OF SINNERS ITS ONLY MEASURE.

There is no termination to the ill-desert of sin, nor to the due of retributive suffering created by it to God and His whole loyal society. The good-desert of obedience lasts while it does, but ends with it, if it does. But the due of moral love to God and His loyal society from every one is as lasting as his being. Sin is repudiation of this due and of the law which creates it, and is thus in conflict with the nature which gives the law. It is wrong and injury to the universal society, breaking its order and harmony and creating unhappiness and misery in it wherever its contagion extends—assailing its rights and securities—diffusing pernicious influences in it—causing jarrings, schisms, wars, and havocs in it—imperiling the rectitude and everlasting well-being of its probationary members—destroying the possibility of self-recovery in all who commit it, and of the eradication of it and its plague from the universe—causing the whole dire progeny of its natural consequences in all guilty of it—and wronging God supremely by disregarding and trampling upon His rights, claims, interests, authority, and heart. There is no evil in the universe not from it. It is the accursed mother of all curses, including everlasting

death and punitive retribution. The only retribution possible is Divinely inflicted suffering, whatever it may be or include. This, we have seen, is *due* from the sinner to God and His universal society. It is his everlasting *debt* to them, because his ill-desert, created by his sin, is everlasting. *Whatever punishment he deserves for his sin, as he commits it, he deserves the same for it as long as he exists;* so that, if, at any time during his probation, he repents and is forgiven and restored by God to the treatment of the holy, *it must be by pure grace, and not on the ground of justice at all—not as, in any sense, deserved by him.* Ill-desert is a soul-color that never fades. This is true of even the ill-desert of wrong done by one man to another in their private relations. Its doer can never maintain that he deserves no retribution for it from the wronged one, and demand *as his right*, that the latter, or any one, shall regard and treat him *as if* he had not done it. He can no more do so in a week than in a day, in a month than in a week, in a year than in a month, in any number of years than in one, in myriads of ages than in a lifetime. No duration can have the slightest effect in obliterating or diminishing his ill-desert, or in restoring his forfeited right to the wronged one's favor; and, if that one ever restores him to it and treats him *as if* innocent towards him, even if he may have repented, it must be by exercising grace in forgiving him contrary to his abiding, unimpaired ill-desert. How can it be otherwise in respect to the ill-desert of all sinners against God? In its very nature, sin involves an everlasting forfeiture of all right to His favor and desert of punishment from Him, the same as when acted. Like the blood-spot on the hand of Lady Macbeth, the dooming color of ill-desert on the sinner's soul will not out, nor fade. But, besides this fadeless fact of ill-desert, the everlasting rights, interests, and concerns of God and His whole loyal, eternal society absolutely demand the perpetual punishment of irreclaimable sinners according to their ill-deserts, as we have already shown and will yet show more fully; and God, therefore, can be neither *just* nor *benevolent*, if He does not inflict it upon all such sinners or provide some adequate substitution for its endurance by them, on the ground of which He can justly exercise grace towards them during their probation, and forgive all who fulfill the ethical conditions of reliance upon it and return to obedience, on which it is offered to all.

§ 52. TRUE MEANING OF THE WRATH OF GOD AGAINST SINNERS.

The necessity on God to inflict this punishment upon all sinners, unless rescued in the way stated, proceeds, as already shown, from

justice in the law as it is in, and emanates from, His own and all other moral natures; and the perfect conformity of His will to this quality of the law and of His nature, with His corresponding emotions, is His *wrath* (orge) against them. This is the only *wrath-principle* which can be ascribed to Him or any other good being. Far enough is His wrath from mere flaming emotions of indignation, or combustion of anger against sinners. It is no such ebulliency of emotion or *passion*, but His holy will with accordant emotions—His moral disposition, perfect as His nature, to treat sinners deserving the penalty of the law precisely as it requires—that is, *exactly according to their ill-deserts for its social ends*, as already set forth. There is no other rule of retribution possible, conceivable, just, or adequate to these ends, and therefore benevolent, to treat them by; and it is the only one taught in Scripture.* If therefore sinners of our race are not saved by grace through a substitution, God can have no room for *counsel* about subjecting them to the penal suffering they deserve, and no *liberty* to do better by them, or at all otherwise, than just as they deserve. *The measure of inflicted suffering must be in every case neither less nor more than exactly* JUST—*that is, exactly according to the measure of ill-desert as God sees it, since deficiency of it would be unjust to God and His loyal society, and excess of it would be cruelty to the sufferer—that is, while perfect ethical public justice must be its end, perfect distributive justice must be its measure.*

§ 53. ADDITIONAL PROOF THAT GOD CAN HAVE NO RIGHT OF COUNSEL AND NO LIBERTY, AGAINST PUNISHING INCORRIGIBLE SINNERS AS THEY DESERVE.

Bushnell says—"There is no principle which any human being can state, or even think, that obliges Him [God], on pain of losing character, to do by the disobedient exactly as they deserve. The rule, taken as a measure, has no moral significance. God, therefore, need not give Himself up to wrath [justice], in order to be just; He can have the right of counsel still. Perfect liberty is left to Him to do by the wrong-doer better than he deserves, and yet without any fault of justice—better, that is, considering His own condemning judgment of him, and the man's condemning judgment of himself, than He might well do, or even ought to do, if the sublime interests of His government should require."† We make this quotation now to show

(*) Job 34:11; Ps. 62:12; Prov. 24:12; Jer. 17:10; 32:19; Ez. 7:27; 33:20; Mat. 16:27; Rom. 2:6; II. Cor. 5:10; 11:15; I. Pet. 1:17; Rev. 2:23; 20:12; 22:12.

(†) Vicarious Sacrifice, pp. 170, 171.

the importance of the position we are maintaining. If we have done anything, we have both thought and stated, and, as we believe, demonstrated precisely such a principle; and it is fair to retort that no human being can state, or even think, any principle which permits God to treat the disobedient otherwise than exactly as they deserve, unless on the ground of a substitution. This author certainly has not stated one, and, we infer, because he could not think one; and no attempt to jumble law and redemption together can attain such a one. Justice either does, or does not, demand *social* retributions. If it does, how can God have a right of counsel and a liberty about meeting that demand, which involves all "the sublime interests of His government," the rights, dues, interests, and concerns of His loyal society forever, and of Himself as necessarily connected with it? If it does not demand them, what is it, at best, but a name? If not *social*, there can be none, because every one stands and must be dealt with as an isolated unit. Deserts, good or bad, and a social-moral system are then impossible. That last clause—"if the sublime interests of His government require," is the insurmountable barrier in the way of any counsel and liberty in the case, unless on the basis of a substitution. Besides this rule, no other can even be thought; and to say that God can have a right of counsel about conforming to it, and a liberty to do better, or at all otherwise, by the sinner than he deserves, unless in providing and executing a substitution, is to say that He has such a right about conforming to the law, and a liberty to treat sinners without regard to its demands, than which, if His nature contains and gives the law, what can be more absurd? It is to say further that He has this right as to whether He will regard, and do all He wisely can to secure the rights, interests, and concerns forever of Himself and all the loyal society, and a liberty to do better for sinners than to regard these and to do what He can to secure them! It is to say still further, that the law with its justice, is not in and from His nature and no less immutable, and that He is not bound to act by it! It implies a denial that either He or His intelligent creatures have any rights and claims to be mutually and sacredly regarded, or any moral dues from or debts to each other by their nature, and of course that sinners *owe* God and His loyal society any *debt* whatever of punitive suffering for all the wrong and injury they have done them! In short, it implies a denial that God has any social-moral system, and so that either He or any other being has any real rights whatever! For this so-called right of counsel is one simply to disregard all rights and to act by mere *caprice;* and this so-called liberty

is that of mere *arbitrary will*, which recognizes no law; and both would be against the law as it is in all moral natures.

§ 54. ABSURDITY OF THE NOTION, THAT HE CAN HAVE THIS RIGHT AND LIBERTY.

Let us consider it some further. If God, by counsel, may inflict on sinners *less* punishment than they deserve, the question is, how much less? A quarter? A half? Three-quarters? Nine-tenths? Ninety-nine hundredths? Why may He not dispense with it entirely, and abandon all show of government and justice?—all care whether obedience is or is not rendered to His arbitrary so-called law? All basis for punishment is destroyed by the supposition, as it leaves no principle to proportion it by, or to demand it at all; and the whole intelligent universe is afloat on a sea of mere arbitrary will and caprice. But we deny that any such right of counsel and such liberty are consistent with the benevolence of God. As the ends of justice, both as ethical and as retributive, are social, being those for which He created moral natures, and consisting in His own and their proper good, the retributive punishment of sinners which it demands is as truly *benevolence to the universal holy society* as the reward to the obedient which it requires is to them. How then can God's benevolence be *perfect*, if His infliction of retributive punishment on sinners is not *perfectly just* according to their ill-desert? If it is *less* than they deserve, it must be less *by so much* than would be perfectly benevolent to the holy society; and, since He must always act from design, it must be *designedly* less. But, if He designs not to act in perfect benevolence to the universal holy society, can there be ANY *real benevolence* in His acting? Designedly defective, imperfect benevolence, what else could that be in any being, especially in God, than designed selfishness? In Him, it could only be a selfish sympathy, in the case we are considering, with the guilty against the supreme rights, dues, interests, and concerns of the loyal and Himself; and what benevolence could consist with that? But, if benevolence designedly less than perfect were possible for God, how much less may it be, and still be genuine? One quarter? One-half? Three-quarters? Nine-tenths? Ninety-nine hundredths? The supposition is absurd. He plainly cannot be benevolent at all, if not perfectly so; and, for the same reasons, He cannot be just at all, if not perfectly so. As the Siamese twins were so vitally connected, that they must live or die together, so God's benevolence and justice are vitally and eternally united, and they have the same consummate end, which is that

of the law, the highest possible well-being of all who do not forfeit it by sin. No retributive punishment, therefore, or any less than exactly according to the ill-desert of sinners, as God sees it, would be *injustice* to the universal holy society and Himself; and, for this very reason, would be equally the opposite of *benevolence* to it and Himself. By refusing to inflict it, He would act against His own law and His own and all other moral natures which give it, and would bring blight and destruction on the holiness and well-being of Himself and all those natures. So totally false and fatal is this notion that God has a right of counsel as to whether He will or will not execute the exact punishment deserved by sinners without any substitution for it, and a liberty to do better by them than to execute it; and that justice is not in and of the law and the nature which gives it, but is a mere *invention*, incorporated by arbitrary will into a positive institution of government. What errors it would prevent, what truths establish, if men, when reasoning about what God can or cannot do, would remember that, although He is omnipotent and independent of His creatures, His will and actions are nevertheless never arbitrary or capricious, but are always and absolutely ruled by His eternal and immutable nature, having the law in it for Himself and them!

§ 55. WHAT GOD'S DESIGN IN INFLICTING THIS PUNISHMENT IS NOT, AND WHAT IT IS.

The design of the infliction of this retributive punishment is not, as some hold, to maintain the *authority* of God as Moral Governor, but to secure from sinners, as we have shown, the *debt* of penal suffering which they *owe* God and His universal holy society as the naturally demanded substitute for the moral love of which they have robbed them. The end of the punishment is the same as of that love, which is the greatest possible real good of that society and of God as related to it; and it is demanded by the law and the nature which gives it for that end and no other. As to God's authority, it is His moral right to govern for that end, and is no more an arbitrary assumption or arrogation than His conformity to His law and nature in any other respect. He cannot, therefore, inflict retributive punishment to maintain His authority or His right to govern, which would be making this its own end. But, when the real end demands punishment, He is bound by an infinite obligation of His own nature to inflict it, unless He can and does, *from mercy to the guilty*, provide a substitution for it at least as effective, as a means to secure

that end, as the punishment would be. Beyond choosing between these two courses He has no other option, not capricious and unjust; and, even if He provides a substitute, He must nevertheless inflict the punishment on all who do not accept and rely upon it for salvation, not to maintain His authority, nor as mere governmental policy, but to discharge His absolute duty by the law and His nature to secure the end stated. When He does this, He must grade the infliction exactly according to the measure of each one's ill-desert, as He sees it, and according to no other, less or greater, because there is no other, and the infliction would be arbitrary and capricious, and not justice at all. It is the verdict of universal reason and conscience, that the degree of each one's ill-desert is the only just measure of his punishment. If God deals with sinners as the law requires, He must punish them according to this degree, the necessity for Him to do this, like that for a moral government, being one of moral nature, Divine and created. He can neither disregard nor vary from this rule of retribution in His administration of the law, the whole function of His will and omnipotence, as Ruler, being to comply with and execute its demands. In no sense does He make justice.

What we have thus said involves as a postulate, that the *nature*, not the *relations*, of moral beings is the ground and source of all their mutual obligations, rights, and dues. Reason and conscience affirm that these pertain entirely to the *person*, while relations are simply the *conditions* or *occasions* of this affirmation. For, how could that nature, which is the ground and source of all relations, not be also the ground and source of all its own obligations, rights, and dues respecting others in those relations? How could its relations, which wholly result from and depend upon itself as their ground and source, and most of which are transient, be the ground and source of its obligations, rights, and dues, or other than simply conditions or occasions of its causing and affirming these in itself respecting the related beings?

§ 56. SIN AN EVIL IN ITSELF, HAVING INTRINSIC ILL-DESERT.

What we have thus said also involves as a postulate, that *sin is an evil in itself, having intrinsic demerit or ill-desert.* It is no objection to this, that the ideas of merit and demerit are relative; for the law itself and both obedience and sin are relative in the same sense, that is, are *social.* But how does the relative or social nature of sin prevent it from being an evil in itself, and from having intrinsic ill-

desert? Is it not such an evil for one to will and act intrinsic injustice and antagonism to God and man, intrinsic violation of the mandate of his moral reason to render them love as their intrinsic natural due? Says one—"Plainly, sin is an evil only as in its nature it is related to evil consequences."* Our questions just put apply equally to this affirmation; yet, as it relates directly to the matter of our discussion, we deem it important to notice it some farther although it scarcely has currency. Its necessary counterpart must be, that obedience is a good only as in its nature it is related to good consequences; and, in both cases, the consequences must be simply natural. We ask, then, *first*, what that is "in the nature" of obedience or sin which is related to these consequences of each? Plainly, the peculiar quality of each; and is not this quality or peculiar nature of each intrinsic? How can it be extrinsic? And, as the consequences of each mainly consist in and result from the action of conscience respecting it *in itself*, and not respecting anything extrinsic to it, what else can that *in itself* possibly be than its intrinsic right or wrong, good or evil quality or nature? The fact, that each kind of action invaribly produces the same peculiar class of consequences, never that of the other, proves that each has its own peculiar intrinsic quality, which renders it such a fixed, invariable cause. But, *secondly*, has conscience ever taught or hinted that obedience is not a good in itself and does not create good-desert, or that sin is not an evil in itself and does not create ill-desert, or that these two kinds of desert are *created* by the consequences of the two kinds of action? Does it impute no desert to either kind of action, and produce no sentence of reward or punishment upon its actor, till *after* its consequences appear to him, or *except* as he may have acquired some experience of them from previous action and may thus have anticipated them? How, then, could he ever *begin* to act morally, and to have desert imputed to him by his conscience? A *first* moral act would be utterly impossible, and so no following one would be possible, according to this theory. But the theory is outlawed by the single fact, that the imputation of desert by conscience and its corresponding sentence of reward or punishment are *never* based on the consequences, but always on the intrinsic character of the action, or of the actor in it. The only relation the consequences of either kind of action can sustain to its desert is, that, so far as the actor is able to foresee them as sure, or in any degree

(*) See Prof. N. W. Taylor's Lectures on the Moral Government of God, Vol. II., p. 279.

likely, to result, if he does the action, and as he does it to secure them, or in disregard or defiance of them, he *increases* the good or bad character and desert of the action, or of himself in it. But *thirdly*, if obedience is not a good in itself and sin not an evil in itself, but each is such only as it is related to its natural consequences, then neither of them is, *in itself*, moral action at all, and *intrinsically* they are both alike perfectly indifferent, neither good nor bad. Their names, obedience, and sin, indicate no moral quality in or difference between them, but simply their respective relations to their consequences; and to these, not as God sees them, but as the actor of either does or can anticipate them. But what conceivable reason is there why, of two intrinsically non-moral, indifferent actions, one should invariably produce good consequences, the other bad—why they should not both produce the same—or why either of them should produce such as it does, and not the opposite, or any at all? If there is no intrinsic moral and deserving difference between the actions, there can be none otherwise; and how can they produce different consequences, and that invariably? But further, as consequences have no moral quality, and both kinds of action are in themselves non-moral there is no conceivable reason why this quality should be in, or belong to, the nature of these actions as related to their consequences; and it is plainly impossible that it should; for how can the relation of a non-moral cause to its non-moral effects be itself moral, or make either it or these moral? There can, therefore, according to this theory, be no ethical system, no morality, no merit or demerit, in any sense. By no effort can the truth be escaped, that the sole reason why obedience and sin produce the natural consequences they do in their actors exists entirely in the intrinsic moral quality of each; and that, prime among these consequences is the fact, that, as the moral quality of actions does not inhere in them apart from the actors, but in them in their actions, the merit or demerit of the actions pertains entirely to the actors. It is the actor that *deserves* reward or punishment for his acting; and therefore it is not in any of his executive acts, but in his heart, spirit, or radical moral will, from which these proceed, that merit and demerit, desert of reward or of punishment has its birth, home, and greater or less measure. There are myriads of murderers, adulterers, thieves, liars, and criminals of all kinds *in heart*, who never committed the executive acts of such, who are really more criminal and deserve greater punishment than many who have committed them. So there are myriads of truly holy ones *in heart*, who

have done very few and only inconspicuous executive acts, who are intrinsically more well-deserving of, and will receive from God greater, some of them perhaps vastly greater, rewards than multitudes who have abounded in such acts. The soul itself, the immortal spirit is the only real home of all true morality towards God or man, and of good or ill-desert, and God is the only perfect spectator, critic, and exact recompenser of all done in it according to its intrinsic desert.

§ 57. NO PLAN OR MEASURE OF REDEMPTION IN GOD'S MORAL GOVERNMENT.

From what has been shown, it follows that God's moral government, instituted as we have seen, involves no plan or measure of redemption, has no reference to the recovery of sinners, and no provision in it for mercy or grace towards them.* His moral government consists in holding and treating all created moral beings as responsible and accountable to Him, as their absolutely rightful Moral Governor, for their moral action, and in administering the sanctions of His law to them by favoring and rewarding the obedient and frowning upon and punishing the disobedient according to their deserts, as its justice demands for its end. It was instituted in and for moral beings *as such*, and not *as sinners;* and its institution did not imply that any of them would ever become sinners, but merely that in their freedom they might. How, then, could it contain a redemptive arrangement or provision of any kind, or have one involved in it? Conscience certainly never gives an intimation of it. It never whispers of redemption or mercy, but inexorably dooms all guilty souls; and, in doing so, it but echoes the sentence of God, as Moral Governor. The question is not whether God, foreseeing the sin of mankind, had or had not an eternal purpose or plan of redemption in His mind for them, for this He certainly had; but whether it was part of, or embraced in, His moral government instituted in and for His rational creatures, or was devised by Him to rescue human sinners from the penalty and power of their sin, which it certainly was. *They* violate the law of His government; *He* devises and executes a plan to save them from the punitive retribution they deserve for the violation; and, while the plan and its execution relate directly to His government, they do so, just as a remedy for a disease relates to the bodily constitution. In the nature of the case, they can no more be a part of it, or involved in it, than a remedy

(*) Bushnell's Vicarious Sacrifice, Part III., Chap. II.

can be a part of or involved in that constitution. They must be independent of it in origin, subsequent to it in the order of things, and necessarily a matter of distinct counsel and adoption, of mere mercy and grace, and not of government at all. To suppose a redemptive provision *in* God's moral government is intrinsically absurd. It is to suppose that, from its beginning, His government has carried its own nullification in its vitals, has been self-abrogated, or only an empty show. It would be an invitation and incitement to moral beings, if aware of it, to begin and continue to sin. It would be like the Temperance Society I once aided in organizing with a pledge of future total abstinence from all intoxicating beverages. After the constitution was adopted, the names of nearly all present, about fifty, were subscribed, and the officers were elected, one member moved that an article should be added to the constitution, that, if any member should at any time wish to be released from the pledge, he could be by applying to the President or Secretary! I opposed its adoption, but a minister who had joined favored it, saying that he did not believe in binding people by covenants and pledges longer than they willed; and it was adopted! That society died therewith by this, its own act; and so would God's moral government, or any other, which, by its institution, contained a provision or method of redemption for its own transgressions. This notion arises from the vitiating mistake, already noticed, of confounding God's moral government with His temporary provisional government, *positively instituted* for the Israelitish people through Moses. But this was only a modified application of His moral government to *sinners* of that people in their temporal life and relations to each other and to God, which was "ordained by angels in the hand of a Mediator" (Gal. 3:19), as part of a grace-scheme towards them and typically towards mankind. This mistake is astonishing; for this theocratic government over Israel was not over any of mankind *before* it was ordained at Sinai; nor was it ever over any other people; nor has it been over them since the time of Christ or the destruction of Jerusalem; nor will it ever be over any of mankind again; yet surely God has *always* had His moral government over *all* mankind and all rational creatures, and always will have. It is from the penalties for sin of this *universal and perpetual* government that the scheme of redemption provides the way and means of salvation for human sinners; and it is by the infliction of these everlasting penalties that all not saved by this grace-scheme will be punished. We have no knowledge of any such scheme in or con-

nected with God's government over rational beings in any other world; and thus this notion of a redemptive provision in it, *as instituted*, and therefore universal for sinners, vanishes into air, and it is made certain that the redemptive provision for human sinners is outside of God's government over them both in origin and in intrinsic nature. His moral government is founded in and demanded by His own and all created moral natures; His redemptive system is His *device*, His *scheme* to save sinners from its penalty and their sin. As already said, this provision is related to this government as medicine is to man's bodily constitution. Men become diseased in body by violating their constitution, just as they become sinners and liable to penal retribution by violating God's government; and, as the design of medicine is to cure the disease of the body, so that of the redemptive provision is to cure the whole condition of the sinner induced by sin.

§ 58. FURTHER REASONS WHY HE MUST INFLICT EXACT RETRIBUTIVE PUNISHMENT ON SINNERS AS THEY DESERVE, UNLESS HE CAN SAVE THEM THROUGH A SUBSTITUTION.

As God created all moral natures with His law in and dictated to them by their practical reason, and established by conscience with its intuitive affirmations of desert of reward or of punishment by obeying or disobeying for sanctions; and as He thus instituted His moral government *in* them, He not only constituted them a universal ethical society, but by necessarily putting Himself into it and being its Ruler, He must be responsible before His own conscience for securing to Himself and the loyal of them the due of retributive suffering from sinners, which justice in them all, in the law, and in His government demands. As He is eternally identified with the society and its Head, He must have infinite rights, dues, interests, and concerns in and from it; and justice, therefore, has everlasting demands upon each and all in it, or in revolt from it *in respect to Him, both as a Person and as sustaining to them all the relations He does as their Maker, Proprietor, Preserver, Benefactor, and Ruler*. Sin not only robs Him of the moral love due Him naturally as a Person, and morally as absolutely good and deserving the greatest possible gratitude, honor, reverence, and all obedience, but it intrinsically and practically denies and wars against all His authority, and all His rights to moral love and that can belong to it in action. Sinners therefore *owe* Him a correlative due of suffering immeasurably greater than to all other beings, and His *claim* against

them for it is correspondingly greater than that of all others for what is due to them. His relations to *all*, and His responsibility to all the loyal, existing, and to be created in all futurity, make it impossible that He should abandon this claim and leave it unsecured. To do so, He would war against His own law and government founded in His own nature and theirs, and thus subvert His whole character. As His claim and due are of the very essence of justice, which is the bond and clamp of the intelligent universe, and as essential to it as the attraction of gravitation is to the material universe, how can He disregard them in any degree or respect?

As it respects the universal holy society, a shuddering terror might well sieze it, if it found that God would leave the least jot of His own or their just due from sinners unsecured in some way. For, to do so would be an arbitrary negation by Him of ethical justice to them, according to which as a precedent, He might wholly and forever disregard it, and make *injustice* the principle, or want of it, of His treatment of them all. For, as justice is the great universally social principle, injustice, its opposite, must be equally universally dissocial and rife with conflicts, wrongs, and wars. As every penal claim of God is also one of the whole society under Him, and as every due of penal suffering to Him is also one to it, if He should leave any such claim unmet or due unsecured, He would thereby sanction universal injustice and make caprice His only rule of procedure, and outlaw all rights, and all His law. For, in whatever way he treats one transgressor, He can, and virtually does, treat every one; and He would thus arbitrarily discard all regard for all the claims and dues of justice in the universe, not only as retributive, but as ethical, because, in essence, they are identical. With justice, He would necessarily discard the *pure moral love*, which the imperative of the law makes due from each and all to each and all according to their rights; and with this its *end*, their true and everlasting good. The whole interlinked *trio* go together.

§ 59. JUSTICE THE SOCIAL BOND, TYING ALL TO RENDER RECIPROCAL MORAL LOVE ILLUSTRATED.

Thus, as justice in the law is the one social bond which ties all to render moral love to each other, if that bond be broken, they, like the material worlds, if their bond of attraction were gone, must unsphere themselves from their Divinely constituted correlation of mutual love, and, driven on by their mere personal, self-centering tendencies and selfishness, must rush lawless into all disorder,

collision, and anarchy, each ruined and ruining forever. Or, as justice is the one Divinely-wrought vase to hold and preserve the sacred cordial of the mutual holy love of all moral beings, if that vase be broken and not repaired by the boundless moral act of its Great Artificer, its infinitely precious contents must flow away from them all forever, leaving them to perish with the raging thirst of the consuming fever of confirmed selfishness and all its terrific progeny of acted enormities and eternal natural consequences. Or, as justice is the heart, arteries, and veins, which contain and diffuse the blood of holy love in the body of the universal society, if the heart or one of these main conveyers of that blood, which is the moral and spiritual life of that body, be cut or torn open, it must gush out of it and leave it collapsed in the spiritual death of utter selfishness and all its issues and trains of consequential curses. Is it possible, then, that, if moral beings break that bond, fracture that Divine vase, cut or rend that heart or its great conduits for circulating that moral blood of holy love through the whole body of the universal society by sin, and cause all the disorder, conflict, anarchy, and pernicious consequences which convulse it, and blight, torment, and blast themselves and each other forever, and which afflict all the loyal and even their Creator, subjecting them to grief, trials, endurances, self-denials, labors, and measureless sacrifices, they will yet incur no positive retribution from God according to their deserts, or beyond the mere personal natural consequences of their sin? Is it possible that no endurance of penal suffering from the hand of God is *due* from them to Him and the loyal society for the injustice and injury they have done to Him and it? Is it possible that justice has no claims, function, or existence against wrong-doers? Is it possible that, if the bond it constitutes be not restored, the fractured vase not repaired, the deadly wound to the heart and circulating apparatus not perfectly healed, the harmony which that bond alone can secure, the cordial of moral love which can only be kept in that vase, the life-blood of that love which can only circulate in that heart and apparatus can, by any means or power in the universe, be secured, kept, and circulated, or have existence in the empire of God? They have *robbed* that empire and its Head of the love they *owed* it and Him; shall they not *pay* the correlative of retributive suffering in its stead? They have projected into it a *curse* of malignity sufficient to turn it into a universal hell; shall they not receive a corresponding curse of punishment in return? They have trampled justice, as *ethical*, into the dust by substituting their selfishness

and its deeds for the love it binds them to render to God and all others; shall it not spring out of it again, as *retributive*, to smite them back according to their ill-deserts?

§ 60. THE PRINCIPLE OF ETHICAL AND RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE THE SAME.

To answer such questions in the negative is to contradict universal conscience; for its voice in consciousness is even stronger for *retributive* than for *ethical* justice, amazingly strong as it is for that, as shown in Chapter II.; and, if men build their ethical and theological fabrics professedly on psychology, they should accept and adhere to all its deliveries alike. When they do this, they will no longer advocate and eulogize *ethical justice*, as they should, and then turn round and denounce *retributive* as an outrage on the sensibilities of mankind, and at war with the benevolence of God, when moral reason is for the latter equally as for the former. Theodore Parker, in his sermon on "The Function and Place of Conscience," preached in 1850 against the Fugitive Slave Law, spoke thus of ethical justice—"It is the point in morals common to me and all mankind, common to me and God, common to mankind and God; the point where all duties unite—to myself, my brethren, and my God; the point where all interests meet and balance—my interests, those of mankind, and the interests of God. When justice is done, all is harmony and peaceful progress in the world of man; but when justice is not done, the reverse follows—discord and confusion; for injustice is not the point where all duties and all interests meet and balance, not the point of morals common to mankind and me, or to us and God." Truly and grandly said, but deeper truth than its author thought. For, suppose justice is not done by any number of moral beings, but injustice, assailing all duties and interests common to God and His rational universe, and setting discord and confusion into action against Him and it with measureless damage to them. Has justice then no farther function respecting the evil-doers than like some rightful and illustrious monarch, deposed and confined by his rebellious subjects, who, still crazily fancying himself their sovereign, persists in proclaiming his mandates to his mocking deposers, to act the discrowned and degraded part in moral natures of continually babbling out to them its ethical rights, demands, and mandates, as if still sovereign, only to see them disregarded and scorned by those natures because it has no power to enforce them by deserved and requisite penal retributions? Does the fact that the rebels and scorners have trampled and flouted ethical justice end the matter,

so that they *owe* no endurance of retributive justice from God, as due to Him and His loyal society instead of the love of which they have robbed Him and them, and for the injury they have done them by acting against it? Does conscience ever attest any such stupendous folly? No; it attests with unsurpassed positiveness, as already repeatedly shown, that not only guilt or desert of punishment, but that endless, is created by all sin, and that the endurance of it by sinners is due to God and all holy beings. It is essential to God's benevolence to secure this due, because justice is social, and what it demands is His and their everlasting interest, concern, and right, as the safeguard of their love, order, and blessedness, and therefore of His own righteous character and all the holy relations between Him and them forever. It is ethical justice in Him to secure it, and would be ethical injustice in Him not to do so, because, if He should not, they would be universally, perpetually, and fatally wronged and ruined, as He would thus practically declare moral love and its results to them of no importance, and show Himself indifferent, whether they mutually rendered it or not, and between those who did and those who did not. It is therefore absolutely incumbent on Him to punish all sinners as they deserve, or to meet the ends of retributive justice in their behalf by a substitution, which, if they avail themselves of it, will at least equally secure those ends to Himself and all loyal beings, *before* He can forgive and save one of them, even if he should repent.

§ 61. NO SINNERS EVER WOULD OR COULD REPENT, IF NO ATONEMENT, EVEN IF GOD WOULD FORGIVE THEM.

Men say, God is infinitely good and merciful, and therefore would and must forgive sinners, if they repent for that reason alone. But the inference is without foundation in the premise. For, without an atonement and the grace manifested on its basis, they are under the law alone, and there are no facts, truths, motives, influences, manifestations, nor conditions, either in and from the nature of law and government, or from God as Moral Governor, which, considering their subjective state and objective liability to the punishment their conscience tells them they deserve for their sins, have the least adaptation or tendency to bring them to repentance. All there are have directly the opposite tendency. Repentance consists essentially in turning from sin, which is selfishness, to true moral, complacent love to God by an entire surrendry to Him in faith on the ground of His manifested mercy and grace. But sin separates

and alienates its actor from Him; creates in conscience the sense of guilt or desert of punishment from, and a profound dread of, Him; makes its actor regard Him, not as kindly disposed, but as an incensed adversary and punisher; and it therefore excites aversion and hostility of heart against Him, especially when His holy character, claims, and relations to himself are brought clearly before him. Conscience, the terrible judge, condemns and dooms him without a hint of Divine mercy or grace for him; and thus, with his guilty aversion and opposition of heart towards God, and without hope of favor from Him, he shrinks from Him, and dislikes to retain Him in knowledge, or to be pressingly reminded of Him as related to himself. Besides, the law of habit increasingly binds and sets him in this state of sin and alienation; and there is an intrinsic self-delusion, a kind of sorcery in sin, which infatuates its actor and urges him on in it, and which increasingly blinds his eyes to all spiritual realites, and prevents all proper apprehensions of them. Such being the subjective state of sinners, which renders it among the most difficult of things to bring them to repent, even under all the Divine manifestations, revelations, truths, motives, agencies, and influences of Christianity, how could they possibly be brought to do it, if without these, and left entirely to themselves under the law alone, by which they are already consciously condemned and doomed? As they could have no ground of hope, because they would have no promises or intimations from God, that He would be merciful and gracious to them, if they should repent, how, in their whole condition, could they possibly trust him as willing to forgive them? and, if they could not trust, how could they love Him with any complacency, or hope for any favor from Him? Men cannot act morally without motives, without which their will is "as idle as a painted ship upon a painted ocean," but in view only of such as are before them, and therefore it avails nothing to say they are still free agents; for, without an atonement and all the redemptive provisions, disclosures, truths, motives, agencies, including that of the Holy Spirit, and influences it involves, besides which there are none adapted to bring men from the state in which they are to repentance, how could they repent? The law is without a single motive in itself to bring men to repentance, that is, to renounce their selfishness and hostility to God and to begin to love Him, while its whole bearing on them in their subjective state renders it impossible, that, under it alone, they ever would, or morally could, repent, if the entire redemptive provision had not been graciously made for them,

including the agency of the Holy Spirit. This is no less the ground and source of all the necessary conditions of repentance than of forgiveness.* No heathen ever could repent, if it were not for the traditions and shimmerings of redemptive grace announced to our first parents in the protevangel, indicated to Noah, and diffused to the nations in the reports they received of God's dealings with Abraham and his Israelitish posterity—all made effective by the mighty agency of the Holy Spirit.

§ 62. EVEN IF THEY COULD, IT WOULD BE NO REPARATION FOR THEIR SINS.

But, assuming that men could and would repent without any redemptive provision, what reparation would that be of the stupendous wrong and injury they have done to God and His loyal universe? How could it restore justice to its power to bind men to render to each other the moral love which it makes *owed by and due to* every one? How could it restore the broken bond, the fractured vase, the ruptured heart, artery, or vein, arrest the pernicious consequences sent out through mankind and the intelligent universe by sin, and set moral love and its consequences in that universal and perfect operation, which they would forever have had, if they had not been so appallingly supplanted and counteracted by sin? It could do nothing of the kind, meet no end of justice, and repair no damage whatever. If, therefore, God should pardon sinners and treat them as the obedient merely because they repent, and without the ground of a substitutionary atonement for so doing, He would practically put universal conscience, His own creation, with its sense of guilt, and its judicial condemning and dooming in them, and its corresponding action in all holy beings under ban as false, and would capriciously and fatally outrage all moral nature, including His own. He would disregard the law in and from it with its justice, which makes moral love *owed by and due to* every one, and thus dismantle this love of all enforcement, defense, and estimation, consigning it to the mere option of each actor, whether to render it or not, and leaving its end of the true good of moral beings like Jerusalem razed and trodden down of the Gentiles. He would practically proclaim moral nature with its conscience, the law in and from it with its justice, matter, and end, the love which fulfills its matter with its natural consequences, the sin which destroys that love and its end with its natural consequences, the everlasting tendencies of

(*) § 73, p. 96.

each of these kinds of action, and all the rights, dues, debts, interests, concerns, securities, and necessities of Himself and His whole loyal society forever such insignificant trifles, that they weigh comparatively nothing against the mere personal and forfeited interests and concerns of a repentant sinner of whatever degree, even though his enormities may have hurled myriads or millions into eternity, few of them repentant, many of them black with most, some with all, named and nameless crimes and vices, but the great mass chiefly innocent of these; and though he may have devastated nations and continents and caused multiplied millions to cry to heaven with immeasurable anguish for just vengeance. How could God possibly be just or benevolent, or not the direct opposite, if He should disregard that cry, should pardon any such tiger of the world or actor of crime, vice, or wrong of any kind simply for repentance?

No essential truth or error abides alone in human minds; but, from a necessary logic, each belongs to a whole family circle adhesively united, and draws its kindred with or after it. So, not only does this notion, that repentance is the only requisite for the forgiveness of sinners, deny the necessity for and the fact of an atonement, and involve all the consequent positions and negations indicated, but it makes place for itself and its kindred inventions by evicting denials of staple truths. Let us here notice one or more of these kindred.

§ 63. POSITION THAT GOD AND ALL GOOD BEINGS SHOULD ENTER INTO SYMPATHY WITH, AND GO TO COST FOR, SINNERS, LIMITED.

Some who maintain the notion stated concerning repentance, represent that it is the great business of God and all good beings respecting sinners, to enter themselves by voluntary sympathy into their bad condition and woes, and to woo, serve, endure, sacrifice, and put themselves to cost for them, no matter what wrong or enormity of wickedness they may do. They state this without limitation; and, as far as God is concerned, they represent His doing this as the only atonement He makes. According to the principle as declared, He and they should do this for them the more devotedly, the worse they grow in sin and the deeper they sink in its dire results. They should do it with superlative zeal for all of highest bad eminence, whose enormities of crime and all wickedness convulse, torment, debauch, and curse their fellow men! The principle, as they state it, spreads its all-embracing arms around the antidiluvians, the Sodomites, the Pharaohs, Cæsars, Herods, and Judas

and the murderers of our Lord, the Alvas, the perpetrators of the St. Bartholomew massacre, of the dragoonades, and of all the horrors of the French Revolution, and all the scourges of nations who find their territories gardens and leave them deserts! Whole Amazons and Mississippis of greatest sympathy and cost should be poured on all these and millions like them, impersonated pestilences, earthquakes, famines, deluges, and wars; and, with them, on all the millions of monsters of lust and crime, outrage and wrong of every kind; while comparatively only brooks and dwart rivers of these expenditures should be poured upon the multitudes of their murdered or living victims of each sex and all ages! Such, in substance, is a fair representation of this principle. Connected with the notion, that the natural consequences of sin are its only retribution, it not only requires God and all good beings to be absolute non-resistants to all bad ones, but to be their everlasting sympathizers and cost-payers in proportion to their wickedness and whole bad condition, as if their sins against God and wrongs or enormities against men were merely their calamities, and the sympathy and cost of God, of all they have wronged or outraged, and of all good beings were only or supremely due to them! and for God to render these to them is atonement!

This notion is a tangle of precious truth with hideous error, a mixture of sacred honey with destructive poison. God enters Himself into no sympathy with, and goes to no cost for any grade of sinners, especially those whose vices and crimes make them the pests of mankind, which in the least conflicts with His punishing them exactly as they deserve when the gracious probation He has given expires, as He often begins to do in time. Nor should angels or men. Rather should they enter themselves into thorough sympathy with all the wronged—with all good beings wronged with them in principle, feelings, and interests—and with God, the benevolent and just Ruler and Guardian of His intelligent creatures, who is transcendently wronged and outraged in all the wrongs and outrages done to them. And, as the magnates in sin and its enormities never, or very rarely, repent, all others on earth and all in heaven should rejoice that they will infallibly receive the retribution they deserve; and all sympathizers with the victims of their crimes should put themselves to all requisite cost to bring them to deserved justice on earth. If we trace history, sacred and secular, from its beginning till now, and aggregate into one catalogue all the human monsters of the successive generations in every part of the world,

who, as monarchs or rulers of empires, kingdoms, or republics, or those in some way subordinate to or connected with them; or, as conspirators, traitors, rebels, usurpers, tyrants, mighty conquerors, or commanders of armies, or as their subordinates, agents, and tools; or as some Popes, and inquisitors and all persecutors who have blackened its pages with their recorded crimes, vices, and enormities; and if we notice and realize the measureless evils and miseries inflicted and caused by each and all of them, male and female, on others, whether on individuals, on a few, on hundreds, on thousands, or on millions—on a single nation, or on many, or even on vast portions of continents—of brief, or of protracted, continuance, even for centuries, or perpetual—evils and miseries often including incalculable havoc, not only of lives by wars and otherwise, but of treasures, and of the products of the arts and labors of vast populations through numerous generations and ages:—if we thus trace, notice, and realize, how, I ask, is it possible that the benevolent and righteous God could enter Himself into any sympathy with, or go to any cost for, the authors of such stupendous crimes and evils, which would in the least conflict with punishing them exactly as they deserve when their probation is ended? or, that angels could, or even the mass of mankind, though consciously sinners themselves?

But, besides these magnates in wickedness, there have always been multitudes in inferior spheres equally apostate from all good and rank in vice and criminality—murderers, parricides, matricides, fratricides, killers of wives, of husbands, of offspring, even of embryos, and assassins--pirates, robbers, burglars, thieves, swindlers, forgers, cheats, gamblers, and such like—liars, deceivers, impostors, slanderers, treacherous dissemblers, perfidious injurers, underminers, hypocrites, perjurers, blasphemers, profane deniers of and scoffers at God and His Gospel, and persecutors—crowds of men and women sunk in all the pollutions and crimes of licentiousness—drunkards and drunkard-makers, and ingrates who repay good with evil. Considering all the crimes and enormities of all such, the destruction of life and well-being they cause, the hosts of their victims, the millions of souls blighted and forever ruined by them, the incalculable injury and agony caused to untold millions in time, the countless currents of corruption, degradation, shame, desolation, and despair they originate or make worse, and the impiety and outrage they commit against God and all that is pure, just, and good on earth and in heaven;—and considering, on the other hand, what all these dark legions of men and women would have been to them-

selves, to the world, to the whole everlasting society, and to God, if they had lived just and holy lives, and all the souls they would have been agents in saving, of all of which they have robbed God and His loyal society forever in addition to all their acted enormities—considering all these, by what possibility could God, that society, or even mankind not of them, so withdraw and alienate sympathy with, and cost for, all their victims, all even of themselves not yet drawn beyond recovery into their whirlpools of wickedness, and all liable to be their victims in this world and forever, as to expend these upon them in any sense which would conflict in the least with their subjection to the punishment they deserve when their probation is ended, or with such beginnings of it in time as men find it practicable to inflict?

But mankind are all sinners, and all sin is opposition to and wrong against God and all His society, being in smaller measure the same in principle, effects, and tendencies as in the appalling measures already considered; and they all deserve punishment according to the degrees of their guilt. Neither God nor other holy beings, therefore, can enter themselves into any sympathy with, nor go to any cost for, any of them, except within the same limits which confine them respecting the worst of the race. For the sympathy intended is not mere natural pity or compassion, which is involuntary, but is *voluntary*, and the cost intended is an expenditure of effort and sacrifice for its objects to bring them back to obedience to God, and both must terminate towards the incorrigible when their probation ends. A knowledge of the history of the world is a sufficient antidote to all this sentimental invention of sympathy and outlay of cost beyond that bound.

The true view of God's real sympathy for mankind will be expanded in the sequel, and we only indicate it here. The rule of its outgo is, that its largest, fullest exercise or current is towards the innocent or least guilty, especially when and in proportion as they are subjected to wrongs and sufferings by others, are beset with temptations, particularly if resisting them, or are compassed about with difficulties and dangers—the more in every case, if they are His children and ask His interposition in their behalf. But the strength of its outgo towards every worse class diminishes, till, towards the worst, nothing of it remains but that Divine pity or compassion which His all-perfect nature must feel for them as irreclaimable and necessitating the punishment they deserve from Him. This rule is precisely the same for all good beings, and is the one for

His own and their going to cost for them. Any other rule makes a moral system and moral government impossible.

§ 64. NO CHANGE OF WILL AND CHARACTER BY OMNIPOTENCE, NO ANNIHILATION, AND THE RADICAL FAULT OF ALL THESE NOTIONS.

Before concluding this Chapter, I must glance at two other notions sometimes advanced in opposition to positive future and endless retributive punishment. One of them is, that God will omnipotently change the perverse will and character of those who die in sin to righteous at, or in connection with, death, and make them all blessed forever. As if either sin or obedience which consist in the choices of moral beings which mold each one's character, could possibly be either abolished or created by physical omnipotence, and were not necessarily their own work in complying with or resisting motives and influences! But, if God can thus change sinners to saints, when dying or dead, by omnipotence, why not while they live? Why did He not so change the first pair immediately after their fall, and before they had offspring, and thus prevent the propagation of a race of sinners? Why has He not thus excluded sin and all its measureless train of curses and woes, not only from earth, but from the total universe, and *compelled* universal holiness and blessedness? What moral system is possible with a principle so preposterous and pernicious to all accountability, according to which, there would be no difference, beyond this life of condition or destiny, between the righteous and the wicked, the best and the worst while in it? Even the semblance of a probation or plan of redemption is out of the question; and it matters not how men live and act before they die.

The other notion is, that God will annihilate all the incorrigible, despite the fact that He made them in His own immortal image. Why, then, did He not annihilate the fallen angels when they sinned, and thus prevent all their inconceivable deviltry, especially that which they have done to man? The fact that He did not makes it certain, along with what Scripture teaches respecting their destiny and that of incorrigible human sinners, that He will not then. Annihilation of moral natures is plainly abhorrent to His great plan respecting them.

But the radical fault of all the notions invented against future and endless punishment, except this last, is, that, by discarding the ethical justice of the law and thus reducing the moral love it requires to a mere personal matter, they reduce sin to the same, and, with it,

its penalty to its mere natural consequences. They thus equally reduce the motives to repentance and against sin; and, when their advocates add that sinners will have a probation after death, in which they can repent when they will, they reduce and enervate them to mere trifles, and lead men, set in sin, to go on impenitent through life under the infatuation that they can repent beyond it, and will not be punished before they do. But the adherents of all these fictions constantly assume and assert that, if God should not treat sinners as they teach, but should inflict retributive punishment upon them as they deserve, He would violate some supreme obligation, do some stupendous wrong, be heartless and cruel instead of a good being and *Father*, and would deserve the condemnation and denunciation, instead of the love and honor, of all His rational creatures!—we add, especially of persistent sinners! Hence, if they profess belief in any atonement, it is not in a vicarious one, for this they denounce because it implies retributive justice, but in what they call a moral one, which is none at all, but is intrinsically non-moral and contra-moral. No so-called atonement can be truly moral, which discards positive retributions from God, as demanded by the nature of moral beings, the social and just law dictated by it, and the judicial sentence of conscience, that sin deserves and demands such retribution. These demands require perfect justice to be maintained throughout the universal society, as the conserving condition of all true moral love and blessedness in it.

The conclusion of the whole preceding discussion is, that, by the law as social and just, and for its end, all sinners must suffer exact retributive punishment according to the measure of each one's actual ill-desert as God sees it. From this, they have no possible way of escape by anything they or any mere creatures in the universe can do to retrieve them. "Die they or justice must," both as ethical and as retributive, and both in God Himself and in His universal society; and with it all moral love and good in Him and it forever. *A substitutional atonement is absolutely necessary as a ground of forgiveness and all salvation for sinners.* Without it all mankind are forever lost.

CHAPTER VII.

Confirmation of the foregoing exposition of the law in moral natures, and of retributions, by the teachings of both the Testaments of Scripture. God not merely a Father, but has and administers a universal moral government. No probation after death.

§ 65. SCRIPTURAL DOCTRINE OF THE LAW IN THE MORAL NATURE OF MAN, WHAT AND WHAT NOT.

The remarkable passage in Rom. 2:14–16 positively teaches, that all Gentiles, and, of course, all mankind, are, by their nature, "a law unto themselves," "showing the work of the law written in their hearts"—that is, that the law in them is essentially identical with that *declared* and legislatively applied to Israel in the Theocratic government instituted over them. The Apostle's argument, from verse 9 onward, demands this identity, as does the nature of the case. This is plain, if we supply in the passage the word *declared* or *revealed* where it is implied. "For when Gentiles, having no [revealed] law, do by nature the things of the [revealed] law, these, having no [revealed] law, are a law unto themselves: Who show the work of the [revealed] law written in their hearts"—that is, not on tables of stone, as that was. The law, then, being thus innate in the spiritual nature of man, is no Kantian imperative without a rule of action having a matter and an end, a kind of hook inserted in it, on which each person may suspend any maxim he may deem fit for law universal, thus making him law-maker as to all executive action for himself and the intelligent universe! Nor is it an imperative in each one to do that, and that only, which he deems due to his own spiritual excellence or dignity, in which also there is no rule other than his own notion or judgment of what is becoming to himself, and which, therefore, has no *social* character, enjoins pure *egoism*, and, like the former, makes him deem his own *judgment or action* of what is becoming to himself the rule of all executive action for all others. Nor is it an imperative in each to love the true, the beautiful, and the good for their own sakes. For these are not identical

with God and other moral beings; are not ultimate ends of moral action, the first two of them being affirmed by reason, as all first truths are, and the last of them, virtue, being acted for an end beyond itself; are not ends in themselves; cannot consequently be loved for their own sakes; and, if they could, there could be no virtue in so loving them. Nor is it an *idea of right*, or of any kind, conceived as a rule of action and different from the revealed law; for no idea can be a rule of action or a law, and, if it could, it must be identical with the one law declared in Scripture and written in human hearts. Nor is it a rule for mere *utilitarian action*. Such action is always determined by judgment; is only a *means* to accomplish a chosen end or ends, which is or are not otherwise binding; is therefore always merely *executive* and to be acted only when deemed *useful;* and is mere prudence. For judgment can prescribe no end, law, or obligation. Moral reason alone prescribes these; and true virtue is *willing* or *choosing* its end for what it is in itself according to its law and obligation. Nor is it a rule for mere sentiment or feeling of any kind; for no such rule is possible. They are in themselves involuntary, and there is no law or obligation to them. When the will is submitted to the law, they are attendant incentives to its steadfastness and to benevolent actions; but when it is submitted to their sway, there is no virtue in complying with it, but selfishness, often developed in opposition to law, justice, government, order, and public good. Rejecting all these mutually clashing notions as neither truly psychological nor Scriptural, we believe that there is a truer psychology and a deeper philosophy of man and law, of virtue and sin, and of the way to become and be really virtuous in the Bible, especially in the Epistle to the Romans, than can be found in all the moral philosophies which have been written in any land or age. We believe that, in the teachings of Christ, of His Apostles, taught by Him and the inspiring Spirit, and of all "the holy men of old, who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost" respecting the law, the guilt of violating it, retributive reward and punishment, the government of God, justice, mercy, faith, and the whole moral condition of man, we have the real truth, and what a correct psychology will always find substantially in consciousness.

What, then, do these unerring teachers tell us respecting the matter, end, and justice of the law, which is written first in all human hearts, and then on the pages of the inspired Book? The substance of the Decalogue is thus declared by our Lord, quoting from Lev. 19:18 and Deut. 6:5—"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God

with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbor as thyself (Mat. 22:37–40; Mark 12:30, 31; Luke 10:27); and He added, that "upon these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets"—that is, they embody the essential principle of the whole legislation of God in the Old Testament. He also expresses it as requiring *perfect ethical justice* in the golden words—"Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them" (Mat. 7: 12; Luke 6:31), adding—"This is the law and the prophets." That is, the whole legislation of God in the Old Testament involves the principle of perfect ethical justice, so that all true moral love is required to be *just love*—a love *due* from and to each other and to God, and acted in all *doings* of each towards every other one. In perfect accordance, the Apostle Paul says—"Love worketh no ill to his neighbor: love therefore is the fulfillment of the law" (Rom. 13: 10; see the two preceding verses), thus making it embrace pure ethical justice; and he says again—"For the whole law is *fulfilled* in one word, even in this; Thou shalt *love* thy neighbor as thyself," which love is perfect justice (Gal. 5:14). So runs the whole current of Scriptural teachings respecting the law and obedience to it; and it proves that the law is concrete and social, binding mankind and all moral beings by its intrinsic quality of justice to render its *matter* of pure moral love to each other equally as to self, and to God absolutely, for its *end* of the greatest good of each, and to render this as what is reciprocally *due* or *just*, and therefore *righteous*. As far as this obedient love is moral, it is *voluntary and designed*, and consists in freely *willing* or *choosing* the good of its objects for their sakes. It is unselfish, disinterested, embraces all righteousness; and, because it is *just*, it is impartial, and, in principle, universal. But, while morally consisting in free action of the will, yet, according to that correlation of faculties with which all rational creatures are constituted, it always evokes from the sensibility and expends all congruous emotions upon its objects; and it directs and molds the thoughts and whole mental action in relation to them. It should be as consummate as possible towards God, and towards our fellow men equally as towards ourselves. The expression "*as thyself*" shows that each one is required by the law to choose his own good or love himself morally, not selfishly, and, because his love of himself is known to him by his own consciousness, and is thus a constant *medium* of knowing that due to others, to make it the measure and standard of that.

§ 66. NO OTHER VIRTUE THAN MORAL LOVE; THIS THE SAME IN GOD, ANGELS, AND SAINTS.

There are those who maintain that love is not the only virtue, and that there are others. If they mean merely instinctive, emotional, naturally affectional, or sentimental love, they are, in a sense, right; for in neither of these senses is it moral love at all. But, if they mean moral love, which is that required by the law, set forth throughout the Scriptures, and specially asserted in the teachings of Christ and His Apostles, they are certainly mistaken; for one main fact thus rooted and reiterated is, that *it is the one only real virtue in itself*, the one only obedience to or fulfillment of the law, the one only bond of perfectness, the one only pure ethical justice or righteousness, the one only *generic* virtue, or right moral heart, out of which all known good acts or doings proceed, and from which no consciously bad ones can, (I. Cor. 13; all the passages quoted above; I. John 3:4–10; and the whole current of Scripture). What could be taught more conclusively than that, besides moral love, there is and can be no other virtue in any moral sense, none which does not spring from it as its vital source, as the branch does from the originating vitalizing trunk? Do the asserters of other virtues than moral love mean particular species or modes of action which are not included and enjoined in the *Thou shalt love* of the epitomies of the two tables of the law, both quoted from the Old Testament by our Lord and His Apostles, and which therefore are not done from, but are entirely separate from and independent of, this love? In Rom. 13:8–10, the Apostle distinctly declares that all the commandments of the second table of the law, and, by the nature of the case at least, if not by intention, that all others whatever, which enjoin duties of man to man, are summed up in the epitome of that table, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself;" and that "love worketh no ill to his neighbor: therefore love is the fulfillment of the law." The same thing is clearly taught, at least by necessary implication, in I. Cor. 13, in Gal. 5:14, and in other places. How, then, can there possibly be any other virtues than are included in, or proceed from, this ethical soul of all?

> "In some fair body thus the informing soul
> With spirit feeds, with vigor fills the whole,
> Each motion guides, and every nerve sustains;
> Itself unseen, but in the effects remains."
> —*Pope, Essay on Criticism, Part I., lines 76–80.*

Are not "all deeds of the law," all moralities without this either actions of custom, "dead works," or Pharisaic legalities or hypoc-

risies? It is customary in common use to call different *exhibitions* of character *virtues*, some even which are not really moral. In the same way, different modes of acting out and manifesting moral love are and may be called virtues. But they are such, not *in themselves* apart from this love, but as its *fruits* or *emanations;* and all the moral life and worth in them are from it, the mother from God of all specific actions which are of truly right moral quality. Unless it can be shown that there are actions and modes of action which are not required by the law, and not produced and inspired by the love it enjoins, but are wholly apart from and independent of it, and yet are somehow really moral, it is idle to say there are other virtues besides love. Scripture makes no mistake in its teachings.

Such is the law written *essentially* in the hearts of men, but with clear distinctness in the Scriptures. That it is in the nature of God, they clearly teach. How else could He be love, or good, just, righteous, holy, or merciful? How else could He appeal to Israel to judge whether His ways are equal or just?—could justice and judgment be the habitation of His throne?—could He be a moral nature?—could mankind be such natures by being created in His image?—could they, by rendering the love required by the law, be perfect even as *He is perfect?*—could He declare the law, and have a moral government?—or could He deserve praise and glory for His character and whole conduct from all moral beings? That it is in the nature of angels is shown by the facts, that some of them sinned and are reserved unto judgment; that they are to be judged by the saints; that some of them do the will of God and are holy; that they were commanded to worship our Lord at His advent into the world, and are all made subject unto Him; that they are all ministering spirits [not of dead men] sent forth to minister to the heirs of salvation; that they are represented as doing God's will in high Providential missions from the antiquities of time to its end; and that they are to be forever associated with the saints around the throne in heaven in worshipping, serving, and praising God and the Lamb. The law is thus the social bond and constitution by which all moral beings, existing and to exist in all futurity, are combined into one grand, universal, everlasting moral system and society. All obedience to this law being social, is that, therefore, to which this whole society has a right from each of its members; and sin is anti-social, as it is injustice and wrong against the whole, an actual robbing it, with God at its head, of its supreme right and due.

§ 67. GOD HAS A POSITIVE MORAL GOVERNMENT, AND NOT A MERELY PATERNAL ONE.

That God has a positive moral government over all created moral beings, or is their Moral Governor and Guardian, as He must be if He has a law, is prodigally taught in the Bible. Very few things are taught in it with greater profusion. It is as if God foresaw, and, in giving His Word, designed by this profusion to forestall, the attempts of the numbers who are constantly endeavoring to get rid of this radically important fact as somehow inconsistent with His goodness, and are declaring that He is simply a Father, has only a paternal government, and deals with and treats *each of His offspring* without regard to any rights, claims, dues, interests, or concerns of Himself and of His loyal universal society, as affected by their character and conduct on the one hand, and by His treatment of them on the other. Constantly harping on this one string of His Fatherhood, and representing His love for mankind as mere natural affection, like that of human fathers, or even mothers, instead of moral conformity to the everlasting social law in both Him and them, they deny, sometimes even contemptuously, that He is a Ruler having a moral government over all, and maintain that His only government over them consists in the self-acting laws of their own nature! *As if laws, either natural or moral, ever executed themselves!* Accordingly, they deny that, in devising the measure of human redemption, it was any part of His design to secure governmental or social ends for Himself and His loyal society wronged by sinners, and assert that it was solely to *win* men from sin, and so to save them from the rack of these automatic laws. The train and head of this comet, sweeping for some years past specially athwart the face of the theological heavens, demand each other; and it was for the sake of the train that the head was invented. But so insubstantial and tenuous are they both, that all the everlasting lights in those heavens shine through them, as through gauze, bright still to all clear-seeing eyes; and, when soon the gauze shall have flitted away, those all-glorious lights will appear brighter than ever before. How adverse to the psychological facts concerning the law written in the heart the tenuous vagrant is, we believe we have shown; that it is equally adverse to revelation we hope to show in the sequel. It is certainly surprising that the assumption that God is the Father of mankind *as His creatures*, and especially in sin, should be arrayed against the doctrine that He is the Moral Governor of all rational creatures; for neither is there a shadow of

contradiction between the two, if the assumption were true as made, nor is it affirmed in Scripture that it is true. What does it teach on these two points?

§ 68. THAT GOD IS THE FATHER OF MANKIND AS CREATURES NOT TAUGHT IN THE SCRIPTURES.

In the first place, this assumption has no support in the Old Testament. Should any point to Mal. 2:10—"Have we not all one Father? hath not one God created us?"—as supporting it, the reply is, the context shows that the prophet asked these questions with reference, not to mankind generally, but to the Jews only, as God's peculiar people; and, besides that, according to Hebrew parallelism, the term in the first question is used as parallel to "God created" in the second. Essentially similiar are all other instances in the Old Testament, in which God is called the Father (Deut. 32:6; Is. 63:16; 64:8; Jer. 3:4, 19; 31:9, and Mal. 1:6). In the second place, it can only be assumed as implied in three passages in the New Testament. The first of these is Luke 3:38, in which the evangelist closes his ascending genealogy of Christ by saying that Adam "was the son of God." He certainly does not mean that he was the son of God by physical generation as Seth was of Adam, or as any other one of the descending line was of his father, nor in any other way than that he was *created* by God in His own image and after His own likeness, and He was therefore God's son only in the figurative sense that he was His *creature*, as all his descendants are equally His *creatures*. The second of these is in our Lord's Parable of the Lost Son (Luke 15:11–32), in which the relation of God to two classes of mankind, those who, having forsaken Him and sunk into grossest immoralities and vices, are brought to return to Him truly repentant, and those who, like the self-righteous Pharisees, claim to have been always righteous and to need no repentance, is represented by that of a human father to two sons, such as are described. From this representation, it is inferred by some that He implies that God is the Father of all men in the literal sense in which a human father is of his children, overlooking the fact that God is simply man's Creator *literally* (Gen. 1:26, 27), and his Father only *figuratively* by the nature of the case. The point of the analogy is, that the tenacious, merciful love of the human father pictured towards his lost son, and his welcoming reception of him when he returned repentant, *illustrate*, not the physical paternity, but the tenacious, merciful love of God towards

human sinners as His *creatures,* and His welcoming reception of all of them who return to Him truly repentant; while the course of the human father towards the elder son, whose whole conduct and spirit showed him the contrary of what he assumed and claimed to be, in taking him on his own ground to show him his perverseness and to bring him out of it, *illustrates* the course of God toward those Pharisees and all like them, whose whole conduct towards Himself and repentant sinners proved them the contrary of what they assumued and claimed to be, in forbearingly taking them, as it were, on their own ground to show them their perverseness and to bring them to repentance along with the publicans and sinners. The illustration neither asserts nor implies the absurdity of the *natural Fatherhood* of God, nor proves anything in its favor; but, as it was intended to do, it wonderously represents His merciful love towards mankind despite all their sins, but especially to all of them who return to Him in true repentance. The third of these is Acts 17:28, 29, in which the Apostle Paul quotes from the Greek poet Aratus the words—"For His offspring" [or *race,* as we prefer] "we are;" and, assuming that his hearers agreed with the quotation, he went on to argue from it, as if their own ground, against their idolatry. Neither it nor his use of it signifies that God is the Father of mankind in a natural or physical sense, or in any other than that He is their Creator, which is the only *natural* meaning it can have. There is no other Scriptural passage on which this assumption can even seemingly rest. Why this extremely parsimonious use of even *the analogy* there is between God's Creatorship and human fatherhood? We believe, to avoid furnishing even a seeming basis to sentimentalist preachers and others for attempting to get rid of the fundamental truth that God is a Moral Governor by arraying against it this fancy of His *natural Fatherhood* of mankind, with only a Father's government or lack of one over them. They thus attenuate and debase in conception the consistence of His love from moral to natural, from designed, voluntary, and social towards all to merely emotional, affectional, and sympathetic towards each. The climax of this attenuation and debasement is capped by the folly of the *motherhood* of God.

§ 69. GOD'S MANIFESTED LOVE AND CHARACTER AS A MORAL GOVERNOR UNAPPROACHED BY WHAT THEY WOULD BE, WERE HE MERELY A FATHER.

Obviously, this notion of the literal or natural Fatherhood of God to mankind, instead of being a conviction based on clear, per-

tinent evidence, is merely a tenet invented and adopted without such evidence for an end beyond itself, and in antagonism to the invincible fact and truth that He is a Moral Governor over all His rational creatures; and the reason for the antagonism is in the law He administers. The holders of this notion antagonize the law both on account of the action it requires and of the penal retribution it threatens for sin. The action it requires is pure moral love from each to God and every other one; and it requires this as justice to God and every other one. It is its quality of justice which constitutes it bindingly social, so that the love it requires is *owed* by each to God and every other one, and is *due* from every other one, even God, to each who has not forfeited the right to it. All action contrary to this love is, in principle, necessarily in violation of the rights of God and all others, and is thus universal, everlasting, measureless wrong, injustice, and injury to Him and all others; and this quality of justice, *as retributive*, demands that each sinner shall be positively punished by God exactly according to his ill-desert, as He sees it, when the time of retribution comes. If God is a Moral Governor, and maintains His law and government, He must infallibly thus punish all sinners, unless He can retrieve them by a redemptive measure, containing an atonement. If He does not, He necessarily treats the law, obedience, and sin as trifles; practically abolishes the universal moral system with all its order and well-being, and brands the very constitution of moral natures, in which that system is founded, as only to be disregarded and trampled upon; makes nothing of all the violations of the rights and dues, natural and moral, and the interests and concerns of Himself and others done by sinners; and, by thus virtually sanctioning all the wrong, injustice, and injury of all these violations by every one since Adam fell, evinces Himself infinitely more unjust and injurious than all of them together, and shows that He is neither a righteous nor a good being. Hence, the absolute necessity for the mission and atoning death of Christ in order to the salvation of any; and the fact of the manifested love of God, of the Father in giving His only-begotten Son to meet this necessity, of the Son in coming and doing it, and of the Holy Spirit in performing all His part in accomplishing this unparalleled measure of Godhead. The love of God thus manifested for human sinners immeasurably surpasses, not only all His other manifestations of it which have ever been made, but any that He could possibly make of it, if His relations to them were those of a merely literal Father, and not of a Moral

Governor. There is nothing *moral* in such Fatherhood, nor in mere natural affection for offspring, since, whether paternal or maternal, it is simply instinctive or *natural* in human as well as in all inferior animal parents, just as filial affection to parents also is; and there is nothing done from it, however beautiful or lovely to see, by creaturely parents of any species, nor could there be by God, which approaches comparison with the excellence and glorious beauty of truly moral action and manifestation. For God to create mankind and other moral beings must necessarily be, not only *moral* action, but of its highest kind; for it was to make living miniature images and likenesses of Himself, having the same kind of spiritual, intellectual, moral, sensitive, and voluntary nature as His own; endowed with moral reason, which, by containing and affirming the law, renders each of them a moral being, and under a natural necessity of acting morally and responsibly in all his relations to other such beings and to Himself; it was to constitute a universal moral system embracing with Himself, by a necessity of their nature, all His intelligent creatures; it was to assume towards them absolute obligations to govern them all according to the law in their reason and the universal moral system constituted by it, and not according to any mere sentimental, simply *personal*, sympathies; and it was to do and to assume to do all this, knowing perfectly that sin would invade the universal and eternal moral society with all its train of curses, all the inconceivable havoc it would work among mankind and others of it, and the stupendous cost it would bring on Himself to retrieve even a part of them from its destructive power. To create such beings was therefore incomparably the greatest and grandest of the works of God, the one of matchlessly highest design, highest end, highest nature, highest wisdom, highest creative power, the one for which all the others were done, the sole one of moral kind among them, and, of such kind, the fundamental and the consummate one of all others ever done or to be done by Him even in executing the redemptive measure through all its parts and stages. It is as certain, then, as that He created all moral beings, and as that, by their moral nature with its law, they are in a universal moral system, that He is, in the strictly normal sense of the words, Moral Governor over them all. By creating them what and related as they are, He necessarily created an infinite obligation and responsibility upon Himself to each and all of them, while without sin, not only to govern them, but to do so exactly as pure moral reason, the law, and the universal moral system demand. It would be infinite injustice in Him, if He did not.

§ 70. THAT GOD IS FATHER OF MANKIND LITERALLY IS ABSURD, AND THAT HIS GOVERNMENT IS ONLY PATERNAL IS DEGRADING TO IT AND HIM.

The relation of God to mankind as the Originator of their being with all its essential qualities is the same to all other moral beings; and not Father, but Creator is the only term which does or can express it. The term Father, in its literal sense of begetter or generator, is not synonymous with Creator; and it is purely absurd to apply it to Him in that sense, or otherwise than figuratively in reference to His relation to mankind as their Creator. He can figuratively be called their Father, to indicate His affectionate interest in them, in entire consistency with the real fact that He is their Moral Ruler and must govern and treat them every one precisely as the universal law and moral system demand. But when He is called their Father in opposition to and rejection of this whole real fact, the term is necessarily used literally, and therefore absurdly. Literally He is not the Father of mankind; but He is incomparably more, their Creator, who has in Him all the amazing affection for them demonstrated by what He has done and sacrificed in His whole redemptive measure, especially in the incarnation and atonement of His Son, in connection with His eternal law and government over them, and the universal and everlasting moral system. But the asserters of this literal Fatherhood are such in opposition to this moral system, to the law with its justice, and to its administration. They want a God *too good* to have and execute such a law, and to maintain such a system of as perfect universal justice fulfilled by holy love as possible!—one who will treat His own law, not as such, authoritative and absolutely binding on all with proportional sanctions, but merely as an unauthoritative *ideal* rule of action, perfect, but not to be enforced as practical!—a Father, therefore, with will free from it to follow His mere feelings of affection for His sinning children, and to deal with each of them regardless of others, and of all their and His own rights, dues, interests, and concerns outraged by him, and of the universal, everlasting, moral system, founded in all moral natures, but fundamentally in His own! It ought to decide against this notion, to look at what must be true, if it is, in contrast with what must be true, if God is a Moral Governor over all His rational creatures. 1. If it be true, and God is not a Moral Governor who, at the time of final reckoning, will deal with *every* sinner as all the rights, dues, interests, and concerns of *all* others and Himself, which have been violated by him, and as the

law in all moral natures and the universal and eternal moral system demand for perfect maintenance, then the following, among many other things, must be true:—He is in antagonism to His own and all the moral natures He has made; to the law in and from them, and declared by Him; and to all the intuitions and affirmations of moral reason and conscience connected with the law and with obedience to it and sin, specially as to natural and moral rights and dues, obligations and debts, good-desert and ill-desert, accountability and retributions of both reward and punishment:—He makes no account of either obedience or sin, except as it concerns its actor, and him only as the one benefits or the other injures him, and is regardless of all the evils, injuries, and miseries caused, and the sins, vices, crimes, and enormities committed by sinners:—And, if judged by the standard of the law, He cannot be just, righteous, benevolent, nor good, but must be the opposite, His whole character as a righteous and good Being being swallowed up and lost in this invented, non-moral, sentimental, literal notion of the paternity of God to all mankind—"A gulf profound as that Serbonian bog, * * * where armies whole have sunk." 2. But, if God is a Moral Governor, and will, in the final reckoning, deal with every sinner, not saved by grace, precisely as His own and all created moral natures, as the universal, unchangeable law and moral system, as all the intuitions and affirmations indicated, and as eternal justice in the law and moral system, as all these with all they involve demand, then He is absolutely just and good, the exactly righteous Moral Governor over His whole intelligent universe. Such are these two alternatives; and they demonstrate the absolute necessity for the atonement of Christ in order to the salvation of any human sinner.

§ 71. THE SCRIPTURAL DOCTRINE OF GOD'S FATHERHOOD, AND OF HIS REAL CHILDREN.

It is only of the regenerated of mankind, or the truly religious, that God is declared in Scripture to be, and to offer to be, the Father; and of course he is the Father of such, not as their Creator, nor in any *natural* sense, but in a *spiritual* and *moral or religious* sense. Such only can from the heart truly say—"Our Father, who art in heaven" (Mat. 6:9). "But as many as received Him, to them gave He the right to become the children of God, even to them that believe on His name: which were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God" (John 1:12, 13). "Wherefore, come ye out from among them,

and be ye separate, saith the Lord, and touch no unclean thing; and I will receive you, and will be to you a Father, and ye shall be my sons and daughters, saith the Lord Almighty" (II. Cor. 6:17, 18). "For ye are all sons of God, through faith, in Christ Jesus" (Gal. 3:26). "For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are sons of God" (Rom. 8:14. See also verses 15, 16). So runs the whole current of Scriptural teaching as to those to whom God is a Father, and those who are His children. As to others in contrast, see Mat. 13:38; John 8:37–44; and I. John 3:8–10.

§ 72. MEANING OF THE WORD GOD, AND WHAT THE SCRIPTURES TEACH RESPECTING HIM AS MORAL GOVERNOR.

What now do the Scriptures teach as to whether God is a moral Governor over mankind, and all intelligent creatures? Not only do they positively teach that He is one, but they do so in every variety of way and most aboundingly. It is important to notice that the very word God includes governing in its meaning. In Webster's Dictionary, under this word, after referring to it in some half a score of branches or varieties of the Teutonic language, the writer says—"As this word and *good* are written exactly alike in Anglo-Saxon, it has been inferred that God was named from His *goodness*. But the corresponding words in most of the other languages are not the same, and it is believed no instance can be found of a name given to the Supreme Being from the attribute of *goodness*. It is probably an idea too remote from the rude conceptions of men in early ages. With the exception of the word *Jehovah*, the name of the Supreme Being appears usually to have reference to His supremacy or power, and to be equivalent to lord or ruler. In the present case, there is some evidence that this is the sense of this word; for, in Persian, *goda*, or *khoda*, signifies lord, master, prince, or ruler." Under No. 2 of its specific meanings, he gives—"The Supreme Being; the eternal and infinite Spirit, the Creator and the Sovereign of the universe; Jehovah." So, in Hebrew, Elohim, which is the name of God as Creator, Upholder and Controller of all things and beings, signifies *strength, almightiness*, the Author, Controller, and Ruler of all things and creatures; while Jehovah designates Him as the specially revealed, eternally existing God of redemptive providence, grace, and salvation. The word God, therefore, is a correct translation of the word *Elohim*, both having the main functional meaning in relation to moral beings of *controlling, ruling, governing* them as such. Absolute moral rulership is in

every generic idea of God, and is so prominent in a large number of Scripture passages, that it is impossible not to receive from them a profound sense of His sovereign majesty and universal moral government.

The Scriptures superabundantly teach both directly and by implications, that God is a Moral Governor, and sovereignly requires from men and all intelligent creatures perfect obedience to His law, as known or knowable by them, under the sanctions of deserved retributions of rewards for it, or punishments for disobedience. To prove this, we need not quote nor even refer to all the passages which so teach, but to a proportion of them sufficiently large to evince the momentous importance to mankind of this sovereign function of God towards them, and of their knowledge of the fact that He exercises it over them. We adduce them in separate groups according to the special points they inculcuate:—1. He is called Lord, which properly means ruler or governor, hundreds of times; and much the most frequently it has or includes this legitimate sense. It is applied to God as *one*, and to the Father and the Son. For proof, see Cruden's, Young's, or any full Concordance. 2. In I. Tim. 6:15, He is called "the blessed and only *Potentate*," implying that, in the absolute sense, He is the only real one in the universe. 3. In the same verse is added "*King* of kings, and Lord of lords." See same titles in Rev. 19:16; also in changed order in Rev. 17:14. In 15:3, He is called "King of the ages." In I. Tim. 1:17, He is called "the King eternal, immortal, invisible;" and, in all, He is called King about thirty-five times. 4. A *throne*, the official seat of a king, and so the symbol of sovereign majesty and government, is ascribed to Him in the heavens, or as heaven itself, about seventy times. 5. *Majesty* is ascribed to Him some fifteen times. 6. He is represented as *reigning* over all mankind and all moral beings about fifteen times. 7. Also, as *ruling* mankind twelve times. 8. Also as *doing His sovereign will universally* three times. 9. Also as having universal and everlasting dominion about ten times. 10. Also, as having a *kingdom* over mankind and all intelligent beings more than a dozen times, besides scores of passages which speak of *the kingdom of God*, and *of heaven*, in the Gospel sense. 11. Also as a *law-giver*, able to save and to destroy. 12. Accordingly, He has declared His law (1) in the moral nature or reason of man, and all His rational creatures (see Rom. 1:18–32; 2:6–15, 26, 27); and (2) He has added to man an objective, inspired declaration both of its essential principle and of a vast number of

its applications to them in all their relations to each other and to Himself—this declaration of it being made indispensably necessary by their extremely defective knowledge of it in both the respects mentioned, caused by their moral depravity and corruption. 13. He has declared the sanctions of His law, of both reward and punishment, and that He will administer them in exact accordance with the good or ill desert of every moral actor for his deeds done during this life. We have shown that universal conscience attests that He will administer positive retributions, distinct from, and in addition to, all the natural consequences of moral action; and we now proceed to point out what the Scriptures teach respecting this radical point. We indicate only part of their teachings on this point, and request readers to turn to and read the passages referred to:—

(1) God will reward or punish every moral actor, except sinners forgiven on the basis of Christ's atonement, strictly according to his deserts for his works or deeds done in this life. This is His absolute rule of retribution (II. Sam. 3:39; Job 34:11; Ps. 62:12; Prov. 24:12; Is. 3:10, 11; Jer. 17:10; 32:19; Ez. 7:27; Mat. 16:27; Rom. 2:6–10; II. Cor. 5:10; I. Pet. 1:17; Rev. 2:23; 20:12, 13; 22:12). (2) He will do this conclusively in the day of judgment (Eccl. 12:14; Mat. 7:21–23; 13:40–43, 47–50; 16:27; 25:31–46; Luke 13:23–30; John 5:27–29; Rom. 2:5–11, 16; 14:10–12; I. Cor. 4:5; II. Cor. 5:10; II. Thess. 1:6–10; Heb. 10:26–31; II. Pet. 2:4–10; 3:7). (3) Penal retributions to which the wicked will then be consigned. *First*, those awaiting the wicked angels (Mat. 25:41, 45; II. Pet. 2:4; Jude 6). *Second*, those awaiting wicked men—(*a*) They will not enter into, but will be forever shut out of the kingdom of heaven (Mat. 5:20; 7:21–23; 8:11, 12; 13:41, 42, 47–50; 25:1–12, 14–30, 34–41; Mark 9:47; Luke 13:25–28; I. Cor. 6:9, 10; Gal. 5:19–21; Eph. 5:5)—(*b*). They will not enter into the New Jerusalem (Rev. 21:27; 22:15)—(*c*). They will be cast into "outer darkness" (Mat. 8:12; 22:13; 25:30; II. Pet. 2:17; Jude 13—(*d*). They will be cast into a furnace of fire (Mat. 18:8, 9; 25:41; Jude 7); fire unquenchable, Mark 9:43–49; the lake of fire, Rev. 19:20; 20:10, 12–15; 21:8, 27; into (γεέννα) hell (Mat. 5:29, 30; 10:28; Luke 12:4, 5; Mat. 18:9; 23:33; Mark 9:43, 45, 47)—(*e*). They will go away into everlasting punishment (Mat. 25:46); are reserved to be punished (II. Pet. 2:9); will be punished with everlasting destruction (Mat. 7:13; II. Thess. 1:9; I. Tim. 6:9)—(*f*). They will suffer the wrath, ὀργή, of God, the punitive retribution His justice, as retributive, demands (Mat. 3:7; Luke 3:7; John 3:36; Rom. 2:5–11; Eph. 5:5, 6; Col.

3:6; I. Thess. 1:10; Rev. 11:18)—(*g*). God will render to them indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish (Rom. 2:5–9; 1:18; Heb. 10:26, 27)—(*h*). He will take vengeance on them in the sense of inflicting exact *retributive, repaying, recompensing, rewarding* punishment (Deut. 32:35, 41, 43; Ps. 94:1; Rom. 3:5; 6:23; 12:19; II. Thess. 1:8; Heb. 10:30; Jude 7)—(*i*). Their resurrection will be to shame and everlasting contempt (Dan. 12:2); to damnation (John 5:28, 29); and they will receive the damnation of hell (Mat. 23:33; John 5:29)—(*j*). They will perish forever (John 3:14–16; Rom. 2:12; I. Cor. 1:18; II. Cor. 2:15; II. Thess. 2:10; II. Pet. 2:12; 3:9).

14. God has, in Scripture, declared Himself the universal Judge, and is to judge all mankind at the end of the world in and by Jesus Christ. Gen. 18:25; Deut. 32:36; I. Sam. 2:10; I. Chron. 16:33; Ps. 7:8, 11; 9:8; 50:4, 6; 75:7; 94:2; 96:13; 98:9; Is. 3:13; Rom. 3:6; Heb. 10:30; 12:23; I. Pet. 4:5; Rev. 20:12, 13. Respecting Jesus Christ as the final Judge of the world, see Mat. 7:21–23; 16:27; 25:31–46; John 5:22, 27; Acts 10:42; 17:31; Rom. 2:16; II. Tim. 4:8. This function of Judge is ascribed to God in the Scriptures scores of times.

Such are the Scriptural representations, mostly in the New Testament, and in the teachings of the Lord Himself and of His Apostles, concerning the penal retributions awaiting the apostate angels and all mankind who die in their sins when the final judgment shall be declared. No exegetical torturing can transmute them into the mere natural consequences of sin, which are also affirmed and portrayed most amply and vividly throughout the inspired Book as infallibly linked to each kind of moral action. These representations prove that, in addition to these, God will Himself confer *positive rewards* on the obedient, and inflict *positive punishment* on the persistently disobedient; that this infliction will, in each case, be exactly proportioned to the measure of his guilt or ill-desert in its severity; and that, in all cases, it will be endless. No true eschatology can conflict with these revealed certainties; and no mortal can know anything contrary to them. Like a terrible battery of so many guns, full-charged and ready to sweep a confronting foe with exterminating destruction, the revealed certainties of all the passages referred to, and others of like kind, are planted, charged with all their fearful imports, to be discharged upon all who live and die persistent in sin. How should all so living heed our Lord's counsel?—"Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear Him which is able to destroy both soul

and body in hell," ——, (Mat. 10:28; Luke 12:4). If all so living and dying are to have all such passages verified in their own cases (and they certainly are, if God's word is true,) what thought of man or angel can grasp the dreadfulness of the doom they bring upon themselves? It matters not to say of some of the most fearful of these representations that they are *figurative;* for God, that cannot lie, nor leave His inspired servants to lie, has declared them to men in His revelation of both Testaments, not merely as what would be true to all men, if Christ had not come, but as what will inevitably be true to all who refuse compliance with the terms of salvation through Him and live and die in sin, though He has come; and whatever figures there are in them cannot misrepresent the realities they express. If the fire or lake of fire threatened be *figurative*, the suffering caused by it can be no less severe than if it is *literal.* The figure must not misrepresent the fact. But, whether figurative or literal, it is to pervert all rules of interpretation to construe them to signify the mere natural consequences of sin, caused by automatic laws in moral natures, if they sin; and it is false and demoralizing to proclaim to the world in sermons and books, as has been done, that "God never had anything against sinners," and will never inflict any positive punishment upon them, so that all they have to fear is the injury they will occasion these laws to work in them, if they go on in sin.

§ 73. NO PROBATION AFTER DEATH FOR ANY OF MANKIND WHO DIE IN SIN.

1. There certainly will be none for any of them after the end of the world and the final judgment; for Christ will then deliver up His Mediatorial Kingdom to God, even the Father, and be Mediator no longer, all human destinies having been forever decided.*

2. The question, then, is confined to the time between death and the final judgment of all mankind. Some maintain that there will be a continued or new probation during that time for all, or some, who have died in sin, because they will still possess freedom of will, and therefore can repent just as men can in this life. But they overlook the natural and necessary condition of freedom here or hereafter. The will is a correlated faculty, just as eyes and ears are correlated organs. Suppose a man with perfect eyes and ears immured in a massive-walled dungeon, into which not a ray of light nor a vibration of air can penetrate. His eyes and ears would be

(*) I. Cor. 15:24–27; Mat. 25:31–46; Rom. 2:5–12; and many others.

to him, as far as their functions are concerned, *as if* they were extinct, although, in themselves, perfect. The reason is, that his and all eyes are correlated to light, and ears to vibratory air; and neither of them can perform their functions out of the element to which they are correlated. In like way, the will is correlated to motives, and cannot act in any way, or with reference to any end or object without motives to do so. It cannot act in a dream without dreamed motives, nor in derangement without wildly fancied ones. If there are none before minds in reference to any special end or matter, their wills can no more act respecting it than stones can. Hence the freedom of the will is that of a power, not to act without motives, but to determine its own action either in accordance with or against all before the mind to or against any object or matter of choice, without any necessity created by them to act either way rather than the other. The will is not free not to act at all when there are motives before the mind in reference to any matter, but only to make the determination stated. Now, plainly, the fact that it is, and forever will be thus free, proves nothing whatever in favor of a probation after death for any of the race. The decisive question is, whether Christ and salvation by him are still offered by the Gospel to all or any who die in their sins. The answer, as far as the Scriptures are concerned, is, that they not only do not teach or imply such a probation, but they teach and imply the contrary. There is not a promise nor a prophecy in the Old Testament, nor a declaration or statement in the New, concerning the object or effect of the mission of Christ, which intimates that it was designed to have any *converting or saving relation* to any who die in their sins—that any of the sainted dead would ever be commissioned to go and preach the Gospel among them—or that a single one of them ever would or could be *converted and saved* by any agency whatever. In addition to this negative *proof*, all that is positively taught in these promises and prophecies, declarations and statements, shows that they relate to mankind only in this life, and *proves* that God has made no provision and puts forth no effort to convert them after death. These two proofs are abundantly confirmed directly and by palpable implications in Scripture. Our Lord, in His Parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus, shuts out the possibility of any such probation, when He represents Abraham as saying, in reply to the rich man's request for Lazarus to be sent to him for the service he states, verse 26,—"And besides all this, between us and you there is a great gulf fixed: so that they which would pass from hence to

you cannot; neither can they pass over thence to us, *that would.*" And, if what Abraham is represented, in verse 31, as saying respecting this wretched man's five brethren is true, is it likely or possible that they would repent in Hades with their brother? Then these proofs are confirmed by all those passages which denounce Divine rejection and punishment to all who die in impenitence, and by all those which declare that future retributions of both rewards and punishments, will be for "the deeds done in the body," or according to works done or character formed before death, and therefore not natural consequences of sin, but positive inflictions; while no passage hints that there will be any for anything done by anyone in the intermediate state, as these must be if there is a probation there. Then, if there is such a probation, it is wondrously strange that Christ never even hinted it, but absolutely concealed it in His teachings, while in the parable quoted, it is shown to be impossible. There is the same reticence respecting it in all the teachings of Apostles and others in the New Testament, two passages only being supposed by any to even imply it (Mat. 12:32; I. Pet. 3:19). But whatever they teach, they certainly do not teach in opposition to the whole current of Scriptures besides, that there is such a probation (John 9:4). We cannot, however, attempt a thorough examination of them here. We think, with the passages named (Heb. 9:27, 28) settles it, and they all, with the entire matter and teaching of the Gospel, exclude it from the family of Christian truths.

3. If the natural consequences of moral action are its only retributions, these, in the absence of the Gospel and all its motives and influences, must be the only motives to repentance. But mankind are, in this life, entirely unconscious of many of these consequences, and have very defective recognitions and realizations of any of them. Especially is this true of all in sin and unbelief; so that, to them, the motives of these consequences are imbecile against sin or to repentance. They have proved so to them all during this life, even to those of them under the Gospel, many of these thoroughly instructed in it. Can we suppose these motives will prove effectual to any after death? Must they not rather lose all tendency to move any to repent? This must certainly be the case, if there will then be no Gospel, and so no ground of faith in God, no warranted hope of acceptance by Him, no agency of the Holy Spirit to renew and help them, and no Church with its preaching and influences. What probation, then, can they have?

4. In addition, the law of habit, constantly increasing its binding power in them, if it has not already before death, must immediately or very soon after it, in connection with their changed conditions, confirm them all in everlasting sin. In this life, even when spent amidst the effulgence of the Gospel, multitudes become confirmed by it beyond change; and its rapid progress towards the same result is manifest in all who persist in sin. Death can put no arrest on this law; and, even if there were a Gospel and a probation after it, this law must very soon make them of no avail for any. If there is no Gospel after it, the case is what we have shown in the previous paragraph. According as this law takes effect, the will becomes morally enslaved; and, when its effect is complete, all moral freedom is gone forever; all power of moral self-arbitration, no matter what motives and influences act on the mind, is forever lost to the will, as myriads of cases in this life prove. It is, therefore, entirely futile to argue for a future probation from the natural freedom of the will, as if this were not often neutralized by habit even in this life.

5. But, if probation continues from death to the end of the world and the general judgment, for the heathen or any others who die without a knowledge of Christ, how unequal, and, in the language of those who teach that it does, unfair it would be to the successive generations of them! There would be none for those found alive when the end comes, nor for any who die just before it comes. It would be shorter to each generation after the first till it dwindled to nothing for the last! If, because God is love, He must continue probation to these after death, ought He not to give an equally lengthy one to all? If He does not, does He love all alike? But how could He do this, unless He should postpone the judgment of the race and extend the probation of everyone till he either repents or is confirmed by the law of habit never to do so? As the righteous of all the generations will not enter on their perfected state of glory and blessedness till after the general resurrection and judgment, is it fair or right to keep all their "numbers without number" out of this state and disembodied, till the last persisting sinner of them repents that God knows ever will, should it not be till after thousands or even millions of years? It must be a trial even to the saints to be kept waiting so long for the obstinate laggards! But how stands the case, if the natural consequences of moral action are the only retributions? Then a final judgment of the race is excluded as without either place or purpose; and we see not why both an end of the world and of our race are not also excluded as purposeless.

But, according to the uniform teaching of Scripture, mankind are all subject to a positive moral system and government, embracing an end of the world and of the race, a final general judgment, positive retributions of reward and punishment "according to the deeds done in the body," or during this earthly life; and this proves that probation ends with it.

6. But, in fact, a probation after death, unless *for a limited time made known*, would nullify itself. A probation for sinners is purely *gracious*, and not a matter of *justice* in any sense. It is a *time of trial* granted them, during which they may return to obedience and obtain forgiveness and all promised good, if they will. Its *known* limitation, with the certainty that, if they do not return within that time, no additional one will be granted and they must suffer the punishment and whole treatment from God which they deserve, constitutes the radical and chief *motive* to induce them to return. Without such a known limitation and condition, in what sense could there be a probation? Considering the character and whole disposition and habit of sinners, the grant to them of unlimited time for repentance would be in reality a license and dominant motive to persist in sin. It would infallibly create in them the assurance that they may sin on forever, exempt from any positive punishment; and, even if they should still be under the Gospel, it would lead them to reject its offers, motives, and influences forever. If they should not be under it, and the natural consequences of moral action are to be its only retributions, and therefore the only motives to repentance, we have already shown how absolutely ineffectual these must prove. A grant of unlimited time would forever exclude an administration of positive retributions, and, of course, all motives from the prospect of them; so that those of the conscious and recognized natural consequences of moral action would be the only ones to operate upon them. Not only, therefore, is there no reason to think that a single soul of them ever would repent, if granted unlimited time for repentance, but every reason to think that not a single one of them would; and there would be no probation in their case. As to a limited time of probation after death, not only, as we have shown, is it not taught in Scripture, but all that we have presented shows that it would be equally useless and self-nullifying.

7. To sum up what we have urged against this notion of a future probation for those or any who have died in sin, it is in conflict with the uniform teachings of Scripture, both direct and necessarily implied; it is irreconcilable with the known operation and effects of

the law of habit; there can be no probation after the end of the world and the general judgment; it would make a positive moral system and government impossible, and nullify all the motives of positive sanctions; it would abolish justice to either the righteous or the wicked, and leave all the wrongs of the world disregarded; if the Gospel should still be preached to the souls of the dead, all its motives and influences must be without effect, while their power upon sinners in this life, who adopt this notion, must be nullified or vastly impaired; it would nullify itself, destroying the possibility of a trial; it would license sin, and supply motives for persistence in it; it would make God unrighteous, if, during its indefinite or perpetual continuance, He should inflict final, positive punishment on the wicked in violation of his promise that He would not, implied in granting it, or in having no moral system and government, and being, from sympathy with the wicked, regardless of the rights, interests, and supreme concern of the righteous; and it would vastly impair the motives to righteousness in all worlds, in which it should be made or become known. We therefore hold it hostile to all vital truth of law, gospel, moral reason, and conscience, a mere invention of sentimentality to set aside unwelcome truth.

The argument from the social nature of the law, disclosed in its matter, end, and justice, is an invincible demonstration that there must be *social retributions* — positive rewards and punishments *retributed* by God Himself as universal Ruler, entirely beyond all the merely natural consequences of moral action; and that they are determined during probation in this life. It would be mere arbitrary caprice in Him not to administer them, because it would be to disregard and conflict with the nature of all moral beings, His own included.

PART II.

THE MODE OF GOD'S EXISTENCE; THE INCARNATION OF THE SON; THE REDEMPTIVE PLAN AND THE ETERNAL PURPOSE OF GOD; HIS FOREKNOWLEDGE, ELECTION, AND PREDESTINATION IN IT.

CHAPTER VIII.

What men may know of God, and what they cannot, without a special revelation from Him, and what by that of the Scriptures. Why what they teach concerning the mode of His existence should be accepted. Mysteries respecting Him of no weight against it; and predicament of deniers of the Scriptures and their teachings. The love of God for man is that of Him as three persons.

"Shall God be less miraculous than what
His hand has form'd? Shall mysteries descend
From unmysterious? Things more elevate
Be more familiar? Uncreated lie
More obvious than created to the grasp
Of human thought? The more of wonderful
Is heard in Him, the more we should assent.
Could we conceive Him, God He could not be;
Or He not God, or we could not be men.
A God alone can comprehend a God."
—*Young's Night Thoughts. Night IX.*

§ 74. ALL THINGS ENVELOPED IN INSOLUBLE MYSTERY—ESPECIALLY THE BEING AND MODE OF EXISTENCE OF GOD.

All being and substance, mind or matter, infinite or finite, are, as to essence and intrinsic qualities—that is, as to *what* they are in essential nature and properties, and as to *how* they exist, impenetrable mysteries to man, and doubtless to all finite minds. We know they exist, and all our other knowledge of them depends on this; but how do we know it, since we *perceive* only their phenomena

and manifestations, not their essence? When one perceives these, whether of mind or matter, he knows by an intuition of his reason that they belong to an existing *being* or *substance* which underlies them; and this knowledge is certain. In the same way he knows, with equal certainty, that there is a radical difference between the essence and attributes of mind and those of matter, because all the phenomena and manifestations of the one are invariably totally different from those of the other, which could not be, were they the same. But here his knowledge of what they are, *per se*, ends; for what mortal *comprehends*, or in any way knows what the essence either of himself or of any other being, or of any material object, is, or *how* it exists at all, or in the mode in which it does? Insoluble mystery envelops both the *what is it?* and the *how is it?* of the essence of all being and the substance of all matter; so that we live, move, and have our being in *mystery*, in the *incomprehensible*. It is beneath, above, around, and in us, like the atmosphere, or the ubiquity of God. It is in everything that exists, in all matter, in all mind, and supremely in God; and, besides Him, there is nothing else so universal, so omnipresent; and no one will ever cross its frontiers to explore or to destroy it.

§ 75. THE FACT OF MYSTERY OR INCOMPREHENSIBILITY OF A BEING OR OBJECT NO REASON FOR DISBELIEVING OR DENYING IT.

When, therefore, men are pondering the teachings of Scripture concerning God, the mode of His existence, His attributes, His doings and manifestations in creation, providence, government, or redemption; or concerning the nature and properties or qualities of man or matter; it is purely preposterous for any of them to say—"Oh, its all a mystery! I cannot comprehend it, and therefore cannot believe it." What, then, can he believe? If he ponders his own body, does he comprehend its substance, vital principle, digestive efficiency, by which his food is changed and assimilated into bones, cartilages, nerves, muscles, hair, nails, skin, and all parts and organs, or how it continues to live and perform all its functions? Does he comprehend how all kinds of grasses, leaves, flowers, fruits, seeds, roots, germs, and all vegetable growths from the least to the largest are what they are? or what their vitality and essence are? Does he comprehend how all the genera and species of the animal kingdom, beasts, birds, fishes, reptiles, insects, and animalcules are what they are, what the principle of their vitality and organization is, or any more about them than that they exist as they do? Does

he comprehend how all the various metals, precious stones, original rocks, peculiar clays and soils assumed their peculiarities, or what they, the air, and all the elements of nature are in their essential substance?* When he can so comprehend all these, and all about the essence and faculties, *in themselves*, of human minds or souls, and *how* they are connected with and use their bodies in all ways, that no mystery, no incomprehensibility will remain respecting these *arcana*, it will seem reasonable for him to object to receiving and holding as true any doctrine of revelation concerning God or anything else because there is mystery or incomprehensibility in it, but not till then! Hence, when we talk concerning the nature, the mode of being, or the attributes of God; the Trinity of Persons in His being; the incarnation of the second Person, by which the Divine and human natures became united into one Person; or anything else beyond our power of comprehension, the fact of mystery or incomprehensibility in it is no reason whatever, *in itself*, why it should not be accepted and believed. The case is precisely the same as that of all the other things referred to, which every one *does* accept and believe. All things are grounded in and pervaded with insoluble mystery. *Omnia exeunt in mysterium*, as a schoolman says.

§ 76. WHAT THE SCRIPTURES TEACH CONCERNING GOD AS ONE BEING AND THREE PERSONS.

With this introduction in mind, let us consider what the Scriptures teach concerning God. They teach that He is *one Being*, the *only God*—that He is Spirit, an infinite moral being, eternally existent, and immutable—and that He has the natural attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence. They teach that He is the Creator and Upholder of all worlds and creatures; and the Ruler or Governor of all moral natures among them. They teach that, while *one* in Being, He is *three* in Persons—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, each being in relation to the others, an *I*, a *Thou*, and a He; each of them speaking to and of each of the others just as each of three human persons does; and each claiming, and having ascribed to Him by each of the others, and by the inspired writers, the same Divine nature, attributes, and perfections which are possessed by each of the others, or by all in *one*. Respecting the Son, they teach as follows:—John 1:1–4. "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.

(*) See Job, Chapters 37–39.

The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by Him; and without Him was not anything made that has been made. In Him was life; and the life was the light of men." Is. 9:6 predicted His advent, and the names by which He should be called, among which is "The Mighty God." Matthew (1:23) quotes Is. 7:14 as fulfilled in Jesus Christ, the true "Immanuel, God with us." In John 5:17, 18, we are told that "Jesus answered" the Jews, who persecuted Him because He had healed a man on the Sabbath day. "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work;" and that they then "sought the more to kill Him, because He not only had broken the Sabbath, but said also that God was His Father, making Himself equal with God;" and, in verse 23, He says—"That all men should honor the Son, even as they honor the Father. He that honoreth not the Son, honoreth not the Father which hath sent Him." In John 10:30, He says—"I and my Father are one," and the Jews rightly understood Him (verse 33) as "making Himself God;" and, in verses 35–38, He vindicates Himself in so doing. In John 14:9, He said to Phillip—"Have I been so long time with you, and yet hast thou not known me, Philip? he that hath seen me hath seen the Father; and how sayest thou, then, Show us the Father?" In Rev. 1:8, He declared to John—"I am the Alpha and the Omega, saith the Lord God, which is, and which was, and which is to come, the Almighty." In Rom. 9:5, Paul says of Him—"Whose are the Fathers, and of whom, as concerning the flesh, Christ came, who is over all, God blessed forever." In Phil. 2:6, he also says of Him—"Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God." In Col. 1:15, he says—"Who is the image of the invisible God" (II. Cor. 4:4). In I. Tim. 3:16, he says—"God [or He who] was manifest in the flesh, justified in the Spirit, seen of angels," etc. In Heb. 1:3, he says—"Who being the effulgence of His glory, and the very image of His substance," etc.; and, in verses 4–13, he proves Him God according to the Old Testament, not only by being declared to be the Son of God, but by the fact that, in prophetic anticipation, God calls on all the angels to worship Him, addresses Him as God, and ascribes to Him an everlasting throne and kingdom, creation and immutability. The two last ascriptions, with those in verse 3 and that of being His Son, are made to Him as preincarnate; and thus they all prove that, as Divine, He never was an *impersonal hypostasis,* but has eternally been *strictly a Person* in the same sense in which His eternal Father is, who addresses and speaks of Him, and from whom He is, as the plain meaning of the language

and the nature of the case demand, eternally distinct, *as such*. They therefore absolutely prove that God is not *one* Person only with three manifestations named Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; for who can imagine one manifestation thus speaking to and concerning another! In Col. 1:19, Paul says—"For it pleased the Father, that in Him should all the fullness [of God] dwell." The connection shows that this statement has special reference to His Divine nature; and what else than nonsense does the Sabellian notion of *three manifestations*, or that of *three impersonal hypostases*, or that of God's being only one in Person as in Being or essence, make of it? In I. John 5:20, it is said—"This [that is Jesus Christ] is the true God, and eternal life." See John 17:5. That all things were created, are upheld, and consist by Him is taught in John 1:3, 10; I. Cor. 8:6; Col. 1:16, 17; Heb. 1:2, 3, 10. In view of all the passages quoted, if understood, as the common rules of interpretation, including those of grammar, require, we see no possible way of candid process by which to avoid the certain conclusion, that, in His Divine nature, our Lord is God in precisely the same sense in which the Father is, that is, in nature and person, and of course that the Father is God no more than He; and that both the Father and the Son are alike Persons in the one eternal and unchangeable Being or essence of God. And what is thus true of these *two* Persons is equally so of the *third*, the Holy Spirit; so that the revealed mode of the existence of the one eternal, immutable essence or being of God is that there is a Trinity of eternal and equal Persons in it. Whoever objects to this talks mere assumption, without and against Scriptural, and therefore any, sound reason respecting it.

§ 77. NO ANTECEDENT PROBABILITY OR PRESUMPTION AGAINST THE SCRIPTURAL TEACHING.

We have shown that all *substance*, *essence*, *being* is entirely incomprehensible to man, both as to *what it is in itself* and as to *how it exists in any mode;* and that this is specially true of that of God, the self-existent, infinite, immutable, and absolute One. As to our own essence or being, each of us knows by self-consciousness, not what it is in itself, but simply that it exists; that it does so in the *mode* of a single person, an I distinct from all other I's or persons; that it performs the functions of speculative and moral intuition, reasoning, judging, remembering, conceiving, imagining, and all thinking—of all varieties of feeling and desiring—and of all willing choices and volitions; and thus that it possesses *intelligence, sensibility, and will.*

Consciousness, as a *power* of mind, is that of knowing, and, as an *exercise* of it, is actually knowing, ourselves as the active or passive subjects of our mental exercises and experiences. As we have no knowledge from it what our essence is, so neither has any one *how* he is a moral being or person, having the faculties he has and exerciring them as he does. Its deliverances teach the *oneness* of his person, but not of his being; for we know otherwise that his being is not *one* essence or substance, but at least *two*, a combination of mind or spirit and matter, having not one characterizing phenomenon in common. In view of the entirely different phenomena of the two, our reason intuitively affirms the necessarily corresponding difference of the two themselves. Now, if these two totally different essences or substances can be thus combined, we neither do nor can know *how*, into one being, what mortal can think why any number of *persons* may not exist in the one infinite, spiritual essence of God, as well as one?—or *how*, as His essence and mode of existence are both absolutely incomprehensible to man, there is or can be even a possibility of absurdity, contradiction, conflict with reason, or improbability in the revealed doctrine of a Trinity of Persons in the infinite essence of God?—of an *I*, a *Thou* and a *He* in His mode of existence? It is just as utterly impossible to comprehend how *one* Person exists in His essence or being, as how three do, since both are fathomless mysteries to man. If one should say that God is three *beings or essences in one*, using the terms in the same sense, his saying would plainly be not only self-contradictory, but nonsensical. But no such thing is asserted when one says there are three Persons in His one being or essence; for there is a palpable distinction between the term *person*, and the term *being* when used in the sense of essence or substance; and therefore the proposition involves no absurdity, no contradiction, nothing incredible or even improbable, but is perfectly consistent and rational, being, for aught anyone can possibly know respecting the matter, the true expression of the actual mode of the Divine existence.

§ 78. INCOMPETENCE OF MAN WITHOUT A REVELATION TO KNOW THIS, DEMONSTRATED BY THE HISTORY OF THE HEATHEN WORLD.

Whoever accepts the Scriptures as God's inspired revelation to man must accept this proposition; for they most positively, variously, and aboundingly assert what it expresses. He certainly knows what the *mode* of His own existence is; and men as certainly neither do nor can know anything whatever either for or against it,

aside from what this revelation teaches. The history of the whole heathen world from its beginning demonstrates the utter incompetence of man, without an authentic revelation from God, despite all his boasted reason, to know anything about this matter. Blind to the fact, that there neither is nor can be more than one God, they have, with extremely rare exceptions, everywhere believed that there are *many*, or, as in India and elsewhere, have adopted the foolish dream of Pantheism, or, comparatively very few, even Atheism. They have thus radically erred as to His being, His unity, and His personality, as they always equally have as to His character, government, and relations to and disposition towards mankind. If throughout this widest and most lasting experiment ever made in this world concerning any matter, human reason, untaught by a revelation from God respecting Himself, and having the whole field to itself, has proved so utterly imbecile, as these results demonstrate, in relation to what is and what is not true of God's being, mode of existence, character, government, and whole attitude towards mankind, what fatuity it is now for men to reject the revelation He has given them on all these points, and to rely again entirely upon that same blind imbecile as to these things, to give us better light and guidance respecting them, or any at all!—and that, too, when all they know or think about Him more or better than the heathen have ever been able to, they have demonstrably learned directly and indirectly from that professed revelation! This fatuous retrogression and reliance, eked out by the felonious claim, that all which they have received from that revelation since their childhood has come from this demonstrated imbecile alone, is the whole stock in trade of our modern infidels; and all who discard that revelation respecting God and other vital matters in claimed obedience to their reason are, whether consciously or not, in reality partners in that felonious claim. If God should, by a righteous writ of replevin, recover from them all they thus falsely claim as their own, He would leave them precisely what all other heathen are, having only heathen reason, heathen ignorance of all revealed concerning God, Christ, the moral system, and the way and means of human salvation, and heathen gods and superstitions! These infidels totally mistake the functions of reason concerning all such matters, and ascribe to it such as it is utterly incompetent to execute—as much so as men are to visit, explore, and bring back true reports of all in the sun, or in any star, planet, or moon in all the heavens.

§ 79. FUNCTIONS OF REASON RESPECTING RELIGIOUS AND MORAL TRUTHS AND FACTS.

What functions can reason fulfill, especially respecting religious and moral truths and facts? In general, it perceives and affirms all first truths, mathematical or ethical, although not directly the *essence* or *substance* of either matter or mind. As before stated, we first know their phenomena, not by reason, but by observation and experience. This knowledge of them being thus received, reason *then* intuitively affirms the existence of the essences or substances to which they pertain. When the phenomena pertaining to them differ *entirely*, as those of mind and those of matter do, it intuitively affirms that they also *differ entirely* in intrinsic nature and qualities. We thus know that there are *classes* of essences or substances generically alike, and others generically different—some material, some spiritual; of the material, some organic and some not; some vital and some not; of the non-material or mental, the rational alone moral beings, and all others non-moral. But reason never affirms the essence or substance of either class of them identical with that of the other, but the contrary; and it is the sole scientific source of knowledge respecting them. It also affirms a First Force and Cause, of which all others are simply effects—a primal Essence or Being, by which all others, with their varieties of nature, constitution, and qualities, are only creations—one therefore of a nature and attributes perfectly *adequate to create* all the varieties of them, and to uphold, control, change, or destroy them universally. This knowledge, no mere assumptions or fancies of false science about matter as uncreated and eternal, with self-sprung laws and forces in it, existing from eternity till within calculable time as a universe of most attenuated fire-mist, and then unaccountably originating from itself initial life or protoplasm, from which all of both vegetable and animal kinds which have existed since have been produced by the natural process of evolution, will ever explode or supplant. Reason's intuitive affirmation of this primal and perpetual Cause of all that exists, involves that it is adequate in all respects to *cause* and continue them; and the necessary logical conclusion is, that it must be a MIND, a spiritual, intelligent, voluntary, designing, *Moral Being*, ubiquitous, almighty, all-knowing, all-wise, righteous, administering a moral government over mankind, and exercising a universal providence.

But reason affirms all these truths respecting God to men now, in the Christian light, with a clearness and fullness, with which it

never did nor could at any time or place in the heathen world. Whatever manifestations of Him *they* could observe or be informed of were only those made by Him in *creation* and *providence*, because they have always lacked the whole resplendent information which He has given concerning Himself in the inspired Scriptures and their obvious influences and results of all kinds on the minds, hearts, and whole condition of populations as far as molded by them; and because of the common blindness of their minds from the corruptions and viciousness in which they have been sunk, and of all the darkening influences they have in all ways exerted upon each other. But, however much better than they, we who have received the Christian Revelation may know the things knowable about God, we, no more than they, can know those things about Him which, as we have shown, are, in the nature of the case, unknowable by the human mind. Hence all, infidel or professedly Christian, who endeavor to know these things by their reason, set it at a task, for accomplishing which omniscience alone is competent—a stupendous blunder which ought to cease.

§ 80. APPLICATION OF ALL THIS TO DENIERS OF THE SCRIPTURAL DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.

The deniers of this doctrine affirm that it is self-contradictory, contrary to reason, and absurd. We affirm the contrary. Are they right, or are we? This doctrine, as before said, is not that there are three distinct essences or beings in one, which would be what they assert. As already said, there is a clear distinction between an essence or being and a person, the former not necessarily being also an *I*, as the latter is. No essence, the phenomena of which are those of matter, is an *I* or *person;* nor is that of any irrational creature; yet every essence is a *being*. It is only by the addition of reason to it that it becomes a person. It was by this addition, breathed into the new-formed being of man by the Creator, that he became a living soul, a spiritual, self-conscious *thinking, feeling, willing*, moral nature in distinction from all irrational, non-moral creatures, the minds of which are only instinctive. It is totally unimportant, as to the present sense in which the word *person* is or ought to be used philosophically, theologically, or otherwise, to know or care in what primary, secondary, or other sense the old Latins used it. It is the only word used for centuries in philosophy and theology, and even popularly, to signify a rational sensitive, voluntary, moral nature. Such a nature is always a person, and no other is, or can be; and

no *personless being can be a moral one.* As the terms thinking, feeling, willing sum up all the phenomena of a mind or person, and they are all totally unlike those of matter, they prove that mind or person is not matter, but spirit. Beyond what is thus stated, we know nothing concerning what constitutes or pertains to a person.

If, now, anyone asks whether we hold that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are Persons in this sense, we ask in turn, why not? If he asks further, whether we hold that *each* of them thinks, feels, and wills, and has His own distinct consciousness of doing so by His own distinct power, we answer again, why not? What difficulty is there in the way of believing this more than in that of believing the same true of three, or any number of human persons, if this term is not confounded with the term beings? If he still asks how each of them can have His own distinct activities and feelings, and consciousness of them, if they are all of one essence and are one Being, and if the consciousness of each is absolutely open and known to both the others, our answer is, that their identity of essence or being in no way implies identity of action, feeling and consciousness more than of Persons; and that neither of them knows any activity or feeling of either of the other two *as His own*, but only as His whose it is, nor consequently has *His* consciousness. How then, does the fact that the consciousness of each is absolutely open and known to each of the others in the least conflict with the fact that it is as distinctly His own as if He were the only one? Does the fact that human persons often know a great part of the contents of the consciousness of each other at all conflict with the fact that each has his own, and that the phenomena it attests belong purely to himself? The oneness of the Divine Essence or Being and the infinite holiness of the three Persons in it secure the absolute and eternal concurrent concord of the wills and whole character and state of the three, so that there is eternal unity of will as well as oneness of essence or being in the Godhead. What valid objection, then, can there be to the doctrine of the Trinity?—of three distinct Persons in the one Divine Being? Since all essence or substance is utterly incomprehensible in itself, especially the infinite, spiritual, Divine Essence, and also the mode of its existence, especially of that of this infinite Essence, in what conceivable way can anyone see any self-contradiction, contrariety to reason, or absurdity in the doctrine? If there ever was one perfectly self-consistent, harmonious with, though not of, reason, and without a taint or touch of absurdity, this is it; while all objections to and denials of it assume grounds which are false,

or self-contradictory, or contrary to reason, and absurd. For no one can so characterize this doctrine without confounding person with essence or being and assuming that he knows and comprehends by his reason both the essence of God's being and the mode of His existence, which, as we have shown, is necessarily a baseless assumption. Yet this assumption is the major premise of every assertion that the doctrine of the Trinity is absurd. The asserter's syllogism is this:—"Reason teaches and I comprehend what the essence of God intrinsically is, and the mode of His existence. Hence, I know that His essence or being and His Person are one and the same, so that the one essence is only one Person. Therefore, the doctrine of three Persons in it is self-contradictory, contrary to reason, and absurd." Both the premises, major and minor, are false in fact, and so, of course, is the conclusion; so that the whole argument is fatally absurd. The Trinitarian syllogism, on the contrary, is this—"The Holy Scriptures are an authentic revelation from God, and clearly teach that there are three Persons in the one Essence or Being of God. Human reason teaches nothing whatever for or against this Scriptural teaching, so that men have no valid ground on which to deny or doubt that teaching, but have all the evidence for the truth of the Scriptures and the Christian system for receiving it. Therefore, we believe that there are three Persons in the one Divine Essence or Being, equal, of course, in all attributes and perfections."*

(*) The view concerning the Trinity, presented in the last two lectures of Joseph Cook in his volume, entitled Transcendentalism, of 1878, seems to us now, after more than eight years, as it did then, a deviation from the Scriptural teaching on this fundamental subject. Our estimate of this eminent and famed lecturer and man is very high, and only our higher estimate of this radical subject could move us to utter the following in opposition, which we wrote then, but which is no less important now. That volume is not at hand, and the reader must gather from our remarks what it is in those Lectures to which we are objecting. We believe our objections perfectly fair, and they are no evidence whatever of a lack of high appreciation and respect for one who, as an author, aims at greatest truths in so many directions, and so generally hits the mark. The truest marksman shoots amiss sometimes. This said, we proceed.

What is a Trinity of *impersonal subsistences*, but three *impersonal substances, essences, or beings, distinct from each other?* We cannot deny the possibility of such existences, but, if existent, they can be nothing but blanks of reason and moral nature, can sustain no relation to rational, moral natures, any others, or mutually; and can have no self-consciousness, no designs, no intelligent activity, no moral character, and no desert of regard by moral beings. We see no reason for supposing such subsistences in the Divine Essence. Nothing of the kind is taught in Scripture, and they are mere speculative inventions. If *reminded that they are spiritual, we respond, yes, and therefore participant of the Divine Eternal Reason, and consequently personal, since all rationals, all existences having reason, of whom mankind have any knowledge, are personal.* To us, an impersonal rational, spiritual subsistence is intrinsically absurd and impossible; and, to say that God is one essence with, or having in it, three impersonal hypostases or sub-

§ 81. NO RATIONAL GROUND FOR REJECTING THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY FROM FEAR OF CONTRAVENING THE SCRIPTURES.

If the Scriptures are an inspired revelation from God, the very fact that they so repeatedly and positively assert the *oneness* of God against polytheism, and yet assert with like repetition and positiveness, that He exists in *three Persons*, makes it equally certain that this is the mode of His existence, and forbids to deny it. If, in writing them, "holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost," and if "all Scripture is given by inspiration of God," it follows that, in the supreme sense, the Holy Spirit is the Author of all the teachings of Scripture. He inspired it in all benevolence and wisdom to teach mankind all facts and truths necessary for them to know in order to their salvation, and of course to guard them against all essential errors. Only, then, let it be remembered how prone they have been always and everywhere to go into polytheism and creature-worship; how, throughout the Scriptures, these are branded as foulest and most ruinous sin against God; and how likely they would be to go into them, and thus bring ruin on themselves, if representations were made in them that there were *two* or *three* Gods who were to be equally honored and worshipped, if there were but one; and also that the Spirit perfectly understood the whole case, and certainly would not conduct His readers any nearer the borders of so fatal an error than absolute truth and fact demand;

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sistences is, in reality or effect, to say that He is simply, only, and independently of these, *unipersonal*. For, what function can be ascribed to them, unless that they are mere passive organs through which the one Person acts out all His functions and parts. To say that there is but one Person in the Divine Essence or Being—that is, one set of personal attributes, one will, and one consciousness, is to say that these three impersonal subsistences are, to human insight at least, eternally insignificant ciphers, whether existent or not, and is to *Unitarianize;* while to say that they are the organs, each of a special kind or class of the manifestations of the one Divine Person, He having in these different classes of them the relations to Himself indicated by the designations, The Father, The Son, The Holy Spirit, is to *Sabellianize.*

The mutually interchanged *I, Thou, He,* by these three, so often repeated in Scripture, is the language of Persons, *not fictitious nor figurative, but real;* and these designations are ascribed to them by the sacred writers, not only as mutually used by them, but to express their own assured belief or knowledge respecting them *as related to each other*, and not to men, except that, in comparatively a few instances, they thus use the designation, Father. Then, these three ascribe to each other will, functions, relational action, affections, emotions, and no other than personal activities and characteristics; and besides, the titles, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit can mean nothing but Persons; for who can concieve of an *impersonal* Father, Son, or Holy Spirit?—or of each and all of these three impersonals in the relations to each other indicated by these designations? In addition, neither could the impersonal Father send His impersonal Son, nor that Son be sent by that Father, nor the impersonal Spirit, if possibly existent, proceed from and be sent by them both, because all this would be impossible in the nature of the case,

and, if all this is remembered and considered, what can be more certain, than that whatever the Scriptures contain about the Father as God, the Son as God, and the Holy Spirit as God—that is, about a Trinity of Persons in the one Divine essence, must be true to the very letter, and that there can be no shadow of danger in fully receiving in its obvious normal sense whatever is said concerning each of them and their mutual relations? The danger must lie wholly on the side of rejecting these communications. Suppose, for illustration, a mere human author, in whose intelligence, judgment, veracity, and all integrity we place complete confidence, shows himself especially careful to assert and establish the greatness of the nature, character, rights, and claims of *one* particular person, are we not bound to believe that whatever he asserts or admits as true of *another* in the same respects, he fully recognizes as really belonging to him, and, as far as his authority goes, to receive his declarations respecting him in their fullest significance? If, for instance, he is obviously anxious to assert and maintain the greatness of the nature, excellences, rights, and merits of Washington, and to urge his consequent claims on the American people for their correspond-

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as the one only Person and agent in the Divine Essence is distinct from each and all these inert subsistences. Coleridge, somewhere in his Works, contrasts the conceptions of God as a *unit-Person* and as a *unit-essence of three Persons*—the former as that of mere Deism, admitting no manifestation by incarnation and atonement for human redemption, nor, of course, of the love moving to it; the latter as that of Scripture, according to which it is perfectly possible and gloriously actual. The *unipersonal God* is that of Mahometans, not of Christianity; and, to our conscience, Naaman's fault, if, as he proposed to the prophet his wish to do, he went with his royal master going to worship in the temple of Rimmon, was vastly less than ours would be, if we should kneel with any Sultan and his fellow *misbelievers* in their mosque in their worship, and thus recognize their falsely conceived God as identical with the Christian, and sanction their apostate rejection of the revealed *Tripersonal God*, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the only God of love and redemption for lost man. The Allah they conceive is not a God of love or justice, but, in character, simply a reflected likeness of his creator, the ignorant, impure, morally, and religiously blind, big-headed, unprincipled, fanatical, prototype Mormon, who, claiming to be his prophet, and combining the consummate impostor, bigot and general robber, initiated that appalling ravage of continents, which, through subsequent centuries, has wrought such incalculable havoc of life, liberty, products of the arts and labors of many generations, right belief, religion, morality, and civilization over such vast portions of the globe. The core of that pernicious delusion is the mere Deistic assumption of a *unipersonal God*, supported by neither Scripture nor reason, while the doctrine of the Trinity of Persons in one Being is purely one of Scripture, untaught by which human reason knows nothing for or against it *as it is*, although it is not without remarkable precursory glimmerings in parts of the heathen world. When, where, or how the first of them originated we are not definitely told, but their origin was certainly in high antiquity; they did not come by any teachings of human reason, but were probably, as Cudworth thinks, intimated or gathered from some revelation from God concerning the mode of His existence, given through Moses or some one or more of the chosen people, presumably including David (see Gen. 1:26, and Psalms 2 and 110); and some knowledge of such revelations being diffused to different nations, among others

ing veneration and gratitude, is it not certain that whatever of the same excellences and merits he asserts or admits as belonging to another and as constituting claims for him to the same estimation, honor, and regard (suppose to Jefferson, John Adams, or any other), we ought to believe him as fully meaning all he says? In exact proportion to the importance he plainly attaches to what he admits and asserts respecting the former, and the earnestness with which he affirms *his* claims, we are bound to assume that he fully intends all he admits and asserts respecting the latter. If he admits and asserts that, *official relations excepted*, the latter is *equal* to the former, we certainly ought to believe that, in his opinion, truth and fact require him to do so. But suppose, further, he clearly sees that, if his readers should understand him to mean *more* respecting the latter than he really does, it would greatly injure or even ruin them, then certainly, if truly benevolent, he would be as select and careful as possible in his use of terms and forms of expression, and assuredly he would rather stop short of saying all he, in truth, might on the side where he knew the danger lay, than go full length in saying it. Whatever he would say, which in his view might even feebly tend to

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Egypt, it was obtained there and taken to Greece by Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato. (See Cudworth's Int. Sys. of the Universe, Chap. IV., XXXVI. See also a recent Article in the Bib. Sac.) But, when this doctrine is recognized as it is, it is not only seen that it in no sense conflicts with reason, but that the whole constitution of the truths and facts of the Gospel is grounded upon and conformed to it, and that the unipersonal notion compels the rejection of them all, and of the measureless manifested love of God in them. The only method, therefore, for ascertaining the real truth of this doctrine is to begin by discarding the notion that untaught reason does or can know anything for or against it, and with this, of course, the groundless assumption that God is only *unipersonal*, which is a breeder of intellectual, moral, and theological miasms and plagues worse incomparably than Rhine-ooze ever bred, and to accept the Scriptural teaching and data in their plain, normal, exegetical sense. To say that the doctrine of three Persons *in* the one Divine Essence is *tritheism* is alien to discrimination; for the latter is the notion of three separate, independent essences or beings, each a Person, a God, and rests on the assumption that being and person are precisely one and the same. Not the revealed doctrine of the Trinity of God, which avoids on the one side the error that He is only unipersonal, and on the other that of Tritheism, but the assumption that reason teaches the intrinsic essence and the mode of existence of God, and specially, of the two errors stated, the one placed first, that He is only unipersonal, which is founded upon it, is the fearful Rhine-slush, in which "armies whole have sunk" sheer down, alas, how deep! from the Divine light and glories of the three Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in the one being of God as revealed in the Living Oracles, and from the matchless circle of truths and facts of the Gospel vitally correlated to them separately and in common. (See Howe's Calm Discourse of the Trinity.)

As to the many-centuried illustration of light, new burnished by this polisher, we must say of it, as we do of all attempted ones since the first, it is really none at all; for what illustration of the mode of existence of the infinite, spiritual, incomprehensible essence of God by any sense object is or can be possible? Any illustration of the purely incomprehensible is a *lucus a non lucendo*. *If God is not* TRIPERSONAL, *a real atonement is impossible, and Christianity false.*

lead them to ruin, or into danger of it, he would say only because he sincerely believed the rights of truth and the greatest good required him to say it; and we would therefore be bound to credit him with meaning all that his language expressed, since not to do this would impugn his character or capability, or both.

§ 82. WHAT THE ADOPTION OF TRINITARIANISM BY THE MAIN MASS OF THE CHURCH FROM ITS BEGINNING ARGUES.

How these suppositions apply to the Holy Spirit as the supreme Author of the Scriptures, to their teachings on the matter of the three Persons in the one Divine Essence, and to the Son of God Himself and His teachings recorded by the inspiration of the Spirit, we need not stop to show. But we ask every intelligent reader thoroughly to consider, in connection with them, the momentous fact, that these teachings of the Spirit and of our Lord in the Scriptures are recorded with so many repetitions, such a variety of expression, and such necessary implications, that the great mass of their readers from the Apostles' times down, including a succession of the most illustrious minds and accomplished scholars and critics that have ever existed and shed light, luster, and influence on mankind, have believed with most perfect conviction that they do positively teach the Trinity of Persons in God. They have believed that they would be guilty of the greatest possible vice of scholars, critics, or professed reasoners, that of willfully rejecting the plain, normal meaning of the Scriptures, and of torturing their language to force its real meaning out of it from repugnance to it, and to force a false one of mere assumption into it, if they did not receive this doctrine in the only legitimate sense of the inspired language. Is it, then, credible or conceivable, according to any theory of inspiration which recognizes the Bible as a reliable revelation from God, reliable both by the influence and guidance of the Spirit on its writers and by containing the teachings of our infallible Lord, who both knew perfectly what they wished expressed, and how to express or to secure the best expression of it, and who also knew how the great mass of their readers in all after time would be led into radical error and perversion, if they have been, concerning the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, if what Scripture contains concerning them is not so stated as to express the truth, but the contrary, and yet caused or permitted those contents to be given as they are? Is it not certain from everything in the case, including their object in giving these teachings, that they would not have

given them at all, certainly not as they are, if they had not designed that their readers should understand them just as the great mass of them always have? Is it credible or conceivable that, having asserted, in opposition to all polytheism and creature-worship, so often and peremptorily that God is *one*, and equally forbidden the least recognition of any other, they would in the same book, and without explanation or appearance of consciously saying anything contradictory or inconsistent, assert and necessarily imply that the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Spirit is God, ascribing to each all the Divine attributes of the others, and representing them as speaking to and of each other and each of Himself as God, if such were not the actual fact and truth? Is it credible or conceivable that they should thus knowingly and therefore designedly so teach as to precipitate all their readers, who accept their utterances in their plain, obvious meaning, into that very perversion respecting God, which, in other teachings in the same revelation, they have branded with such terrible denunciations, dooming all in and persistent in it to God's avenging curse? What kind of character is this to impute to them? But the case is made still worse by the fact, that the clear-seeing portion of this main mass of all who have, from the first, accepted the teachings of Christ and the Spirit in their manifest sense, have seen that the whole redemptive measure, set forth in the Scriptures, especially in the Gospel, necessarily rests upon the eternal fact of a Trinity of Persons in the being of God. But for this fact, no such measure would have been possible; nor could there have been an authentic revelation of one from God; and the Scriptures containing the professed one which we have could be only an inexplicable enigma of human invention, because it is impossible to even imagine how the conception of either this measure or the Triunity of God could have entered the minds of its writers, since they were Jews with the belief of their race and time thoroughly ingrained in them, that God is simply one, until the disciples of Christ were initiated by Him in this doctrine of the Trinity as rudimentally taught in the Old Testament and still more fully by Himself. One fact worth noting here is, that the common result of rejecting the doctrine of the Trinity is the rejection with it not only of the whole evangelical system, but of the Scriptures as an inspired and authentic Divine revelation.

§ 83. PREDICAMENT OF THEISTIC DENIERS OF THE SCRIPTURAL REVELATION CONCERNING GOD, THE TRINITY, AND THE ATONEMENT.

There is, then, no middle ground between accepting the whole doctrine of the redemptive measure, and its necessary basis of the Triunity of God, as clearly revealed in the Scriptures, and discarding them as no revelation at all from God. All theists who adopt the latter alternative are in the following predicament. They believe in a personal God, an eternal Mind and moral Being, infinite in all attributes and perfections, who is the Creator and Upholder of all worlds and creatures, including our race of rational, self-conscious, moral natures. This race, when moral agents, are consciously a race of sinners; and, by reason of their moral nature, sin darkens and blinds their moral reason and judgment; benumbs the sensibility of their conscience and their susceptibility of all best feeling; works in them the habit of itself and of all the connected action of the intelligence and sensibility; sets them in hostility to God and His law; prevents all holy aims and ends; causes all evil desires and passions, and prevents good ones; produces disorders, jarrings, and miseries within them; urges to all kinds of vices and corruptions; incites to social antagonisms, conflicts, and all kinds of injustice, injuries and wrongs; creates conscious guilt or desert of punishment from God, and fills them with fears and lookings for of stern retribution from Him in their immortal future; thus, in every way, it more and more darkens, perverts, corrupts, enslaves, degrades, torments, tempests, and curses them in time, and covers their whole prospect of immortality with menaces of wrath to come; and, besides, it sheds corresponding blight and death on all by their social relations. Now, the Creator knew perfectly, before He created them, the total history of the moral action and experiences of every one of them. Yet He not only created the first pair with their race-constitution, but when they sinned, instead of cutting them off and preventing the race, He spared them and continued it, and thus has the responsibility before His own infinite conscience, and in a subordinate sense, before the finite consciences of the rational universe, not only for creating the first pair constituted as they were for a race, but for continuing them and their race after they sinned with all their sinward tendencies and consequent liabilities, individual and social, to become utterly corrupt and apostate, and the certainty of everlasting ruin to them all, unless redeemed in time. One thing is certain from the nature of the case, from Scripture, and, as it respects mankind, from all history, all

reliable observation, and all confessed experience, that, while moral beings can by their own will plunge into sin and its appalling consequences, they have, in and of themselves, no self-restoring power; they can never extricate themselves from its ever-tightening bonds; and God alone can rend these off and extricate them, if they will yield to His gracious Spirit's power.

What, then, is the predicament of all professed theists, who reject God's Scriptural revelation to man, and with it, of course, the whole redemptive measure, and the Triunity of God, on which it rests? Let us see. Notwithstanding God's responsibility, just stated, for the existence and continuance of our race, and His absolute knowledge of their whole appalling condition and prospects as sinners, He has never, according to these theists, been moved by the unutterably mournful spectacle before Him to *manifest* the least pity for, or mercy towards, them, so as to *do* the least thing to retrieve and save them! Quietly, through all the centuries since creation's day, He has sat in His far off heaven or been omnipresent to them in total indifference to their state and fate, and has seen them, generation after generation, in thronging millions, after the fitful, and often morally delirious, fever of their sin-cursed lives, plunging precipitate over death's precipice into an utterly unilluminated eternity with all their guilt sitting heavy on them, and yet has never deigned to communicate to them a single word of information or instruction to relieve their darkness, to guide them a single step, to inspire in them the least hope, to place before them a single motive to urge or allure them to attempt a religious amendment of heart and life, to impart a single influence to help or comfort them, or to show that He has any interest in, concern for, or care about them, or what becomes of them! He thus leaves them to grope on, sin on, corrupt on, suffer on, die on; some of them all along babbling away about what reason does or can teach, but which it certainly cannot, in effort to make out that man needs no other revelation than it gives; some crying up materialistic science as the chief concern of man, and trying to substitute even that which is falsely so-called for all moral and religious science and its immortal importance; some, in true heathen style, going after lying spirits to seek from them what they consciously need, a revelation; vast portions of them plunging and sinking into grossest immoralities, vices, crimes, and every species of enormity and degradation; whole nations and populations of them utterly perishing from the earth, having had no means of knowing any more than the heathen always have about

Him, about his attributes, character, government, disposition, and designs towards them, whether He can have mercy upon and save them, loves or hates them—or about themselves as creatures and sinners, their relations to Him, their guilt, their need of salvation, how it is possible, and their future state—not knowing enough to preserve them from polytheism and idolatry, or even grossest fetichism, if the teachings of the one wondrous Book, which these professed theists discard as an authentic, inspired revelation from God, had never been given to any part of mankind. They cannot act, except under the influences upon and the motives before them; and, if they are ignorant of precisely such moral and religious facts and truths as the Bible contains, and without their motives, and are in essential error and under its motives, and if without good and under evil influences, it is vain to expect that with their enormous preverse tendencies, they ever will act rightly and form good characters, aud not wrongly and form bad ones. Hence, without an authentic revelation from God, such as we hold the Bible to be, and such motives as it contains and influences as are connected with it, mankind never would improve *in a religious and moral sense* to the end of time. Never have they improved in this sense anywhere or in any age, not a nation, tribe, or family of them; and, from the nature of the case, they must, as always in the past, grow more and more corrupt and sink as plummets do in water. And, sinking in this sense, they must, as they always have done, soon sink in every other sense, till utter extinction or basest degradation is reached and they become either mere historical existences or ignominious shadows of their less degenerate former selves, fit only to "point a moral, or adorn a tale" for all who fail to discern the real cause of their ruin. A law of development and progress in man? You may search all the history of the heathen world from its beginning, as the Lord through His prophet said He would "search Jerusalem with candles," for the least scintilla of such a law, and it will not be found; and it will certainly be found nowhere else. If such a law ever existed, it was utterly abrogated as far as religion and morality, and as all else dependent on these, or beyond temporary flushes and glimmerings, soon hid by clouds or swallowed in night, are concerned, the moment the first sin brought blight on the race. The only law shown by the entire history of the heathen world down all its thousands of years and through all its vast majorities of mankind is one by which that world has always sunk from bad to worse to all its superstitions of polytheism, idolatry, fetichism, pantheism,

and atheism, and to all demoralization, corruption, degradation, and, vast portions of it, to utter destruction from the earth. What say all the records and testimonies from highest antiquity down concerning this law of retrogression? What say all the mounds, ruins, and wastes of extinct cities, nations and vast populations, utterly vanished? The fit epitaph for them all would be—"Blighted and destroyed by the law of development and progress, reversed as it is in mankind in sin, and without an authentic, inspired revelation from God, and His gracious intervention for man's salvation recorded in and connected with it." For the reasons shown, and others set forth in another place in this work, man never would, and, from his subjective state and lack of requisite objective motives, never could restore himself to right and vital relations to God more than he can raise himself from the dead. Whoever writes a book "On the Intellectual Development of Europe," or "On Civilization," or "On the so-called Absolute Religion," or on any subject, with an aim to set aside the Bible and its inspired teachings respecting man's lost condition, the measure of redemption, and all involved in these, and omits or denies these radical factors for the comprehension and exhibition of the real case in such a work, necessarily misconstrues the whole matter. He misshapes such pertinent facts as he has, denies or invents others, and thus simply romances in contradiction, not of the Bible only, but of all history of the heathen world, all reliable observation, and all scientific conceptions of what the nature of a genuine religion and a genuine morality must be. In view, now, of this whole appalling condition of mankind in sin and without a Divinely inspired revelation and a manifested gracious intervention of God to restore them to Himself and all good forever, if we judge the case according to the law as given by both moral reason and Scripture, and as ever maintained by conscience, what must we think of the character of God, if, despite His responsibility for their existence, both as created, and as continued by Him, when the first pair had sinned, notwithstanding their inherited evil tendencies, He has remained wholly indifferent concerning them, and has neither given them such a revelation, nor made such an intervention? What colors of language or thought could paint Him dark enough? Yet such is the God of infidel theism or Deism; and it is from preference of this imaginary, loveless, unjust, self-hiding God, that it rejects the revelation of the true one, and all the manifestations recorded in it of His measureless love, His justice, mercy and grace—the full-orbed moral perfection of the

Triune Christian God, and all the truth and fact, all the motives, and all the influences in and connected with that revelation and those manifestations? Its *imagined* God is substantially the lazy one of Epicurus; and yet it is constantly panegyrizing this ill-charactered substitution for the real Christian one as transcendently excelling in character and the realization of the ideal of absolute goodness, although never having made a single manifestation of love to mankind, unless in ordinary Providence. What could be more preposterous?

§ 84. NO PRESUMPTION AGAINST ANY DOCTRINE OF CHRISTIANITY, BUT A DECISIVE ONE, A MORAL CERTAINTY THAT IT IS TRUE.

In view of all thus shown, we may now take the advanced position, that, not only is there no inconsistency, contradiction of reason, or absurdity in the doctrine of the Trinity, or in any doctrine embraced in the Christian system, and so no antecedent presumption, even the faintest, against all or any of these doctrines, but, in the fact itself that the Scriptures come to mankind as a declared revelation from God, and teach the facts and doctrines they do, there is, aside from all external evidences and proofs of their Divine origin, although these together are invincible, not only a presumption, but one of the strongest character, a real moral certainty, that they are such a revelation, and that every doctrine taught in them is an authentic Divine verity. It is utterly incredible that God, having created mankind moral beings, and such therefore that, if they would render pure moral love to Him and each other, they would infallibly possess all the blessedness of its natural consequences and of His favor and rewards, and, if they would sin, they would as infallibly receive all the blight and curse of its natural consequences and His penal retributions; and that, when the first pair sinned, and involved their entire posterity with them in all the consequential and penal results of their apostasy, all which were absolutely foreknown by God as they have been and will be developed in every nation, tribe, family, and person, He nevertheless continued the race, and has exercised such manifest, careful and beneficent providence over and for it—we say, it is utterly incredible, if we believe Him a good Being, that He should not have devised, and purposed to execute, in the best way and time, a merciful and gracious measure for their salvation. If He is benevolent, not only are all the assumed presumptions of infidelity, and of all denials of the evangelical doctrines and system utterly groundless, but there is the

strongest possible antecedent presumption, a clear moral certainty, that He would give them an authentic revelation of all facts and and truths essential to their having a sufficient knowledge of Himself, themselves, and the relations between Him and them; that He would intervene in the most effective way possible for their salvation, and fully inform them in His revelation of the intervention, and how to be restored through it to right relations to Himself; that the revelation would contain and evolve upon them the weightiest possible motives to counterpoise all those urging to sin, and to lead them to all rectitude, and would be connected with the strongest possible influences to bring them to yield to those motives and thus to be saved.

§ 85. MANKIND COULD NOT ANTICIPATE WHAT THE CONTENTS OF A REVELATION OR THE MANNER OF ITS COMMUNICATION WOULD BE.

Men could have no precedent knowledge of what the contents or manner of communication of a revelation from God would be, or what special interventions or manifestations, He would, should, or could make; and hence they could have no rational presumption against either the former when given or the latter when made. But, concerning a revelation, we can *now*, since it has been made, see that it must be fronted against all polytheism, idolatry, superstitions, delusions, perversions, and sin, and must set forth all facts and truths essential for men to know about God—His relation, as Creator and Preserver, to all worlds and their living occupants—His real moral character—His law and government over mankind and all intelligent creatures—His relations to, and disposition towards, mankind as sinners—what He has done and proposes to do for them, what He requires them to do, and the final destines of the saved and the lost. We also *now* see, that, in order to front and counteract the monstrous evils of the heathen world, and to preserve His chosen people of Israel, and through them to prepare the way for, and, at the fullness of time, execute a consummate measure for, the salvation of as many as possible of mankind, *His interventions and manifestations* must, in the nature of the case, largely consist in or involve miracles, stupendous wonder-works, deeds and displays of omnipotence, of both judgment and mercy, demonstrative to all, both Israelites and heathen, having knowledge of them, that He is absolute Ruler of nature, as well as of angels and men, and that, besides Him, all other so-called gods are lying vanities; and thus, while putting the fear of Him and the dread of Him on

the heathen, He was impressing the chosen people with awe of His holy and righteous sovereignty, and at the same time merciful and gracious disposition towards all, but especially those who truly seek His forgiveness of sin and His restoring favor. The fact that we have a professed revelation, having the opposite characteristics stated, and that it records a continuous series, displayed through the centuries requiring them, of Divine interventions and manifestations, culminating in the supreme and stupendous one, which all the preceding prepared for, heralded, and pointed to—that miracle of miracles, the Eternal and only-begotten Son of God incarnate, living among men, teaching as never man taught, being emphatically the miracle-worker. the voluntary submitter to His sufferings and death to save men, the riser from the dead on the third day and ascender to the Mediatorial throne in heaven. According to its own testimony, this revelation throughout was given, and all the interventions and manifestations it records were performed by God for no ends that imposture could aim at, but only to bring lost men back to Himself and to all the benefits and blessings of true religion and His infinite love and favor. This whole aggregate fact has, we say, all through it, like light through a diamond, all radiant from it, like light from the sun, a self-demonstrating evidence and proof that it is from God; that He inspired and guided holy men to write its successive parts, each when He had prepared the way for it till it was complete; and that it was thus given in the best possible way and form in which it could be to fulfill its beneficent ends among men.

§ 86. THE INFIDEL NOTION OF WHAT THE LOVE OF GOD IS, ARRAYED AGAINST THE SCRIPTURAL TEACHINGS, OF NO WEIGHT.

Infidels and deniers of the redemptive system revealed in the Scriptures are constantly arraying against it and its involved facts and truths respecting both God and man their notion of the *love* of God. We have already shown the groundlessness of their assumption of knowing about His love any more than the heathen have always known of it, except as they have necessarily received some knowledge of it from that revelation which they discard or dispute. What we now assert against them, much as it may astonish them, is, that the doctrine of the love of God, as known or believed in Christendom beyond what was ever known of it among the heathen, is not only derived from the Scriptures, but rests entirely on the other doctrine in them of His Triunity and their teachings concerning the

manifestations of each of the three Persons in the measure of redemption. We neither do nor can know anything about the real love of any being by our reason, or except as it is *manifested* to or before us, or is authentically testified to us by others, to or before whom it has been manifested. If the Bible, which gives all the testimony men have concerning His love for mankind, though sinners, and its manifestations, except those of *nature and providence*, and those personal ones of it which individual Christians profess to receive from Him, is not an authentic revelation from Him, will any infidel tell us of any other manifestation of it than those of *nature and providence*, which the heathen have always had, ever made by Him to men? What communication has He ever made to them, or when did He ever lift a hand to help them? How has He ever by word or deed manifested any pity for them, any interest in them, any concern or care what becomes of them, any disposition of mercy or grace, of willingness or desire to rescue them from their evil condition as sinners, liable to the penalty and under the power and blight, spiritual darkness and hopelessness of sin? Where, then, is there any proof or evidence that He is *love*, in even the infidel sense of the word? We deny that there is any, and that infidels know of any; and we challenge them to adduce any not drawn from the Bible. If He has never manifested any, what but idle assertion is it, without a shadow of evidence or reason, for them to talk and affirm about it, as they constantly do, as if it were an incontestable postulate of reason, though reason knows nothing of it?

§ 87. THE ONLY EVIDENCE INFIDELS CAN HAVE OF GOD'S LOVE FOR MANKIND AS SINNERS.

The only real evidence infidels can have of God's love for mankind *as sinners* consists in such shows of it as they can observe in the whole course of His providence; for the shows of it in nature are towards them *as creatures, not as sinners*, and are not evidence of it towards them *as sinners*. If a human father should build and furnish a magnificent mansion for his children as loyal and obedient to him, how would the *shows* of his love for them *as such* furnish any evidence to them, if they should turn disobedient and hostile, that he still continued to love them and would not punish them in just displeasure? They could furnish none; and precisely the same is true of the shows of God's love for mankind in all He did for them in creating them and all adapted to their necessities and happiness. He created and constituted them to love and obey Him

and to be blessed in so doing, and not to evince any love for them, if they should turn sinners—a distinction which should not be overlooked. But the case is different as to His providence in preserving them and in all His dealings with them as persons, families, communities, nations, and a race; for the fact that He has preserved the race, and the general tenor of His providential dealings with them, both ordinary and special, do evince and prove that He has a *mercifully benevolent disposition* towards them. But, viewed as a whole and without the disclosures of revelation to furnish solutions of its dark riddles and frightful enigmas, His providence from the first has seemed to present goodness and severity so commingled and cooperant as to make it doubtful which predominated, often even compelling the conviction that the latter ruled, that His benevolence towards mankind is less than His anger. For, while He has "given them life and breath and all things," He has also visited them with incalculable evils—with earthquakes, tempests, floods, famines, pestilences, and the whole cohort of diseases which distress and torment them, destroy their happiness and lives, and cause bereavements, lamentations, and countless ills—so that, if they had no other evidences and proofs of His *love* for them *as sinners* than His providence alone affords, it would be hid behind a fearful eclipse, and leave them benighted on the momentous question whether He would or could ever confer His full favor upon them and give them deliverance from all their evils. It leaves all dark and dubious, a gloomy obscuration thronged with ill omens and quaking fears, the same which has ever enshrouded all heathen lands, and which might well appall even infidelity itself, if it could see things as they are, and *think*. The question—"Does God really love mankind?" or, "Is He benevolent?" could never be solved among men, but only answered *Yes and No*, the *No* the terrible conviction of most. Who can ever be sufficiently grateful to Him, that He has not left it in this dreadful ambiguity, but has given us a solution of it such as Providence alone could never give nor even indicate. What an effulgent, joyous light burst upon the world in that stupendous measure of God, of which we are told—"In this was *manifested the love of God* towards us, because that God sent His only-begotten Son into the world, that we might live through Him. Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that He loved us, and sent His Son to be the propitiation for our sins." This manifestation is the Divine light which scatters the darkness and reveals the mystery of providence. This is the key to all its intricate wards,

the solution of all its appalling riddles. *In*, not *out* of, this, was the love of God *manifested;* and, when John uttered the words quoted, he doubtless had those of our Lord Himself to Nicodemus in mind—"God so loved the world, that He gave His only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on Him should not perish but have eternal life." Why does not the guilty, conscience-racked world leap for joy at the peerless good news of this unspeakable outgoing of God's love for mankind *as sinners*, and at the same time for the universal and eternal holy society?

§ 88. PREDICAMENT OF THOSE WHO BELIEVE ONLY EXCERPTS OR SELECTED PARTS OF THE BIBLE, AND DISCARD ALL OTHERS.

Turning now to those who, professing a certain *maimed belief* in the Bible as a revelation from God, deny the Trinity and the redemptive system, we ask them what manifestations they have of God's love for mankind as sinners, after *their* denial, more than declared infidels, or the heathen have always had? If they do not accept the teachings of the Bible as a whole, and especially concerning God and His manifestations of love for fallen man, on what parts of its teachings can they rely as authentic? They as really fall back on the mere guesses of their own blind minds as declared infidels do, and as the heathen have always done, and can therefore know nothing about the points named or any others rejected. The Bible, as a whole, either is or is not an authentic revelation from God of all the facts and truths it expresses. If it is one, all its teachings concerning Himself and mankind, His love for them, and His whole manifestation of it in the measure of redemption are true; and this manifestation of it is revealed as made, not by a *unipersonal God*, but by a Trinity of Persons in one Essence of Godhead. The Father gives and sends His only-begotten Son; the Son, affirmed to be God and equal to the Father, comes, becomes incarnate, declares and reveals the Father, teaches and does for mankind whatever the Father has prescribed to Him, voluntarily suffers and dies for them, being not spared, but delivered up by the Father to undergo all He did; and the Holy Spirit, proceeding from the Father and the Son, is sent by them jointly to fulfill all the functions ascribed to Him for the spiritual renovation of sinful men. These three parts thus performed by them constitute the whole manifestation of God's love for mankind *as sinners;* and, except in these parts, including preparations for them recorded in the Old Testament, it is not manifested to them *as such*, otherwise than in providence, already shown. How,

now, we ask, could the Father perform His, if He had no such Son? How could the Son perform His, if He and His Father were not distinct Persons and agents in the one Godhead? And how could these two jointly perform the sending of the Spirit, and He perform His part, if He did not proceed from them, and is not a Person and agent? How could each of them perform the part in the whole measure ascribed to Him, as related to that of each of the others, if each were not in fact and in relation to the others a distinct Person and actor in the one Divine Essence? If each does not exist in it and did not perform the part ascribed to Him, then how could any such manifestation of God's love for sinful men as the measure displays possibly be made? This demands consideration.

§ 89. NO BEING CAN REALLY MANIFEST THE LOVE OF ANOTHER, ETC.

We hold it certain that *no one moral being can really manifest the love of any other one*, any more than he can *be* the other, and have his mind and heart, disposition and consciousness. He can only tell others of it as it has been manifested and expressed to himself or within his knowledge by some means; and, in addition, he can, as an authorized agent, ministerially execute special offices to accomplish its ends towards its object or objects. He can thus be a *medium*, through which another's love can be in some limited measure made known; and, at the same time, he can also more or less manifest his own; but his doing this will not, in itself, be manifesting that of anyone else. But it is certainly impossible, that any creature, human, angelic, or supposed superangelic, could, though perfect in holiness, manifest the love of God to mankind, especially His love towards them as sinners. Finite in nature and sustaining all his relations to other like beings and to God, owing as a creature constant, perfect obedience to God, and being so limited in intelligence, feeling, and will, how could he possibly have or manifest the thoughts, feelings, and will, the mind and heart, the whole disposition of the infinite God, related as He is to all His creatures, and especially to man, as their Creator, Preserver, and Moral Governor, and as having been enormously sinned against by man? He could not possibly. *As God alone can comprehend Himself, so He alone can manifest His own love to mankind or any other creatures, while objects of it, however related.* If, therefore, our Lord Jesus Christ was not truly God in just the same sense as the Father is, that of being a Person in the one Divine Essence, He could not and did not manifest the love of God to man, but only His own,

that of a creature; and, at most, He was only a finite *medium* through whom God gave a mere limited show of it by creating Him such a being as He was, man or more; aiding Him to develop the character He did; sending Him among men on the mission He fulfilled till He was executed as a martyr; and, by the manifestation and example of Christ's love for them, showing them His own to the extent of providing and sending among them so excellent a creature. If such were the case, then the history of Jesus Christ in the New Testament demonstrates that *He, the creature,* manifested immensely greater love for them, than God did in and through Him. But, if He was a Person in the Divine Essence, then, not only the Father's giving and sending Him, but His coming, incarnation, whole earthly life and labors among and for men, all His interest in, and sympathy, suffering and death for, them, all recorded of Him, were, with equal reality, parts of a manifestation by one and the same God of His merciful love, His whole heart and disposition towards man ruined by sin against Himself, which must forever amaze the intelligent universe and defy all creaturely conception. Let it be distinctly pondered.

§ 90. HOW THE GREATNESS AND STRENGTH OF ANY BEING'S LOVE FOR OTHERS IS SHOWN. HOW GOD'S FOR MANKIND.

The measure of the greatness and strength of the love of any being for others, deserving or undeserving, is shown by the efforts, self-denial, self-sacrifice, and suffering to which he subjects himself for their sake. What, then, must the measure of the greatness and strength of the love of God be for mankind, who, instead of rendering to Him His due of love and its obedience, are all sunk in sin and enmity against Him, if, nevertheless, it impelled Him, so offended, though Creator and Ruler, not only to restrain His justice from smiting them according to their ill-desert, but, notwithstanding His own infinity of nature, and exemption from all touch of evil, to devise and execute a measure involving such stupendous condescension, humiliation, self-denial, and self-sacrifice on the part of both the Father and the Son, to the degree on the part of the latter of His submission to all that He became, did, and endured till His mission on earth was ended, and on that of the whole Trinity to all done by them in their respective parts from Christ's resurrection till now, and that will be done by them till time ends, to effect human salvation. The measure of God's love for mankind is infinite, The attempt, therefore, to substitute any manifestation, which a creature of whatever grade,

though specially created and sent among them by Him to make it, could make, for this direct, infinite one is a feat of absurdity vastly surpassing an attempt to substitute the flickering light of a candle at noon for the splendor of the cloudless meridian sun. But we must also take in the part of the Holy Spirit. If He also is a Person in the Godhead, all the influences and operations ascribed to Him in the Scriptures, as put forth for the renovation and salvation of men, are equally a direct manifestation of the infinite merciful love and heart of the one God towards our sinful race. What but boundless fatuity is it, to turn away from this manifestation, and the revealed fact of the Trinity on which it rests, and to substitute for it either the empty shadow derived from his own imagination which the infidel calls the love of God, or any anti-Trinitarian supposed manifestation of it *through* the gift of a mere missionary *creature* of any grade whatever?

§ 91. ON WHAT THE FACT AND DOCTRINE OF THE LOVE OF GOD FOR MANKIND ENTIRELY REST.

The inevitable conclusion is, that the fact and doctrine of the love of God for mankind, though sinners, in any Christian sense of the term love—in any beyond that dim and dubious one disclosed in providence alone and always observable by the heathen, which is the infidel and Deistic one—or in any, which has proof, evidence, or even probability of it as actually manifested by God Himself, rest entirely on and are inseparable from the revealed fact and doctrine of the Trinity of Persons in the one being or essence of God. Whoever denies the foundation, denies the superstructure; and whoever denies the Trinity, denies not only the manifestation of the love of God for our guilty race, declared in the Scriptures, but the very possibility of any *direct, personally made* manifestation of it whatever—any which could evince the least degree of self-denial and self-sacrifice for them, or disposition to act anything involving the least degree of these to save them, or which could constitute a measure to redeem them from either the penalty of sin by atonement or its power by adapted and adequate motives and influences, and to exalt them to the glories and blessedness of heaven. *For, how could God, an infinite Spirit, if only one Person, perform any of the parts of this manifestation to, and for the redemption of, mankind, or make any other one for the same end?* How could He possibly place Himself in *obvious* personal relations to them, and *directly manifest* interest in them, pity for them, merciful love and grace

towards them, or a disposition to rescue and save them? There is in mankind everywhere a profound sense or feeling, conscience-born, that they deserve punishment from God for their sin, and that He is not their friend, but is hostile to, and will punish, them. This sense fills them with an equally profound dread and distrust of Him, and causes them to shrink from Him with guilty recoil and strong aversion. This state and attitude of their minds towards Him nothing could overcome and dissipate, but some most impressive and moving manifestation of Himself to them in compassionate kindness, in *obvious* intervention to save them, and, in that, with greatest and most expressive exhibitions of self-denial, self-sacrifice, and suffering for their sakes—the entire manifestation being in kind and manner perfectly adapted to meet their whole case as sinners, to affect them to their hearts' core, to overcome and remove their paralyzing fear and distrust of Him, and their alienation from and aversion to Him, to inspire hope, to win their confidence, to excite gratitude, and to generate within them positive faith in and an all-controlling love of Him. How else could He possibly make any such manifestation, than in the way the Scriptures declare, by the Son's incarnation, or assumption of man's nature into a personal union with His Divine, by living with them as a fellowman in their conditions and relations, by freely acting and conversing with them in a human manner, by performing miracles in attestation of His Divine nature and power, by His mission, and His benevolence to and sympathy with them in their sufferings, and by revealing to and teaching them all facts and truths essential for them to know concerning God, themselves, and the relations between them; concerning Himself, His mission, and His relations to both the Father and them; concerning the Holy Spirit and His agency; and concerning their salvation through His own sufferings and death voluntarily undergone *in their stead for their benefit?* What motives would He thus develop, create, and roll upon them through all time!—motives potent to move all open and considerate minds as winds move seas—those of His amazing self-humiliation, self-denial, self-sacrifice, and self-assumption of His appalling sufferings and death to redeem our depraved, hostile, lost race—those in all His teachings, in His earnest reproofs, solemn warnings, affectionate entreaties and expostulations, terrible threatenings, and fearful representations of the doom awaiting the incorrigible—and those of His affecting illustrations of the profound interest in and care for them of both the Father and Himself, of His tender calls and invitations, and of His manifold promises of ines-

timable blessings in this life, and measureless good and glory in that which is to come. These motives are intrinsically the weightiest conceivable, and are adapted to press every susceptibility of human souls to bring them to yield to His requirements and invitations. But suppose, now, that God is only *unipersonal*, and this whole manifestation is necessarily false; for how could He make it? How could He abdicate His throne and government, and be made under His own law? Who would administer it, while He was under it, and "in the form of a servant?" How could He be given and sent by Himself as incarnate?—be His own Son?—do and suffer all He did in obedience to the will, the command of Himself as His own Father? Even if, by any possibility, or for any good end, He could incarnate Himself, it could not be to make an atonement "for the remission of sins;" for how could He, one Person, make an atonement to Himself? If He could make none, we deny that He could forgive sinners, even if He could some how bring them to repentance, if He has and cares anything for a universal moral system which He constituted by creating a universe of moral beings, necessarily interbound by the same moral reason, the same righteous law of moral love in and from it, essentially the same natural rights, with moral added, if obedient, the same conscience, substantially the same ideas of justice both as ethical and as retributive, the same intuitions of obligation, the same sense of guilt or desert of punishment for violation of it or sin, the same sense of responsibility and accountability to God as moral Governor, the same natural ties of fellow-feeling and sympathy, the same moral judgments, condemnations, and spontaneous demands for the retributive punishment of all wrongers and injurers of others according to their ill-desert, and the same moral judgments, approvals, and demands for rewards to all who do as the law requires to others according to their good-desert. The sun in heaven, with the whole connected solar system, is not more absolutely, undeniably manifest than the universal moral society and system of moral beings with God as its Creator and Head. What can be more preposterous, anti-moral, and pernicious to all involved in and dependent upon this universal and eternal moral sytsem, than the position of deniers of the atonement in common, that there is any moral necessity, any reason in the nature of the case, excluding God from dealing with every one personally, irrespective of the moral relations he sustains by character and desert, good or bad, to others in that system and society, or any that He should universally and without exception regard and

treat each only and precisely as he stands related by character and desert to the rights, dues, interests, and concerns of the whole society, God included, in that system? Their position is essentially a denial of that society and system, and so of the law, of moral nature containing and issuing it, of God's moral government, of His moral nature containing it, of its requirement of pure moral love, of justice either ethical or retributive, of all obligation not wholly arbitrary to God or our fellows, of all natural and moral rights and dues of any number and of God, fronting all others; and thus, since, if nothing is right, nothing can be wrong, of all possibility of duty, of morality, of responsibility and accountability, of obligation, of society in any other sense than that of a universe of incoherent, monadic enormities of being, of whom are mankind, who are only kept from all anarchic reciprocities of vice, villainy, and every variety of crime, diabolism, and internecine destruction, whether sunk in savageries or raised in so-called civilizations, by mutualities of fear, interest, or gratification. We discard the notion with utmost aversion, as unworthy of respect, and subversive of the most fundamental truths in existence. In direct antagonism, though reverently towards God, we deny that He has or can have any right, for all the reasons in those truths and others, to deal with one of them as if wholly disconnected with the universal society and system, and so not responsible and accountable to that society, including Him as its Head, for any wrong he has ever done; and so that it, or He in it, is under no obligation to reward and favor anyone, though his obedience may have been perfect. But, to say that God will forgive all sinners of whatever degree of criminality, without an atonement for them, if only they will repent, is in substance to assert precisely this same monstrous contradiction of the moral law and the whole moral system. By so doing, He would brand His law and government as unnatural, unjust, and opposed to benevolence, and demonstrate that He was either unjust in constituting mankind with natures palpably moral, or for a universal reciprocity of responsibility and accountability with rewards and punishments according to actual deserts at the end of probation, or is so in forgiving them, regardless of their constitution, of the law in and from it with its quality of justice, and of the rights, dues, interests, and concerns of His whole society forever. Not only, therefore, could He not forgive any without an atonement merely on condition of repentance, but He could neither offer nor promise to do so, and so could array no motives before them to

allay their guilty fears, to create hope in them, to quell their aversion and win their confidence, to inspire their gratitude and to draw them to trust, love, and obey Him. *The doctrines of the Trinity, of the love of God for our guilty race, and of a substitutional atonement as a basis for forgiveness of any of them, therefore, all stand or fall together.* How desolate the world without them! How environed with hope with them!

What is true of the three radical doctrines just named is equally so of all others involved in the Christian system. Not only is there no rational presumption *against* any of them, but there is the strongest possible one, a moral certainty, *in favor* of each and all of them; and therefore to reject all or any of them essential to the Christian system is not rational, while to accept all of them which are essential to it is rational.

CHAPTER IX.

The Scriptural doctrine of the incarnation of the second Person of the Trinity; necessary in order to His Mediatorial relations to God and man, including His whole mission on earth, and His relations to His redeemed Church and the intelligent universe—all involved in God's eternal Plan of the material, animated, and rational creation.

According to the Scriptural teaching, the only-begotten Son of God, the second Person of the Trinity, was sent by the Father, and came of His own most free consent, into our world by entering into the relation to mankind, fallen and lost, which was constituted by His incarnation in the man Jesus. In order to accomplish the ends for which He came, it is declared by Himself, by Apostles, and by inspired writers, and is implied in His whole manifestation, that it was *necessary* for Him to become one of them—that He must "in all things be made like unto His brethren," "must be born of a woman," must assume "the *form* of a servant" and thus "come under the law," and must live the life and die the death He did, both which were absolutely foreknown by Him. "Forasmuch then as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, He also Himself likewise took part of the same, that through death He might destroy him that had the power of death, that is, the devil; and deliver them who through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage" (Heb. 2:14, 15).

§ 92. THE NOTION THAT THE DIVINE NATURE OF CHRIST WAS INCARNATED IN A MERE HUMAN BODY WITHOUT A SOUL GROUNDLESS.

But did He really assume a *human nature* into union with His Divine, or merely a *body like a human one*, but lacking a human mind, soul, or spirit? In the beginning of the 4th century, Apollinaris of Laodicea held that, as the Word or Divine nature of Christ was an infinitely perfect reason or intelligence, there was no need for a human reason to be united to it in the incarnation, and

objected, besides, that he could not conceive how two reasons could be united in one Person. He therefore held that the human nature of Christ had no reason or *rational soul*, but that it was merely a body with an *animal soul*, holding the common belief of his time, that man has two souls—one rational, or a spirit; the other animal. His notion was rejected by the Church; and nothing like it has been advanced since, until in our time one even more preposterous has been set forth, which is, that not only was there no human soul in Christ's body, but His Divine nature, having dwarfed itself to the measure of a just originated human mind, was the only soul in it, and that it gradually developed back, as the body grew, towards His primary infinitude ! * The notion is duplicate in both meaning and falseness. First, as it respects His Divine nature, how is it among possibilities, that an eternal, necessarily existing spiritual being, infinite in nature and attributes, could thus reduce Himself, even to the lack of *all* power, *all* knowledge, *all* presence beyond the point of His actual occupancy?—how, that the Creator, Preserver, and Possessor of all worlds and creatures should thus abolish *all* His power over, *all* His knowledge of, all His ubiquity in, and *all* His relations to it and all its contents, and diminish Himself to the condition of a human mind in its first existence? If He could, how could He, so diminished, exercise love or any moral activity, or not be a void of all voluntary moral character? But further, if He could, why not as well commit an infinite suicide by self-annihilation, and thus bereave the world and the universe of their Maker and Upholder, to the delight of atheist madmen, and the woe of all the morally rational? Still further, if He could do all this, why could not the Father and the Spirit also? and what would then be the condition of the universe? Not a very desirable one, we think. But how could His *will* thus change or abolish His *nature?* How can He be thus mutable in nature? If He is, so must the Father and Spirit be, and the doctrine of the immutability of God is a fiction. Further yet, if He could so abolish His own attributes, including His power, how could He replace them either at once or gradually? and would He be God until they were replaced to full infinity! What would He be in the meantime? If the other Persons of the Godhead should replace them to Him, would they, to

(*) This was written six or eight years ago, and with no reference, of course, to the Kenosist Article in Rev. J. M. Williams' Rational Theology. The special reference will be recognized by many, and need not be stated. "The Humiliation of Christ," by Prof. A. B. Bruce, D. D., gives a full history of Kenosist authors and views.

that extent, *create* Him, and He be a *creature?* Besides, if they could thus recreate Him from utmost infantility to infinity, why might they not so change all finite moral beings into infinite ones by creative additions, so as to fill the universe with beings at once *infinite creatures and infinite Gods?* What a wild fantasy the notion is as it respects Christ's Divine nature! But, secondly, as to His body, it is no better. A mere body like a man's, without a man's soul or mind in it, is not a man, and never was, if it has always been void of one; so that this notion as really denies the manhood as the Deity of Christ. How could a mere body, like a man's, whether occupied by the minimized Divine nature supposed, or by that nature undiminished, be "the seed of the woman," of Abraham, or of David, or "the fruit of David's loins," or "the Son of man," or the "one mediator between God and men, *himself* man, Christ Jesus" (New V.), or "the second Adam," or a brother of men, or "in all things assimilated to His brethren" (N. V.), or anything else implying real humanity? As "God cannot be tempted with evil," so only a human soul in Jesus could "in all points be tempted like as we are;" and through it only could He be "touched with the feeling of our infirmities;" be, in any proper sense, an example to us of either rectitude towards men or perfect religion towards God; fulfill the human part of the atonement; and be a High Priest and Mediator for us in heaven. The whole conception of a Mediator between God and man requires that He should have the nature of each, of one as really as of the other; and therefore He is declared to be "*Himself* man, Christ Jesus," since His humanity specially qualifies Him for that function, as also to be the Judge of the world, as He is ordained to be. Then, as physical death involves the separation of the human soul from the body, the fact that He commended, not His Divine nature, but His spirit, to His Father's hands proves that He had one, as also does His assertion that His soul was very sorrowful even unto death. No, there is no basis for this notion, which would rob us of the most precious link between us and God, a highest proof of His amazingly condescending and tender love for us in Christ. It is through His perfect humanity that His Divinity comes near and touches us with its vitalizing power—that God is manifested to us in the tenderness of His mercy and the opulence of His grace. It is a very *artery* out of God's heart into ours, through which He pulses the life-current of His infinite fullness of pity and love for us into ours. It is this that *adapts* Christ to all our case; and, without this, the gulf of separation

between us and Him must have continued eternally impassable. "No admission" for any Kenosist notion is inscribed over the gate of Christianity.

§ 93. WHAT SCRIPTURE TEACHES RESPECTING THE TWO NATURES AND THE PERSONALITY OF CHRIST.

We know nothing concerning the two natures and the personality of Christ, except what the Scriptures teach. According to these, He commonly spoke of His body and His soul or spirit just as men generally do. He called Himself the Son of Man; and, though less frequently for prudential reasons, yet often and with greater emphasis, the *Son of God, His only-begotten Son*, and *His Son*. He asserted that He was before Abraham; that He had glory with the Father before the world was; that His Father loved Him before the foundation of the world; that He and His Father are one; that all men should honor the Son, even as they honor the Father; and that He came down from heaven, and was, at the same time, in heaven. Among other testimonies are the following:—John 1:1. "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God." V. 14. "The Word became flesh." Rom. 1:3, 4. "His Son, who was born of the seed of David according to the flesh, who was declared to be the Son of God with power" (N. V.); 8:3 "God, sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin." Gal. 4:4. "But when the fullness of the time came, God sent forth His Son, born of a woman." Phil. 2:6–8. "Who, being in the form of God, did not think it a thing of robbery to be equal with God, but emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men" (partly N. V.). Col. 1:19. "For it pleased *the Father* that in Him should all the fullness dwell"—(that is, all stated in vs. 15–18). V. 2:9. "For in Him dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead bodily." I. Tim. 3:16. "God was manifest in the flesh." Heb. 2:14. "Forasmuch then as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, He also Himself in like manner took part of the same." V. 17. "Wherefore in all things it behooved Him to be made like unto His brethren." From these and kindred passages, including the record of the generation by the Holy Ghost, and the birth by the virgin Mary, of our Lord, the following points seem manifest:—1. Until the fullness of time, our Lord existed from eternity a purely Divine nature and person. 2. At that time, He was sent by the Father, came, assumed to Himself a true and perfect

human *nature, not person*, making such a union between it and the Divine nature as, without changing, mixing, or confusing their distinct essences or properties, to constitute them only one Person, one no longer simply Divine, but both Divine and human, *the God-man, theanthropos.* 3. This union was effected by the Holy Spirit in causing Mary's conception, so that the human nature never was a separate *person*, but, from its germ, existed in the union; and it was only in this complex person that all the human faculties and properties had their whole action and development. The incarnation, therefore, was not the assumption by the Son of God of a human person already existing, which would have been merely an *association* of that person with Himself, and would have made *two persons* in Christ, instead of *one;* but it was the assumption of a human nature in its incipient existence into an eternal union with Himself, by which one Person was constituted. Thus, as far as possible, He let Himself down by an infinite self-humiliation into His relation to mankind in the form of a servant. 4. It is thus perfectly proper to ascribe the properties, abilities, actions, and states of either of these two natures to the one complex Person constituted from them—to say either that He was very God, or was very man—was eternal, or was born—was the Son of God, or the Son of Man—was the Creator and Upholder of the universe, or was conceived by the virgin—was infinite in being and all natural attributes, and yet grew in stature and wisdom, and lacked knowledge of some things—was the Lord of glory, and yet was condemned and crucified by the Jews, died, and was entombed—and that He was God who purchased the Church with His own blood, or man who at the appointed day is to judge the world, and the one Mediator between God and man. The peculiarities of each nature are equally attributable to the one Person, because the two are combined in Him. He wept at the grave of Lazarus, because a complete human nature was embraced in His Person; He raised him from the dead, because a complete Divine one was embraced in it; and the one was just as *personal* to Him as the other. There is an analogue of all this in the constitution of man, which consists of two distinct natures, one material and the other mental, neither of which is, by itself, a person. It is their vital union which constitutes them one; and yet, in it, there is not the slightest change of the substance or properties of either nature, nor commixture of them, but each of them remains as perfectly itself and distinct from the other, as if they had never been united in one person. Nor

does any one find even a suggestion of difficulty in ascribing alike the peculiar properties and states of either the mind or the body to the one person composed of them, because they all alike belong to the one person. But, while alike ascribed to the *one person*, those of either of the *natures* never can be ascribed to the other. Each of them must forever retain its own. The application is obvious; and we here leave this matter of the incarnation by referring to the whole preceding Chapter as having full relation to it, both for silencing objections and for showing that the presumption or probability is entirely in its favor.*

§ 94. DESIGN TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE INCARNATION.

What ends was the incarnation designed to accomplish? In general, God's purpose in it, *as it related to mankind*, was, that, in and through the Divine-Human Person thus formed, He might enter into such relations to them, that He could manifest Himself to them in His true nature and character by developing and displaying before and towards them, in ways adapted to impress and affect them to the highest degree, His power over them and nature personally exerted in beneficence to them; His knowledge of and wisdom respecting them; His moral government over and claims upon them; His inflexible justice, immaculate righteousness, and inviolate veracity, all in perfect harmony with His yearning pity for, and merciful love and grace towards them, despite all their sin and guilt. The teachings of the incarnate Son, His miracles, His constant labors for the good of others, His all-perfect character and example, His visible atonement by His sufferings and death of crucifixion for the world, His lying in the tomb, His resurrection and ascension to heaven, His securing and sending the Holy Spirit to influence and renovate men, His institution of the Church, His Mediatorial reign in heaven, and all His relations to the redeemed, and everlastingly modified relations to the whole universe forever depended on the fact of His becoming so; and, if He had not, there could have been no salvation for any of our race. God's purpose, *as it related to other intelligent creatures*, was, first, *as it respected good ones*, that they might see, in the amazing manifestion towards mankind in and through the incarnation as indicated, such a display of His character and perfections, exceeding all they ever before saw or could see of them, as to inspire correspondingly augmented love and loyalty

(*) See on incarnation the places treating of it in Shedd's Hist. of Doctrines, Hagenback's Hist. of Doctrines, Hooker's Eccl. Polity, Pearson on the Creed, etc.

to Him in them, and to reconcile them to the exaltation of the redeemed of men to relations and glories in heaven vastly excelling their own; and, secondly, *as it respected bad ones*, that, by the same display, the righteousness of His own character and His government, in His administration of retributive justice upon them, might be absolutely vindicated even to themselves. God's purpose, *as it respects Himself*, was to gratify His infinitely benevolent and merciful heart by preventing the endless wickedness and misery, and securing the endless holiness and blessedness, of all of mankind who could be reclaimed and saved by means of the measure; to augment immeasurably the blessedness and glory of all holy beings in the universe that shall exist to endless ages; and to develop His intrinsic glory and pour its infinite splendor forever over His intelligent universe. This general statement will be considered more fully before we close this Chapter.

§ 95. NO GROUND TO THINK THE INCARNATION WOULD HAVE BEEN MADE, IF MAN HAD NOT SINNED.

We see no ground for the assumption or supposition of a few speculatists, that the incarnation would have been made, if men had never sinned. The Scriptural teachings give it no countenance, but are directly to the contrary.* But without it no atonement could have been made for the sins of mankind; and, since, in the nature of the case, no creature, however exalted, no other being than God, could achieve this measure, so, as we have seen, He could, only because He is a Trinity of Persons in one nature. Let us here notice this point a little further. The *nature or essence* of God is, in itself, eternally inoperative. It is only the *Persons* in it that act; and, in the Divine operations, especially in the great measure of redemption, each of them does His own part in distinction from each of the others and His part. They could not, though all equal, change places or parts in either Person or action. From what is revealed, it is plain, that it would not have been possible for either the Father or the Holy Spirit to have acted the part, which the Son did, as related to and connected with the part acted by each of them. It would have been equally so for the Son or Spirit to have acted the part of the Father, or for the Father or the Son to have acted that of the Spirit; and were there but one Person in the essence of God, He could, by no possibility, act all or any of the parts ascribed to

(*) John 3:16, 17; John 4:9, 10; Mat. 18:11; Luke 19:10; Heb. 2:9-18, and many other places.

the three, as they relate to and connect with each other. As to the three impersonal subsistences or Swedenborg's nonsensical Trinity of "Essentials" (which are not so), there is no conceivable place or use for them; nor is there, if the Scriptures are true, for a unipersonal God. Nor is the distinction between the three Persons and their parts, just shown, a matter of mere grammar, language, representation, or personation, but one of the eternal mode of the existence of God, and of His corresponding counsel to achieve human redemption. Hence, as man could not be saved without an atonement, the Scriptures show that the second Person of the three was the one who *must* make it, and that, to make it, He *must* become incarnate, the God-man, as He did.* As the passages referred to positively teach that it was mainly in order to make an atonement that He became incarnate, this consummate fact must be understood as implied in every passage which says God *sent* or He *gave* His Son to effect the salvation of men, because He sent and gave Him only in the way of the incarnation; and every passage which asserts that we have been bought, ransomed, redeemed, purchased, forgiven, justified, or saved by His blood, His death, His laying down or giving His life, Himself, His bearing our sins in His own body, His being made an offering, a sacrifice, a curse, or sin, His being obedient unto death, His being lifted up, His having suffered, His being a propitiation, or any similar, implies that it is true of Him, because He became incarnate, since otherwise nothing of the kind would have been possible; and the Scriptures show that a fundamental reason for His incarnation was that He might make the atonement.

§ 96. NECESSITY OF THE INCARNATION IN ORDER TO THE ATONEMENT.

While the maker of the atonement must be God, the second Person of the Godhead, as we have seen, He as such alone could not make it from lack of qualifying nature and relations. Mankind were all sinners, all liable to the deserved and just penalty of the law, and could in no way retrieve themselves, or be retrieved by other creatures, from it. If retrievable at all, God only can do it—can execute any of the necessary conditions and provisions. That is, He only can do and provide all requisite to retrieve them consistently with the nature and demands of the changeless law and its

(*) Mat. 20:28; Mark 10;4, 5; Luke 24:26, 27, 44-47; John 3:14-16; 10:17, 18; 12:23-27; Acts 3:18; 17:2, 3; 26:22, 23; Rom. 3:24-26; Gal. 4:4, 5; Phil. 2:6-8; I. Tim. 2:3-6; Heb. 2:9-17; 8:3; 9:10-15, 24-28; 10:4-14; I. Pet. 1:18-21; I. John 4:9, 10; Rev. 13:8.

justice, of moral government, of the universal moral system grounded in His own and all other moral natures, and with their own personal and social necessity of complying with the moral conditions of their retrieval. But, while He must be the author and executor of any measure for human salvation, He must adapt it entirely to the nature of the case. Men, having sinned, must themselves suffer the deserved penalty, if dealt with in their own persons. If one of such qualifications of person, character, and relations to them and to God, that He can by God's arrangement be their *representative*, and suffer as a *substitute* for them all a full equivalent, *in effect*, for the sufferings deserved by them all, so that, by fulfilling the necessary ethical conditions, they may be forgiven and saved, He must, whatever else He is, be of their race, bone of their bone and flesh of their flesh, a man. The reason for this necessity is the race-constitution of mankind; and we invite some attention to it.

§ 97. ANGELS LACKING A RACE-CONSTITUTION, AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ADAM'S ACTIONS AND THEIRS.

The angels are not a race. They have neither a race-constitution, nor the natural affections, affinities, susceptibilities, sympathies, interdependencies, and mutual liabilities involved in a race, each of them having been created separately. They are an *order* of beings lacking *natural* connection, each of them acting, and standing or falling, without entailing any moral bias upon any other to either rectitude or sin. They can affect each other only by direct effort or influence, and hence could not fall as an *order* by the action of any one or more of them infecting their nature, but only individually by each one's own will. Consequently, while some of them thus fell, others "kept their first estate," as vastly the greatest portion of them doubtless have, those only, who of themselves sinned, being "reserved in everlasting chains under darkness unto the judgment of the great day." But the case of mankind is very different. By their race-constitution, originated by the creation of the first pair, they were to come into existence as a race; and Adam was the natural head of it all. He necessarily so *represented* them in moral relation and action, that it depended on his obedience or disobedience whether their common nature should be transmitted from him in archetypal integrity, or damaged, disordered, vitiated. If in the former state, they would, under God's favor and conserving influence secured by his obedience, all be like him in character, in receiving

the fruits and rewards of disobedience, and in everlasting destiny. If in the latter state, they would all follow him in apostasy, falling in him under the law of sin, and incurring its natural consequences and retributive liabilities. While Adam was a responsible person as every man is, his *nature* was in reality no more his than that of each of his posterity to the last. It was the nature of mankind in germ; and, because the whole multitude of his posterity was thus contained in his race-constitution, and was to be distributed from it by natural propagation, he necessarily had the whole so in his keeping, that, from the nature of the case, and of course by God's design, his trial-action was *potentially* that of the entire race, and must affect it throughout, just as it did the whole, when he did the act, before its distribution began. That is, the effects of that act, physical, and moral in tendency, were permanent in the total nature and race, so that his act was potentially that of total humanity, and its effects, not only on the common nature, but on their moral relations to God, were universal. If he had obeyed, the act would have been as if that of each of them, and each of them would have had its effects. These consequences would have been the same whether he knew it or not, though we suppose he did and acted with this knowledge. The only covenant between God and Adam in the case, of which we have knowledge, was that implied in every command or prohibition, that, if obedient, he should receive the reward of life, but, if not, the punishment of death, though he could have only a very meager conception of the meaning of the terms. But we should distinctly note, that, from the very nature of the race-constitution and relations, it was impossible, whether Adam should stand or fall, that a single one of his descendants, our Lord Jesus excepted, should ever have a *legal* probation for himself, unless he had it potentially in Adam, and that Adam necessarily did go through one, which in effect was for every one of them, and was just as if each was acting in and with him.

§ 98. MANKIND THE CONSUMMATE ORDER OF RATIONAL CREATURES.

As this relation of Adam and his trial-action to his posterity sprung from his race-constitution, there was nothing arbitrary or fictitious in it; and the whole case is susceptible of satisfactory explanation and vindication. There is abundant evidence in Scripture, that the human race was constituted to be the consummate order of created beings in the universe; and that the race-constitution was necessary to their being such. We think that, without

this race, creation would have been defective in its supreme design, which all centered in the existence, holiness, blessedness, and glory of the intelligent natures it should contain and in God's pleasure and glory from them—that the keystone of its eternal arch, according to its whole plan, would have been wanting. This gives the sufficient reason why, notwithstanding God's perfect knowledge of the tremendous liability involved in the existence of such a race, and of the Fall and the appalling disaster it brought on it all *in time*, and, through their own consenting bad agency, on a vast proportion of them *forever*, He saw it demanded on the whole by absolute benevolence, and therefore wisest and best, that He should create man so constituted, although He also foresaw the stupendous sacrifice and cost their creation would bring upon Himself. The Scriptures teach that there are different orders or grades of angels, all standing closely related in the way of system and order—cherubim, seraphim, thrones, principalities, and powers. What was the designed relation of mankind to them and to all other intelligent creatures, whether existing or to exist?—one non-essential, as part of a system?—one entirely subordinate, although filling a designed place in a system?—or one consummately essential to the completion and ever-unfolding realization of God's archetypal idea or plan embodied in the total creation?—and even to the conservation of other orders or races of moral beings, which may yet be created at successive epochs and in different worlds as God may fit them for occupation?

The information of Scripture alone can furnish or indicate a solution to these inquiries. Its first is in Gen. 1:26, 27. When God had completed the creation of the heavens and the earth, and of all the inferior creatures, He made a solemn pause, as if having come to the great consummating, crowning work, for which all else had been done, and He must use special counsel concerning it, "whereas," as noted by one, "always before He had immediately uttered the creative word," which "had regard simply to the thing itself which was summoned into being, or to some preceding object physically connected with the new creature." The being now to be created is to be directly related to the Creator Himself, and to be ruler of the earth and all other creatures. God therefore says—"Let us (or We will) make man in our image, after our likeness." "So God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them." The *us* or *we* and *our* in verse 26 is not the plural of majesty, but indicates the plurality of

Persons in the Godhead, afterwards clearly revealed, of whom the second was specially the Creator. He, in II. Cor. 4:4, is called "the image of God," and, in Col. 1:15, "the image of the invisible God." The Greek word, rendered *image* in these places, while indicating the Son as the exact manifestation of God, implies that He is such, because, in nature, attributes, and character, He is the *essential*, complete resemblance of God, and exactly represents Him. The Hebrew word, rendered *image* in Gen. 1:26, 27, corresponds in its general meaning, although, as used of man, its sense is incomparably less full. It indicates the *type*, *style*, or *kind* of man's *nature*, what it intrinsically and really is *in kind*, and not merely apparently, so that it is homogeneous to God's, of the same kind, and therefore *like* His, or *after His likeness*. It includes that his nature would be so perfect that he would at once form a *character* like God's. Wondrous record! If it gives the most aggrandizing and august conception of human nature which ever entered the world. This image was in man's spiritual part, not formed out of pre-existing matter as his body was, but directly created; and it belongs to the nature of the case that it was created *immortal*. How infinitely far from God's image and likeness—what a parody and mockery of them, would it have been, if without immortality! It is an insufferable imposture of words, to tell us we are created in the image and after the likeness of God who is intrinsically immortal, if we are not! There is not a valid principle, ground, or reason why any should even suppose this essential part of man, not "formed from the dust of the ground," as His body was, but directly created and breathed into it by the Creator to constitue His image and likeness, could possibly be mortal, like his body—especially there is not, when we are positively told by the Spirit of inspiration in Eccl. 12:7, referring both to man's original creation and the doom of bodily death upon him, that, at death "the dust returns to the earth as it was, and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it"—that is, created and breathed it into the body; and when, in Zech. 12:1 and Is. 42:5, He represents His doing this as the *climax* of all His works of creation. It was Paul's perfect knowledge of this sublime origin and nature of man which led him, in addressing the Athenians in the Areopagus, to quote an expression from the Greek poet Aratus, Cleanthes, and others of them having uttered substantially the same, the sense of which is, that "we are all of the race of God," to approve it, and to argue from it—"As, therefore, we are the race, or offspring, of God, we ought not to think that the Godhead is like unto gold, or

silver, or stone, graven by art and man's device,"* Acts 17:28, 29. Thus was Adam, as it were, an essential miniature of God, and, in him each one of his posterity; for, although this image was lost as it respects character, both Scripture and the nature of the case show, that, as far as essential nature goes, it was not and never can be lost, though it has been fearfully perverted. It could only be lost with being. We add that, as the race-constitution does not belong to the angels, so they are nowhere said to have been created in the image and after the likeness of God, which seems to indicate some specific relation between them and Him. "So God created him in His own image, in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them."† Now, considering this account of the creation of man as the close and climax of the works of the six days, we are constrained to believe that it sets him higher in intrinsic nature, relationship to God, and importance to the rational universe than any other order of created intelligences—especially so, when viewed in connection with other revelations concerning him.

Of these, we refer to the following passages which plainly teach, either directly or by necessary implication, that, not only was God's Eternal Son to be inserted into our race by the incarnation, but, by this identification with it, both He and it, or the saved of it, the real Church, would stand related to all other moral natures, existing and to exist in ever-augmenting multitudes through the ages of ages, in a way vitally essential probably to the very creation, or to the conservation, if created, of all future orders, and certainly to the highest and incomparably greater good of all, except the lost of angels and of men.‡ From these passages, to which others might be added, we deduce the following as probably main parts of God's plan and ends in creation.

§ 99. CHIEF PARTS AND ENDS OF GOD'S PLAN OF CREATION—A BRIEF THEODOCY.

1. God had an eternal, all-embracing plan of the universe of worlds and of all orders of creatures to exist upon them before "the beginning" of creation, and all His creative acts have been done according to that plan. It embraced all His own courses, measures, and acts from the beginning onward forever in reference

(*) Cicero De Legibus, Lib. I., Chap. 7, 8, §§ 22-27.

(†) Gen. 1:27; 5:1, 2; Mal. 2:15.

(‡) Rom. 8:28, 29; I. Cor. 3:22, 23; 15:24-28; Eph. 1:4-10, 18-23; 3:9-11; Phil. 2:9-11; Col. 1:15-20; II. Tim. 1:9; Heb. 1:2-14; 2:5-18; I. Pet. 3:22; Rev. 5:8-14; 7:9-12; Eph. 5:23-32; Rev. 19:7-9; 21:2, 9.

to each material part, each order of creatures, and each individual of each order to exist in it in all coming ages. No jot or tittle of the whole has been omitted from it, nor has one been added to it.

2. This plan was certainly *the best possible*, probably *the only one possible* for an eternal universe, to secure *the great end* for which His infinite goodness impelled Him to devise it, and to create according to it. This end was His own pleasure and glory from the existence of all the moral beings He would ever create, upon whom He could forever pour the emanations of His fullness to the measure of their capacity to receive them, and from whom He could receive everlasting reciprocations of trust, love, gratitude, glory, praise, blessing, and all devotion in endless augmentation; and it would embrace all their good.

3. In this plan, the material parts and all the irrational creatures, with all their qualities and adaptations, were to be supremely for the service and benefit of the intelligent, moral beings destined to use them, just as houses with all their adaptations are planned and built for their designed occupants; so that *the end* of the whole material and sentient creation was to serve and benefit moral natures, and thus manifest God's goodness to and care for them.

4. Only two different orders of moral beings, angels, the first created, and mankind, are mentioned in Scripture. Of these, men occupy the earth, angels heaven, perhaps the only two worlds yet fitted for occupation by intelligent beings when these were created. But the fact that neither the material, nor the irrational animal, creation can be an end in itself, so that we cannot suppose any material world created without an end beyond itself, or merely for star-show, supplies the strongest probable evidence, amounting to even a moral certainty, that all the *planets* in space are designed to be, and yet will be, inhabited by rational beings—a moral certainty, because there is no imaginable valid reason to the contrary. The fact that He has created angels and men, despite His absolute foreknowledge of all that the lapse of so many of the former and of all the latter would cost Him, along with the other fact that He has created all the existing worlds, is strong presumptive evidence that He will continue to make the additions of moral beings to occupy them, which we have indicated; for the creation of the two orders mentioned and of worlds for them, with such cost to Himself involved, certainly shows that He has an infinite urgency of nature or heart to originate such beings, and to communicate to them the fullness of His love and blessing.

§ 100. WHAT, IN SUBSTANCE, THE GENERAL PLAN OF THE UNIVERSE, MATERIAL AND VITAL, MANIFESTLY IS.

5. This eternal plan of the universe was not that it was to be merely an aggregate of separate, unrelated worlds, orders of beings, and single creatures, like grains of sand in a heap, but an organic unity, like a tree, in which every world, order of beings, and each of moral sort should be correlated to others and the whole by ties of nature and of mutualities of influence, services, supports, and dependencies, so that not one of them could be omitted, or essentially different in constitution and relations from the archetypal design, without damage to the whole, proportional to the intrinsic importance of the omitted object. The material universe is to a great extent the symbol of the spiritual. All the worlds which compose it are so correlated by the mutualities of gravitation, forces, motion, light, electricity, and probably other ties, that each of them, and each sub-system of them is dependent on each and all of the others in some measure for being and continuing what it is, for the regularity and order of its revolutions, and for its adaptations and capabilities to be the home of destined rational occupants. If a single system, or even world, constituted just as it is, had been omitted from the universe, neither would the whole nor any part of it have been as perfect as it is; and the best possible material creation, which we are bound to assume the actual one to be, could not have existed. In like manner, God's plan required that every order and individual of the intelligent universe, ever to exist, should be constituted in all respects, and correlated in nature to every other one, precisely as it is or will be; so that to omit a single order or individual of the whole would be to omit a constituent part of the best possibly constituted whole, and thus to prevent the greatest possible pleasure and glory to God from His intelligent creatures, and the equally great well-being, blessedness, and glory to them. Considering the fact that He absolutely foreknew, when He adopted the plan, that such a part of the angels would lapse and perish, and that, through them, mankind would also lapse, and would all perish, unless retrieved by Himself in the way He saw would be necessary, and which must be included in the plan; and considering that, despite all this foreknowledge, He created both the orders of beings, and that, in order to save as many of mankind as possible, He has actually made the stupendous sacrifice of the redemptive measure, the necessary conclusion is, that neither of these two orders of angels and men, nor an indi-

vidual of them, could be omitted from the plan by His infinite goodness and wisdom, without impairing its character—that both the orders, and every individual in them, of whatever foreknown history, must be created precisely as they have been. If asked why He created the angels that fell, when He perfectly foreknew their apostasy and loss, their desperate hostility to Himself and all good, and their success in effecting the fall and ruin of man, the only answer possible for us must be, simply because He saw they could not be omitted without violation of the incomparably best plan, if not the only one better than none, which might involve a decision to create no universe at all. We believe the question of His creating these reprobate angels, foreknowing that they would be such, was simply *whether He should create a universe with them in it, or none at all.* The alternative was—*A universe with them in it, or the eternal solitude of infinite space with Himself alone in it!* The answer is the same to the question, why He created man with the precise constitution of body and mind with which He did, when He perfectly foreknew the total disaster of his lapse, and all the loss of souls which would result, as well as His own infinite sacrifice to save such of them as He foreknew He could—especially, why He created any of them who He foreknew would be lost, notwithstanding His own designed sacrifice in time to save all possible of the race. The alternative was—Create the race and each person of it constituted precisely as they are, with all evils foreseen, and with them the material universe to be occupied by new and ever-augmenting races or orders of moral beings, secured (we believe) from lapse and ruin and eternally blessed in consequence of the involved redemptive measure and its results, or not create this race, nor any other moral beings, creatures or worlds. If not thus absolute, it must have been —Create them, with all the evils foreseen, or create a universe of worlds tenanted by only non-moral creatures, so that neither in the worlds nor the creatures shall there be one that is *an end in itself,* and therefore of any intrinsic value. None would then be lost, because there would be none to be lost! The universal organic plan included not only all orders of created moral beings, but every individual of every order. Not only Gabriel and Michael and every chief loyal angel, and every subordinate one, but Satan and each follower of his apostasy, from highest to lowest, were as beings in the mighty plan; and not only Adam in special, but every one of his race, to the last born, of whatever condition was in it, tied up in the nexus of generations and all kinds of natural relationships.

Even infants, dying such, are thus interwoven with the race, and so with the vast organic whole, by nature, by their influence on parents, and by the interest in them of parents, of all kindred, of angels, and of Christ. Such, we believe, is the true doctrine of the plan of the universe; and we see not how any intelligent theist can doubt it, without also doubting the infinite goodness, power, wisdom, and prescience of God, and disregarding all the myriads of analogies in the constitutions of matter and mind which demonstrate that nothing exists insulated from other things, and that all individual existences are correlated by Divinely constituted ties, and "are but parts of one stupenduous whole"—that, amidst all individualities and distinctions, there are uniting bonds, by which all beings and things are combined in different ways and relations, graded up from lowest and most limited, as if from terrace to terrace, to the consummate, all-embracing, organic whole of the universe. This whole, constituted throughout just as it is, its non-vital material parts palpably for the vital, and both the non-vital and the irrational vital for the rational, and being thus permeated all through, as a body is with its venous system, and stamped all over, as a printed sheet is with letters, words, and sentences, with palpabilities of plan, design, adaptation, provision, subserviency of all lower to higher things, final causes, and systems, was either *the only one possible to be planned* in harmony with infinite goodness and wisdom, connected with a foresight of the results of any plan, which mainly relates to *free moral beings* and their conservation from universal wreck and ruin, or at least so nearly so that the proportion conserved shall so overpoise that loss as to make it benevolent to adopt it, or it was, as a whole, *incomparably the best possible.* The fact that God adopted that of the existing universe proves that it was the best possible, as He would not adopt any other; and that it was *incomparably the best possible* is proved by the fact that He adopted it, despite His absolute foresight of all the grief, self-denial, and self-sacrifice it would cost Him, as He certainly would not have done so at such infinite cost to Himself, if any other would have served in any comparable degree. But we believe that the fact that He adopted it at such cost to Himself proves that it was really *the only plan possible* without the loss of all the moral beings He might create, or of so vast a majority of them that it would be better to create none at all. It seems to us that this doctrine of the plan of creation sweeps away all all objections which have been raised to God's honor and justice in

creating our race as He did, despite all the lapse and loss which He knew would result.

§ 101. HOW OUR RACE IS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE ANGELS, AND THUS THE KEYSTONE ORDER OF INTELLIGENT BEINGS.

6. In this all-embracing plan, mankind are distinguished from the angels by being a race, and constituted of spirit and matter; by capabilities of development, improvement, and glorification, perhaps endless, and probably excelling those of any other order, fitting them for the highest creaturely exaltation, relations to God, and functions in the universe forever, especially after the judgment; by being so peculiarized in nature by such a constitution and capabilities, as to be in the image and after the likeness of God, as we are not told any other order of creatures is; and thus, by highest type of nature, to be designedly fitted for consummate preeminence; by the designed *natural* relationship of them all to Christ, the whole Godhead, and the universe by the incarnation; and, in addition, by the *spiritual and eternal* relationship to all these of all of them who shall become the Church; and by all the designs, process of dealings, and special doings of the Trinity respecting them from the creation of Adam onward forever. *Thus distinguished, they are necessarily the keystone order of intelligent beings in the universe, the center and crown of the whole creation.* If referred to Ps. 8:5 and Heb. 2:7 as teaching differently in saying—"Thou madest him a little lower than the angels," we respond in the brief words of Moll on the passage in his Com. on Hebrews (Lange's Series), merely substituting the word *corporeal* for the word *mortal* used by him, that "man's inferiority to angels, having its ground in his *corporeal* nature, is but transient, and limited to earthly life." It belongs to him simply *as created, not as the redeemed will be* when exalted and glorified with Christ; and it is one of *time* as well as of *degree*. If the race had remained loyal to God, every one of it would have partaken of the exaltation which would then have awaited it; but now only the Church, the redeemed will be recipients of the exaltation and glory promised to be conferred upon them. The archetypal design for the race will be realized only in them, all others of it being blasted by sin, like fruits by some hot Sirocco winds.

§ 102. WHY ALL SINCE ADAM BEGIN LIFE IN GREAT PERIL, AND ARE ON A GRACIOUS, NOT LEGAL, PROBATION AS HE WAS.

7. Although indicated in No. 5, we here state directly, that the lapse and loss of the apostate angels—the organization by them of

a kingdom of utter hostility to God and all good beings, of pure malignant wickedness, lies and perversion, unrestingly striving to accomplish the utmost evil in the universe—the lapse of mankind through the agency of this organization under its head—the whole development of sin and its results in their nature, their character, and their conduct in all their relations and conditions, domestic, social, civil, political, educational, institutional, and religious, from Adam's first transgression on—the loss of all of them unretrieved through the redemptive measure—these were not facts unforeseen by God when He adopted His plan, and bursting in on it afterwards, like unanticipated convulsions and cataclysms to nullify or derange it. They were perfectly foreseen, as unavoidably *incidental* to the absolutely *best, or only possible plan* of a universe created for, and consummately consisting in, *free moral beings;* and the plan was formed, and adapted to the greatest possible degree, to meet, restrain, counteract, and rescue from these terrific incidentals. The very grandeur of the nature of free moral beings constitutes their frightful hazard of self-destruction. They are neither molded nor conserved in rectitude by omnipotent power, but by the *motives* of whatever truths and facts are known and recognized by them, and by whatever *influences* from God and from other good beings, if any such are shedding or exerting them upon them; and it is only when sufficient of both to good are brought to bear upon them to carry and keep their wills against whatever contrary ones may be operating upon them, that they, especially if new-created, can be conserved from making shipwreck of themselves. Hence, there is necessarily measureless peril, as we have shown before, in the case of all newly-created moral beings, especially in the earlier part of their probation, while their experience and observation of the consequences of either right or wrong moral action, beginning at nothing, commonly grow so slowly and gain such meager measures—their intelligence and practical reason are in the mere beginnings of their development; their sensibility is all fresh, quick, and impulsive towards perceived or imagined objects, adapted to give special gratification; their will is unset in the confirming habit of rectitude; their knowledge of truths and facts is yet slight; and the urgency upon them of such favorable influences as belong to their crude condition is still trivial. This peril must be vastly greater in the case of our race than in that of beings created separately as the angels are. These each may be created in full natural maturity, and capable of exerting full intel-

lectual and moral powers at once in acquiring knowledge, and in perceiving and acting according to, or against, moral truth and obligation; so that they can, as it were, begin probation with an advanced degree of knowledge, capability and responsibility. Adam, doubtless, was substantially so created, and began his probation at such an advance; Eve also, though in an inferior degree, as derived and dependent. But the case differs with their posterity. Each of them begins an infant, and, even if our first parents had not fallen, would, as *really* as now, have needed to be developed under the care, teaching, training, example, and influence of parents and others. As they could not be born other than infants, they could not possibly be put on separate, independent *legal* probations as each angel was and Adam was. For, besides whatever constitutional tendency they might inherit from Adam, they would be developed, molded, and incipiently charactered by receiving the influences, examples, teachings, training, and whole impression of parents and all around them. But the source and fountain of the radical bad tendency and of the whole impression and molding of evil kind must, as it respects mankind, be traced to Adam, as, by necessity of his relation, the natural Head and Representative of all his posterity. *He, and, in a subordinate sense Eve, are the only human beings who ever had, or could have, a separate, legal probation.* That of each of their descendants is *a merciful and gracious one*, as to whether he will or not, under all the motives and influences of God's merciful and gracious manifestations and revelations of all kinds, repent during this life, and accept, *in faith*, offered forgiveness and the restoring favor of God. It has often been said, and truly, that the legal trial of the whole race in Adam was *better* in every respect, than that of each of them separately would have been. But, whether better or not, the legal trial of each for himself was impossible; and, from the nature of the race-constitution and relation, it was unavoidable that Adam's trial should really be for them all, and should determine the integrity or vitiation of the whole human nature, the radical moral *tendency* or *proneness* of each regular partaker of that nature to good or evil as really as of himself.

§ 103. WAS IT JUST, BENEVOLENT, AND HONORABLE IN GOD TO CREATE OUR RACE SO CONSTITUTED AND RELATED TO ADAM?

Many have perplexed and vexed themselves and others with the question stated, and some have resorted to wondrous shifts to vindicate His innocence of any wrong in the case. Of these shifts,

one was the wild hypothesis of the pre-existence of human souls, constituted as angels, who fell in that state of existence. But this hypothesis lacks evidence from revelation or any other source. It involves positions so prodigious, that, compared with them, the fables of Lethe and Circe are trifles; and, were it proved true, the real difficulty in the case would remain unchanged and unrelieved. For that difficulty is not, as is assumed in this hypothesis, that all or any of Adam's descendants have not had a fair probation, as they come into the world vitiated in nature, so that they all violate the law in their first moral action; but it lies in the deeper fact, that God should create any moral beings at all, who, He foreknew, would fall and be forever lost. As He created each angel separately, why did He not omit from them all who, He foreknew, would apostatize, and would work such measureless evil, not only among themselves, but to our race, beginning with the first pair? If He had omitted them, our race might not, and probably would not, then have fallen, and none of them would have been lost. Or, when He foreknew the apostasy of man through the Tempter, and that, although He would intervene in the redemptive measure, multitudes of them would persist in sin, die incorrigible, and be lost, why did He not so arrange to control human increase that none should be born, who, He foreknew, would so live, die, and forever perish? Why did He so tenaciously adhere to His first design of the race-constitution, and not prevent such immeasurable evil? Let sentimentalists who assume, and with such zeal assert in these times, in substance, that *God must create no moral being, unless He insures him for a blessed immortality*, consider anew whether He does or can do any such insuring business—whether He is not debarred from it by the very nature of moral beings so long as they are on probation, whether legal or gracious. It is a positive certainty, that there is, there must be, some all-outweighing reason, vitally connected with and involved in God's eternal plan of His universe, which He will not disregard or discard by the least departure from that plan either to prevent any evil or to insure any good extraneous to it, however great. In His estimation, that reason involves *a good to His eternal universe, including Himself*, so incomparably greater than any to be secured by His carrying on a universal insurance business, if such a business there could be, that, despite His absolute foreknowledge that, if He should create all the angels He planned for, such a part of them would apostatize, work measureless evil, and be forever lost, He did create them all; that, despite the same fore-

knowledge that, if He should create the entire human race He planned for, they would all be turned by Satan into apostasy with all its blight and curse, and a great proportion of them would die incorrigible and be lost, *He did create them all;* and that, despite the same foreknowledge of the stupendous cost to Himself of both these full creations, if done by Him, He did create them both. From these momentous facts, the following seem proper conclusions:—(1). God's plan of the universe was absolutely the best, or the only one which could, *in the universal and eternal run*, succeed in its consummate object of a universal and eternal society and system of moral beings:—(2). It was unchangeable and eternal as a whole and in all its essential parts, and was never to be deviated from:—(3). All moral beings embraced in it to exist were to be created such to constitute one, and only one, moral society and system, as their natures, having the one social-moral law in and from them, and their reciprocal rights, dues, dependences, interests, concerns, obligations, consciences, and natural consequences of moral action all demonstrate and demand:—(4). Hence, neither the whole of the angels nor of mankind, nor any individual of either of them could be created to be or act, or to be regarded, treated, or dealt with by God, in any respect as if separate from and independent of that society and system, but solely as inherently a constituent in them. Not one of them was created, nor exists, nor possibly can exist for himself, but each of them absolutely for God, and for every other one as for himself; so that none of them is his own proprietor, but, while God is absolute Proprietor of them all, they are universally and forever reciprocal proprietors of each other:—(5). As God created all the angels and men embraced in His plan in this universal and eternal solidarity, although foreknowing all of them who would be lost, for the same supreme reason, we may be sure, He will never annihilate any of them; nor will He ever pardon or save a single sinner, except in perfect accordance with all the reciprocities of all kinds included in the solidarity of the universal moral society and system:—(6). It is evident from the preceding connection, that God's supreme end in planning and creating moral beings was transcendently *above their mere personal happiness;* and that neither his own happiness, nor that of any other one is or can be the true moral end of any of them. God's end in creating them was their existence as such social-moral beings in their natural and moral relations to Himself and to each other—that is, that He might have a universal and eternal holy society and system of such beings—each

rendering to Him and every other one *the pure moral love of his being and true good*, which fulfills the law in them. The *good* of God is His holy character, pleasure, and glory, and loving Him is making these our supreme end. The *good* of a created moral being consists in obeying the law, or acting moral love, towards God and each fellow being, in all the natural consequences of so doing, and in all the regards and rewards he receives in return from them, especially from God; and loving them morally is willing this complete good to each of them as, or making it, our end respecting him. This same complete good is the only true moral end of each respecting himself; and as, in the moral solidarity of the universal society and system, this good of each is utterly inseparable from that of every other one, and its vital center is necessarily the moral action and character of loving God and every other one as the law requires, which alone is pure ethical justice, while its residue stated depends entirely upon, and lives or dies with this, it is no more glaringly preposterous to call a square a circle, than to say that anyone can either morally make his own separate, isolated good his end, or possess it while in sin, or unless in obedience to and acceptance with God. As to the term *happiness*, it has neither moral significance, nor definable meaning; but, as it is always merely personal, and consists only in feelings or experiences of pleasure or gratification of some kind, consequential on various conditions not necessarily moral, it palpably cannot be the true good of anyone, nor the true end of moral action, which must be the vital center of the true good. Carlyle rightly spurned Pope's line—"Oh Happiness! our being's end and aim!" But, when he substituted "blessedness" for happiness, he changed sound rather than sense, and failed to see what the true good is, because he did not recognize the moral solidarity of the universal society and system. A social system must have social ends, or good for ends.

The question, therefore, of God's benevolence, justice, and honor in creating our race or any other moral beings goes back to, and can only be settled by, this doctrine of the plan of the universe, and it comes to this; which was better, or good, right, and honorable in God, to plan and create the total universe, constituted throughout in all respects as He knew was best on the whole, or not to create it?—but specially, each order and individual of rational natures ever to exist in it, foreknowing all that would be true of each of them, and all that the lapsed portion of them would cost Himself, or to create none at all, and to dwell eternally alone in the solitude of

infinite space? For, we have already shown that, whoever believes God infinitely good, wise, and powerful, must believe His plan of the universe *incomparably* the best possible for many reasons, all crowned by this, that it involved such infinite self-denial and self-sacrifice to Himself in all that the Son became, did, and suffered; and that, in this case, *incomparably best* means, we think, *the only one possible* for a universe of moral beings, necessarily free-agents and liable to temptation, in which there would be the least possible loss and the greatest possible conservation, reclamation, and eternal good and glory. We deem it certain, that God devised and constituted the universe of such beings, so as to involve the least liability in them to fall into sin and its ruin which could consist with the necessary freedom of a moral system. Of all God's works, the most critical and, to our thought, most nearly impossible for even Him, must have been the creation of moral beings so constituted and circumstanced that He would foreknow that, though free, they would not all fall and perish, but that there would be a sufficient portion of them, who would not sin and who would be recovered from sin, to constitute an eternal society and system of holy and glorified ones, and to make it best and benevolent to create all embraced in His plan. One thing is certain; all questions concerning the goodness, justice, and honor of God in creating and constituting any order or individual of moral beings must be settled, not by considering either as if separate from the whole, but as vitally connected and interlinked with it in order to secure its consummate, eternal end; so that neither could have been omitted, nor essentially different from what it is, without defeating or materially damaging that end. We must rest at last on the ground that infinite goodness impelled and infinite wisdom guided Him to create the whole and every part in incomparably the best way, if not in the only one in which it could be done *without* the lapse and loss of all embraced in it, and *with* the loss of *the least possible number* of them and the greatest excellence of character and glory secured to all the ever-augmenting multitudes of the conserved and saved.

§ 104. THE ENTIRE PART OF THE SON OF GOD RADICALLY INCLUDED IN THE ETERNAL PLAN.

8. The all-embracing plan included the entire part of the Son of God. He was the Word, the Revealer or Manifester of God. All worlds and creatures were to be created by and for Him, and by Him were to be upheld and to consist in their organization and

order. He was to be the giver of all life, and the Providential Dispenser for this world, and doubtless for all worlds. He was to be Jehovah, the covenant God of the chosen people, and the Messiah to appear among them in the fullness of time incarnate forever in our nature, the antitypical Adam of our race, *who was to go through another representative probation under the law for them in absolute obedience*, was to suffer and die at its close to make an atonement for their sins, and to rise from the dead, ascend to heaven, be glorified, and be exalted there to the Mediatorial throne as part of His infinitely deserved reward. His reign was to close with the final judgment; and, during it, "the things in the heavens, and the things upon the earth were all to be summed up in Him." This would be done in two ways—(1). At the judgment, the *completed* Church would be publicly recognized by Him, the Judge of all, before all the condemned and the angels, and assigned to "the kingdom prepared for it from the foundation of the world," all the holy angels being perfectly reconciled to it as redeemed and exalted to the highest creaturely rank and authority in the universe by Him. Thus, in Him, the Head, there would be absolute harmony between all good beings forever—(2). On the other hand, He would "put down all [hostile] rule, and all authority and power"—would put all enemies under His feet"—would "destroy him that would have the power of death, that is, the devil"—would "gather out of His kingdom all things that offend, and them which do iniquity," and "cast them into a furnace of fire," "into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels"—and would thus abolish the whole hostile kingdom, shutting every member of it up in the prison of the universe, so that never again in all sequent ages would it be infested or infected with any tempting agency or influence. These two results being thus accomplished, "He was to deliver up the kingdom to God, even the Father"—that is, the Mediatorial kingdom, which was given Him when He ascended to heaven after His resurrection, that He might carry on and complete the great work of redemption. Having done this, there will be no farther use for His Mediatorial reign, and He will resign it to the Father. But neither His human nature, nor His Headship over the whole redeemed Church, nor His sovereignty over all beings which necessarily belongs to Him as one of the Persons of the Eternal Godhead, and of which He never can divest Himself, is included in what He will then deliver up; for all these are independent of His Mediatorial reign, and will pertain to Him forever. But, having made this delivery, "He will Himself

be subjected to Him that did subject all things unto Him, that God may be all in all." During His Mediatorial reign, Christ is "the all in all" to His Church (Col. 3:11)—that is, He has the entire care of it, and from and through Him only it receives all Divine communications and manifestations; but, when it is ended, although He will continue its Head forever in a special sense, yet, as the redemptive measure will then be forever completed, and, as neither Person of the Trinity will any longer have His distinct office in its execution, they, Father, Son, and Spirit, the one God, will evermore act together, and be "the all in all" to the total holy universe—that is, as there will be no need of a Mediator, He will immediately manifest Himself to, deal in all ways with, and communicate all good and blessedness to all the holy forever. The part of our Lord will appear farther in the next number.

§ 105. THE WHOLE DESTINY OF THE CHURCH AS RELATED TO CHRIST INCLUDED IN THE PLAN.

9. This universal plan includes the whole destiny of the Church as related to Christ and the intelligent universe. Because of the designed incarnation of the Son, and through the redemption of the Church secured by it, all its individual members were to be, by renovation and adoption, His brethren, among whom He would be the first-born, and not ashamed to call them His brethren and His children.* By this relation to Him, they would be the children of God, and therefore His heirs, and joint-heirs with Christ to all His inheritance. They would, as a *whole,* be so vitally joined to Him, and so to each other, as to be, as it were, organically His very body, and each of them a "member of it in particular" (I. Cor. 12:27)—"of His body, of His flesh, and of His bones" (Eph. 5:30). At the resurrection, their bodies will be raised incorruptible, immortal, and fashioned like His glorious body, so that they shall be in His image and fitted to share His glory forever. He would make them kings and priests unto God; inheritors of a kingdom prepared for them from the foundation of the world; sitters with Him in His throne, as He is with His Father in His throne, to reign with Him; judges with Him of the unreclaimed world and evil angels in the final judgment; and His bride, His wife. As this whole plan concerning the Church and its relations to Christ and the universe should be fulfilled and displayed, it was a chief "intent that unto the principalities and the powers in the heavenly places might be known

(*) Rom. 8:29; Heb. 2:11-15.

through the Church the manifold wisdom of God"—it being at once their instructress and the consummate example of it. Except its participation in judging the world and the bad angels, all else thus ascribed to it as a *whole* and *individually* will belong to it forever; and what an immortal prospect does the whole present!

Are all these, so inconceivably exalted above all other created beings, of corresponding special importance, in their connection with Christ, to the whole intelligent universe, existing and ever to exist? As brethren of the great first-born, they will eternally co-operate with Him, in absolute union of spirit and end, in all common to Him and them. As children and heirs of God and joint-heirs with Christ of all worlds and creatures, they will participate with Him in interest in, and endeavor to secure the supreme good of all moral beings in them all. As the body and members of Christ, they will be His organ and agents forever in accomplishing His glorious designs respecting all other moral beings with which He may populate the worlds. As spiritually kings, reigning with Christ forever and ever, they will not, of course, rule one another, nor the lost in the everlasting prison, but all other moral beings existing and to exist in the universe in all futurity. As spiritually priests unto God, they will officiate, not merely for themselves in perpetual worship and praise, nor for the holy angels, but for the same beings over whom they will reign; for they are both kings and priests in one and to the same ones. As the Lamb's wife, besides being His constant most intimate and cherished companion, the Church will be, in a most vital spiritual sense, the mother, nourisher, guardian, instructress and trainer of all the new orders or races who shall be spiritually kept from lapse and ruin by her, and be, in this sense, the offspring of her union with Him. Such are the characteristics of the designed destiny of the Church as related to Christ, the whole Godhead, and the intelligent universe; and it is sublime and important beyond the thought of man or angel. It matters not how far these descriptions may be, or be deemed, symbolical, its destiny will be none the less vitally real and consummately important in the intelligent universe. The consummation will be this:—All hostile and tempting agency being utterly suppressed and shut up forever at the judgment, and Christ, with His Church so related to Him, to the whole Godhead, and to the universe, and so qualified by its origin, history, experience, knowledge, character, and glorification to fulfill all the transcendent and everlasting functions respecting other orders or races of moral beings yet to exist, which these

descriptions set forth, can then *safely* create one after another, as world after world shall be fitted to receive it; so that there will never be another fall of any order, race, or part of one, but, from their origin, they will all be under the fostering care, influence, training, teaching, and government in a religious and moral sense of this glorious spiritual mother, the Lamb's wife—of this royal priesthood —of these brethren and members of Christ—of these heirs of God and joint-heirs with Christ to the permanent heritage of the whole creation. We are told that there is "an innumerable company" of the holy angels, and the redeemed of our race are spoken of as "a great multitude which no man could number;" and, as ever-multiplying successions of new orders or races of moral beings added in the unending future, all preserved and forever blessed through the Church, the infinite Mind alone can grasp the ever-augmenting aggregate. Compared with them, the whole number of lost angels and men will not be in the proportion of one to myriads! Thus the Church will eternally be the one grand creaturely organism and sphere for the manifestation of the infinite goodness and glory of God, and the co-operator with Christ in everlastingly augmenting, conserving, and blessing the universe of moral beings; and we think there is or may be a sublime and glorious meaning of more than mere doxology in the wonderful words of the Great Apostle at the end of Eph., Chap. III., as literally rendered—"Unto Him [God] be glory in the Church unto all the generations of the age of ages. Amen."

These nine positions embody what we deem to be the substantial import of the passages referred to at their beginning, and of some others quoted or referred to as we have proceeded. We think them worthy of earnest and careful consideration. They contain the weightiest conceivable motives to induce all to abandon the doomed cause of sin and Satan, and to unite themselves to Christ by obeying the Gospel; for what a measureless loss it will be to fail of having a part in the inexpressibly glorious future of those who are heirs of God and joint-heirs with Christ! What a destiny do they unfold for all who truly believe in our Lord Jesus Christ!

CHAPTER X.

God's foreknowledge, eternal purpose, election, and predestination. Divine sovereignty as related to man's freedom.

§ 106. GOD'S OMNISCIENCE NATURAL, ETERNAL, AND WHOLLY INDEPENDENT OF HIS WILL.

At the bottom of all questions concerning these, lies that of the omniscience of God. That is, whether, by necessity of His eternal nature, He has absolute knowledge of the entire universe of matter and of all creatures in it from its origin ever onward, especially of His rational creatures, of all that will ever be true of each of them as to action, character, states, and experiences, and as to the relations of each of them to Himself and to every other one all along his whole immortal existence, and also of all that will be true of Himself in all respects and in all His relations to each and all of them forever. That He has such knowledge is as certain as that, by the same necessity of His nature, He has omniscience, omnipresence, immutability, and eternal existence; and He has it as He has that of all His other *natural* attributes, in as total independence of any action of His own will as of that of any or all His creatures. If He could limit it by His will, as imagined by Adam Clark and some others, there is no reason left why He could not, by the same, reduce Himself to total ignorance of all things, nor why He could not equally limit or even abolish His omnipresence. His knowledge must be universal and absolute; and the term foreknowledge is used only because, in our time-relations and with our finite faculties and modes of knowing, we naturally conceive His to be like ours of things future to us. To escape this error, we must remember that His knowledge is unacquired, natural, and eternal—which is truly a fact "too wonderful for us; it is high, we cannot attain unto it." From the same conditions of our finite nature, we must in like manner form our conceptions of all included in God's whole purpose or plan of a redemptive system. We remark here respect-

ing knowledge, infinite or finite, that it causes nothing, makes nothing this or that, does nothing, determines nothing in any way, is totally inefficient, while, on the contrary, it is itself caused and determined to be precisely what it is, when void of error, by its objects. Things do not exist because they are known by any being, but they are known because they do or will exist, as the knower sees, when their conditions are fulfilled. Matter, light, life, God will not exist because any being knows they will, but all know they will, because they will be independent of all knowledge.

§ 107. ALL WORLDS AND CREATURES BY AND FOR THE SON, AND THE SCOPE OF THE REDEMPTIVE PLAN.

This plan included in the redemptive system for mankind not only the incarnation and atonement of the Son to rescue them from the necessity of suffering the penalty their sin would deserve, but all the truth and motives of God's inspired revelation, all the manifestation made by Christ of the infinite merciful and gracious love of Himself, His Father and the Spirit for them in His temporal life and death, all He would continually do and secure for them by His mediatorial reign and intercessions, all that the Father and Holy Spirit do in their respective gracious offices, all that is done in truly Christian ways by the Church and individuals of it in their different relations, and all the workings and manifestations of Providence. These truths, motives, facts, agencies, and influences are the greatest possible in this best system, so that we cannot even imagine any additions to them to bring men to a real ethical change, which can only exist in a most free and cordial turning from sin to true obedience to God, initiated and continued by faith in Him. Like the atonement, all these are designedly adapted for the recovery of all men alike from sin to obedience. They are in fact adapted to all alike, and to suppose them limited by a specializing design of God to any part of the race, *as sinners*, would conflict with the reasons shown why the atonement must be provisionally for all alike. Hence, whether all, or only a part, of mankind under the Gospel, capable of acting accountably, shall be brought by what is included in and connected with the redemptive plan to the ethical state it requires as the necessary condition of both forgiveness and the relations to God conferred with it, *must be decided ultimately or conclusively by each one's own act or choice in yielding or refusing to yield to the motives and influences brought to them by the execution of the plan.* This determining choice cannot be made for one by any other being,

nor compelled, nor dispensed with, since all that is morally good or bad, right or wrong in any moral being must consist in and result from it. Of course, the heathen who have no knowledge of the Gospel can only make this choice under such truths, motives, and influences as they have in its absence; and yet each of them does and must make it under these, and thus determines for himself its consequences, good or bad. In the nature of the case, therefore, the question of the salvation of accountable mankind is necessarily determined by each of them for himself during his probation under whatever light, motives, and influences he has. Conditions never cease for any in this life, because probation does not; and such is the plan as it relates to man in this world.

§ 108. DIFFICULTY OF BRINGING MEN TO REPENT, AND LIMITATIONS OF THE SPIRIT'S AGENCY.

It must not be overlooked, if we would comprehend the whole case, that, as we have shown, not one of our race ever would or could truly repent without the redemptive system; nor even with it and under its revealed truths and motives, unless *brought* to do so by the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit, which is secured by and included in it. It is under this alone that any ever abandon their sinful choice and begin and persevere in the right one; and, humanly speaking, to *bring* them to do this even by this power, is the greatest achievement of God—only not a miracle, because it is constantly effected in numbers. This is proved by numerous facts, of which one is the case of such multitudes who have knowledge of the Gospel, profess to hold it true, are more or less impressed and affected by it, are, perhaps the largest number of them, at times deeply convicted of their sin and need of a Saviour, often most pungently, and yet obstinately refuse to give it up by trusting and obeying Him. Another is, that it costs such numbers of those who do make this change such strenuous struggles to do so; another is, the strong averments in Scripture of our Lord, His Apostles, and others respecting the greatness of the change and the difficulty of bringing men to make it. Another is, that ministers and all of all times who have endeavored to bring men to make it have ever found and seen it a supremely difficult thing to be accomplished, and beyond their power. Another is the eager proneness of great numbers to hail and adopt any species of infidelity or skepticism adverse to obligation to Christ or to God. Another is the unbelief and moral blindness universally gendered by sin. Another is the bind-

ing force of the habit of sin to hold men in it, despite all their knowledge and conviction of its guilt and evil, and all motives and influences to forsake it. Another is their intense devotion to pleasure and self-gratification, reckless of conflicting obligations and of all the evil consequences to themselves and others, both in this world and in that which is to come; and, besides these, there are many others. It is, therefore, utterly in vain to suppose any of the race ever would or could, *of themselves*, repent without the redemptive provisions, or with them, not only if ignorant of them, but if having the fullest knowledge of them they can have in sin. The Holy Spirit was given to men on the basis of the atonement; and, as He was provisionally for all, so He freely exerts His power upon all in the largest measure He sees consistently practicable and therefore wisest and adapted to secure the greatest number of true conversions with the best universal and endless results. The power He exerts on men is specifically different from mere physical omnipotence exerted on matter. *It is spiritual power exerted on their spiritual nature*, not in any way to change its identity, to conflict with its laws, to supercede the proper normal action of its intelligence, sensibility, and will, nor to release it from the necessity of intelligently arbitrating its own moral action in compliance with, or in opposition to, the moral truth and its motives before it. Its operation is limited by all these, being to affect, quicken, and energize the darkened moral reason, the obtuse conscience, and all the disordered and torpified faculties and susceptibilities of the moral nature, thus bringing the mind to perceive, realize, and feel, and the will out of the bondage of the dire habit of sin into a free yielding to the sacred truth and motives before and upon it. We know that He accomplishes this, among the most difficult and greatest works of God,* in only a part of mankind; but why? It cannot be because He values their being, pities, or desires to save them more than others, or has any partiality for them either as beings or as sinners; nor because He does not exert upon each of them, as he is personally in all respects, and as he is related to all others in the natural, social, and moral system, all this power He can consistently with His absolute knowledge of what is wisest and best for all; for not to do this would conflict with the nature of mercy and of the whole case, and would be partial and arbitrary.† But it is because these *do*, and others *do not*, under all He thus does to bring all and each

(*) Eph. 1:19; 2:10.

(†) Ez. 18:23, 32; 32:3; John 3:16, 17; I. Tim. 2:4; Titus 2:11; II. Pet. 3:9.

of them to yield to and receive His grace, arbitrate to do so. The self-determined action of each is necessarily the hinge on which the result turns. No assertion of the spirit's all-efficiency to bring all to yield, if He so willed, has any real pertinency to the case. God created them moral beings, and must act upon and treat them *as such*. He created them so, that, by necessity of their nature, they all and each stand in organic correlation to each other and the universal society, and He must act towards and treat each of them as their moral relations to each other and that society demand. He created them according to an all-embracing *plan* of natural and moral correlation, and to this He related His other plan of redemption with perfect designed adaptation for them all alike; and, in executing it, He must act towards each of them according to and within the lines of the former. We have before shown that, as beings and sinners, and as related to God, His law and government, the universal and everlasting holy society, and the demand of justice as retributive against them, they are all alike, and that He and these are all related alike to them as such; and that, as the nature of mercy is to will and seek the good of sinners, as far as it consists with the good of the obedient, for its own sake, He must have that disposition towards them all alike, and act it towards them all on the same general principle. It matters not, therefore, what His efficiency is in itself, He can only exert it on finite moral beings *as such*—on them in a universal organic correlation *as such*—on them as existing by and according to a universal, all-interlinking plan, *and so according to it*—on them as, for all the facts and reasons stated before and here, all *alike objects of mercy*—on them as by nature necessarily, under all possible motives and influences, deciders of their own moral action, right or wrong. Hence, His exertion of it on any of them cannot go beyond, but must be confined by and within the limits of all these facts, as the ocean is by and within its shores. In other words, by planning and constituting them and their normal relations as He has, He restricted the exertion of His efficiency upon them within the limits of that primary plan. On the other hand, His infinite mercy and goodness, revealed in the whole redemptive system with Christ in His infinite atonement as representatively the substitute of all, make it certain that He exerts His spiritual power upon every one of them up to those limits, or to the utmost degree morally possible. Those whom He *brings* by it to yield themselves in perfect freedom to the truth and motives before them, as He can cause them to apprehend them, God

will save, while those whom He cannot bring by it to do this, but who persist in sin despite all the truth and motives before them, as He can cause them to apprehend them, God cannot save, and they must perish. No predestination is involved in their destruction, nor possible against them from the nature of the case. They sink of themselves by moral, as plummets do in water by natural gravitation. From all this, it is obvious, that the case of all mankind, *as sinners*, in their relation to God's efficiency, coincides exactly with it in their relation to the atonement, so that whether His efficiency shall be effectual to them, as whether the atonement shall be actual for them, is necessarily conditioned on their own action under it, in yielding to or resisting it.

§ 109. WHAT MUST BE TRUE OF THE DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY AS RELATED TO MAN'S FREEDOM.

We thus see what must be true of Divine Sovereignty, and its relation to man's freedom. The notion that God elected and predestinated a certain number or part of mankind to holiness and salvation for some supposed secret, unrevealed reason or reasons, *outside of*, and, in the order of things, *antecedent to* and *independent of* His redemptive measure, instead of electing all He foresaw He could *bring* by that measure to ethical fitness for forgiveness and all included in salvation, cannot possibly be true. It conflicts with all the facts of the case which are indicated at the beginning of the previous Chapter; with the whole current of Scripture respecting those facts, respecting the redemptive measure, specially the atonement, as related both to all mankind and to the elect, and respecting all mankind and the elect as related to it; with the nature of mercy which is as impartial as justice; therefore with the law itself which is essentially the same rule of moral action in God as in other moral natures, and requires absolutely impartial good-will to and treatment of all equally according to their moral characters, good or bad, and their consequent moral relations; with the fact that Christ was the representative, not of a part of, but of all mankind in all His action for them, and supremely in His voluntarily endured atoning, suffering, and death for them; with the fact that the elect were "chosen *in* Him before the foundation of the world;" with the absolutely unqualified equal offer to all alike of salvation through Him on condition of "repentance towards God and faith in Him;" and with other facts. He was *the sphere* in which God acted the election; and therefore He did not make it *out of, and antecedent to*

His plan of the redemptive measure, of which Christ, by all He was, did, suffered, and secured for men, was the fulfilling consummation, for any supposed secret reason or reasons whatever. On the contrary, as the redemptive plan was all founded upon and centered *in* Him, and as this plan or purpose was *purposed in Him*, the expression, *in Him*, can mean nothing else, than that all the reasons for, and the making of, the election were originated and founded entirely in Him, as in Himself and all He did, suffered and secured for men, the agency of the Holy Spirit included, the fulfilling consummation of that eternal purpose or plan. Out of, and but for Him, there would and could have been no such plan, and no election of any. It was made entirely with reference to the *effects* which God foresaw He could secure by the execution of the plan in Christ in bringing men, in their freedom of choice to comply with the ethical condition of salvation, and was of all He foresaw He could consistently bring to do this. If He had foreseen that He could thus bring all, He would assuredly have elected all. Hence, the election of only a part of mankind was in no sense arbitrary, partial, or against the equal chance of all others to be saved on the same condition, if they will, but was simply *God's determination* to save each one He saw He could consistently bring to comply with that necessary condition, while, with equal desire and disposition of mercy, He is doing all He consistently can to bring all others to do the same, and they will not.

§ 110. NO OTHER REASONS FOR ELECTION THAN THE FORESEEN EFFECTS OF THE REDEMPTIVE MEASURE.

Men can suppose anything; but not only is there no ground in Scripture or the nature of the case or the moral system, in which God's action is included, for supposing that He had any reason or reasons for His election extraneous to and independent of those consisting in the *effects*, foreseen by Him, of the redemptive measure, to secure which He planned it, and which are the greatest possible number of mankind saved, the greatest possible everlasting good of all holy beings, and the greatest possible satisfaction and glory to Himself forever, but there are in all these, as we have already sufficiently shown, and as will be additionally shown in subsequent places, insuperable grounds against the supposition. Such an election would be purely arbitrary, and in conflict with the constitution and moral system of the intelligent universe; and there could be no such supposed reasons. We main-

tain in opposition to it, that the main, general, and determining reasons for God's elective choice are not hidden from and inscrutable to man, but are revealed and manifest, and are precisely those we have stated. God foresaw them when He formed and adopted the plans of both creation and redemption, *and never will, nor righteously can, in any case depart from them.* The baffling difficulty of comprehending why one is brought by the agency of the Holy Spirit upon or in him to yield to it, while another, apparently in equally favorable or in even far better conditions, and under a stronger exertion of it is not, that, in his case, it is different in kind or design from what it is in the case of the other, but is in *the wondrous, inscrutable power of the* WILL, with which God constitued mankind and all finite moral beings, to arbitrate or determine their own moral action or choices under all the motives, influences, and agencies which may or can operate upon them, either in accordance with or in opposition to them, whether urging to good or to evil. This power is awful when in sin, the more it is habit-set in it and the eyes of moral reason are darkened by it. We have already noticed how desperately the will of men is set in sin, and how correspondingly difficult it is, even for the Spirit of God, to overcome it and bring it into submission to God, because its power is especially evinced in resisting Him and all the truths, motives, and facts to which they should yield. The Bible never assigns, as the reason or any part of it why those who persist in sin are not brought by the Holy Spirit to comply with the terms of salvation, that they were not elected, or that they have only His "common operations," not His special efficiency, or that God had any reason whatever, secret or revealed, against doing all possible according to the moral system founded in His own, in their, and in all other moral nature to convert and save them.* The reason it always assigns is their own positive unwillingness to do the ethical condition of receiving all grace, to bring them to do which the Spirit's agency is exerted. As His agency is not physical, but spiritual power, and as it is never exerted on any beyond what is consistent with their moral nature, and best on the whole for all others in the moral system, it is never such that the will of man in sin cannot resist or refuse to yield to it. Accordingly our Lord, who spoke for the whole Godhead, told the opposing Jews—"Ye will not come to me, that ye might have life." He

(*) Ez. 18:23, 31, 32; 33:11; John 3:16, 17; I. Tim. 2:4-6; Titus 2:11; II. Pet. 3:9; and add all the invitations, promises, threatenings, warnings, expostulations, exhortations, and entreaties of the Word of God addressed to all alike; and, above all, the atonement of Christ provisionally for all.

lamented over Jerusalem, that though He *would* often have gathered its children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, they *would* not. In upbraiding the cities wherein most of His mighty works were done, He declared that, if they had been done in Tyre, Sidon, and Sodom, those fearfully corrupt heathen cities, they *would have repented*, while these *would not;* and that it would therefore be more tolerable in the day of judgment for those than for these. He thus clearly taught, not only that they did and could resist all the mighty motives and influence of His manifold works, teachings, and holy presence among them, but that some do and can resist vastly greater ones than would, and doubtless often do, suffice to convert others, even though seemingly far less within likelihood of being converted at all. The case of the Ninevites repenting under the preaching of Jonah, cited by our Lord, proves the same thing (Mat. 12:41). He declared the reason of the condemnation of men, that they loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil; that they would not believe; that they make futile excuses for not accepting the invitations to the feast provided for them; and, while Stephen charged the Jews he addressed with resisting the Holy Ghost, as their fathers did, Paul declares it a special characteristic of the wicked men of the last days, that they resist the truth; and stubborn unbelief is everywhere in Scripture assigned as the reason sinners are not saved. The difficulty of seeing why some yield to, and others resist, all the motives set before them and the influences and operations of the Holy Spirit and of men upon them, to bring them from sin to God is not confined to this matter alone, but confronts us equally when different ones are constantly seen arbitrating their choices oppositely respecting matters and courses in this life under the same general outward motives and influences. This power of will in man and all moral natures is entirely incomprehensible to us, as all being and all faculties are, all we know of them being that they really exist as they do. All ontology is a myster

§ 111. IN WHAT GOD'S SOVEREIGNTY CONSISTS.

In what, then, does God's sovereignty consist? Not, of course, in His electing and predestinating some of mankind, for the manifestation of His glory, unto eternal life and glory, and in His passing by and foreordaining the rest of them, for the glory of His sovereign power over His creatures, to dishonor and wrath or everlasting death for their sin, to the praise of His glorious justice,

according to the secret counsel and good-pleasure of His own will, or *for any secret, unrevealed reason or reasons whatever outside of and, in the order of things, antecedent to His devising the plan of redemption;* and not in carrying out those decrees in time, in executing that measure exclusively for those thus elected, by the whole mission of Jesus Christ, the Gospel of grace, and the effectual call of the Holy Spirit, while others have no such call, but merely some "common operations" of His, if any, not designed to bring them out of their state of sin and death to grace and salvation, who yet, for their willful neglect and contempt of the grace offered to them, are justly left in their unbelief, and never truly come to Jesus Christ. There have been many myriads of glorious men and people who *could* believe what is thus stated, as there are and will be myriads more; but *never*, from earliest direction of his thought to it by a father, who thoroughly understood and believed it, and, by catechetical and other inculcations, endeavored to train his children to do the same, *could* this writer for a moment receive it as true. He, as is already manifest from the foregoing, believes it *consists in God's devising and executing His plans of both creation and redemption entirely of Himself exactly as, in His infinite knowledge, goodness, and wisdom, He saw was absolutely best for all the* ENDS *of His benevolence.* As it related to the creation of mankind and all moral natures, it consisted in constituting them just as He did, rational, sensitive, with will-power necessarily free to determine their own moral choices under all motives and influences, immortal, having His law in their moral reason, and being thus, by necessity of nature, universally in a moral system and under His moral government, to be ruled by Him exactly as the immutable law with its characteristics in Him as well as in them requires, and therefore invariably without partiality or arbitrariness, and according to the nature, character, deserts, and relations of each, as He sees them. As the fall of the first human pair, and, with them, if spared from the punishment they deserved, of their whole posterity, was perfectly foreknown by Him before the foundation of the world, it consisted in His purposing to spare them and so their race during a limited life of gracious probation in this world, notwithstanding His foresight of all that would be true of every one of them, and of all that this purpose would cost Himself. It consisted in devising, as the ground of this purpose, the entire redemptive measure, including Christ, His atonement, the Holy Spirit, and the whole inspired revelation with all its truths and motives, as a provision of pure

mercy and grace for them all alike *as sinners*, as the impartial nature of mercy required it should be, being moved thereto by His infinite pity for them in their foreseen ruined state with the mitigating circumstances involved in it, and by His foresight of the multitudes of them He could save, and of the measureless good He could accomplish by it to His entire holy society and Himself forever. But, while He devised this stupendous provision for all alike as sinners, He perfectly foreknew, that part of them He could not, and part of them He could, bring by it, administered in the wisest and best possible way, to forsake sin and return to Him in faith and its obedience. But, as He foreknew each of them He could bring by it, so administered, to do this, if He adopted the measure, and that their number would more than compensate for all it would cost Him, His sovereignty consisted further in adopting it for the sake of saving these from sin and ruin, and so "in choosing or electing them in Jesus Christ, according to the foreknowledge of God the Father," in the only proper sense of that word, "to obedience" and all else Scripture tells us they are elected or chosen to, culminating in salvation. It consisted further in His predestinating all thus elected to aggrandizements, glories, blessedness, and eternal relations to Christ, to the Father, to the Spirit, and to the whole intelligent universe, all *additional to salvation* in itself, and surpassing all highest conceptions of any of themselves in this life. Beyond all these, it consists in His determining the order and procession of all His providences, general and special, towards mankind universally, towards nations, communities, families, and persons in all their relations and conditions. In short, it consists in His devising, determining, and doing all *His own* measures, works, courses, and acts absolutely of Himself, or according to the counsel of His own will, as in His infinite knowledge, goodness, and wisdom He sees best for all the ends of His benevolence. We add respecting all who exhaust their probation in sin despite whatever knowledge they have of His mercy and grace towards men, and whatever agency His Spirit could properly exert upon them, that it consisted in His purposing their existence according to the race-system which He chose as best, to do the best He could for each of them providentially and by His Spirit during his time-relations to others in that system, and to inflict on each of them the exact punishment he deserves, neither more or less, as demanded by justice to him as retributive, and to Himself and all good beings as ethical.

§ 112. NOTHING IN IT INCONSISTENT WITH THE MORAL SYSTEM OR MAN'S FREEDOM.

Such, we believe, is the true view of God's sovereignty; and there is nothing in it arbitrary, partial, inconsistent with the moral system constituted by the law in all moral natures as declared in Scripture and the consciousness of man. Nor is there anything in it irreconcilable with man's freedom. On the one hand, according to it, God is absolutely independent in devising, purposing, constituting, governing, and doing, "according to the counsel of His own will," acting under His own infinite knowledge, benevolence, and wisdom, all that *He* ever has done or will do, in creation, in universal providence, in respect to all His creatures, and in respect to mankind and every one of them from the first to the last. On the other hand, every one of them is perfectly free, in the sphere of his moral action, in determining his own choices and courses, right or wrong, good or evil, under all the motives before and influences upon him from God, his fellow men, angels, or devils. As before said, the power which the Holy Spirit exerts upon any one to bring him to right choice and action is spiritual, not physical; impelling, not compelling; and He exerts it with perfect regard for the constitution, faculties, and laws of the mind—specially, if conceivably possible for one power more than the others, for the will, the crowning one of the moral nature, the determiner of all ethical choices, with which He endowed and distinguished mankind in the scale of being. He never invades, subverts, supplants, impairs, nor dispenses with the necessity of each one's exercising for himself this wondrous, mysterious, august power of his nature. The Spirit's operation on the mind is to quicken its intelligence, sensibility, and conscience out of their deadness respecting moral and religious truth and its applications to the person's self, to perceive, feel, and realize it with solemn convictions of sin, guilt, danger, duty, and need of Divine mercy and gracious help to restore him to God, and thus to bring him to yield himself to God in thorough repentance and faith as He is made known to him. If one yields and another does not, the action of each is perfectly consistent with it, because it in no sense interferes with the free action of his will under or against it. How, then, can there be even a shadow of inconsistency or irreconcilability between God's sovereignty in the Spirit's agency and man's freedom? Never was there a more perfect consistency between two correlated things; and, if men will only cast to the winds the assumption of an election for reasons outside of, and antecedent in the

order of things to, those consisting in the *effects* which God foreknew He could secure by the redemptive measure, and for which He planned and adopted it, and with this its logical child, that the Spirit's efficiency is limited and guided and designedly effectual by that election only in the case of those who are its objects, and not by the plan and nature of that measure, including His agency, as a designed provision for all alike *as sinners*, who must, by necessity of nature, determine their own action under it in yielding to or resisting Him acting according to it, we shall no more be told that "all attempts to bridge over the gulf between the two [God's sovereignty and man's freedom] are futile in the present imperfect condition of man."* There never was nor can be any gulf between them to be bridged over, even in the view of election we are opposing, if we truly believe in both and in their consequent relations to each other. God never does men's willing and doing any more when they yield to Him than when they do not; but, as Paul puts it, "He works in them *to* the willing and the doing" (Phil. 2:13). His working in them precedes theirs and is constantly completed at the line where their willing and doing under it is secured, or where the *will not* of resisters becomes set. Their freedom of will is the shore-bound over which the tides and billows of His influence never break, and by which they are constantly stayed in the case alike of both them that are saved and them that are lost. How, then, can there possibly be any gulf of inconsistency or irreconcilability between His sovereign working in either case and their willing and doing under it in their freedom? To us, it is pure nonsense to suppose there is any, and no less to keep asserting that the origin of sin is an insoluble mystery. There is no more mystery about it than about the origin of obedience.

§113 GOD'S FOREKNOWLEDGE NOT IDENTICAL WITH HIS ELECTION AND PREDESTINATION.

Despite all the efforts which have been made to establish the identity of God's foreknowledge of those He will save and His election of them, we maintain that there is an intrinsic distinction between them, as shown in I. Pet. 1:2, just as there is a distinction between it and predestination or foreordination as shown in Rom. 8:29, and elsewhere; for it would be idle to say, "elect according to the election of God." We do not believe that either the verb, *to*

*) See note at foot of p. 278 of Lange's Com. on Romans—Quotation from Alford.

foreknow, or the noun, *foreknowledge*, ever means in Scripture, when ascribed to God, either election or predestination [foreordination], or otherwise than as it relates to either of them. Whatever they may imply respecting these, they always, when predicated of God, properly signify His omniscience in relation to their object or objects, as the basis of these acts of His will. His omniscience is, in no sense, voluntary, being a natural attribute, while both these acts are purely so; and, without it, as, in the order of things, their basis, they would be impossible. Hence, when either of these voluntary acts is involved by implication of relation in the meaning of this verb or noun, it is so only as it is based on this. How could it be otherwise? Both God's love which prompted them and His efficiency to execute them would be blind and incapable of operating for any end without infinite wisdom to guide or direct them; and this wisdom would be impossible without the basis and essential constituent of His natural attribute of omniscience. No wisdom is possible to God or man, except on the basis of knowledge, which must be antecedent in the nature of the case. It was necessary, therefore, that God's omniscience should be clearly marked as the eternal, changeless basis of all His plans and acts of creation and redemption, of their effects, and of His perfect wisdom in them all. Hence, to suppose that election and predestination are antecedent in order to foreknowledge, or that this is based on either of them, is intrinsically absurd; and it is so, not only for the reason stated, but because His foreknowledge of all the results of His plans of both was as perfect before as after He adopted them; and He adopted them on account of that knowledge. It did not, therefore, depend on, but was the ground condition and reason for His adopting them, so that to make it depend on either of them is an impossible reversal against the whole nature of the case. An election not based on foreknowledge would necessarily be one without any wisdom, reason, or proper end; and the conception of such a transposition is one of confusion, and can produce nothing but confusion.

§ 114. MEANING OF HIS FOREKNOWING THOSE HE ELECTED AND PREDESTINATED.

The first question, then, to be considered here is, what are we to understand by God's foreknowledge of those whom, on the basis of it, He elected and predestinated or foreordained to the ends of both these acts? Plainly, it was a foreknowledge of them as in some peculiar sense different from the rest of mankind; and there-

fore it was not of them as moral beings, nor as sinners, nor as differently related as sinners to Himself, His holy universe and His moral system in either of these respects from the rest. Nor was it of them as elected; for they were "elected according to the foreknowledge of God;" and besides, election is nothing peculiar *in* them, but is God's act *towards* them as foreknown by Him to be somehow peculiarized by something pleasing to Him; for His election of them included and proceeded from complacent love for them as future possessors of that peculiarity. Nor was it of them as predestinated; for what is true of them as elected is equally so of them as predestinated. Nor was it of them as ever to become morrally prepared for forgiveness and salvation *in and of themselves*, without the gracious motives and influences of the redemptive provision, or to have a shadow of merit or desert of the Divine favor, whatever they would do or become *of themselves*, or not to have an everlasting desert of the opposite. Nor was it of them as earning or deserving forgiveness and salvation by any *works* without faith or with it; for this would make these *due* to them by justice, instead of being purely gifts of grace. Nor was it of them as constituted with an *indoles, a natural quality or disposition*, different from and better than that of others;* for, to constitute them so would be a partial, arbitrary work of physical omnipotence beyond the natural laws of propagation, in conflict with the nature of the case which we have shown, with the redemptive system correlated to it, and with the nature of mercy, because, if omnipotence could be thus exerted for *them*, there is no conceivable reason, not arbitrary, why it could not be equally for all, to secure the salvation of all. Besides, it often occurs that the same parents, pious or wicked, have offspring of very different dispositions, that of one very bad, even of the worst, that of another very good, or even of the best; and yet often the former are, and the latter are not converted. Nor was it of them as sustaining any of the common relations of mankind to each other, the intelligent universe, and God. Nor, in short, was it of them in any respect *outside* of the foreseen *rectified character*, to which He could bring them, which distinguishes them from all foreseen as incorrigible in sin, which constitutes their *special* relations to others, to the intelligent universe, and to God, and which He foreknew He could, by adopting and executing the plan of redemption, consistently *bring* them to begin and continue freely to the end of their probation. We speak humanly when we say He *formed* this plan; for it

(*) Lange's Com. on Rom. 9:12, 13, pp. 311-313.

and all its results must have been to Him an immediate *intuition*, as that of creation must also have been; and it was for the sake of its beneficent results to men, the intelligent universe, and Himself consummately, that He, "by the counsel of His own will," adopted it, just as it was for the sake of all the results of that of creation, that He adopted it. He thus saw that plan and its execution as related to mankind as a provision of His mercy for them *all alike as sinners;* He saw all the results of its execution in the case of each and all of them; and He saw that doing all He could by it, and therefore wisely and benevolently, for all and each, He could bring only a part of them to yield to Him in their freedom, while the rest, in their freedom, would not, but would persist in sin; and His prevision of each of the former part must have been attended with *complacency* to them, and of each of the other part with *displacency* to them for their foreseen action. This prevision was in no sense voluntary, but the necessary action ot His natural attribute of omniscience; but it was antecedent to, and furnished the reasons for, His redemptive purpose, election, and predestination, which were all acts of His will.

§ 115. WHAT SCRIPTURE TEACHES CONCERNING GOD'S ETERNAL PURPOSE, ELECTION, AND PREDESTINATION.

Is this showing a true exhibition of what Scripture declares concerning God's *purpose*, *election*, and *predestination*, and their relations to His foreknowledge and to each other? We must not entangle ourselves with difficulties of our own making by trying to think of these acts of God as done in chronological succession, but must regard them as eternally co-existent and connected in His infinite Mind and plan *in a necessary order of relation.* According to Scripture, the first of them, in this order, is His "eternal *purpose*, which He purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord."* This purpose was His purely self-moved, self-determined adoption of the plan of redemption, which, in His omniscient and benevolent wisdom, He saw was the best possible. It related to mankind generally, to those of them He saw He could bring to faith and salvation specially, to all things in heaven and earth which He saw He could harmonize in Christ,† and to each Person in the Godhead. As it related to those foreknown as renewed by the execution of this plan, it involved both their election and their predestination to the special ends of

(*) Eph. 3:11. See, also, Eph. 1:9, 11; Rom. 8:28; 9:11; II. Tim. 1:9.

(†) Eph. 1:9, 10; Col. 1:19, 20.

both these acts. It thus comprehended all He has done and will do forever in executing it and securing all its results to man, the whole intelligent universe, and Himself to endless ages.

The second in the order of these acts of God, which was involved in His purpose, was His election of each of those whom He foreknew, as explained. It was His choice of each of them out of mankind to be an object of its ends, not from any arbitrary partiality, but because He foreknew that, while doing all He consistently could, according to the universal moral system, to bring all others to the same ends, who nevertheless would not, in their freedom, yield to be brought, He could consistently bring these to yield, in their freedom, to be brought to those ends. It was essentially His determination so to bring them in their times. Scripture contains the following statements respecting it: I. Pet. 1:2. "Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, through (en) santification of the Spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ." Eph 1:4. "According as He hath chosen us in Him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before Him." II. Thess. 2:13. "For that God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation in sanctification of the Spirit and belief [faith] of the truth." It is spoken of in many other places, but these are the only direct statements of what it consisted in. The election of Jacob (Rom. 9:11), was to none of the ends stated in these passages, but was of him to be the progenitor of the theocratic people, and of them in him to be such.* According to these, election was an act of the Father. He chose those intended *in Christ*, who, in His Divine-Human Person, and in all He did and suffered on earth and continues to do in heaven as the one Mediator between God and men, contains all the grounds for the choice and all the potencies which He foreknew would secure its results in their cases; so that He did not choose them for any reasons *outside* of Him and of the redemptive measure, which was to be executed in, by and through Him. He chose them *out* (eklego) for Himself from the rest of mankind, for the peculiar reason in them already stated, for which He would, with equal readiness and pleasure, have chosen all the rest, if He had foreseen it in them. Election thus differs from God's redemptive purpose, as a special under a whole, its aim being vastly restricted compared with that of His purpose, being confined to its objects alone. It was an "election of grace" to them, because

(*) Gen. 25:22, 23; Mal. 1:2, 3.

they would not and could not have a shadow of merit or desert of it, but would have exactly the contrary; and He was moved to it, not merely by His pity and benevolence in themselves towards them (for He had these equally towards all), but by His foreknowledge of them *as brought* to become saints and thus objects of His approval and complacency, as no others foreknown as incorrigible in sin ever could be, and by all the foreseen everlasting results of good to them, the intelligent universe, and consummately to Himself. According to the first and third of the passages quoted above, the election was to be made effectual to its objects (en) *in, by,* or *under the power of,* the Spirit—"in sanctification of the Spirit." It was by His agency alone that the result would in every case be secured. But, in the third of these passages, we are told that those elected were chosen, not only in santification of the Spirit, but also "in faith of the truth," that is, in the faith required in the Gospel, which, in both the old version and the new, is wrongly translated *belief;* and this teaches that their foreseen *action,* not in works, but in yielding to the Spirit in faith, was also a reason in God's mind for electing them; for faith is the antithesis of works, the one only possible way of receiving, taking, appropriating grace and salvation. The same is implied in both the other passages, because both obedience and being holy and blameless are their own action in and from faith. But it is thoroughly important to notice the *ends* of their election stated in these passages. In the first of them, there are *two,* "obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ," that is, justification; in the second, there is one, "blameless holiness," or sanctification, which implies both the preceding; in the third, it is "salvation," which implies them all. Nowhere are any other *ends* ascribed to it; and these perfectly accord with our Lord's teachings concerning it. John 6:37. "All that the Father giveth me, shall *come to me;* and him that *cometh to me,* I will in no wise cast out."* The action of their will in exercising faith under the influence of the Spirit is thus a declared foreseen condition of and reason for it.

The third in order of these acts of God is *predestination or foreordination.* It consists in His determining or ordaining beforehand, that is, in His adoption of His plan of the redemptive measure, to do with and for each of the elect, but for no others, all that the passages teaching it declare, which are the following: Rom. 8:29, 30. "For whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be conformed

(*) See vs. 38-40; 44, 45; 10:27-29; 17:2, 6-11, 24.

to the image of His Son, that He might be the first-born among many brethren: and whom He predestinated them He also called." Eph. 1:5. "In love having predestinated us into the adoption of children through Jesus Christ unto Himself according to the good-pleasure [the *en* must include benevolence] of His will, to the praise of the glory of His grace." Eph. 1:11. "In whom also we were made a heritage, having been predestinated according to the purpose of Him who worketh all things after the counsel of His will; to the end that we should be unto the praise of His glory." See vs. 13, 14. Looking at these passages, we note the following things: 1. Those who are the objects of predestination or foreordination are the same persons who are the objects of election. It is entirely confined to them. 2. The execution of election involves *the voluntary action of its objects* under the agency of the Spirit for the fulfillment of all its ends, while predestination is totally executed by God Himself, not only without any agency of its objects, but without any distinct agency of the Spirit. It is strictly His own act or acts, destining or ordaining them to its ends. 3. Its ends to them are entirely different from, instead of being included in, those of election; and, in designed order, *they are plainly after and additional or supplemental to them*, as it is to election. Their adoption as sons, with its co-heirship with Christ (Rom. 8:14–17), is clearly so to their begun obedience and justification, as is their being made God's heritage, and their being conformed to the image of Christ. Instead, therefore, of predestination being first in the order of God's plan of redemption, and the foundation of all His other acts in it, it is last in it, its close and crown; and, instead of its relating to all mankind and angels as its objects, it relates only and exclusively to those who are the objects of the election, and to them only as additional to it, and as supplementing its ends with its own. There is no possible place in or under that plan for the horrible, ogreish metamorphosis of it by Augustine; and well may all believers rejoice that they are the objects of such an infallible *destination*. Beyond the ends of predestination, already noticed, which pertain to its objects, it had a supreme, ultimate end, which pertained to God Himself, and is declared with variations three times over in Eph. 1:6, 12, 14, at the close of three circles of thought respecting it—"unto the praise of the glory of His grace"—"that we should be to the praise of His glory"—"unto the praise of His glory." As His predestination of its objects to the stupendous ends stated, over and above those of election which are fulfilled in their salvation,

was, and His execution of them would be, totally "according to the good-pleasure of His will" and "the purpose of Him who worketh all things after the counsel of His own will," and so would be ineffable grace to them added to all that of their salvation in itself, there would be infinite glory in that grace, of which *they* would be eternal manifestations and monuments, which would not only deserve and draw forth their own utmost praise, but that of all holy beings forever.

§ 116. EXAMINATION OF ROM. 8:27–30 AND EPH. 1:4–14.

In order to show that this view of the relations of election and predestination is the correct one, it is necessary to ascertain the true meaning and relations of the passages in Rom. 8:28–30 and Eph. 1:4–14. The former is less complete than the latter, and does not, as Lange supposes in his Commentary, *in loco*, "contain the whole Divine plan of salvation from the first foundation to the ultimate object," as its scope is restricted by the subject and aim of the entire context." The passages together give the whole plan. In Rom. 8:29, election is not mentioned before predestination as it is in Eph. 1:4, while foreknowledge is mentioned in that passage, but not in this. The reason for the omission in either case is not that election and foreknowledge are identical or include each other, as Lange and others suppose;* for the former is, and the latter is not, an act of the *Divine will*, and they are clearly distinguished in I. Pet. 1:2. The reason for not mentioning election in Rom. 8:29 is, that predestination implies it as its antecedent, just as the reason for not mentioning foreknowledge in Eph. 1:4 and in II. Thess. 2:13 is that the choosing in them implies it as its necessary antecedent and basis. Nothing is more common than such omissions of antecedents, and assumptions of them as implied. Why should interpreters, instead of recognizing them as implied, confound things radically different in nature, especially when, as in this case, election would have been impossible in the nature of the case, except on the pre-existent basis of foreknowledge in the proper sense of that much-abused term?

We believe the following the true view of Rom. 8:28–30. We have already shown what, we think, is meant by the expression, *the purpose of God;* that He must have formed it on the basis of His infallible foreknowledge of all its results to men, to the intelligent

(*) For a specimen of strange logic as to their identity, see Lange's Com. on Rom., p. 289, 2d column, near bottom.

universe, and to Himself; that it was for the sake of the infinite whole of those beneficent results that, according to His good-pleasure and the counsel of His own will, He formed and adopted it; and that, as it related to those of mankind whom He foreknew as brought by Him, working fully within its lines, to come to Him in obedience, it included His two special, subordinate acts respecting them, that of His election of them to *its* ends, and that of His predestination of them to *its* ends. This is its evident meaning in Rom. 8:28, and in Eph. 1;9, 11; 3:11; II. Tim. 1:9. Rom. 8:29, 30, is simply an expanded statement of subordinate acts of God involved in *that purpose* respecting those to whom it related, by which He designed to effect it. Election is not mentioned among them, but verse 33 shows it was implied. The opening clause of this statement "whom He foreknew," shows that the purpose itself and all these subordinate acts, election, and predestination included, were according to His foreknowledge, just as Peter's statement, "elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father" shows that His election was based on it, and as, in Eph. 1:11, we are told that believers "were predestinated according to God's purpose." Besides, Eph. 1:9, 10, shows that His purpose is vastly wider in its scope than His predestination. It is impossible to adjust all these teachings to the notion that, in the order of relation, predestination, instead of being *after* election and the crowning act of the redemptive plan, respecting the redeemed, was either *before*, or *identical with*, God's purpose, and so the foundation of that plan, and even of His foreknowledge—especially when its specified ends are recognized in connection with those of election, while no special ends are assigned to His purpose, and both election and predestination are constantly declared to be according to it and His foreknowledge.

The first Chapter of the Epistle to Ephesians, written by the Apostle about three years later than that to the Romans, contains the fullest and the only distinctly designed statement in all Scripture of these eternal acts of God; and all his other statements of them, being incidental, should be construed in harmony with this. In verse 3, he pronounces the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ *blessed*, specially for having *blessed* believers with all spiritual *blessings* in heavenly places in Christ, thus ascribing all these acts and their results to believers to Him. In verse 4, he ascribes to Him their election, before the foundation of the world, to the end that they should be holy and blameless before Him; and his thus

placing it before predestination shows that, in order, it is before it. Then follow, in verses 5–14, two distinct statements concerning predestination and its ends to them, with three of its ulterior ends to Himself. He states in verse 5, that God predestinated them to the end stated in it "according to the good-pleasure of His will," and in verse 11, that He did it to the end stated in it "according to His purpose, as He works all things after the counsel of His own will." Verses 9 and 10 show that that purpose had a consummate end vastly beyond them, even to summing up all things in Christ, which are in heaven as well as on earth. That the participle, "having predestinated," at the beginning of verse 5, is only expressive of the co-existence of the act with that of election in the eternal purpose, is certified, not only by the fact that election is placed first in the statement, but by the fact that its ends are plainly stated as successive and additional to those of election, stated in verse 4, in II. Thess. 2:13, and in I. Pet. 1:2; by the fact, before shown and now certified anew, that it is neither prior to nor identical with God's purpose, otherwise than both election and it are as involved in it; and by the fact that its ends are done for its objects by God Himself without any condition or action of theirs, while those of election are not. To make this last point manifest, we here repeat a statement of the ends of each. Those of election are "*through faith of the truth*," as well as "sanctification of the Spirit" (II. Thess. 2:13); "to obedience," "to justification" conditioned on it (I. Pet. 1:2); to "sanctification" (Eph. 1:4); and "to salvation" (II. Thess. 2:13), which is everywhere in the Gospel conditioned on faith. Salvation, in itself, does not imply any of the ends of predestination, but is, as the term signifies, rescue from sin and its natural and retributive consequences to the full degree of everlasting confirmation in perfect holiness and blessedness. This and all it implies could certainly have been accomplished without any of the ends of predestination, which are these: 1. The adoption of its objects by the Father as sons to Himself through Jesus Christ, which involves His making them His heirs and joint-heirs with Christ to all that He inherits (Rom. 8:15–17. 2. His making them His heritage in Christ (Eph. 1:11). 3. Conformity to the image of His Son [that is, in condition] that He might be the first-born among many brethren (Rom. 8:29). From this showing, it is perfectly plain that these ends neither precede nor are identical with, but succeed and are additional to, those of election. Overlooking what is thus revealed concerning each of these eternal acts of God and its ends,

and making it mean what it never does in all the Scriptures, have caused measureless mischief in the Church and world.

§ 117. THE PURPOSE AND ELECTION IN ROM. 9:11 MEAN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT THINGS FROM THOSE WE ARE CONSIDERING.

There is a seeming discrepancy between the words in Rom. 9:11, "that the purpose of God according to election might stand," and what we have shown concerning election and its ends, which we must notice. Our first remark is, that this passage must be interpreted consistently with those we have considered, both according to the rule that the more obscure must be interpreted by the less so or the clear, and to the fact that, in those, the fundamental ends of election are stated, while in this neither of them is. We have seen that, according to Rom. 8:28, 29, 33; Eph. 1:9-11; 3:11; II. Tim. 1:9; and I. Pet. 1:2, the first and fundamental act of God in the whole redemptive measure was His purpose to execute it, and that it involved the two subordinate acts, (1) of election, and (2) of predestination. It is plain, therefore, that, in the clause, "that the purpose of God according to election might stand," each of the words *purpose* and *election* must have a different meaning from what it has in any of these other harmonious passages. In Rom. 9:1–5, the Apostle expresses his profound solicitude for the salvation of the Jews, as his kinsmen according to the flesh, to whom pertained all the advantages recounted in verses 4, 5. But, to head off their assumption, that they would be saved because they were of the seed of Abraham, or the promises of God to him for his seed would be nullified, he says in verse 6—"Not as though the word of God hath come to naught;" and in verses 7–13, he refutes their assumption by showing that God had acted on a different principle in relation to the immediate "seed" of even Abraham and Isaac themselves. In verse 7, he begins with two discriminating affirmations —(1) that "they are not all Israel which are [descendants] of Israel" or Jacob, which is a general one directly applying to them, and (2) that "neither, because they are Abraham's seed, are they all children" [in the sense of the promise]; because, in Gen. 21:12, God, by saying to Abraham, "In Isaac shall thy seed be called," had confined the special seed which He had covenanted and promised to give him to Isaac and his descendants (Gen. 17:7). Putting this in distinct form, he says in verse 8, "That is, it is not the children of the flesh that are children of God; but the children of the promise are reckoned for a seed." The expression, "children of

God," in the first clause, does not mean those really such in character, but, as the last clause shows, the special "seed" or line of posterity promised by God to Abraham, only a part of which ever became His real children. In verse 9, he quotes this promise from Gen. 18:10, 14. In verses 10–13, he adduces the more striking case of the sons and posterity of Isaac, as recorded in Gen. 25:21–23, and adds a quotation from Mal. 1:2, 3. The case was, that, in answer to Isaac's prayer, his barren wife conceived. Having remarkable sensations, the cause of which she did not understand, she inquired of Jehovah concerning them, and He gave her this answer —"*Two nations* are in thy womb, and *two manner of people* shall be separated from thy bowels; and *the one people* shall be stronger than *the other people;* and the elder shall serve the younger." In reference to this answer, Paul, in Rom. 9:11, says—"For *the children* being not yet born, neither having done anything good or bad, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of Him that calleth; it was said unto her, the elder shall serve the younger. As it is written, Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated."

Now, considering the passages together, that in Gen. and this in Rom., we seek the true meaning of the latter. 1. In God's answer to Rebekah, neither of the twins is spoken of as an individual, but each only as being in effect a whole nation or people in her, in which he is included as its progenitor. Nor are any in it spoken of as individuals. 2. The purpose of God respecting them, stated to her in His answer, is that quoted by Paul in Rom. 9:12, "The elder shall serve the younger." 3. Paul states, verse 11, the obvious fact, that, as the children were not yet born, and had done nothing good or bad, when God declared this purpose concerning each of them as in germ a nation, it was wholly without regard to works done by them, good or bad, or to any moral deserts of theirs, good or ill, but solely of Him that calleth. It is simply arbitrary to assume or suppose that Paul, in verse 11, meant to speak of the unborn twins as individuals, apart from the nations to descend from them. It is so, because God neither said nor meant that in His answer to Rebekah, in Gen. 25:23; because he quotes, in verse 12, the purpose of God, there declared, respecting the "two nations in her womb," including them as their respective progenitors; because *God's election of Israel related to them as a nation or people*, as we shall see; and because the object of his argument was to refute the assumption of the Jews, that they would be saved, because they were descendants of Abraham and Israel, or God's word would come to

naught, by confronting them with antagonist facts in the cases of those partriarchs themselves, and not to prove or disprove that God had a "purpose according to election" to confer or not to confer eternal salvation on a single one of them. 4. The election, according to which this purpose of God was, is that stated in verse 13, "Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated," which is quoted from Mal. 1:2, 3. The whole connection there shows that, by Jacob and Esau, the prophet did not mean those two brothers as individuals, but the nations descended from them, with them as their progenitors. Thus this election and the purpose of God according to it related entirely and only to the "two nations" or "peoples," which God declared to Rebekah were in her womb, as told in Gen. 25:23, and not to separate individuals at all. 5. Neither this purpose nor this election was identical with the purpose or the election of the redemptive measure; for their relation to each other is in reversed order. That purpose was not according to election, and this was, while that election was according to that purpose, and this was not according to this purpose; and both that purpose and that election related to the eternal salvation of men as individuals, while neither this purpose nor this election related either to separate persons or to the eternal salvation of any, but solely to the two nations or peoples in this world. The fact that Esau never personally served Jacob as a person, nor any of his descendants, proves that the purpose did not relate to them as persons, but only to their nations, and to these not for centuries after they lived; and as the purpose was according to the election, both it and the clause in Mal. 1:3, added to "Esau I hated," prove that the election was not of Jacob as a person, apart from his nation, but only as included in it as its progenitor. 6. The end or ends of this election were not identical with any of the ends of the redemptive election; but were those of the Abrahamic birthright and all that it involved in this world—all the special relations to God and mankind, the advantages and prerogatives by which they were constituted and characterized as God's chosen, peculiar people, to be in time an organized theocracy and put in possession of the promised land of Canaan, of whom the great promised "seed" (Gal. 3:16), the Messiah, was to come. They included all specified by Paul in verses 4, 5. If these ends had included eternal salvation, not one of all the generations of this nation would have failed of it, nor would one of all those of the nation of Esau have attained it; but, if they all pertained to this nation *as such* in this world, this election neither secured this salvation to one of them,

nor excepted Esau or any of his descendants from it. As to the notion of Lange that this election, and the redemptive one also, determined the *indoles* or natural disposition of its objects,* it is unwarranted by Scripture, arbitrary, partial, and a mere invention of its author. 7. There is this further to be noticed of this election, that, as it was necessary, in order to accomplish the development and ends of the redemptive measure among mankind, that there should be such a chosen, peculiar, theocratic nation; as it was necessary that this nation, as is shown by God's whole course with Abraham in calling him, covenanting with him, and giving him the promises, should be from him through Isaac; as the whole entail of what was to peculiarize that nation was pendent on the possession of the Abrahamic birthright; as, on account of this whole chain of facts, this birthright was not really one of primogeniture, but of Divine dispensation; and as, in the nature of the case, it could pertain only to one of Isaac's two sons with his nation; it is manifest that *God was under a necessity of His own making* to elect between them to which it should pertain, as He had a perfect right to do. 8. But why did He elect Jacob and his nation? As the twins, seminally containing their future twin nations, were yet unborn and without moral action and desert, good or bad, when the election was made, neither was the election of the younger nor the rejection of the elder done as deserved by the works of either of them, but entirely of God's own will, who called the younger. But this is neither saying nor implying that God's reasons for this election of the younger were any other than *the effects* He foresaw He could secure by it, which He could not by electing the elder. God only elects or loves what is or will be lovely; and when He elected or "loved" the Jacob-nation, it was not for any secret reason or reasons outside of and apart from it, but for what, morally lovely, He foresaw He could secure in it, or bring it to be in itself and as an instrument and agency for the ends of His redemptive measure, by His providential and gracious management, influences, institutions, laws, and tutelage. This moral loveliness He foresaw He could not induce in the Esau-nation, *as a nation*, or not to any such degree as in the other, or as would secure the ends of the election; but, instead, He foresaw in it, as a whole, only what, despite all He could wisely do for it, would be morally unlovely and hateful. The reasons, therefore, for this election were in what He foresaw would be true in the case of each of these nations under it and all it involved on His part, both in

(*) See his Com. on Rom., 9:12, 13.

themselves and as related to His great redemptive measure; and there is not a hint either in Gen. 25:23, or in Mal. 1:2, 3, or in Rom. 9:10–13, or anywhere else, that it was for any other reasons whatever. 9. This election singled out the Jacob-nation, not only from that of Esau, but from all the nations of the world, for a special relation and service to God and a special religious and moral relation and mission to mankind, to culminate in the advent and mission of our Lord Jesus Christ from and among it. It singled it out to be a kingdom of God on earth, a theocracy specially constituted, trained, and conserved in the true theistic, Abrahamic religion by His special superintendence, interventions, discipline, revelations, institutions, organizations, deliverances, protections, punishments, restorations, priesthood, judges, kings, inspired prophets, psalmists, authors, holy men and women, and heroic champions and leaders, His Spirit, His Scripture, His assignment to it of Canaan, and all its relations to other nations and theirs to it, until the Great Redeemer should come from it, and in many momentous respects to the end of the world.

§ 118. SUCH ELECTIONS AS THAT OF THE JACOB-NATION AND REJECTIONS AS THAT OF THE ESAU-NATION COMMON.

Expounders of Scripture have rightly observed, that there is nothing singular in the fact of the election of the nation of Jacob instead of that of Esau for a special relation to and mission in the world, since history, from the beginning,* records manifold such elections, showing that they belong to the order of God's management of the race. They are clearly manifest in our own national history from its beginning. But they scarcely deserve comparison with this one in respect to ends and importance. For, while this had world-ends for the chosen nation itself through centuries and for others related to it, they were comparatively trivial and entirely subordinate to its main, grand, consummate end, which was that it should be God's organ for conserving, developing, and representing the true Abrahamic, theistic religion in the apostate world, and thus preparing the way for its promised consummate unfolding in Christ and His dispensation of eternal salvation for mankind. In order to be such an organ to the most complete degree possible, we can see the necessity that it should be a theocracy, an organized kingdom of God on earth, which would represent or typify Christ in His relations to, and government of, His spiritual kingdom of God, and the

(*) Deut. 32:8; Gen. 10; Acts 17:26.

relations of that kingdom and each one in it to Him. The more completely it could be constituted to *typify or symbolically prefigure* all this, the greater its adaptation to educate and mold the successive generations of its people would be. Therefore, not only the whole nation as theocratic, or a kingdom of God among all the other nations of mankind, was typical of Christ and His kingdom, and *as such* a constant embodied prophecy of them, but everything on God's side respecting it, and on its side respecting Him as their Ruler and covenant God, which could be made typical of the same, or of anything important in the relations of Christ to His people individually or otherwise, was so made, and was thus a constant prophecy of every such thing. It was as if, from the outset of that nation, God's relation to, and every step and measure in His course towards and for it on the one side, and its relation to Him and everything in its organization, institutions, and history under Him had a finger pointing forward to, and a mouth prophesying and proclaiming all down the centuries respecting Christ and His spiritual, everlasting kingdom, and all the relations between Him and it. As it was precisely to be such a theocratic, typical nation that this Jacob-nation was elected, it is manifest that the election of it was itself entirely typical, and the purpose according to it was simply to execute it. 10. As this election of Isaac and of Jacob was not of either of them as an individual and was not to eternal salvation, but was of each of them as progenitor of and identified with the promised line of His theocratic posterity in this world, so the rejection of Ishmael and Esau was not of either of them as an individual and from eternal salvation; and, as this purpose of God according to this election related to them and that promised line only in this world, so this rejection of Ishmael and Esau in connection with their posterities, related to them only in this world. Both this election and this purpose, therefore, were subordinate and subservient to God's election to eternal salvation and His eternal redemptive purpose, which were in order, antecedent to them, underlay them, and will continue with our whole race, while they ended with the advent of Christ. 11. But, by adducing those cases of God's electing only parts of the very offspring of Abraham and Isaac, including their national descendants, to inherit His promised theocratic relations and blessings, and rejecting the other parts from receiving them, the Apostle most pertinently proves respecting the Israelitish nation of his time, that their natural descent from those ancestral patriarchs was not the condition of the promises made to Abraham re-

specting his seed from Sarah, and did not secure their salvation, nor any special favor to them as individuals, nor prevent their being rejected as a nation for not accepting and believing in Christ as their promised Messiah and Saviour. He thus shows that, as God, in those patriarchal beginnings, elected out of all the offspring of Abraham, to whom the promises were given, the nation of Jacob to the special theocratic relations to Himself without infringing those promises, so then, when Christ had come, He did not infringe them by electing out of this nation itself to salvation the remnant of it which believed, and rejecting the whole of it besides for its unbelief. He was only acting on the same general principle.

Such, we believe, is the true view of this whole passage. But the Apostle well knew the objections which the antagonizing Jews would still array against it; and he goes on to overthrow them and to set forth and establish from their Scriptures the full truth concerning their unbelieving nation. Chapters 9, 10, and 11 are one section of this epistolary treatise of the Great Apostle, pronounced by Coleridge, "the most profound work in existence," and by Schaff, "this wonderful production of a wonderful man;" and the remainder of this section is directly connected with the passage we have considered, throws back its light upon it, and unfolds its profound import and significance. The Apostle was a consummate master in reasoning and in adroit construction of his argument to meet and fit close to his opponents without giving them just cause for offense. He knew how his showing that they were, as a nation, no longer God's elect people in the theocratic sense, or in any sense which secured their salvation, but were rejected, would shock and revolt them; but he wishes and designs to show them more and worse concerning their real condition and relations to God and the Gentile nations. His argument throughout the section is a wondrous, infrangible concatenation, of which the portion we have examined contains the first link, which is all that specially concerns what we have been endeavoring to show in this Chapter. We, therefore, omit here the examination we have made of the whole remainder of the section to its close at the end of the 11th Chapter. Should Providence favor us with an opportunity, we design to publish our examination of the entire section, with other productions, including one on Materialism and Evolution, and one on the Sufferings and Death of our Lord according to the Gospel records, after the publication of this now in hand.

PART III.

THE LAW A UNIT; DIVIDED TOWARD HUMAN SINNERS INTO THE TWO DEMANDS FOR RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND MERCY. EXPIATION AND PROPITIATION. THE ATONEMENT AND ITS PURPOSE.

CHAPTER XI.

The unity of the Law in all moral beings in respect to the ever-obedient. Divided towards human sinners into two opposite demands—one of justice as retributive, the other of mercy; and the relations of these demands to each other.

§ 119. THE LAW IN ALL MINDS A UNIT TOWARDS THE EVER-OBEDIENT, AND ALSO THE LOVE IT ENJOINS.

The *applications* of the law to moral beings are as numerous and various as their relations to each other and to God. But neither any nor all of these are the law. Not even the ten commandments, nor the two tables of them are in reality the law. It is a *unit*. Nor can it be obeyed by acting *formally* according to any number of its applications, or even of the ten commandments, but only by exercising the pure moral love to moral beings, which it enjoins, and which is a *unit*. To render this love to all the ever-obedient is *ethical justice* to them, because it is their *due*, that to which they intuitively know each other to have a *natural right* as well as a *moral one;* so that, in rendering it, each simply *pays* this due. The law being thus purely *social*, the love must be rendered to each who has not by sin forfeited the right to it, not as isolated from all others, but as related to them by the social bond of the law in their common nature, so that it cannot be truly rendered to one, if not in principle to God and all, nor withheld from one, if not in principle from God and all. *This must be just as true of the law in*

God's mind and of His love conformed to it, as it is of it in the minds of other moral beings and of their love in obedience to it. This must be so, because, by creating them such beings, He not only constituted them universally a social moral society, interbound by the law in them to the perfect and perpetual mutuality of the love it enjoins, but demonstrated that *He* is such a Being, and so, by necessity of nature, in and of that society forever; acting in all moral relations by the same law which is in all its other members; exercising the same love with His infinite powers which it requires them to exercise with their finite powers; and governing it with all rightful authority, as its only all-sufficient, everlasting Author and Head, as the law makes Him responsible to do. But let us specially notice here, that the love which fulfills the law, whether of God or of any other Being, *must be without any modification, a unit perfectly full towards every sinlessly obedient one, which it must not and cannot be towards any sinner.* This position is certain. If sin had never entered the universe, the love of each in it to each would have been thus *perfectly full*, and its universal reciprocity would have been universal ethical justice, and have *united* all with God as Head in an absolutely perfect society. But it did enter, and all the inconceivable numbers guilty of it have rent and fractured that society, so that it can never be restored to its original or ideal universal state. All these have forfeited all *right* to the moral love of God and all holy beings, so that it is not *due* to them; and, at the same time, they have created a correlative right in the still loyal society and God, both as a Person and as Ruler, to the retributive punitive suffering of each of them as God sees he deserves, so that it is due both to Him and that society, and is His and its infinite interest and concern. Thus their moral relations to the law, to that society, to God, and to the universal and eternal moral system are radically changed; and both the law and the love which fulfills it are correspondingly *changed or modified* towards them. Let us glance at these changes or modifications.

§ 120. BOTH THESE UNITS DIVIDED IN ALL TOWARDS HUMAN SINNERS.

On the one hand, the moment of their first sin, the justice of the law, before *for* them, ceases to be so, because, by the forfeiture their sin makes, nothing is due to them, and, on the other, it turns *against* them, demanding their punishment as they deserve to meet the due from them to God and His holy society. If they have sinned against known highest obligation, and so in presumptuous

defiance of it and God, the antagonism of the law's justice to them is *absolute;* no scope is left for the exercise of mercy towards them, and they must be punished as they deserve. Instead of the *full unmodified* love, due to all the ever-obedient, being due to them, nothing is from God, unless that their punishment shall not exceed their ill-desert. The sin of the angels that kept not their first estate was doubtless thus *absolute;* and, when the *gracious* probation granted to human sinners ends, the antagonism of the law's justice to all who shall remain incorrigible must be equally absolute. When it becomes so towards any, it is easy to see that there can be no such sympathy with them in any holy mind as will lead it to insert itself into their lot and feeling of ruin and pain, or as will make it *unhappy* by suffering in feeling with them. Who that believes what the Scriptures teach concerning Satan and his angels can possibly have any such sympathy with them in their penal suffering? Who could have it with the myriads of moral monsters of both sexes from Cain down,* if known to suffer penally as they deserve? There are certainly multitudes of cases, in which there can be no sympathy with sufferers of severest penal inflictions beyond the mere emotions of pity and sorrow that they should, by their wickedness and crimes, as known even to men in this world, have made their subjection to these socially and morally necessary and good. It is only respecting sinners, in whose cases there are *mitigating circumstances*, such as great want of light and experience, circumvention and great temptation by superior wicked minds, very defective realization of the nature, guilt, and consequences of sin, and other such facts, that the antagonism of the Law's justice to them is not absolute, but modified, and that redemption is possible. The whole matter stands thus:—If there were no sinners, the love required by the law would be a perfect *unit* in every mind to every one, being perfect ethical justice between all:—If all sinners had so sinned, that the demands of the law's retributive justice were absolute against them, then, not only could no *just love*, such as is due to the ever-obedient, but not even its modification to mercy, be exercised towards them, and they would necessarily suffer the punishment they would deserve, which is the case of Satan and his angels, and must be of all incorrigible human sinners when their probation ends:—But, if there are sinners, in whose cases there are such mitigating circumstances as are indicated above, so that the demand of the law's retributive justice is not absolute against them, but admits the modified exercise of moral

(*) See §§ 62, 63.

love towards them, which is called mercy, then, understanding as we must, that mankind in this life are such, what is true of the law, as it is in the minds of God, of all holy moral beings, and even of realizing men respecting them?

§ 121. A KIND OF SCHISM IN THE LAW IN ALL TOWARDS THOSE GUILTY OF MITIGATED SIN.

We answer that their sin, thus mitigated, causes a kind of schism, so to say, in the law in the minds of all referred to, *in relation to them*, dividing it into two contrary demands or dictates—that of its quality of justice, that the due of penal suffering, according to their ill-desert, shall be exacted from them for the great *social end* of the total, everlasting society, and that which enjoins mercy or simple benevolence to them merely for the sake of their good as individuals. This demand or dictate to mercy is not that that of justice shall be disregarded, but that, on account of the mitigating facts in their case, and because their penal suffering would be their utter ruin, while their rescue from it would be their everlasting, perfect good, they shall be rescued, *if possible consistently with the demand of ethical justice to God and His universal and eternal holy society.* These two contrary demands are more or less experienced by the greater part of mankind during their lives towards evil-doers and criminals, in whose cases mitigating facts are known or very probable; and the fact, thus attested, that these contrary demands necessarily proceed from moral nature, often even when extremely perverted, towards such transgressors, along with the whole tenor and teaching of Scripture, certifies us that they co-exist in God respecting human sinners with a strength that man cannot measure. But they must both end in Him respecting each of them, at the end of his probation, for two reasons—one, that, after that, there will be no unsatisfied demand of justice against any one restored; the other, that there will be no demand for mercy to be exercised to any one not restored, as the demand of retributive justice will then be absolute against every such one. They must also end in all fellow-beings, when all the facts concerning each to the end of his probation are made known to them. It is thus that the jarrings of the rational universe will be forever reconciled (Col. 1:20).

Confining now our thought on this point to God, the position is, that, while the law in Him, or the imperative which constitutes it, towards *each ever-obedient one*, is an undivided, unmodified *unit*, and His conformity to it is the same, neither of them is such to-

wards *human sinners*, but on account of the mitigated character of their sin, each of them is divided in Him in the manner we have indicated. To say that either of them is the same towards human sinners as towards the ever-obedient, or as it would be towards them, if they had always obeyed, is to say that there is no moral system or society founded in moral natures; that therefore God makes nothing of the natural and moral rights and dues and the everlasting interests and concerns of the ever-obedient, and is wholly indifferent between the obedience and good-deserts and the sin and ill-deserts of sinners; and that He is neither just nor merciful, holy nor good, but, if a moral Being, necessarily the opposite. But, in reality, it would be morally impossible for Him to render the same complete, unmodified love to human sinners as to the ever-obedient, as it would be in defiance of His infinite moral reason, conscience, and whole moral nature, since it would be putting the unjust on par with the just, the wicked with the righteous, the godless with the godly.* The only love He can exercise to human sinners is the modified love of mercy, which is simply love of their being and its proper good, though sinners. This He cannot possibly exercise towards any ever-obedient one, as his natural and moral rights and dues can only be met by love without modification, and this of mercy would be practically slanderous and unjust towards him by implying that he was a sinner and guilty, and such therefore as God could not exercise towards him.

§ 122. HOW GOD'S MERCY DIFFERS FROM THE LOVE DUE TO THE EVER-OBEDIENT, AND RELATES TO JUSTICE BOTH AS ETHICAL AND AS RETRIBUTIVE.

Mercy differs from the full, unmodified love due to the ever-obedient by including no moral approval of or complacency in its objects, but their opposites; by not being owed and due to them by any right or claim of justice, but by being purely gracious towards them; and by being exercised towards them by God in opposition to all their ill-deserts, and to the whole of His holy indignation and wrath against them, including the demand of retributive justice for their punishment according to their ill-deserts. It is constantly modified by all these facts towards persisting sinners till their life and probation end, and it is all the while subject to and limited and controlled by the demand mentioned of retributive justice. It is

(*) Gen. 18:25; Job 34:10–12; Is. 3:12, 18; Eccl. 8:12, 13; Rom. 1:18; I. Cor. 6:9, 10; Eph. 5:6; Col. 3:6. and numerous other places.

therefore simply that remainder of God's complete love to the ever-obedient, which is permitted by and consistent with the demand of His justice as ethical towards the everlasting loyal society, including Himself, for deserved retribution to be inflicted upon them. Their sin rives away from the love He would render them, if they had always been perfectly obedient, all, except this remainder, thus conditioned, which is constantly becoming more and more reduced in power to help persistent ones with every day of their presumptuous progress. No cement can unite, no clamp or tie force, into one again these riven parts; and no strain of perverse thought can make either the law in God's mind, or the love which fulfills it towards human sinners, the unmodified whole it is towards the ever-obedient. His love is co-eternal with Him, the interchange without beginning or end of the three Persons of the Godhead, and is rendered by Him in unmodified fullness and forever to all His moral creatures thus obedient. But, as just shown, His mercy is only the remainder of it towards such sinners as mankind, which is permitted by and consistent with the demand of retributive justice against them. It has been His moral disposition respecting them co-evally with His foreknowledge of them as sinners—a special kind of disposition which He never could have had, if He had known that neither they, nor any other moral beings would ever become such modified sinners. It was not, therefore, a moral attribute separate from and independent of His love, but such a residue of it as He could exercise towards them consistently with the demand of retributive justice against them and with their foreseen bad character. This disposition was simply the *state* of His will and compassionate feelings towards them as foreknown. It was not *in itself* acting mercy *to* them, which could not be done till they should live and sin; but it was one *to do so* when these foreseen facts should exist. It would have remained forever quiescent and inoperative in Him, if He had not connected with it a *coeval design* THEN *to act or exercise it towards and to them* in all ways and degrees consistent with the demands of justice as ethical to the universal and eternal holy society, including Himself, which demand involved one for retributive justice upon them. From all this, it is plain that mercy could not possibly exist, even as a disposition in God, if He had eternally known that all created moral agents would perfectly obey the law, and that perfect ethical justice would thus forever bind together the total and eternal moral society, Himself included. He would have been co-eternally disposed, and have designed, on His part, to render complete moral

love, which is complete ethical justice, to them all forever, and thus to maintain an eternal, absolutely perfect universal moral system, based on and constructed by such justice without modification. *The principle of retribution is inherent in and essential to the very nature of justice,* and He would necessarily have experienced the demand or dictate to act by it in rendering due rewards to all in ripe time; yet He never could have experienced the contrary demand to act by it in rendering to sinners the punishment they deserve, as He would know that there never would be any. Such would the moral society and system of the universe be to His omniscience, if He had eternally known that none would ever sin. We are here on a specially important summit of observation, and ask readers to station themselves beside us upon it to take a survey of essential points it gives to our views connected with the matters we are considering.

§ 123. HAD MAN NEVER SINNED, GOD COULD NOT HAVE HAD EITHER THE DEMAND FOR RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, NOR THE DICTATE TO MERCY.

The first point we observe is, that, according to the preceding supposition, God never could have experienced either the demand for retributive justice or the dictate to exercise mercy; and neither of them could ever have been known in the universe of creatures! What a contrast to the actual one would such a perfectly and eternally *normal* universe of moral beings present! No sin, no guilt, no punishment, no natural fruits of sin, no hell, no saviour with atonement, no pardon, no sinful race like ours, with all its fools of action and thought, its wrongers and wronged, its criminals and their victims, its misbelievers and infidels, its vicious and reckless, its miseries and all sufferings, known in all its worlds! The unit of absolute ethical justice would enshrine and bless the whole forever.

2. The second point we observe is, that God's eternal foreknowledge that some would sin must cause a coeval experience in Him of the demand of justice as retributive for their deserved punishment when they should exist and sin. Thus the *unit* of ethical justice, which would have been coeval in His mind with His foreknowledge of the perfect and eternal obedience of all moral beings, if they should render it, *would be divided in it into two* distinct dictates or demands for Him to act by when they should exist and sin —one, the purely normal, strictly natural, full, social one of the law as it is in His eternal reason and essentially in every unperverted finite reason, which is ethical towards all the obedient; the other,

originated by His foresight of sinners, was not strictly normal, nor unconditional, but *occasioned and contingent*, which is retributive. In the very nature of the case, therefore, retributive punitive justice is wholly subservient and ministrant to, and amendatory of, violated ethical justice; and, when demanded by this, its execution cannot be waived or omitted without positive injustice to the whole everlasting moral society. The execution of it, when positively demanded, on sinners is in reality executing ethical justice to that whole society, including Himself, and is essential to His fulfilling that, which is rendering to it the moral love due to it. *Retributive justice, therefore, is simply an executive act or course of action, by God,* OF OCCASION, *by which it is evoked,* and without which it could never be done. It is demanded by an *application* of the law or its justice to *sinners*, which could never have been made, if no sinners would ever exist. 3. The third point we observe is, that, on the supposition of a foreknown perfectly and eternally obedient universe of rational creatures, to all whom He would consequently exercise perfect ethical justice forever, any exercise of mercy by Him to any of them would be forever impossible. *On the supposition of His foreknowing, that all He might create would sin absolutely, as the fallen angels did, would deserve absolutely punitive retribution, and would be wholly irredeemable, we think it certain that He would never create one of them.* But, on the supposition that He foreknew, that part of all He might create, say mankind, would sin with just the mitigations they have, and would, for these and other reasons, including their race relations, be redeemable by Him, He also knew that the essential nature and demands of justice and the moral system *must be* perfectly maintained in any devisable righteous, moral, or possible redemptive measure. Their sin would be positive injustice to the universal and eternal moral society, including God supremely, both by robbing it of their perfect and permanent moral love and all its beneficent effects, and by all its injurious and pernicious effects, *as the one only radical and permanent cause of evil in it.* The foresight of it would necessarily excite in Him *wrath* (ὀργή), the demand for the execution of punitive retributive justice *upon them* when they should live and sin, in order to meet the normal, strictly natural, universally social demand of the law or its ethical justice upon Him *to the whole eternal moral society.* The relation of these two demands we have shown; and, from that relation, for God to refuse to execute the retributive, punitive demand upon all such sinners, or to do some fully equivalent thing instead, would necessarily be

absolute, universal, endless, all-ruining injustice in Him. We must conceive of the relation in God's mind of the demand of retributive justice against sinners to His foreknowledge of their sinning as one of dependent and instant succession, and so that it was occasioned and originated in His mysterious antiquities, and necessarily His first-born experience respecting them as such.

§ 124. THE RELATION IN GOD'S MIND OF THIS DICTATE TO THIS DEMAND.

What now must we conceive of the relation in His mind of the demand or dictate in it to exercise mercy towards them to this of retributive justice? There must be sinners, deserving punishment, and the demand for its infliction upon them in God's mind before He could have even pity for them, much more a dictate in it to exercise mercy to them. How could He possibly have a demand to exercise mercy to sinners, if either there were none, or there were no antecedent demand for their retributive punishment? The order of the whole case is this:—1. If God had foreseen the whole eternal society perfectly obedient forever, the imperative in Him towards it would have been that He should forever render to it, *all and personally*, perfect ethical, and *rewarding* retributive, justice. There could be no possible exercise of or place for mercy towards all or any of it to all eternity; and justice alone, absolutely natural and normal, would forever hold all in its holy embrace, because all would be acting and related precisely according to their perfect nature with the law in it, as God would be to His. 2. But, His foreknowledge of part of them, say mankind, as sinners would excite in Him the experience, which He never otherwise could have had, of the demand of punitive retributive justice against them, as ethical justice to all the loyal and Himself forever. The only direct objects of this demand are sinners, each according to his actual ill-desert when the time of infliction comes, while the only objects of unmodified ethical justice are the ever-obedient, each according to His deserts; so that those of each are entirely different from those of the other. 3. His experience of this demand of punitive retributive justice would instantly excite His pity for them, and the dictate in Him to exercise mercy towards them to rescue them from the necessity of that punishment, and to restore as many of them as practicable to right character, Himself and the holy moral society. In the nature of the case, that demand was *first*, or this could never have been. Both of them were originated,

each excited by an *occasion.* That of the first of them was foreseen sin or sinners; that of the second was the fact of the first against them, and was to rescue them from suffering its execution; and, when, at the final judgment, the former shall be executed upon all of them found incorrigible, the latter of them will cease forevermore. From their beginning to their end, the relation between them is never reversed nor reversible. The demand for punitive retributive justice upon sinners is always and necessarily antecedent to and the occasion of the dictate to exercise mercy; so that mercy is always subordinate to and restricted by that demand, and that must therefore be perfectly met and satisfied before this can act effectively for its objects. One solid, invincible reason is, that retributive justice guards all the rights, dues, interests, and concerns of the whole *eternal,* ever-augmenting, obedient society, and of God as its Ruler, which are immeasurably greater and more momentous ends, than those of mercy to any number of sinners; and to exercise this to them without first satisfying the demand of that against them would be to sacrifice all these of that society for the incomparably less good of that doubtless incomparably less number. It would be universal, absolute injustice, utterly subversive and destructive of that entire moral society and system; and we know of nothing said or written concerning the relation between justice and mercy more alien and adverse to either theological or ethical truth and discrimination than the following excerpts, among others which might be found in the same Work and Chapter—"Having much to say about justice, as an exact doing upon wrong of what it deserves, we begin to imagine that justice goes by desert, both in its rules and measures, and thinks of nothing else. It follows, of course, that justice lets go being just, exactly as it falls below the scale of desert in its executed penalties." * "In some sense we have two [dispensations], viz., justice and mercy; but it does not appear that there is any priority of time in one as related to the other, or that both are not introduced to work together for one common result." † "Then, by the supposition, justice may have taken away the chances and infringed the rights of mercy, as truly as mercy can have violated the rights of justice; when if compensations are to be made, the mercy-impulse of God's feeling has as good right to compensation from his justice, as that from his mercy. For his mercy is as old as his justice, and began as soon, and is a character certainly not less dear

(*) Bushnell's V. S., Part III., Chap. III., pp. 267, 8.

(†) Do p. 271.

or sacred. Justice, too, may as fitly groan for the pacification of mercy, as mercy for the pacification of justice."* "God nowhere signifies that he has given up the world to the prior right of justice, and that mercy shall come in, only as she pays a gate-fee for the right of entrance."† What a muddle! What a void of analysis, discrimination, definitions, and clear views of the real meanings of the main terms of the discussion, and of their necessary relations! But what better could consist with the anti-social, anti-moral, law-annulling, God-dethroning, conscience-contradicting, naturalistic absurdity, that the natural consequences of sin are its only punishment, and that God will inflict no positive retributions.

The Scriptural doctrine as to the relation of the demand of retributive justice against, and the dictate of mercy towards, mankind has always been, in substance, this:—In accordance with God's foreknowledge and plan, when the first human pair sinned, instead of immediately executing the demand of retributive justice upon them, at the dictate of His mercy He devised the redemptive measure for them and their race until He saw it would be best to end this. Through that whole time, the execution of that demand against them was to remain for them entirely suspended during this life; and mercy, with her darling daughter grace, attended and aided all along by all best providences, both disciplinary and beneficent, and working with or against the natural consequences of all moral action, good or bad, which follow no rule whatever of justice or desert, has constantly had them under her benign tutelage, doing all and the very best for them that could be done through all their generations. Retributive justice has been no co-factor or co-agent with her in that tutelage, except as certified to all men by the prophet conscience, and to all who have the Word of God by its foretellings, to resume its long-suspended immediate relation to all the incorrigible despite all mercy's intervention to rescue and save them. No, as retributive, justice sprung instantly forward with its demand "at completing of the mortal sin original," but, by Divine behest, with assurance of perfect satisfaction, forthwith withdrew or stood aside, leaving the whole run of the race to mercy, with her daughter and all her attendants indicated, who took all possible possession of the field with all the agencies, means, and methods of infinite wisdom, including the incarnate, atoning Christ and all the gifts He secured for men, with this present life as a time of gracious

(*) Do p. 275.
(†) Do p. 276.

probation, or opportunity for reconciliation with God and eternal redemption, which is an incomparably higher, richer view of mercy than any jumbling, co-factor notion can possibly permit. All denial of positive retributive justice equally derogates from mercy; and, with natural consequences as the only retributions, God can exercise none in remitting or forgiving them. *Whoever fights justice, fights mercy;* the slaughter of justice is that of mercy; and never were truer lines written than those of the poet Young respecting the deniers in his day of God's retributive justice, who made His mercy mere good-natured indifference that would not punish:—

> "They set at odds Heav'n's jarring attributes,
> And with one excellence, another wound;
> Maim Heaven's perfection, break its equal beams,
> Bid mercy triumph over—God himself,
> Undeified by their opprobrious praise:
> A God all mercy is a God unjust."—*Night IV.*

§ 125. POINTS CONNECTED WITH THE SUBJECT OF THE ATONEMENT RESPECTING BOTH GOD AND MAN.

To the preceding discussion concerning the relation of the two cardinal points of justice and mercy, we here fitly append brief statements of some other points essentially involved in the subject of the atonement. As to what must be true on the side of God, we notice the following:—

1. In the nature of the case, the measure of the atonement must have been purely God's own device, and was one which He only could execute. All other moral beings are His creatures and under His government, and are therefore wholly incapable of either devising or executing one. On account of His infinite nature, attributes, excellence of character, and relations to all as their Creator and Ruler, He must be absolutely responsible to His own conscience and to the everlasting holy society, all inter-bound by their natures in a moral system with Him, to govern it in perfect ethical justice or moral love to Himself and all in it according to His own and their natural and moral rights to such a government. As the atonement is a measure for sinners against Him and that society, and is, therefore, directly related to His government, He only can originate and execute it; and He must do so in perfect consistency with ethical justice to Himself and that society. This justice must, like an insurmountable, adamantine wall, forever shut out all favor to sinners which does not consist with and confirm it as the supreme right, interest, and concern of Himself and all its members. For, it must forever be, not only "the point where all interests meet and balance,

those of God and those of all other" moral beings, but the bond that ties Him and all to the perfect reciprocities of the love required by the eternal law; and never, while He and they have rights, dues, interests, and concerns, natural and moral, can it cease to be the standard and measure of that love, and thus the Divine vase to hold it for Him and them. *As retributive*, it is the measure of all rewards owed by and due to Him and all holy beings in eternal mutuality, and of all the punishments to be inflicted by God on sinners at the final judgment. It is thus an eternal defence of all the holy against them and all the pernicious results of their sin and its prolific and ever-varying modes of outward action and manifestation.

2. The impulse in God's sensibility to make an atonement for human sinners was doubtless the deepest *feeling* that ever occupied it. It was measureless pity or sympathy for them in their lost condition as He saw it, both as under the necessity by the law in Himself and them of suffering the punishment demanded by retributive justice, and as wholly incapable of restoration from sin and its natural consequences to the love enjoined by the law and its natural consequences by any efforts of themselves or of any other creatures for them, or even by any of Himself, except by making an atonement for them, by which to meet the demand of retributive justice against them, and to provide agencies and instrumentalities necessary to restore any of them to love and obedience to Him. He foreknew all it would cost Him of self-denial and self-sacrifice to make it, but also that, on the one hand, it would be a vastly less evil, and, on the other, an immeasurably greater good, to Himself and all holy beings, including all He could thus redeem, than the perdition of all, or even of the part, of mankind He saw He could save by it. His infinite reason therefore accorded with His infinite pity, and He accordingly *willed* to make it, and thus to save as many as He saw could be brought by all that He could consistently do to fulfill the ethical conditions necessary to their forgiveness on its ground. His sensibility, intelligence, and will thus perfectly concurring, constituted His HEART towards them, which is one of pure mercy and grace—*mercy*, the disposition to do all possible to save them, consistent with the indefeasible demand of retributive justice against them, and *grace*, the disposition to give and to offer to give them *while yet sinners*, notwithstanding their sins and ill-desert, all gifts and favors prompted by mercy, and consistent with their relations to God and holy beings, and, *to all of them who yield to the required conditions*, all the measureless additional ones promised

in the inspired Word. But, because mercy and grace are in no sense due *to* them by any obligation of justice upon God, and are exercised by Him towards them to rescue them from the demands of retributive justice against them, which nothing less than the atonement could deliver them from, they are necessarily restricted by those demands until they are in fact or fixed design met and moved out of the way. When this is done, all obstruction to the exercise of these towards human sinners is suspended till their gracious probation has ended, and they are free to pour their exhaustless riches upon the successive generations, unhindered except by their resisting depravity and the counterworking of Satan. As God's pity for them must have been vastly the strongest sympathetic *feeling* that ever occupied His sensibility, so His *wisdom* in devising a measure to be a perfect ground for His forgiving them on condition of their true ethical return to Him, and His exercising all grace towards them consistent with the everlasting rights, dues, interests, and concerns of Himself and all holy beings, as *ethical justice demands*, must have been incomparably greater than in devising the whole material universe and all the orders of creatures. So also the determination of His *will* to execute it must equally have transcended in exertion of will-power any other ever made by Him, both on account of the infinite self-denial and self-sacrifice it would cost Him, and of its intrinsic and fundamental importance to Him, to all holy beings, to mankind, and especially to all of them who will be saved by it. For on that Divinely prepared ground would be rooted, grow, and flourish the only spiritual life-tree for mankind with all its fruits of salvation and joy; whose glorious branches would spread far beyond them to the whole universe of created holy beings, and would bear for them endless, measureless augmentation of knowledge of God's character, of the absolute justice of His love to themselves, and His mercy to human sinners to the immenseness of amplitude that justice permits, of their own satisfaction from the numbers of these sinners redeemed and added to their everlasting holy society, and of all their good and blessedness, while it would bear for God Himself endless and boundless pleasure and glory.

§ 126. DEVICE OF THE INCARNATION AND MEDIATORSHIP OF OUR LORD, AND ERRORS CONCERNING THEM.

3. We have shown the origin of the demand of retributive justice against mankind as sinners, and that of the dictate of mercy

towards them. To these antiquities in God's mind, was forthwith added from the pressure of pity and the dictate of mercy *the device* by Him of the redemptive measure for the ruined race. The fundamental requisite in this device was an atonement for the sins of the world; and the fundamental requisite for making it was the incarnation of the second Person of the Godhead, as Scripture surely teaches.* Not only is there not in all Scripture even a hint that our Lord would ever have become incarnate, if mankind had all remained forever obedient, but in the passages referred to, it is directly taught, and, in others, it is plainly implied, that the principal, transcendent end of the incarnation, that upon which all its other ends and uses in this world and the heavenly one depended, was that He might "have somewhat to offer" (Heb. 8:3), and be thus able to make an atonement, a propitiation for the sins of the whole world. It was as the rewarding result of finishing the work which His Father gave Him to do by His atoning sufferings and death, that He prayed His proleptical High-Priestly prayer for His own eternal glorification with Him, as risen from the dead, still and forever to be incarnate, and for that of all believers to be with Him in a union so complete that they will constitute, in a profound sense, His body.† As there is no warrant in Scripture for supposing that our Lord would ever have been incarnated, if our race had never sinned, so neither is there, even the least, that He ever has been or will be a Mediator between God and any other beings than mankind. The Greek noun, *μεσίτης*, *mediator*, is used in the New Testament four times to designate Christ—in I. Tim. 2:5; Heb. 8:6; 9:15; 12:24;—and its meaning in all the cases is, that He executes the function between God and human sinners of one who interposes between hostile or adverse parties to bring them into reconciliation. In Gal. 3:19, it designates Moses as discharging essentially the same function; and, in verse 20, signifies only that a mediator is necessarily between at least two parties. There is no Greek verb which means *to mediate* in the New Testament. It is therefore simply futile and worse, as well as to misuse language, to make our Lord's mediatorship consist in, or include *anything else* than, His acting between God and man, in their opposition produced by man's sin, to effect their reconciliation, which acting was mainly in His priestly function of making atonement for their sins and His intercessions to God for them; or

(*) Mat. 20:28; John 3:16, 17; I. John 4:9, 16; Gal. 4:4, 5; Phil. 2:6-8; Heb. 2:9, 14-17; 9:11, 12, 26; 10:5-10; I. Pet. 1:18-20.

(*) John 17; Eph. 1:20-23.

to say that He *mediates* in any other way than in so acting between these two parties, God and man. Scripture knows nothing whatever of "the mediation of Christ in its universal character," or "His mediating God to the entire universe." His mediating is just as universal as mankind and God, and no more so. Creating is, in no sense, mediating; nor is His upholding or causing the consistence of the universe of things; nor is His revealing or manifesting anything; nor is "communicating" anything "into finite existences." All such notions of Christ's mediatorship are not only groundless, but are, and necessarily produce, "confusion worse confounded." Distinct actings and things must be kept distinct in mind. Invented, supposititious meanings of words and facts are no less perversive and no more allowable in theology than in any other science, or than counterfeit coin in a nation's currency. The Scriptural truth is, that, if God had not foreseen the lapse and sin of our race, and the demand of retributive justice for their punishment, He would never have experienced the dictate of mercy; nor, moved by it, have devised and purposed the plan and measure of *redemption;* nor, in purposing it, have foreordained the incarnation and redeeming death of Christ.*

§ 127. NO END OF IMPORTANCE ATTAINABLE BY THESE, IF MAN HAD NOT SINNED.

The incarnation and mediatorship of Christ are fundamental constituents of the measure of redemption; and this is as exclusively for our race of sinners as its direct objects, as a remedial preparation is for the sick. We must assume both of these constituents of that stupendous measure and mystery of God's justice and mercy as thus wholly confined to it; and to assume that either of them would have been effected, though mankind had never sinned, is essentially to derogate from and depreciate the intrinsic nature and the special relation to man of that whole measure. For, as it respects such an incarnation, although it would be in human nature, it would be for the benefit, not of mankind only, but of the whole universe of the obedient alike. How for their benefit? or for what benefit to them alike? Is it said, for an organ and medium of revealing and manifesting Himself to them? We ask again, revealing and manifesting what of Himself? Surely not that He exists; for they would universally know that without such a medium. Surely

(*) I. Pet. 1:18-20; Acts 2:23; Eph. 3:9, 11; Col. 1:26; II. Tim. 1:9, 10; Titus 1:2, 3; Rev. 13:8; Rom. 16:25, 26.

not that He is the Creator and Upholder of all things, including themselves; nor that He is a moral Being, and that they are the same; nor that they are in a universal moral society and system, with Him as its Ruler, to whom they are responsible and accountable; for there would not be an agnostic, nor a blind infidel among them, nor one without at least a concrete knowledge of the essentials of the moral system. Surely not that He is *ethically just* to them in being *retributively just* in punishing sinners; for this is moral common sense, when the case and terms are understood. Surely not that He is merciful and gracious to any degree; for there would be no sinners, except those apostate angels who were beyond mercy, and therefore none to whom to act or manifest it. And surely not that He so loved the nature and proper good of such sinners as mankind are, despite all their hostility and guilt, as to devise and execute the whole measure of redemption, connected with and dependent upon the incarnation, for their salvation—all the infinite humiliation, self-denial, and self-sacrifice of the Son under the law and in human relations, in all His atoning sufferings and death on the cross, and of the Father in His part towards His only-begotten and well-beloved Son in sending and giving Him to fulfill all the part He did among men, and in not sparing, but freely delivering Him to suffer and die on the cross for them as He did; for nothing of all this measureless mercy and grace to such sinners would be possible, as there would be none. What a dream is the supposed revealing and manifesting effect of such an incarnation? Besides, as it would be *in human nature*, unfallen, and in *its* relations and conditions, and would be revealing and manifesting to mankind, if anything at all concerning Himself, only more clearly the perfection of His character, as it could be disclosed to and apprehended by the obedient generations, and as it would be vacant of all the exhibitions of justice and judgment, or of mercy and grace, wisdom and goodness, which He has actually exercised and made towards them as sinners, how could it possibly have any such supposed effect on other orders of moral beings, existing or to exist? It does not seem to us, that the angels would have much "desire to look into it," as disclosing anything remarkable about God's character, or that it would be to them more than a noteworthy *curiosity* in His course towards men! "Progressive orthodoxy" must not imitate that *crustacean* animal which so readily progresses backward. Plainly, these notions of the incarnation and mediatorship of Christ must greatly impair the reason and sense of gratitude to God,

Father, and Son, in mankind, in respect to them and the redemptive system. As to "difficulty in believing that, but for this insignificant earth, the most glorious revelation of God might not have been given at all," see Discourse IV. of Dr. Chalmer's Astronomical Discourses, and the Scriptures he appends to it.

§ 128. OTHER TRUTHS ON THE SIDE OF GOD.

4. God is one *being;* but, if only one *Person*, He could not make an atonement. As Scripture certainly teaches, He exists as three Persons in one being or spiritual substance.*

5. Scripture also teaches that the incarnation of the second Person was a necessary prerequisite to God's making an atonement. By this, that Person became the REPRESENTATIVE of our race, to act for it in all things, and so its *substitute* in His atoning sufferings and death; and it is by being such that He became and is the "one Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave Himself a ransom for all."

6. In order to the atonement, it was necessary that each Person of the Trinity should fulfill a special part, as Scripture clearly teaches each of them did. And, from the oneness of their substance, attributes, and character, they must have been equally and absolutely voluntary and agreed in devising and adopting the stupendous measure, and in acting their respective parts in it. There can be no schism in the Godhead; and the Son therefore neither would nor could be forced in any sense to become, do, or suffer anything to execute His part, more than the Father or the Holy Spirit to execute His. As far as the execution of each one's part related to men, the only bond on Him to perform it was their mutual agreement freely entered into from measureless mercy and grace to them.

7. It is intrinsically absurd to suppose it was any part of the design of God, Father, Son, and Spirit, in making the atonement, to render Himself merciful and gracious towards human sinners. For, besides the silliness of the supposition, that He, or any intelligent being would undertake in such, or any way to work these or any dispositions in Himself, they were the supreme and constraining reasons and impulsions in Him to make it for them. It was their product, their child brought forth designedly to meet and appease the righteous demands of retributive justice in God and all other moral natures, as we have abundantly shown. How infinitely strong

(*) See Chapter VIII. throughout.

these dispositions in Him must have been to impel Him to make the atonement for our race of sinners, and, as such, enemies, at such a stupendous cost to Himself, no mortal can tell or conceive, except in limited measure. They are morally dimensionless (Eph. 3:17–19).

§ 129. WHAT TRUE ON THE SIDE OF MAN.

On the side of man, two great common facts made an atonement possible for them, which did not exist in the case of the fallen angels: 1. One was their race-constitution, by which the Second Person of the Trinity could become incarnate, the Son of man as well as the Son of God, the God-Man, and thus the *representative* of our race in His entire mission, and, by consequence, its *substitute* in His sufferings and death. It was thus that He was naturally by the Divine arrangement "the one Mediator between God and men." 2. The other was, that there were mitigating circumstances, not only in respect to the fall of our first parents into sin, but in the case of their whole posterity as sinners, which modified their sin, so that it was not *absolute*, as was that of the fallen angels. These will be shown in another place; and we only notice here that, on account of them, although mankind as sinners deserved just retributive punishment, yet that desert of it was modified, and their condition made them objects of God's infinite pity, which prompted Him, as He saw that vast multitudes of them, if not all, would be yet capable of redemption and restoration to harmony with Himself and His universal holy society, to exercise mercy to them to the stupendous degree of making the atonement and doing all connected with it, in order to save as many of them as would be morally possible.

CHAPTER XII.

Expiation and Propitiation.

§ 130. MEANINGS OF THESE TERMS; RELATION OF THE TWO, EXPIATION DEMANDED BY JUSTICE, BOTH AS ETHICAL AND AS RETRIBUTIVE.

It is specially important in relation to the subject of the atonement to understand clearly what is meant by the terms *expiation* and *propitiation*, and we begin this Chapter by investigating their import. Expiation consists in satisfaction rendered by wrong-doers, or others for them, to those whom they have wronged, or to rulers by some equivalent of repairing action, sacrifice, or sufferance of penalty. In theological use, the term means a vicarious sacrifice offered to God by or for sinners in a way authorized by Him, which sacrifice is accepted by Him as a full equivalent for the penal suffering deserved by them for the sin or sins on account of which it is offered, and which is thus a satisfaction of the demand of retributive justice against them. This demand being thus met, God is propitiated towards those for whom the sacrifice has been offered, so that expiation and propitiation are essentially connected as cause and effect. God is propitiated towards sinners by the demand of retributive justice against them being met and satisfied by the sacrifice substituted for them as liable to suffer the penalty they deserve, that they may be saved from it; and, on account of all involved in the case, the fact that He is propitiated towards them only in this way is gloriously honorable to Him; while any imaginable propitiation without expiation would be, on account of all involved in it, enormously dishonorable to Him and noxious to the whole family of Christian truths and doctrines. Those who reject expiation do so, because they have previously rejected retributive justice, and substituted for it an indefinable cloud, which they call righteousness, or very often nothing but foolish talk about the mercy or love of God as disregarding such justice. But what kind of an

ethical entity could this imagined righteousnes of God be, which lacks the osseous quality of justice, and violates its bond to secure to the utmost the rights, dues, interests, and concerns of the whole loyal society under Him, and of Himself? What kind, when that quality of the law, which alone makes *it right* or *straight* between moral beings, and conformity to it *righteousness*, is treated as of no account or wrong. What kind, when, instead of making the crooked straight by retributive inflictions upon sinners themselves or upon a substitute, in order to secure from them the due of penal suffering which they owe to God and the holy society under Him, He and it have no such due from them for all the wrong and injury done by them; and, however enormous their sins or crimes may have been, He must inflict no retributive punishment upon them, but must enter Himself into their bad condition from the natural consequences of all the evil they have done, and must put Himself to cost and tragic suffering for them, to rescue or relieve them, the greater, the worse in sin and condition they are? What kind, when, as is asserted, He has been in this attitude towards, and at this outlay for, them from eternity past, and must be in the same forever, and is thus made not only an eternal non-resistant, which He has no right to be, and which it is utterly wrong for Him to be, but, worse yet, the perpetual vassal and victim of the wicked? It is no kind at all; for nothing can be righteousness in God or any being which is in conflict with any real demand of justice, or the nature and possibility of a moral system. There is no unjust righteousness, nor righteous injustice; for justice is an eternal, fundamental fact in the nature of God, of all moral beings, and of the everlasting law in it; and, in essential principle, ethical and retributive are, as we have said elsewhere, one, and cannot be severed. Were it true, as has been asserted, that the idea of justice is not from the Bible, but only from the Greek and Roman Classics, while it gives that of righteousness only, we would say, so much the worse for the Bible; for, as to this idea, the classics are certainly right. But it is not true: for no other book or class of books in the world competes with the Bible in setting forth in positive declaration, in distinct assumption, and in plain implication, the fact of God's eternal, immutable justice, and that it will be infallibly executed towards His rational creatures, good and bad, as the basis of His holiness, His government, and, in a fundamental way, of His very gospel. It is this fact that made an expiation a *conditio sine qua non* of the forgiveness of sinners; and expiation is intrinsically propitiation, because His justice, being

perfectly vindicated and sustained by the substitution which makes it, is no longer a bar to His mercy and grace, which are therefore set free to operate towards sinners to the utmost degree which consists with infinite wisdom.

§ 131. EXPIATORY SACRIFICES NOT ORIGINATED BY MEN, BUT EVIDENTLY BY DIRECTION OF GOD TO ADAM, AND SO TO MANKIND.

The fact of the expiatory character of all the bloody sacrifices required by the Levitical Law, and also of the same in the heathen world from the earliest times, is certain. The only reasonable explanation of this fact, as it respects the heathen, is, that their offering them *as such* had its origin in the Divinely authorized offering of them by Adam, followed by Abel, by others to the Deluge, by Noah and his sons after it, and by their descendants along down the centuries. Some, however, while admitting the Scriptural account of the origin of such sacrifices, yet say that the belief of the heathen that they were expiatory was not developed till in generations after the Deluge, and was a perversion of the primitive view of them. But the reason and facts of the case are against them:—For, 1. According to history, the heathen were always unanimous in this belief, and made these sacrifices in it. How came this unanimity? Some say, simply from the teachings or impulsions of their consciences or moral nature under the convictions and sense of sin—a specimen of mere naturalistic invention, not comporting with any tellings of Scripture respecting their relation to and effect upon God on one side, when rightly offered, and the offerers on the other, nor with their typical relations to the offering and sacrifice of Christ for the sins of the world. This unanimity is one to be noticed—that of the nations and races of mankind through decades of centuries, which starting in the *blind guess* of some troubled sinner, that, if he should build an altar, lay wood upon it, slay a domestic animal, sheep, goat, bullock, or heifer in such a manner, burn the carcass prepared so and so upon the wood on the altar, and supplicate pardon and favor from God, He would grant them; which guess, acted out and told by its author, being adopted by one, by another, and so on as readily and rapidly as dry combustibles adopt touching flames, became, as fast as made known, the common belief, ritual law, and practice of the *unanimous world!* To add to the wonder, this guess was so perfect, that God also forthwith adopted it! We have no extra capability of belief to waste on so unreasonable an attempt to account for either the origination of

these sacrifices, or the common unanimity of all nations during more than 2000 years before Christ, both as to offering them and as to believing them strictly expiatory. It seems manifest on the face of Gen. 4:3–5, that Cain and Abel simply did as their father had taught and trained them from childhood to do in bringing offerings to the Lord—Abel's being, and Cain's for some reason not being, of the kind proper at that time; and Cain's not being respected by the Lord, because designedly different in kind from Abel's, and brought without faith in a proud, rebellious self-willedness against Him (Heb. 11:5). Our explanation, given above, is therefore plainly the true one. It harmonizes all the involved facts—that of the Divinely directed origination by Adam, the sinning head of the race, of the offering of special kinds of domestic animals as sacrifices to God —that he offered them as expiatory, and taught his children that they were, and his sons to offer them as such—that, apostate Cain doubtless excepted, these children so taught theirs, and these sons offered them as such—and thus this belief concerning, and custom of offering, these sacrifices as expiatory were transmitted down the generations of the ever-increasing numbers and the branching divisions of mankind, till, as far as all embraced in the Roman Empire were concerned, they were abolished in it by Constantine at the end of the third century after Christ. Neither Scripture nor other history hints of any different or later origin either of offering them or believing them both Divinely instituted and expiatory; so that there is no shadow of reason for supposing or guessing that the belief that they were expiatory was a heathenish corruption or departure from the correct, primary view of them handed down from Adam. 2. The fact that God instituted the offering of these same animals as expiatory by the Levitical Law goes to confirm the preceding, and evinces that the heathen were always right in believing their sacrifices expiatory. 3. The fact also that, as appears from Scripture and other history, these domestic animals *only* were offered by them for even centuries, as they had been by Noah, and as they were afterwards to be by Israel as required by the Levitical Law; and, that they remained the *chief* sacrifices after, although in some regions others were added, strengthens the proof of the preceding positions. 4. The heathenish perversions consisted in gradually adding many other kinds of victims, and even human beings, not only foreigners, enemies, captives in war, criminals, slaves, and sometimes poor people, but sons, daughters, and sometimes persons of highest rank, even kings, and persons

taken by lot—in offering their sacrifices to false gods and idols—in making the mere offering of them an *opus operatum*, as ritualists and formalists have always used the Christian sacraments and other religious rites—and in all the gross ceremonies, practices, pollutions, and superstitions more and more connected with them from the ever-increasing darkness and corruption of the heathen mind. But neither any nor all of these go a step towards proving or implying that the belief in the expiatory character of their animal sacrifices was in the least degree a perversion. On the contrary, amidst all these, this fundamental character of these sacrifices remained steadfast in the belief of the heathen, like some peak standing high out of the all-surrounding ocean, unchanged by all its currents and commotions. It was a Pharos shedding the hope-light of the primal revelation of a redemption by sacrifice from the curse of sin over the benighted deep of the apostate mind of the world, and, at the same time, laid and kept a solid foundation in that mind for the truth of salvation by the expiatory sacrifice of Christ; and it thus greatly conduced to the wonderful rapidity of the conversion of the heathen under the preaching of the Gospel.

§ 132. FROM WHOM OBJECTIONS TO EXPIATION ALWAYS COME, AND TO WHAT DENIAL OF IT ALWAYS LEADS.

The objections to expiation from their special start with Socinus down to Dr. Bushnell and since have all along been the same swallows returning. They always come from deniers of retributive justice, or, which is the same in effect, of the moral necessity for its execution, and consequently of the necessity for vicarious atonement to meet and avert its demand against sinners, in order to their forgiveness. The denial of these is prolific of others of correlated and dependent truths and facts of revelation and the Christian system. It involves a denial of any real moral government or even law of God, of real moral nature in God or man having the law in it, of course, of any universal and eternal moral society and system, hence of any rights, dues, interests, and concerns of God and that society against sinners, consequently of any real moral probation under either the law or the gospel, consequently again, of the possibility of the exercise of any mercy or grace by God towards men in making an atonement to rescue them from suffering deserved penal infliction, of their forgiveness on the basis of an atonement, or at all, if the natural consequences of sin are its only punishment, for these cannot be forgiven, and the word is without meaning, and of

still other truths, some radical and vital. The samples and parodies of exegesis this denial induces are wonderful to contemplate. Such eliminations of meanings from, and importations of meanings into, texts; such assumptions of having proved the teachings of Scripture on essential points in controversy, when a thorough canvass of them has not even been fairly begun, certainly not in the works in which they are declared; such misrepresentations and caricatures of doctrines opposed; such ventures of assertion respecting matters of Scripture or fact, reckless of what proper investigation may demonstrate to be truth; such arraying of subordinate parts or applications of prophetical, typical, and other inspired deliverances against the main and transcendent matters communicated, in order to negative or evade those matters and to establish their opposites; such distortions and perversions of words and expressions, and overleaping or trampling upon the most certain principles, processes, and conclusions of logic and sound reasoning; such transfers of real or assumed heathenish and superstitious views and perversions of expiatory sacrifices over to the Scriptural and Christian views and belief concerning them, as they really are, in order to envelop the truth of these with odium and contempt; such rackings and metamorphosings of the palpable meanings of Scriptural terms and teachings respecting sacrifice, atonement, redemption, reconciliation, justification, and others, to force them to fit the poor semblance of the gospel of Christ, which is left when its real expiatory atonement is eliminated from it; such manifold resorts to these and all kindred modes and artifices of partisan controversy as throng the works of some rejecters of this doctrine from Socinus down, cannot, we think, be paralleled in the works of writers on any other subject of partisan authorship. The champion foremost of all in recent times, and most expert in all such modes of warfare, who exerted his prowess against this central truth of Christianity, was the late Dr. Bushnell. In the opulent war-chariot of his exuberant diction, imagery, and rhetoric, in design at least, "O'er shields, and helms, and helmed heads he rode," bearing down on all who withstood his bold career; and he won abundant eclät, if not victory, by the dashing recklessness of his dare-doings.

§ 133. BUSHNELL'S ASSAULTS ON IT MISREPRESENT IT, AND ARE GROUNDLESS AND FALSE.

In his last work, "Forgiveness and Law," he rushed in his usual way, in Section V., pp. 81–92, against the doctrine of expiation, his

method being to set it forth with the superstitious adjuncts and perversions attached to it by the heathen in the run of time; to assume it thus shown to be identical with the Scriptural view; then to hurl the coruscating shafts of his rhetoric at it as a moral monstrosity antagonist to propitiation as conceived by him; and, having enveloped it with the dust-clouds of his assumptions against it, to leave it as if done to death by his resistless onslaught. But he so left it in utter mistake; for, all invulnerable, it still lives unimpaired, and is destined to live till time shall end. Some of his assumptions against it deserve notice. He says—"it cares never for the morality or justice of what is gained, but only for the agreeableness of it," (p. 83)—that it is "fairly unmoral; * * showing that God accepts the pains of the good in payment for the pains of the bad, and is more intent on His modicum of pains than on having proper justice done—taking clean away the word and fact of forgiveness; for, if the debt of sin is paid, there is no longer anything to forgive; substituting government also by a kind of proceeding that has no relation whatever to conscience and right" (pp. 86, 87). A more preposterous tissue was never woven in any loom of absurdity. Of this, we believe the whole Part I. of this work is absolute demonstration; and we here make a glancing reference to it.

In that Part, we have shown that the justice of the law is the protecting fortress of its matter of pure moral love, and that, if justice is not maintained unimpaired, that matter, and with it the rights, dues, claims, interests, and concerns of God and His entire holy empire, is dismantled of all enforcement and protection, and left to be forever swept away from regard and drowned by an all-prevailing deluge of unrestrained selfishness, corruption, and horrors of crime. The eternal law in all moral natures and the moral system it constitutes therefore demand that, if the perfect moral love which is required by the justice of the law as ethical be not rendered by moral actors, the penal suffering which is required by its justice as retributive, and which is the natural correlative or substitute for that love withheld, shall be inflicted. In this Part, it is shown that there is no valid principle or reason conceivable why God cannot, if He will, assume this suffering Himself, instead of inflicting it upon human sinners, and that the imperative of the law to the love due to the ever-obedient, modified towards them by their sin to mercy, requires Him to do so for the sake of their good, if He sees that He can thus consistently secure a sufficiently greater good to justify the self-sacrifice. Instead, therefore, of substitutional suffering,

which, in the very nature of the case, is expiatory, "caring never for the morality or justice of what is gained," it is precisely this that it does care for; and instead of its being "fairly unmoral," not only is it consummately moral, but forgiveness of sinners without it would be, not merely *unmoral*, but utterly *immoral*. It would be a violation of the law, of all moral nature, God's included, and an absolute injustice to Himself and all holy beings forever. "He must accept the pains of the good"—that is, of Himself in Christ, "in payment of the pains of the bad"—that is, of human sinners, and *must* be "intent on getting," not "His modicum," but the full equivalent of them, or the following alternative is before Him: He must Himself commit infinite sin by His utterly immoral, unjust course towards them as sinners against Himself and all holy beings: For next in necessity and importance to the holy love of which they have robbed Him and them, in order to secure the greatest possible good to Himself and them, are the pains of retributive justice, which, although so lightly spoken of by those who make morality, whether conceived as mere sentimental love or as so-called right, simply a personal matter, are due by justice to Him and them, and are irrepressibly demanded by universal conscience, when the case is seen as it is. As to the objection, that these pains "take clean away the word and fact of forgiveness," it is made on the assumption that there can be no *provisional, conditional* substitution, designed to be made an *actual* one for those only who comply with its conditions, and then receive forgiveness on the ground of it—the forgiveness making it actual—that there can be none which is not, in and of itself, unconditionally actual. If it is provisional, an offered one on compliance with the prescribed moral condition, to be made actual to all who do comply, the objection is a birth, of which its parent should be profoundly ashamed.* *Substitution does not imply that Christ suffered the aggregate amount of inflicted pains deserved by all human sinners.* His sufferings would neither have been increased nor diminished, if mankind had been a millionfold more or less numerous than they will be. They must be of infinite value to save one; they can have no more, less, or different value to save myriads, billions, or all. By His one *righteous act* (δικαίωμα, Rom. 5:18), of offering Himself an expiatory sacrifice for all men our Lord *potentially* set aside *conditionally* the condemnation of all and made all righteous (Rom. 5:19). This act had an unlimited, eternal, infinite value, and could have no less, *because of the Divine nature*,

(*) See places indicated on preceding page.

relations, and character of its actor; because it was devised and designed by the infinite wisdom of Godhead as the best, if not the only one, possible to attain the necessary ends and means for human salvation—those on the side of God, those on the side of man, those on the side of the universal and eternal holy society, those on the side of justice and law, and those on the side of mercy and grace; and because, by it, as the acme and consummation of His whole mission, He made God known, not to man only, but to "the principalities and the powers in the heavenly places," in His full-orbed character, glory, and all moral perfections, as was necessary to secure its ends (Eph. 3:9, 10). This substitutional, expiatory, righteous act of Christ, having this infinite value is *provisional* for all human sinners, but made *actual* only for those who appropriate it by faith, and thus receive forgiveness "through His blood" shed in it. How, then, is there any validity in the old, effete objection of infidels, Socinians, and other misbelievers on this essential point, that expiation by the substituted sufferings and death of Christ "takes clean away the word and fact of forgiveness; for, if the debt of sin is paid, there is no longer anything to forgive?" A debt *provisionally* paid for one or many by another on a stated condition, is actually paid when the condition is fulfilled, not before; and then its payment is a fact; and, when the required ethical condition of faith is fulfilled by any one, God makes the provisional substitution of Christ *actual* for him by forgiving him on the ground of it—that is, by applying it to him. But the last of these objections is worthy of its forerunners, and runs thus:—"substituting government also by a kind of proceeding that has no relation whatever to conscience and right." Just the contrary! Maintaining it absolutely inviolate and unimpaired in the very respect in which it is always liable to subversion and destruction—that is, by not giving up a jot or tittle of its fundamental principle of justice, even when moved by urging mercy, for to do that would be radically immoral, but by Himself meeting and satisfying its retributive demands against mankind by suffering in their stead, *provisionally* for all, to become *actually* for as many as fulfill the conditions of the substitution, which was to harmonize forgiveness on the prescribed conditions with the maintenance of unimpaired moral government. His doing this from pure mercy to sinners, that they might escape the punishment deserved by their sins, was the peerless "proceeding" or "righteous act," even of Himself, in its intrinsic moral excellence and grandeur, and in its perfect and supreme "relation to conscience and right"

or justice—was one the equal of which the universe will never see again, and one before which its unanimous conscience will forever pour forth its delighted approbation and applause.

> "In love immense, inviolably just!
> Thou, rather than thy justice should be stain'd,
> Didst stain the cross; and work of wonders far
> The greatest, that thy dearest far might bleed."
>
> —*Young, Night IV.*

§ 134. HOW THE SUFFERINGS OF CHRIST FOR MANKIND MEET AND STAY THE DEMANDS OF JUSTICE AGAINST THEM.

The substituted suffering of Christ, the Divinely constituted *representative* of our sinful race, propitiates God towards them, because it expiates their guilt—that is, because it provisionally meets and suspends the demand of God's retributive justice against them, *provisionally* for all, *actually* for all of them who appropriate it, and thus gives full flow to the abundance of His mercy and grace towards them. This demand of His justice is in Scripture commonly called His *wrath* (ὀργή); but it is utterly to mistake its meaning, to suppose it to be that His infinite sensibility is excited to mere angry emotion or passion against sinners, and that it is entirely optional with Him whether He will gratify it by punishing them, or suppress it, as best He may, and inflict no punishment, being controlled by nothing but His simple will. To conceive it so is to exclude both it and God's action relative to it entirely from the sphere of morality, and to make that action merely a thing of caprice. That His sensibility is occupied with emotions of holy anger against all sinners we hold true; but His wrath against them is vastly different from these. It is the *demand* of His infinite moral nature evoked by their sin that they shall suffer the just penalty they deserve. It is the correlative of the like demand of it aroused by the obedience of those who have never sinned, that they shall receive the reward they deserve; though in their case they have a right to their reward, while sinners have none to their punishment, God and His loyal universe having it.* His wrath, being this demand of His nature or moral reason for the punishment of sinners as they deserve is not mere angry emotions, nor any state at the mere option of His will for keeping or suppressing. But, because He and His holy universe have the right to their penal suffering,

(*) For a few out of scores of passages concerning God's ὀργή, *wrath*, see the following:—Mat. 3:7; Luke 3:7; John 3:36; Rom. 1:18; 2:5, 6, 8, 9; 3:5; 4:15; 5:9; 9:22; 13:4,5; Eph. 2:3; 5:6; Col. 3:6; I. Thess. 1:10; 2:16; 5:9; Heb. 3:11; 4:3; Rev. 6:16, 17; 14:10; 16:19; 19:15.

thus demanded, He, as Ruler, has none to exempt them from it, without or on condition of repentance alone, regardless of that demand. But He has an absolute right, moved by His mercy towards them, to suffer it Himself as a substitute for them, as explained, and thus to expiate it. Having thus met and satisfied this demand against them, called ὀργή, *wrath*, by anthropopathic figure, He is, *ipso facto*, propitiated and reconciled potentially to all, and actually to all who fulfill the prescribed conditions. Thus His mercy and grace are set free to act towards all without any hindrance whatever, except what they themselves make. Justice is perfectly maintained and established inviolate forever, while mercy and grace are at perfect liberty to act in harmony with it for the reconciliation of as many as possible of mankind to God. Such being the nature of God's wrath and of expiation and propitiation, and the mode in which these two essentially identical modifications of the mind and moral relations of God towards mankind are effected, we see that there is nothing arbitrary or capricious in them; no deviation from, or disregard of, the demands of His own eternal, immutable, archetypal, moral nature, and of all finite ones created by Him in His own image; no acting as if there were no moral system and no social-moral *nexus* of justice, the granite foundation and constituent of that system of mutual rights, dues, obligations, responsibilities, accountabilities, interests, and concerns, binding all moral beings to each other and to God; no immoral acting as if sin were not positive wrong and injury to Himself and all, the one blight and curse of the rational universe, but a mere personal concern of the sinner, who, therefore, instead of being subjected to the infliction of the social-moral penalty he deserves, should be regarded by God and all others with yearning sympathy for being encircled by the tightening, injuring, often ruinous coils of the train of its natural consequences, thus making it *socially* an utter trifle, and personally a comparatively diminutive evil; and no like acting as if obedience were of correspondingly meager importance. *All diminution of the badness and guilt of sin is equally of the excellence and good-desert of obedience.* But, in this essentially united pair, expiation and propitiation, we see God maintaining the great social-moral law in His own and all other moral natures with its immutable quality of justice in absolute integrity, and harmonizing His mercy towards human sinners with the whole social demand of that justice against them by an infinite self-sacrifice in their stead, thus acting a style of moral greatness, the grandeur and glory of which are without parallel or

approximation in all else ever done, not by creatures only, but even by Him in all His eternal activity.

§ 135. BUSHNELL'S NOTION OF PROPITIATION A PRODIGIOUS CONCEIT, ANTI-MORAL, AND DEROGATORY TO GOD.

Instead of this essentially united pair achieved by substitution, a prodigious conceit of the latter has been set forth. In it, expiation is discarded as a heathenish perversion and superstition, and a propitiation without it imagined. When it is denied that there is any demand of justice as retributive in God's nature or law, and that Christ suffered instead of sinners to meet and satisfy it, of course propitiation can have no real relation to God's moral nature, and must relate simply to His sensibility as aroused to angry emotion against them—that is, to mere emotional wrath or passion, which is not moral, because it is involuntary and may be complied with or resisted at option. It is not a moral state or requirement of any kind, and puts no obligation whatever upon Him to act according to it; and it can have no moral quality or principle in it more than there is in such wrath or passion in man. In this conceit, too, God is not regarded as Ruler, having all the rights, dues, interests, and concerns of the universal and eternal society in His keeping, so that He is responsible for them, nor as being sinned against as such, but merely as a Person without official relations and responsibilities. Nor are sinners regarded as having sinned against Him as a Ruler, and with Him against that whole society, to the irreparable damage of its everlasting good, thus subjecting themselves to the demand of His retributive justice according to the ill-deserts of their sin against both Him as Ruler and that society as subject to Him; but only as having individually sinned against Him alone. Both He and each sinner towards whom He is to be propitiated are regarded wholly aside from governmental or even social relations, obligations, and justice.* This itself brands the notion as utterly false. As He is in and Ruler of the universal moral society and system, He can have no right so to act.

(*) "The forgiveness of sins, already considered in the Chapter on Forgiveness and Propitiation, is a purely personal matter, in which the Fatherhood love and feeling and the offended holiness of God are concerned. The proceeding here is intelligible and simple, because the forgiveness in question is to be a strictly Personal Settlement, that and that only." Forgiveness and Law, Chap. II., p. 93.

§ 136. ON HIS GROUNDS, GOD'S ANGER AT, AND NEED OF PROPITIATION TOWARDS, SINNERS REASONLESS.

Add now, that the natural consequences of sin are held in this notion to be its only penalty, unless the exclusion of its incorrigible actors from association with the holy is considered a positive one; so that God will *inflict* no positive punishment additional to this upon any. It is in connection with such notions that God is conceived to be emotionally, even passionately angry at human sinners. Why? Not because, according to these notions, they are guilty of any injustice against Himself and the universal society—that is, of withholding or taking from Him and it anything which was *due by right* to them; and consequently not because they deserve a corresponding infliction of punitive justice, to be suffered by them as due by right to Him and it—that is, not because there is any real justice, ethical, or retributive, in His own or other moral natures, in the law in and from them, or in His government, any natural demand for the positive punishment of sinners any more than for that of sick people. Why, then, should He be angry at them at all?—we mean especially, in any sense implying the least disposition to inflict punishment upon them? We can see that, because they have trampled on the so-called idea of right in them, and so greatly debased themselves, although this is only a matter personal to themselves, God has good reason to regard them as perverse, foolish mean, and contemptible, and to be revolted and disgusted at them. But why He "should be put in arms against wrong-doers by His moral disgusts, displeasures, abhorrences, indignations, revulsions," so that, "by force of these recalcitrant sentiments, He is so far shut back in the sympathies of His love, that He can nerve Himself to the severities of His government so long as such severities are wanted"—how "He is not less perfect because these antagonistic sentiments are in Him, but even more perfect than He would be without them," and "yet a propitiation be required, not because they are bad, but only to move them aside when they are not wanted"—none of this can we see, make what optical effort we can; nor do we think any one else can, even the keen-eyed Uriel standing in the Sun. The so-called sentiments named recalcitrant, antagonistic, unreducible, obstructive, and what not, are not properly sentiments at all, but simply emotions, feelings, states of sensibility of different qualities and degrees of antipathy and aversion; and there is nothing in them to antagonize or obstruct any proper sympathies of His love towards them, nothing to put Him in arms

against them, or to constitute even real anger, much less wrath. It would be impious to suppose that in Him, the absolutely perfect One, they could possibly be or become over-measured or excessive, or that they are not, and must not always be, precisely fitting and what they should be towards every sinner; and as long as sinners remain such, we deny that He could move them aside, if He would, or ought to, if He could. The only thing which can possibly move them aside is not any so-called propitiation of Himself towards them, but their true return to obedience; and therefore, the necessity and fact of expiation being denied, propitiation is neither necessary nor possible; and the whole notion of God's propitiating Himself towards sinners by going to cost and sacrifice for them to quell or soothe His emotional passion against them, is of such stuff as is made up of the vainest kind of dreams.

§ 137. THE MODE OF GOD'S SELF-PROPITIATION STATED IS SELF-CONTRADICTORY AND RIDICULOUS.

We are told that, "We do not ourselves go into sacrifice for our enemy to gain or soften ourselves, but only to help him in his trouble, and to minister to his bad mind in ways that may gain him to repentance; everything we do and suffer is for his benefit, or for effect on him, only it results that our sacrifice affects our mind or disposition also towards him. We are in a way of being completely reconciled to him, as we hope he sometime will be to us. The stress of all we do or suffer is for him, and in that consciousness it is that we are atoned, having all our aversions, disgusts, and condemnations liquified, or dissolved away." This is designed to represent God's going to cost and sacrifice for sinners; and *observe, that He has no purpose whatever in the proceding to propitiate Himself towards them, His whole aim being to propitiate them to Himself.* But now look at this—"The propitiation itself proceeds from His love and is only designed to work on other unreducible sentiments that hinder His love in forgiveness it might otherwise bestow. Our own love, as we saw, might be sufficient, if it were not hindered by certain collateral, obstructive sentiments, and God is in this moral analogy with us." Then follows what is quoted above, ending with the statement that "a propitiation is required, not because" [the antagonistic sentiments in him] "are bad, but only to move them aside when they are not wanted." How this and that agree! *Designed to work on other unreducible sentiments that hinder, etc.!*" Our love *hindered* by, etc., and God in this moral analogy with us! *A propitiation required*

to move them aside! Then God *did design* to gain and soften Himself and to remove the hindrance of certain collateral, obstructive sentiments, and *a propitiation was required* to move aside the antagonistic sentiments in Him! Could He, in His high morality, comply with the requirement without *designing* to? This against that, in which self-propitiation is not designed at all, and if it comes, it is only as an incidental result!—also against that, as all the words, mitigating, mollifying, assuaging, liquifying, dissolving, and bathing His feelings till they no longer obstruct, plainly show. But, whether merely incidental or designed matters not; the notion that God propitiates Himself towards sinners in the way asserted is preposterous —especially so, the notion that He *designed* thus to propitiate Himself. We have shown above that His *feelings* towards sinners are precisely what they should be till they repent, and that, under all the assumed conditions, there is nothing whatever in Him to be propitiated towards them. His self-propitiation, in any such way, therefore, whether merely incidental or designed, is not among possible things. But on supposition that it was designed, His thought would run thus: "I have antagonistic, recalcitrant feelings against these sinners, which are unreducible by my holy will. They shut back the sympathies of my love from them, and thus, blocking up my way, hinder me from exercising towards them the love in forgiveness I otherwise might. I am not less perfect because of them; but even more perfect than I would be without them; and yet I must be propitiated, to move them aside, because they are not wanted. They are not bad, but they are not good, because they shut back the sympathies of my love from sinners; and yet they do not hinder me from doing all I possibly could for them, if I did not have them. For, urged by these sympathies, I have been, not merely in the time-sufferings of Christ, but eternally putting myself to infinite cost and tragic sacrifice for sinners; yet not for them as my direct end, but to reduce and move aside my unreducible, obstructive feelings, antagonistic to my loving them in forgiveness, so that I, more perfect with, than I would be without them, may, with my perfection thus diminished, be propitiated towards them, and into greater perfection; and, when I succeed in getting myself propitiated, which I have been eternally endeavoring to accomplish, then all my going to cost and sacrifice will cease, and thence forward all my sympathies and love will be at full liberty without cost, although then there will be no sinners to expend them upon! As soon as I get propitiated, my being so will be useless." If the miniature copy

is not fascinating with beauty, we believe it is essentially faithful to its original!

§ 138. THIS MODE NOT ACCORDING TO ANALOGIES IN HUMAN EXPERIENCE.

But this conception of the matter, we are told, "is according to analogies in our human sentiment and practice." That there are analogies in these to some of the feelings and actions ascribed to God in the notions we have been examining is admitted; but they have no more to do with propitiation, in any proper sense of the term, than had the ancient warriors around Troy. No sane human being ever thought of going into cost-making and sacrifice for enemies, injurers, or any wrong-doers for the purpose of thus propitiating himself towards them—of thus mitigating, smoothing, soothing, mastering, or call it by what word or words you will, his indignations, revulsions, disgusts, animosities; or did not act a perfectly foolish and ridiculous part, if he did; for he must have been saying to himself all the time—"I am trying to cheat both those I am professing to act for and myself—*them*, by seeming to make their good my end, when I am not in fact; *myself*, by trying thus to cool down and work off my exorbitant irritation or angry emotion or passion, rowing one way and looking another." It would be a kind of double imposture, having no relish of true virtue in it and more likely to make matters worse in both directions than better. It seems hardly possible that he should not laugh at himself in consciousness of his tricky maneuver. But, if he goes to cost and sacrifice for his enemies or other evil-doers, not for the purpose of operating any modification in his own feelings against them, even though to do so he must resolutely resist or subdue them, but with a pure design to do them good and to please God, then his endeavor is to propitiate *them*, and himself not at all; and if the idea of propitiation enters his mind, he knows that it is to be wrought in *them*, not in himself. He is simply acting benevolently towards *them* in spite of his feelings, and doing nothing else. This whole conception, therefore, of man or of God propitiating himself, in the sense of allaying or mitigating in any way his own mere feelings or so-called sentiments of any kind or degree against others, by any process whatever of going to cost or sacrifice for them, whether designed to produce that personal effect or not, is as baseless and wild a fiction as was ever invented; and considering all the incongruities, unwarranted assumptions, illogical reasonings, misapplications of Scriptures, uses of

terms and phrases in new or changed meanings, the lavish garniture of language and imagery clothing the whole congeries, and the so-called head of propitiation set on such a body, we think the lines of Horace at the beginning of his Ars Poetica most fittingly descriptive of it:—

> "Humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam
> Jungere si velit, et varias inducere plumas
> Undique collatis membris, ut turpiter atrum
> Desinat in piscem mulier formosa superne,
> Spectatum admissi risum teneatis, amici?
> Credite, Pisones, isti tabulae fore librum
> Persimilem, cujus, velut aegri somnia, vanae
> Fingentur species; ut nec pes, nec caput uni
> Reddatur formæ."*

§ 139. CORRELATED CONCEITS ABOUT THE TRINITY, THE TEDIUM OF AN UNTRAGIC WORLD, THE PROPITIATION ETERNAL, ETC.

But when, to carry out this conceit of propitiation, it is said concerning the Trinity of Persons in the Divine nature—"The three are still one, and the three-folding is but a plural in so many finite forms, used representatively as personations of the Infinite One;" and that—"when these grammatic personalities are all resolved into their representative import, God is one, only so much better known:"—when, to jump the difficulty that this notion of propitiation "requires us to be not only well-doers, but atoners also," it is said—"there is no imaginable world, I am quite sure, that has a thousandth part of the tedium in it which one would have that is wholly made up of delectations. Insipid, uneventful, flat, with no great sentiments in it, no heroic side in duty, nothing heroic anywhere, nothing to condemn that touches us, nothing to forgive because we are not touched—why, such a world would even die of inanity. No, let us have tragedy, and a strong, large mixture of it"—[*i. e.*, a world of universal holiness would be insipid, etc., and one of sin, such as ours, incomparably preferable]:—When it is said that—"the propitiation, so-called, is not a fact accomplished in

(*) *Translated:*—

> If to a human head a painter will'd
> To join an equine neck, and to bring in
> On members drawn from creatures ev'rywhere
> Soft feathers var-ious, that a woman fair
> Above in a black fish should end: could you,
> My friends, allow'd the sight, your laughter hold?
> Believe me, Pisos, that a book would be
> Much like *this* picture, as its meanings all,
> Like sick men's dreams, would quite be figur'd false;
> That neither foot, nor head could be reduc'd
> To one sole form.

time, but an historic matter represented in that way, to exhibit the interior, ante-mundane, eternally proceeding sacrifice of the Lamb that was slain before the foundation of the world:"—When many other such follies, alien to "the glorious gospel of the blessed God" are advanced as correlates or essential implications of this other gospel; such as the natural consequences of sin its only penalty; justification, of course, not pardon or remission of penalty, but renovation of character; God has a moral government and yet forgiveness and propitiation a purely personal matter between God and each sinner; and justice made a thing of Divine will and institution, and therefore of mere option as mercy is, instead of being an eternal, immutable quality of the Divine nature and the law in and from it;—we answer that this fancied propitiation and all its cognate notions are cockatrice's eggs instead of transcendant truths of inspired revelation. And, when we hear "of the religious benefits to be expected from the worthier and better ideal conceptions of God, that will, of course, go with it and keep it company," while dissenting entirely from the utterance and marveling at the self-delusion, we nevertheless *enter ourselves without cost or sacrifice sympathetically* into the hope of a veteran, who, measuring what he has done by what he *wished* to do, fed himself with its honied, though delusive promises. Intention and effort are the root of hope; but not of truth, nor of its realization.

§ 140. RECONCILIATION OF GOD TO MAN—OF HIM FIRST IN ORDER—OF MAN AS A CONSEQUENCE OF HIS TO MAN.

We can now easily understand the matter of *reconciliation* between God and man; for it is certainly *mutual*. On the side of God, there is wrath—the demand of punitive justice aroused in Him against sinners by their sins. It is not mere angry feeling or passion, although this in perfect measure is of course connected with it. It is not *enmity* against sinners; for God never was capable of a malign disposition towards any being. It is not something which by mere will He can disregard or not at option. It is not a demand which relates simply to Himself, but is social, as all justice is, and concerns also the entire and eternal universal society. It is an immutable, indefeasible demand of his eternal, spiritual nature, which must be met, because it guards and enforces the love which is the matter, and thus secures the well-being which is the end of the law, to the greatest possible extent and degree in the universe. Now, just because this demand is not what we thus deny, and is what we

thus affirm, it creates no hindrance whatever to His feeling infinite compassion (*sympathy* is not the accurate word to express it) for them, nor to His infinite merciful love (properly, *infinite benevolence*, as He can have no other quality of love to sinners), from *the utmost possible exertion to save them.* Accordingly, that infinite compassion impelling, that exertion of His infinite benevolence He has made, not by a foolish and futile effort to propitiate, or properly to *conciliate* His *irritated feelings* towards sinners, but by assuming the endurance of sufferings of infinite value, *potentially* instead of the penal suffering deserved by all men, and, in purpose, *actually* instead of that of all of them foreknown as receivers of the substitution, thus expiating their sins by Himself fully meeting the demand of punitive justice against them. By this expiation, made by Himself out of His infinite mercy towards them, He is propitiated towards all—*i. e.*, He is potentially *reconciled* to all, so that there is no hindrance whatever in Him to the exercise of His mercy and grace upon and for them; and He becomes actually reconciled to every one of them whom He can bring by this exercise to become reconciled to Him. Thus the fact of His making expiation for the sins of the world gives the highest conceivable conception and demonstration of His merciful love or benevolence for mankind, and of His actually going to infinite cost and sacrifice for them—immeasurably higher than the poor, meagre notion we have just considered, or than any other whatever, which rejects expiation and makes it God's whole effort merely to conciliate and reconcile them to Himself can even fairly intimate. The puny thing is unworthy to be thought of beside it, instead of being paraded in competition. By this stupendous self-sacrifice, God Himself lifted the bar of holy punitive justice, demanded by His own and all rational nature not subverted, out of the way of the goings forth of His infinite mercy and grace towards human sinners, not only to confer forgiveness upon all truly repentant of them, but to reconcile them to Himself, to do the utmost possible for them in time, to perfect and aggrandize their whole nature through death and the resurrection, and to exalt them to eternal inheritance and glory with Christ in heaven. On the contrary, the attitude of our world of sinners towards God is one of positive, amazing enmity; so that, while *in Him* reconciliation to them is accomplished by Himself in the way of stupendous self-sacrifice stated, to meet and remove the demand of justice in His own eternal, holy nature against them, *in them* it is giving up that enmity, which is most wantonly against nature, and the most

unreasonable ever rooted in human hearts. While in Him it is by a self-moved act of infinite mercy and grace towards them, *in them* it is ceasing from this infatuated hostility and beginning a feeble reciprocation of His measureless, merciful, prevenient love for them, moving, urging, constraining them to be reconciled to Him by this transaction. And let it be marked well, that it is not by any ante-mundane, eternal going to cost and sacrifice for these enemies, the supposition of which has no foundation whatever in truth, and is only an imaginary invention to support a false theory, nor by doing the same for them in time either before or since the atoning sufferings and death of Christ, nor anything aside from these, which men have asserted or imagined, that God is reconciling the world to Himself; but it is precisely in and by the fact of His infinite self-sacrifice in these, to expiate their sins by thus meeting in their stead, as explained, the demand against them of the holy wrath or punitive justice in His all-perfect nature. This *one act and fact*, among all ever done by Him in His eternal activity respecting them or His universe of creatures, is, when understood and realized by them, *the one only* solvent and subduer of their enmity against Him, and allurement of them into love in return. It is "Christ crucified," and nothing whatever outside of that, ante-mundane or in time, that is "the power of God, and the wisdom of God" for reconciling sinners. We say, when understood and realized by them, because neither is this mighty solvent with all its inexpressible adaptations effectual, of itself, to reconcile one of them, though taught in the best possible way by men or angels; nor is Christ by all He became, suffered, and did, taught and manifested in His whole earthly mission among men, nor by all in His heavenly mediation, personally the regenerator and reconciler of sinners to God. In no passage of Scripture are we taught that He is such, either alone or jointly with the Spirit. He tells us Himself that "it is the Spirit that quickens" or makes alive (John 6:63); and we are so instructed throughout the inspired Word. Without His renewing operation on the hearts of men, not one of them would ever be reconciled to God; and in this, as in all other respects, the so-called moral view of the atonement utterly breaks down. This view not only has a far inferior conception and estimate, compared with that of the expiatory, of the adaptation of what Christ has done for man, but also of the insusceptibility of sinners to its power, and consequently of the absolute need of the agency of the Spirit to induce the change in their minds, which is necessary to their understanding and realizing

what He has done and manifested, as set before them, and to show these to them in their true nature and import in such a manner as will make them effectual to win their faith and love. The truth of the case is, that although Christ is the life, and, by His sufferings and death has given free emission to it and created the greatest conceivable inducements to lead them to yield their opposition and to receive it; although, in view of all that the Gospel tells us concerning Him and His mission, there seems motive and influence enough to overcome the strongest enmity ever intrenched in human hearts against God, and to melt and prostrate all the world in grateful, adoring, all-absorbing love to Him; although, if facts did not demonstrate the contrary, it would seem utterly impossible that any, to whom the Gospel has been declared, should continue unsubdued; yet such is the hardness of heart and blindness of mind induced by sin, that, having eyes they see not, having ears they hear not, neither do they understand, and not one of them ever would be reconciled, if the Holy Spirit did not perform the twofold work of quickening them within and of taking the things of Christ and showing them to them objectively till He brings them to realize and yield to their constraining sway. Christ has created and furnished the whole aggregate of objective facts and truths, motives and influences which constitute the sum of the Gospel, and which alone has adaptation to overcome sinners and win them over from unbelief to confidence, from sin to loving obedience, from enmity to reconciliation, and to cause old things in them to pass away and all things to become new; but the Holy Spirit alone can bring sinners into the internal condition, and place this sum in the relation to them, in which its mighty adapted power can work its proper effect upon and in them. It is Christ alone who creates and prepares all the material to be used in constructing a new spiritual temple in a human soul; but it is the Holy Spirit alone who prepares a place for it and builds the edifice there from foundation to pinnacle for an habitation of God. He prepares the heart for the new structure in it by removing its wildness and disorder, discordant with itself, with the truth, motives, and influences of the Gospel, with Christ, with the law and will of God, with the intelligent universe and its good and with God, and thus reconciles it to all, and all to it, on earth and in heaven; and He thus makes it a harmonious dwelling-place for God.

CHAPTER XIII.

The Atonement; its exclusive purpose; what not implied in it; in what alone it consisted; how it met the demands of justice; and love not in its nature essentially vicarious.

"Man disobeying,
Disloyal, breaks his fealty, and sins
Against the high supremacy of heaven,
Affecting Godhead, and, so losing all,
To expiate his treason hath naught left
But to destruction sacred and devote,
He with his whole posterity must die,
Die he, or justice must: unless for him
Some other able, and as willing, pay
The rigid satisfaction, death for death."
—*Par. Lost, Book III., lines 205–216.*

§ 141. ATONEMENT DEFINED, AND ITS ONLY DIRECT END.

The offerings of animal sacrifices, prescribed in the Theocratic Law for Israel, to be made for its transgressors as a basis for their forgiveness on condition of repentance and confession of their sins, were, by the whole nature of the case, Divinely appointed *substitutions* of the animals in their sufferings and deaths for them, to save them from the penal sufferings and death which that law required should be inflicted upon them for their sins. Their forgiveness or not depended on the offering or not of the prescribed sacrifices; and thus those substitutions *demonstrate* that God can and does act ethically on the principle of substitution. While those sacrifices were valid only to rescue from the temporal penalties of that Law, they were designedly typical of the consummate one of "the Lamb of God, which *beareth* [not taketh away] the sin of the world;" and they thus demonstrate that God acted on it in this.

The Hebrew noun and verb designating the designed effect and purpose of those sacrifices are, literally rendered, *cover* and to *cover;* but, in our common version, they are rendered *atonement* and *to make atonement* 80 times, and 49 times by nouns and verbs of like meaning; and the word, atonement, has uniformly this sub-

stitutional sense, except in Rom. 5:11, where it is wrongly used to mean reconciliation. Hence, in theology, this term is used in this strictly Scriptural sense, to signify that *Christ, in His sufferings and death for mankind, represented and was a substitute for them as sinners liable to suffer retributive punishment for their sins in this life; or, that He voluntarily endured them as substitutional, or vicarious in the true sense of the word, for the punitive sufferings and death deserved by them and demanded by the justice of the law in God and all other moral beings.* This substitution was a Divinely designed and adapted provisory substitution for them all *as sinners*, to be made *actual* for as many of them as, during the gracious probation of this life granted with it, would fulfill the necessary ethical conditions of its *application* to them by forgiveness, and for all who, dying before or without moral action, should be fitted by the Holy Spirit to dwell forever with God and all holy beings. As the animal sacrifices of the Israelites were, when connected with repentance, *a cover* to shield them from the penalties incurred by transgressions of the Theocractic Law, so the atoning sacrifice of Christ was a *cover* to shield all brought to fulfill the requisite ethical condition or conditions from the penalties of God's universal and eternal law and government.

§ 142. LEVITICAL ATONEMENTS AND THAT OF CHRIST, ALL MADE TO GOD FOR HUMAN SINNERS.

It is a radically important point, that, while the atonements of the animal sacrifices were made *for* transgressors of the Theocratic Law, they were made exclusively *to* God as Ruler of Israel; and so, while the atonement of Christ was made *for* mankind as sinners, it was made exclusively *to* God as universal and eternal Ruler.* Its *immediate* purpose was to produce an effect *in* God, and so *in* His relations to the universal and eternal society as its necessary Ruler, in their favor, and not one *in* them at all. As it was made *to* Him, not as a private, non-official Person, and in the relations of one, but as universal Ruler by moral necessity, and therefore as related, not only to human sinners, but to all under His eternal government, it is purely absurd to say that its designed immediate, direct effect was not *entirely in Him*, and so *in* His relations to the universal and eternal holy society, but *in* sinners, either wholly or at all, to whom it was not made in any sense or degree! The atonements of the animal sacrifices were plainly designed exclusively to produce *an*

(*) Eph. 5:2; Heb. 2:17; 5:1, 3; 7:27; 8:3; 9:14, 26, 28; 10:10, 12.

effect IN *God* as Theocratic Ruler in favor of those for whom they were made, and so *in* His relations to them and to the whole Theocratic people, and not directly any whatever *in* them. The result of benefit to them was *wholly in consequence* of these being made *to* Him *for* them, and of the *effect* they produced in Him, and so in His relations as Ruler to them and the whole people. This effect, whatever it was, was such as to make it perfectly *just* to the whole obedient theocratic people, *benevolent* to the whole and the transgressors, and *wise and best* in all respects, and therefore *consistent* for Him, not only to forgive them on their repentance, but to exert all practicable gracious influences upon them to induce them to repent. So the atonement of Christ, being made *to* God, and not to sinners at all, produces no effect whatever *in* them. If it did, it would *in all*, as it was *for all;* whereas no effect of moral renewal has ever been produced by *it* in any ignorant of it anywhere, and never will be. If it was *to* or to produce an effect *in* sinners, there is no possible sense in which it was *for* all men, or *for* any before or after Christ died, those only excepted to whom the Gospel has been made known. All effect of renovation *in*, and benefit *to*, any always has been and will be wholly *in consequence* of its effect *in* Him, and so in His relations as Ruler to *all* men as sinners and to the universal and eternal holy society.

§ 143. EFFECT OF THAT OF CHRIST IN GOD AND ON HIS RECTORAL RELATIONS.

In what did that effect in Him consist? We answer, in the naturally necessary demands of justice in Him, both as *ethical* to Himself and that entire society under Him, and as *retributive* to all sinners, being perfectly met and satisfied potentially and conditionally for them all, and actually for all who under grace fulfill the ethical conditions. Not only was all hindrance from these demands of His nature thus swept out of the way of His *exercising* mercy and grace towards them to the greatest degree consistent with His wisdom and their freedom, but *three* urgencies, infinitely strong, were thus created in Him, and combined in pressing Him to do all rightly practicable to save as many of our race as possible. These were in or upon the Father towards the Son, in addition to His own direct, merciful love for them as moral beings, and were (1) the impelling power of His boundless complacency in His Son for making the atonement at such terrible cost to Himself; (2) the obligation of His promise to Him that, for making it, He would give Him, as a main

part of His full reward, all of mankind who could be brought to "newness of life;"* (3) the obligation of justice upon Him to the Son to render Him the greatest possible reward, including all of mankind just mentioned, because, by the nature of the law, the Son deserved it for His obedience unto death, with His measureless self-denial, self-sacrifice, and endurance of suffering, so that it was due Him by moral right. But these urgencies are not included in the real effect of the atonement in God, but are simply results or consequences of it, it consisting entirely in perfectly meeting and satisfying the two demands of justice already stated—that is, of the law—that is, again, of the uncreated, immutable, eternal nature of God Himself with the law in it—and that still further is, of His nature, not merely as a Person, but as related to the universal society as its Ruler, responsible to govern it in strict accordance with the eternal, universal law with its quality of justice. The atonement, *as such*, was completed (τετέλεσται) in doing this exactly when our Lord died on the cross. Thenceforth, it was an accomplished, fixed, unchangeable fact in the moral universe, absolutely incapable of addition, subtraction, or modification; and, being a fact transacted wholly between the Father and the Son, *in itself* it never did nor could produce a scintilla of moral effect of any kind in any soul of man, more than did or could the primal act of creation. Yet all moral renovation and benefits to men, from Adam down, are wholly *in consequence* of the effect of that fundamental transaction in God, and so in His rectoral relations to all moral beings—especially all to men since the august moment of its accomplishment. We are thoroughly informed how they have all been achieved. To secure them, it was necessary that everything concerning it—on the Father's part; on the Son's; the moving cause and reasons why they each undertook and executed His part; all the important facts and truths involved and connected—should be made known to men "for the obedience of faith," since, if ignorant of the whole matter, extremely few would ever be renewed by the Spirit in consequence of it. It was absolutely necessary that the Holy Spirit should be given to exert His agency and influences on men along with the truth, since, without Him, none ever would be brought to comply with the requirements of the Gospel and be saved. It was necessary that the Church and ministry should be provided as organs and agents for carrying on the work of renewing and saving men. There must also be a collection into an authentic, inspired book of the whole

(*) Ps. 2:8; 22:27–31; 72:8–11; 110:1–3; Is. 52:14, 15; 53:10–12; Dan. 7:13, 14.

family of facts and truths, essential and important to be known by men for their instruction and guidance; and these, not vain speculations, theorizings, and conceits, should be everywhere preached and taught to all people. It is only by the knowledge given to men in all the ways indicated, especially of the facts and truths concerning and involved in the atonement, and of the measureless, merciful love which moved both the Father and the Son to their parts in that consummate measure, and by the supreme agency of the Holy Spirit, that any important number are ever brought to comply with the ethical conditions required in the Gospel, and to renewal of heart and life.

§ 144. THE SO-CALLED MORAL VIEW OF IT AGAINST SCRIPTURE AND ABSURD.

From the foregoing showings, it is palpably contradictory and absurd to say or hold that *the direct purpose or end* of the atonement of Christ was or could be either wholly or partly *in* sinners—that it was or could be *to reconcile them to Him, not Him to them*—that is, to influence them to come into moral harmony with Him, and not to constitute a ground *in* Him, and so *in* His rectoral relations to the loyal universal society, on which He could consistently forgive all who would fulfill the necessary conditions. The exact reverse is the invincible truth. As we have before said, the atonement was perfectly accomplished, never to be repeated, the moment Christ died,* while reconciliations of sinners to God are continuous. Of the numerous passages which speak of the sufferings and death of Christ as related to God, not one dissents from the foregoing statements respecting this transaction.† The words, *to God*, when not expressed, are plainly implied in each of these passages after the verb, *to offer*, and the noun, *offering*, being omitted, because understood by all from constant usage. It is omitted for the same reason after the verb, *to give*, in another class of passages;‡ and after the word, *propitiation*.‖ So, when the word *sacrifice* or its plural occurs, *to God*, if not written, is always implied after it;x and, if not written, it is always implied after the verb, *to*

(*) Heb. 7:27; 9:26; 10:12, 14; I. Pet. 3:18.

(†) See passages referred to near beginning of the last section.

(‡) Mat. 20:28; Ma. 10:45; Gal. 1:4; 2:20; Eph. 5:2, 25; I. Tim. 2:6; Titus 2:14.

(‖) Rom. 2:25; 1. John 2:2; 4:10; Heb. 2:17, New Version.

(x) Eph. 5:2; Heb. 5:1; 7:27; 8:3; 9:9, 23, 26; 10:5-8, 11, 12, 26.

sacrifice; and the expression, *sacrifice* or *sacrifices to God*, if not written, is always implied after the verb, *to offer*, or as its subject, if in the passive. The phrase *for sin*, or *for sins*, if not written, is always implied after the noun *sacrifice* or *sacrifices*, and often after the noun *offering*. These are all abreviated modes of expression used by the Israelitish priests and people from the time of their receiving the Law at Sinai and of their first sacrifices according to it down through the centuries; and they all accord in teaching respecting, not only those typical atonements, but the great antitypical one of Christ's offering and sacrifice, that, in no sense, were they or was it made *to* men to produce any effect *in* them, but *to* God only *as governmentally related to them on account of their* SINS—that is, on account of their *violations of His law*—that is again, on account of their *offenses against and opposition to Him as Ruler*, whose law they have disregarded and whose authority they have practically defied. They all accord in teaching that, as the nature and necessity of the case absolutely required, if human sinners were to be saved from the punishment which they deserve and justice demands, the sacrifice of Christ *to* God was *for* them as a substitution for their subjection to it.

§ 145. NOT IMPLIED IN THE SUBSTITUTION OF CHRIST, THAT HE ASSUMED THE ILL-DESERT OF SINNERS.

1. In saying that, in His sufferings and death for mankind, Christ was their representative substitute, it is not implied that He assumed their ill-desert, and thus deserved to suffer all that was inflicted upon Him in their stead; nor that He removed their ill-desert from them in any degree, and thus gave them back *the right* to exemption from the necessity of suffering penally according to it; for to do either of these was, in the nature of the case, both unnecessary and impossible. Directly the opposite is implied; since His substitutional sufferings for them would be those of the just for those of the unjust; of Him perfectly obedient to God as the law requires, and therefore infinitely well-deserving, for them perfectly disobedient, selfish, and ill-deserving. These sufferings of Christ must be *in measure*, as seen, not by men, but by God who alone can see it, at least perfectly *equivalent* in value and efficiency upon Him and His rectoral relations to secure to Him and the universal, everlasting society under Him the just due and end which the penal sufferings and death of all human sinners would, leaving their ill-deserts untouched. Both good- and ill-desert are personal, adhering like fade-

less colors to every moral actor, good or bad, and never, by any possibility, can be transferred, like property or garments, from one to another more than can personal identity. No one can ever *deserve* reward or punishment for the properly personal action of another; and therefore the ill-desert of human sinners could not be transferred to Christ. Besides this, He deserved the direct opposite of all He substitutionally endured for them—complete exemption and protection from all, and positive reward commensurate with His consummate obedience as their representative before He endured them; and He will deserve it forever, while they deserve nothing but punishment according to their sins, and will deserve it forever; for forgiveness, if they should receive it, does not obliterate ill-desert, but merely saves from suffering the punishment it calls for. But, because the substitution saves them from the necessity of suffering this, provided they return to obedience before the close of the gracious probation connected with it, there is no end of justice or benevolence to be secured by their suffering it, if they return; and should God inflict it, He would not only cause an unnecessary, measureless, everlasting evil in the universe, but consummate wrong to the whole loyal society with Himself at its head. He would do it especially to our Lord Jesus Christ, who, being sent by the Father, came and made the representative substitution at such cost to Himself, having the promise that all who would come unto God by Him should be saved, they being given to Him by the Father as a chief part of the reward He so consummately deserved, and it would be a violation of that fundamental promise to Him, as well as of the promise to every sinner that, if he will come, He will in mercy and grace forgive and save him. Besides, if the ill-desert of sinners were abolished by Christ, they could not be *forgiven*. They would have a *right* to be treated as if they had not sinned; and for God to treat them so, instead of being mercy and grace to them, would be demanded by justice.

§ 146. NOR THAT HE EXPERIENCED ANY PERSONAL, NATURAL CONSEQUENCES OF SIN.

2. Nor could His suffering and dying as the substitute of human sinners include the experience by Him of *any of the natural consequences of sin*, whether those in and from conscience or any others in their constitution. For, on the one hand, it is impossible that a *holy* being that has never sinned, God or a creature, should experience any of these; and, on the other, these, as we have shown, are

no part of the retributive penalty of the law, although *abandonment* to them by God will be. Besides, what conceivable relation or adaptation could there be in His suffering these, were it possible, to save sinners from *them* or from their sin which induces them? These can be arrested and prevented only by regeneration, sanctification, and the resurrection. By the first two of these He arrests their occasioning cause; and, by His operation on the body in quickening it and redeeming it at the resurrection (Rom. 8:11, 23), He completes a perfect and eternal deliverance from them; not by any suffering of men themselves, nor of Christ for them, nor by their forgiveness.

§ 147. NOT THE DIRECT DESIGN OF HIS ATONEMENT TO SHOW GOD'S ABHORRENCE OF SIN, ETC.

3. Nor could the direct design of Christ's atoning sufferings and death be to show God's abhorrence of sin, His determination to punish for it, His purpose to maintain His authority, His regard for His law and obedience to it, nor to magnify and make it honorable, nor any such thing. They certainly would show each of these and other similar things to men and other intelligent beings having knowledge of them; and, as He foreknew they would, He doubtless designed them to do so *besides* or *as consequences of their great essential end, which was the same as that of the retributive penal sufferings deserved by sinners.* That is, they were to meet and satisfy the demand of justice as retributive to human sinners according to the ill-desert of their sin, which, in its nature, at once discards the ethical justice required by the law to God, man, and, in principle, all other moral beings, existing and to exist, and is positive injustice to them, being pernicious antagonism to all their natural and moral rights, dues, interests, concerns, and everlasting good. They were to meet and satisfy this demand in God and all holy beings against sinners for their punishment as perfectly at least as that would, so that all of them who would return to God morally, during their gracious probation, would be free from it forever. But, as Christ's sufferings and death were the peerless and consummate manifestation of God's character and whole disposition towards mankind and all created moral beings, they could not but be prolific ever onward of a numerous and glorious offspring of facts and results, including those above specified. But to make any or all of them the direct end of the stupendous intervention is to make the offspring the parent, the radiance of the sun the vast luminary itself.

It is only to state the end differently to say that it was the greatest possible good in the universe of moral beings.

§ 148. HIS SUFFERINGS DIFFERENT IN CHARACTER AND DESIGN FROM THOSE OF MOTHERS, FRIENDS, OR PATRIOTS.

4. The atoning sufferings and death of Christ for the end stated were radically different in essential moral quality or character from any sufferings or death *for* human sinners in the sense in which a mother makes sacrifices or endures sufferings *for* her child in distress, a friend does *for* a friend in bad condition, a patriot does *for* his country oppressed, assailed, or in danger, or any one does *for* another or many in suffering or peril of any kind.* His differs from those of any of these in the precise fact that His were entirely *substitutional*, or, in the only proper sense of the word, *vicarious* for the punitive suffering and death deserved by sinners, while theirs were not. Neither in design nor in fact are the supposed sufferings of a mother *instead* of those of her child. They neither prevent nor remove its ills by being in their *stead*, but are simply sympathetic suffering *with* it in feeling and in endeavoring to minister to its need or to relieve its distress, not to retrieve it from the necessity of suffering deserved punishment by suffering in its stead. There is nothing properly vicarious in hers; there is nothing in His not properly so; and, while hers may be, and commonly is, from mere natural, maternal affection, not from moral love, and is confined to her *own* child or children, His were absolutely from moral love, were for *all* mankind, and for them, not as *friends* but as *sinners* and *enemies* against Him. The same is substantially true of the sympathetic suffering of a friend for a friend, and of any one for any number of others. As to the suffering, or even the death in battle or otherwise, of a patriot for his country, so far is it from being vicarious for any sufferings of his country that his are simply a part of its, and are owed to it by him as a matter of justice. There is no *mercy* in the action of either, because there is no desert of punishment in its objects.

§ 149. HIS NOT EQUAL IN QUANTITY TO THE AGGREGATE OF THOSE DESERVED BY ALL MANKIND, NOR BY THE ELECT.

We hold it impossible that His sufferings could have filled any such measure, although doubtless greater than many suppose. If we hold in mind the teachings of Scripture concerning Him, that

(*) Bushell's Vic. Sac., pp. 46, 47.

He was God and man united in one Person, the God-man, and all His relations to the Father, to mankind, and to the universal and eternal moral society created by Him; and that He became such a Person by His incarnation, on purpose to be the representative of our race of sinners with God, both to act and to suffer for it, the plain fact is that *He was its representative substitute in His atoning sufferings and death.* Now, first, being such a Person; so related to God and the universal society; so absolutely perfect in His obedience to the will of His Father both in doing and in suffering; such a representative substitute in His sufferings and death for mankind liable to suffer as they deserve; being so moved by His Divine pity and mercy towards them, though sinners and enemies, as to act the infinite self-denial and self-sacrifice of abdicating the eternal glory He had with the Father, "in the form of God," and of "taking "the form of a servant" under the law, "being made in the likeness of men," thus deserving nothing from God but an infinite reward; but, instead of seeking it, "being found in fashion as a man, He humbled Himself" still more, "so as to become obedient even unto death, yea, the death of the cross," thus raising His desert of a reward to the greatest that even God could give;—*what limit can there be to the intrinsic moral value and potency of such a substitution of Himself* in His atoning sufferings and death for them liable to suffer the retributive punishment they deserve for their sins? As a representative man is one for many, so his doings or sufferings, as one, are those of one for those of all represented by him; so that they neither need to be nor can be a quantitative equivalent of those of all he represents in them, but only of a representative one. That is, *they need not, at most, exceed what any worst one of the represented is bound to do or to suffer.* As his doing, so his suffering, as such, is equivalent in value and effect to that of all of them. Such is the nature of the case. So, accordingly, was it with the representative doings and sufferings of Christ as done and undergone *to* the Father as Ruler in behalf of all human sinners. And be it noted here incidentally, that the fact that He, being their representative, could not be exempted from drinking the cup of substitutional sufferings and death for them, notwithstanding His agonizing pleadings for the exemption, demonstrates that, unless He drank it in their stead, they could not be exempted from the necessity of suffering themselves the retributive punishment they deserve for their sins, after their gracious probation is ended.

§ 150. WHY HIS WERE EQUIVALENT TO THOSE DESERVED BY ALL HUMAN SINNERS.

But, secondly, if told, that, according to Christ's teachings, the punishment of incorrigible sinners in the Gehenna of fire, and according to John's in the Apocalypse (Rev. 20:12–15), and to those of other Apostles, will be eternal, while the sufferings of Christ from their beginning in the garden to His death were not over fifteen hours; and if asked how His, so brief, could be a substitute for theirs, the question is already sufficiently answered, though, after some addition to this, a still more conclusive one will be given. Our only addition to this is, that, considering all above stated respecting the Person of Christ, His relations to the Father, to man, and to the universal and eternal society, why He became incarnate, and, as man's representative to the Father, did and suffered all He did, it is certain that His brief sufferings and death must have a moral value and potency to meet and sustain the demands of justice against human sinners and to that society absolutely infinite and eternal, and that all the retributive sufferings of all these sinners forever would have incomparably less of both. We add that, during those few hours, *He undoubtedly did suffer all that such a Person could;* and that all these sufferings were endured in obedience to the *will* of the Father, who would not hear His entreaties for exemption from them, but delivered Him up to the hands of His enemies, men and devils, and, in their acme, withdrew His supporting presence from Him; *so that they were all, in a real sense, the product of positive inflictions upon Him by the Father, as the sufferings of lost sinners will be.* This action of the Father towards His only-begotten and well-beloved Son was included in His part of the stupendous transaction, as arranged in the far-back counsels of the Godhead, and was done by Him with infinite self-denial and self-sacrifice as the Son's part was by Him.* But the most conclusive answer of all to the question whether the brief sufferings and the death of Christ could be a sufficient substitute for those deserved by human sinners, as declared in the teachings referred to above, is the answer to the question, how did the Father, to whom as universal Ruler the atonement made by them, and in whom it was to have its sole effect, regard it? This is really the only important question for us concerning it; and the delightful answer is, *with infinite satisfaction.* He alone could know all that pertained to the whole case as related to Himself and the universal and eternal society under Him, and

(*) John 3:16; Rom. 8:32.

what the effect in Him of this atonement was. He knew whether it was a perfect *expiation* for the sins of mankind, and so whether it was a perfect *propitiation* of Himself towards them. That is, He knew whether it perfectly met the demands of justice, both as retributive against them as sinners, and as ethical to Himself, and the universal society, so that they were absolutely unimpaired, and left mercy and grace entirely free to exert themselves to the utmost to bring them to fulfill the conditions of forgiveness on its basis. It is an absolute fact, certified in a throng of places and ways in God's own Book, that He did know it to have all this value and effect; that it did produce a perfect propitiation in Him towards mankind; that Christ, by His sufferings and death, was the propitiation; and that His being such precisely as He was, was arranged for in the redemptive plan in the antiquities of the eternal Trinity of the Godhead.*

§ 151. IN WHAT THE ATONEMENT CONSISTED; WHY MADE; AND WHY IT MORE THAN MET THE DEMANDS OF JUSTICE.

From all the preceding in this Chapter, the clear fact is that *the atonement consisted wholly in Christ's representative substitution of Himself in His sufferings and death to the Father as Ruler of the universal, eternal society, for mankind as liable to suffer retributively as they deserve for their sins in this life, to exempt them conditionally from the necessity of undergoing that suffering themselves.* It was solely from His pure philanthropy, pure mercy and grace towards human sinners, that, in perfect voluntariness, He thus substituted Himself for them, as no one can deny that *He had an absolute right to do;* and it was equally from the same that the Father sent and gave Him to do it, and did all His part towards Him in doing it according to their ante-mundane agreement. So all objections to it, as unjust to Christ, as possibly wrong in any sense, or as not the consummate, all-surpassing acting of absolute ethical justice to all, including the Godhead, in the universal society, and of measureless mercy and grace towards mankind as sinners and enemies, on the Father's part, are against everything in the case, and are implicit denials that He and the Son acted their parts in perfect concert, alike just, alike merciful, and alike with measureless philanthropy, self-denial, and self-sacrifice to the end. They both alike fulfilled their stipulated parts for ends of boundless, eternal gain and un-

(*) Acts 2:23; 3:18; 24:28;—Is. 53:10-12; Phil. 2:9, 10; and numerous other places.

imaginable good—the salvation of numbers numberless of our lost race from all deserved penal retributions, and their exaltation to all their predestined glory, blessedness, relations and beneficent functions with Christ in the intelligent universe; the maintenance and perpetual augmentation of the universal and eternal society in absolute harmony with God, His law and all good: the utter suppression of Satan, his angels, and all his human adherents out of all farther action, influence, or injurious relation in that society; and the infinite satisfaction and glory of the whole Godhead forever from the ever-augmenting result.

A word farther here about justice. It is not a thing separate from the law, and, as such, retributively the *summum jus,* which is *summa injuria,* which, like Shylock with his bond for the pound of Antonio's flesh, exacts rigid execution of its demand. It is the intrinsic quality of the law which makes it social by making its matter of love reciprocally owed and due universally; so that the end of that love, which is the greatest possible real good of moral beings, and its end are identical. This is true of it even when retributive to sinners, as their punishment is to secure this good to the obedient. Hence, when Christ suffered as the representative substitute of sinners to save them from the necessity of suffering as they deserved, He not only met the demands of justice, both as retributive against them and as ethical to God and the universal society, but He did vastly more than the punitive sufferings of all human sinners could have done—all the surpassing, measureless, eternal good, which is indicated above.

§ 152. LOVE, NOT A PRINCIPLE ESSENTIALLY VICARIOUS IN ITS NATURE.

Examples of mere sympathy with, and self-sacrificing ministries to and efforts for suffering objects of affection go not a step towards proving the "theologic fiction," that love in any sense is, in its very nature, *vicarious.* They merely show that the love, whether of a mother for her child, of a friend for a friend, of a patriot for his country, or of any towards any number of others specially related by ties of nature, of mutual attachment, of country, of race, or however, impels to its special executive action for the object or objects thus specially related, but not towards entire mankind, and certainly not towards them when enemies without and against any just cause or reason, and more yet, not if in rebellion against its actor having rightful authority and government over them. Such love is not, in

itself, intrinsically moral, as it is common to mankind, even the worst, and proves nothing as to the real nature and manifestations of *moral love*, which is essentially pure good-will to *all men and moral beings*, acted out according to their characters and relations. As we have before shown, no sympathetic suffering *with* others, whether specially related or not in it, with whatever labors and endurances for them, which is not designed to free them from the *necessity* of undergoing a deserved, punitive suffering by being in its stead, is or can be *vicarious*. This term cannot consent to be wrenched away from meaning *substitutional*, which it only properly can mean, and made to mean this mere sympathizing suffering with suffering objects of affection, which it never did nor can properly mean, to suit the exigency of any system-maker. Moral love in God or any other being is no *principle* at all, but is entirely *action of the moral heart*, a voluntary moral state of the mind of its actor according to the law, which is its only principle. It consists in pure good-will with its correlated emotions and intellectual action; and no action *executive* of it to or for its objects, nor suffering with or for them, is intrinsically any part of it, except as shore-creeks are of oceans. These are merely *special effects* or results of it, both the action and the suffering, as far as it is voluntarily undergone, being always to accomplish or attain some *particular* end or ends of good, because connected with, or important to, the grand end of this love, which is the greatest possible good of all its objects consistent with their several characters, deserts, conditions, and relations to each other, and to God. In itself, therefore, the love of God is in no proper sense vicarious to all, and involves no principle requiring Him to undergo vicarious suffering for human sinners otherwise than it does one to *execute every special act or course which He sees to be made necessary or important, wise or best, by* OCCASION—*that is, in any other sense than it does one to inflict punishment on incorrigible sinners, to forgive those who truly repent, to visit persons, communities, or nations with special judgments, to exercise special providences, or disciplinary chastisements, or to do any special thing.* If sin had never entered the universe, vicarious suffering would have been impossible, because there would have been *no occasion and opportunity* for it; and yet God and all moral beings would have been perfect in love. On the other hand, when God or even human rulers *must* inflict punishment on transgressors, there is *no opportunity or place* for it; and yet God is certainly in perfect love in inflicting punishment, and men may be. There was no opportunity or place for vicarious suffering by God

when He "spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to hell, and delivered them into chains of darkness, to be reserved unto judgment;" and yet He was in perfect love in so treating them. It is only in respect to mankind, in whose case as sinners there are mitigating circumstances, that such suffering for them was possible for God; and therefore *vicarious suffering is necessarily only a* SPECIAL *measure of* OCCASION AND WISDOM, *just as every other special measure and act or course is and must be.* We will see that this measure was possible for God only once, and can never be repeated. So far is such suffering from being an essential principle in the nature of love.

We simply notice here, that the vicarious suffering of Christ for mankind was not to rescue any of them from the necessity of undergoing any suffering in this life, whether natural, including that of bodily death, or providential, or disciplinary. For, (1) It does not do this as a matter of fact, although a mitigation of temporal suffering in various respects is among its effects. (2) It could not do this, because a substitution for any temporal suffering is impossible. (3) It could only be to rescue them *as sinners* from suffering deserved, positive punishment from God, which, without it, it was morally necessary that He should inflict upon them all. (4) As this life is one of probation, and not of retribution, it could only be to rescue from the necessity of suffering this after this life ends, so that as many as would return to God before it ends could be forever freed from suffering it by means of His vicarious suffering for them as the ground of their forgiveness and of all good to them. The atonement was for mankind as *immortals*, to secure their *immortal good. Christianity is a religion for immortals.*

We must pursue this notion of a principle of vicarious suffering in all love farther. If we consider all the requisite and essential conditions of such a measure in a human government, it is perfectly obvious that it can never be adopted by one. Considering the very limited capabilities of all human rulers, the brevity of their lives, the indefiniteness and defectiveness of their relations to their subjects, their faultiness at best in moral character and wisdom, and their lack of truths, motives, and renovating agency and influences requisite to secure any beneficial results in their subjects from such a measure, even if it were at all possible to execute it, how could one even attempt to adopt it without utter folly and the certainty of evil, instead of auspicious results? We know the story of Zaleucas, which has been used to illustrate the vicarious atonement of Christ; but,

while the idea of substitution appears in it, it is so defective in various essential aspects requisite to represent that stupendous measure in its adaptations to meet the whole case between God and human sinners, that, in our earliest consideration of the subject, we discarded the use of it for that purpose. But God, being all that He is in nature, mode of existence as tripersonal, character, and relations to mankind and all moral beings as their Creator, Preserver, and Ruler, and being unlimited in all natural and moral attributes, was infinitely able to devise and execute this supreme measure, to make all the manifestations of Himself in and connected with it to them, to place the momentous truths, facts, and motives involved in and created by it before them, and to exert a personal morally renewing influence upon them to secure, on the ground and in consequence of it, results of salvation to men, of eternal benefit and blessing to all holy beings, and of good to Himself, compensating for it beyond all finite conception. Seeing it thus practicable and infinitely beneficent and wise, in the opulence of His mercy He adopted and executed it *as the one only means to meet the one only* OCCASION *in the case of mankind at least*, created by their sin and the righteous, holy, indefeasible demand of retributive justice against them; *and He can never repeat it towards them, because there can never be another such occasion in their case. There is the strongest reason to think He can never repeat it towards any other race or order of moral beings in the universe. Hence, there never was, nor can be, a Gethsemane, nor, what is more, a Calvary, in the love of any other being than God; never in His towards mankind otherwise than all special acts, courses, and measures are in it when* OCCASIONS *for them arrive whether they are of beneficence, of mercy, or of judgment and justice*, He eternally foreknew the *occasions* for all His special acts, courses, and measures, this among them; and it was in His eternal purpose to execute this "in the fullness of time" forseen by Him in the atoning sufferings and death of Christ. But, since then, it never has been nor will be in His purpose, in His executive acts, nor in His love again towards mankind. Gethsemane and Calvary, therefore, whether viewed separately or together, will forever stand alone among all the executive acts, courses, measures, and manifestations of God towards them; and no real parallel of them will ever be executed again towards them, nor probably towards any other order of beings in the universe.

§ 153. THAT IT IS NOT, SHOWN BY APOSTROPHIZING PROPHETS, CHRIST, ETC.

We think the foregoing a demonstration of the falseness of the notion that love, especially moral love, is in its nature, vicarious. But, as this notion is the legitimate outcome of denying real retributive punishment, and of holding the natural consequences of sin the real and only retributions, and with this that, from the nature of love, God and all good beings must enter into the bad condition of, and go to cost for sinners of all characters and degrees with unlimited sympathy and persistence, we deem it important, besides, to place it in a position that will expose its unscriptural and obnoxious character. For, if true, it is worse than that of non-resistance, maintained by some in the anti-slavery struggle, which required only *passive* endurance of what assailants might inflict, but not vicarious suffering for them, which is *voluntary and positive.* To expose its true character, let us apostrophize as follows:—Oh prophets, psalmists, and saints of the Old Testament down to Malachi! Wherefore did you predict and denounce such appalling burdens and dooms on your own people and their generations, and on all the nations and kingdoms from Babylon to Rome and down the centuries for their sins and apostasies, instead of voluntarily entering, and teaching your people to enter, into their wretched conditions, and of going to the cost of vicarious suffering of the kind of this notion according to this inherent principle of all love? And wherefore did Jehovah, from whom you declaredly spoke, violate "this principle of all love," in so terribly executing them all along the centuries, even until now, overwhelming and sweeping them away with horrors on horrors, the records of which make the hearts of readers quake? But, as many decry the Old Testament in these days, let us come to the New. Oh Saviour of men, the center and sum of absolute love! wherefore didst thou declare thy terrific threatenings and woes against all incorrigible sinners, especially the Scribes and Pharisees, and the Jewish nation adhering to them, dooming Jerusalem and its temple to destruction, and the remnant surviving that destruction to their still-continued dispersion over the Gentile world, and to all their incalculable endurances, notwithstanding thy vicarious sufferings for them and the world, instead of persistently entering thyself into their miseries and going to helping cost for them? and wherefore hast thou been executing thy menaces and doomings until now? Wherefore didst thou threaten all incorrigible sinners, not in relation to Sheol or Hades, the place of all the souls of the dead, but in

relation to *Gehenna, Hell,* the place of future punishment, *nine different recorded times—six* times without qualifications, *once* "hell of fire," *once* with the addition, "the unquenchable fire," and *once* with the addition, "where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched;" declaring *four* times, that they should "*be cast into*" it, *twice* that they "shall go into" it, *once* that "God is able *to destroy both soul and body in*" it, *once* that they *are* "*in danger of it,*" once that they are "*sons of it,*" and *once* asking "*how they can escape the judgment of it?*" Wherefore, further, didst thou announce that "thou wilt say to them on the left hand, Depart from me, ye cursed, into the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels," and that they "shall go away into eternal punishment;" and make numerous other averments of the same awful import? In what possible way can all thy various and appalling declarations of eternal punishment consist with thy love, or with truth, if the natural consequences of sin are its only punishment, and all love is in principle vicarious, and must therefore persistently enter into the bad condition of, and go to cost for *all* sinners? Are *the so-called liberals* right or absurd in pronouncing them all merely *figurative,* so that they do not mean what they say, inflicted eternal punishment, but merely the natural consequences of sin, from which thy vicarious love of sympathy and cost will yet retrieve all sinners? Oh holy Apostles, imbued so peerlessly with love from its very fountain! wherefore did you, in your preaching and writings, denounce such numerous and terrible positive retributions from God upon all incorrigible rejecters of the grace of salvation, instead of declaring to all the doctrine of vicarious, sympathetic love, that God will never *inflict* positive punishment upon any; that only the natural consequences of sin await any, however refractory; that, if they only repent at any time in futurity, they will escape these, and would if Christ had never come and died, nor any grace through His cost-death been given; and that, according to this vicarious principle in the very nature of love, God and all good beings must make themselves their loving vassals and victims by persistently entering themselves into their evil condition, and vicariously going to cost for them to *win* them from their sin and its bad natural results either until they repent or until assured that they never will? Why did you not understand the love you proclaimed, and not shock the sensibilities of at least all claiming to be most advanced in culture and refinement by these gross and barbarious denunciations and appeals *to the low principle of fear?* Oh thou, of holy love the most perfect human shrine, who wert the

Apocalyptic seer! what potent drug had laid thy love asleep, that thou couldst, unparalyzed, bear to see the dreadful panorama of scenes and convulsions; hear the cries of single mighty angels with mighty voices—of hosts of them combined, loud as of tumultuous seas and volleyed thunders—of myriads in heaven united in hymns and hallelujahs, with harpings loud as the sound of many waters or rolling thunders—of Him on the heavenly throne or His criers, uttering great commands or proclamations with mightiest sound—of the souls of the martyrs under heaven's altar crying with loud voice against their murderers—of trumpetings and thunderings with all the attending explanations, informations, songs, lamentations, and sayings in heaven and on earth:—*all* relating to a corresponding series of appalling retributive judgments from Him who sits on the throne on vast portions of mankind for their incorrigible wickedness, and including famines, pestilences, wars, earthquakes, fires, tempests of hail, locusts, and the exerted wrath of God, with all conceivable calamities, torments, and exterminating destructions of the cities, nations, and tribes of the earth, all ending with the final judgment, and with casting into the *lake of fire*, which is the second death, all whose names are not written in the book of life;—and that thou couldst relate the whole in a book, beside which all the catastrophies and horrors of all the tragic dramas and the epics ever written shrink to comparative trifles, and give it to the Church and the world as a prophetic revelation from Jesus Christ Himself, certain to be fulfilled, to forewarn and prepare its crediting readers through all following centuries? Is this thy own and God's way of entering into sympathy with, and going to vicarious cost for, the generations and nations hostile to Him, to His moral system and truth, and to all good? Should not Jesus Christ through you have said that His Father and He could never do any such dreadful things to *His children*, however apostate, wicked, and hostile; and that the loving angels could never act such parts as those of the seven trumpets and the seven seals, and as those who executed such terrific destructions acted? Should not the souls of the martyrs under the altar, "crying with a loud voice, How long, O Lord, holy and true, dost thou not judge and avenge our blood on them that dwell on the earth?" instead of being told "to rest yet for a little season until their fellow-servants also and their brethren, that should be killed as they were, should be fulfilled," have been told to cease their loveless, revengeful cry for vengeance on their murderers, and instead to exercise the love of sympathy and vicarious cost for

them? Instead of receiving the assurance that, after a little season, God would avenge them, should they not have been told that He would never inflict any positive punishment upon their murderers for their crimes against them and all their wickedness, but that He, they, and all good beings must, by the vicarious principle of love, enter into sympathy with and go to cost for them on account of the miserable natural consequences of their very atrocities against them, and of those of all their sins and crimes? To forgive them was of course impossible for either those souls or God, because, as they deserved no infliction of positive retribution, there was nothing to forgive; and as the vicarious principle of love required helping sympathy and suffering for them, how could they, in their white robes, clamor for vengeance on them, which love made it impossible for Him to take, or be assured by Him, "the just and true," that He would inflict it? And how could the angelic and saintly hosts in heaven rejoice and praise God at beholding the inflictions of retributive vengeance on the incorrigible myriads of persecutors, of corrupters of the earth, of worshippers of the wild-beast, of the followers of the false prophet, of the fornicators with the great whore, and of the inhabitants of Great Babylon? Then, how could our Lord Himself on the white horse, "having on His vesture and on His thigh a name written, KING OF KINGS AND LORD OF LORDS," go forth, followed by the armies of heaven, like a mighty Conqueror, to "smite the nations with the sword which goes out of His mouth, to rule them with a rod of iron, and to tread the wine-press of the fierceness of the wrath of Almighty God," an angel "crying with a loud voice, saying to all the fowls that fly in the midst of heaven, Come, and gather yourselves together unto the supper of the great God," specifying what the supper is, which is prepared for them by this resistless One? Lastly, how can the description of the final judgment in Chapter 20:11–15 possibly consist with the notion that the merely natural consequences of sin are real, and its only, retributions or punishment?—or with the notion that love is intrinsically vicarious, and must be persistently acted out towards all sinners by sympathizing with and going to cost for them in the bad condition of those consequences of their sins?—or with any position whatever, other than, that the only retributions are positive inflictions of punishment on finally incorrigible sinners "according to their works," the universal rule, twice expressed in this passage, which punishment, according to the unequivocal teachings of our Lord recorded in the Gospels, as we have shown, consists in being "cast into the lake of

fire," Gehenna, with the devil and his angels for whom it was prepared, which "is the second death?" From this death there will be no resurrection. It will be eternal. The eternal door is locked on them. The eternal curtain hides them. They are eternally outside of the universal moral system.* What enormous nonsense this notion of love is! and how perfectly its likeness is its child, the notion of the so-called moral atonement, which is none at all!

(*) Chap. 21:8, 27; 22:11-15.

CHAPTER XIV.

The designed relations of the Atonement to human sinners as such, to those brought to comply with the conditions of salvation and forgiveness during their probation, and connected points.

§ 154. THE ATONEMENT A PROVISION FOR ALL MANKIND ALIKE, BUT AN ACTUAL ONE FOR THOSE ONLY WHO COMPLY WITH ITS TERMS.

That, in *designed adaptation*, it is a provision for all mankind alike is in the nature of the case. They are all alike creatures of God, made by Him in His own image; alike intrinsically valuable in nature as immortal moral beings; alike in having the law in and from their moral nature, and in being naturally and necessarily subject to it and to the government of God; alike consequently related to Him and all moral beings, existing and yet to exist in all futurity, and He and they to them; alike from and related to Adam as their natural head and representative; alike fallen in and with him in his "first disobedience," thus becoming vitiated in nature and sinners; alike, as such, in their relations to God, to His law in them with its justice, to His government, and to His universal and eternal moral society and system; alike liable to the retributive punishment deserved by their sins, and powerless to escape it; alike sinners, not in an *absolute*, but in a *modified* degree during this probationary life, or as long in it as they do not by willful presumption make themselves utterly incorrigible apostates from God and all obligation, as doubtless some, comparatively very few, of them, do; alike capable of misery and all ruin, if unrescued, and of glory and all good, if saved; alike absolute objects of mercy, the very nature of which is to rescue the guilty, as far as possible, from punishment and all the evil of sin, and to restore them to right character and all good; alike capable, if so rescued and restored, of being occasioning causes of pleasure and glory to God and of happiness to all good beings forever, but, if not, of sorrow to Him and them forever; alike, in fine, in all essential respects. There is not therefore a conceivable principle,

not purely arbitrary, aside from their own voluntary action and courses under and respecting the truths and motives He sets before, and the influences He exerts upon them on the basis of the atonement, and their consequent relations to Him, to the universal holy society in which He is, and to His eternal law and government, on which the atonement could be exclusively designed, as a provision, for only a part of mankind, or not, in the fullest sense, for them all alike *as sinners*. As they are alike in all the respects mentioned, so God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, His law and government, and His universal holy society are all equally and changelessly alike in themselves and as related to them *as sinners*. *In designed adaptation*, therefore, the atonement must be for them all alike *as guilty*, in order to be a provision, on the ground of which forgiveness and all salvation may be freely offered to all on condition of their compliance with the terms of the offer, and that He may make an *actual application* of it to all of them who fulfill this condition. That is, it must, in the nature of the case, be primarily simply a social, provisional, and, of course, conditional substitution for the penal suffering of them all *as sinners*, to be made an *actual one* to such of them only as comply with the conditions under the motives of the facts and truths and the influences of the agencies connected with it, as known to and operant upon them; and it cannot be either an *absolute* or an *actual* one for any of them while continuing in sin. *It is only God's act of forgiving each one* who fulfills the condition, that makes it *actual* for him.

§ 155. THE CONDITION OF ITS APPLICATION TO ANY, AND HOW IT IS MADE.

The condition which constitutes ethical fitness for the actual application of the substitution to any one by forgiveness is not, of course, any kind of works to deserve, earn, and win the favor of God as their reward; nor the mere belief of anything concerning Him as true; but is the voluntary act or exercise of yielding up sin and self to God, *as known*, by believing, trusting, relying upon Him as merciful and gracious to forgive sin and set free from its punishment. It is by faith, that it might be by grace (Rom. 4:16), and can be no other way. According to this general definition, it may be fulfilled by those who are ignorant of the Gospel, because such a faith in God, as known by them, involves such an ethical state in them by the grace of the Holy Spirit, that, if they did know the Gospel of Christ, they would believe in Him as their Saviour and Lord, and that, when He shall become known to them, they will, as it were,

spontaneously believe in Him. Such, doubtless, was the case of the centurion of Capernaum, of Cornelius, and of others among the heathen, to whom the Gospel was preached by the Apostles; and is the case, we hope, of some among them of all times. But, confining ourselves now to those who have knowledge of the vicarious suffering of Christ for mankind, it is, in the Gospel, offered to them all alike and declared to be for all, as the ground of forgiveness on the ethical condition stated; and were it not really so, the offer would neither agree with the fact, nor with sincerity and truth.

§ 156. IF NOT FOR ALL, WOULD NOT ACCORD WITH EITHER JUSTICE OR MERCY.

There are two other confirmations of this position. (1) Unless the atoning suffering of Christ was, in God's design, a provisional substitution for the deserved retributive suffering of all, as alike in all the respects noticed, it would neither accord with the universally social nature of the justice of the law, the retributive demands of which are against them *all* in behalf of God Himself and His entire and eternal holy society, nor with the nature of mercy, which is antithetically correlated to these demands against them all, as *it is love of their nature and its good for their immortal, intrinsic* value, notwithstanding their sin and guilt; and therefore it cannot, from its nature, be confined to any part of them, but must be towards and act for them all alike *as sinners.* It never exists and acts towards holy beings, nor towards sinners absolutely lost, but only towards sinners who may be redeemed, and, through redemption, restored to right character, and so to God and His holy society; and, because redemption from the righteous demands of retributive justice against them is the only gate through which forgiveness and all good from God can enter to any of them, it was necessarily the consummate action and measure of mercy to all to provide this gate, which it could only do by providing a substitute to meet those demands by suffering in their stead. But, as they are all alike in all the respects noticed, all intertied by their race membership and relations, and all objects alike of mercy, which cannot be partial, the substitutional suffering which would provisionally meet, and stay the execution of, those demands against one, would do the same for every other one, and so for them all. Besides, and by doing this, it would secure for them their gracious probation with all the Providential blessings and good they receive during its continuance, and all the truths, motives, agencies, and influences created by and connected with it to bring

them to return to God in faith and its *loving* obedience. But it could not be either an *absolute* or an *actual* substitution for all or any of them *before* such returning, not only because that is the necessary ethical condition of its application to any of them by forgiveness, but because it cannot, in the nature of the case, be absolute for any during this probationary life, and, if it were actual for all or any persisting in sin, it would be an utterly unrighteous measure, at war with the imperative and all the characteristics and obligations of the law, and so with the possibility of a moral system, and would be a license to all to disregard and violate it with entire impunity to any degrees they may wish. We think this argument decisive.

§ 157. NOR WITH CHRIST'S BEING THE REPRESENTATIVE OF MANKIND.

2. But there is another which we think confirms the position stated beyond question. Our Lord Jesus Christ was the *representative* to God of our whole race in His person and in all His action for it;* and therefore His atoning suffering must have been a provisional substitution for it all. He represented it all, not as righteous, but as sinners deserving to suffer penally for their sins as retributive justice demands; and, *in principle, a representative is always a substitute for all he represents.* He is necessarily such in the most absolute sense, if he represents them in suffering and dying to rescue, or provide a rescue for, them from suffering and dying in a punitive sense as they deserve. When our Lord, therefore, as representative of our race of sinners, suffered and died, He was necessarily the substitute in doing so for them all alike *as sinners*—that is, not an absolute, nor an actual, but a provisional, conditional one, to rescue them all alike from the *necessity* of suffering and dying penally as they deserve, provided they ethically return to God during their probation. Only thus could His substitution be an object for any of them either to accept and rely upon, or to reject, or in relation to which they could act at all. We think this manifest, if looked at in the following way:—

§ 158. WHAT TRUE IF IT WERE AN ACTUAL SUBSTITUTION FOR ALL MANKIND AS SINNERS.

1. Suppose the atonement of Christ was made for *all mankind as sinners*, not as simply a provisional, but as an *actual substitution* for their deserved suffering, and, as truth requires, was so declared.

(*) I. Tim. 2:5, 6; Heb. 8:6; 9:15; 12:24; also involved in Rom. 5:12-19; I. Cor. 15:21, 22; also in John 3:16; Heb. 2:9-18; and commonly.

It would then be also an *absolute* one, as it would have no ethical condition for them to fulfill. No action of theirs could have any relation to it either to secure or to prevent its effect. They would all be exempt from all penal liability for their sin of any degree, however enormous. It would make a moral system impossible, as it would practically supplant the law and government of God, and all ethical, no less than retributive, justice, all responsibility and accountability, and so the foundations of all ethics; and it would make forgiveness neither a thing for men to seek nor for God to bestow. It would be utterly immoral in principle and effect—a license to all to live as they list with perfect impunity, certain of heaven and blessedness in the endless future, if any blessedness could be possible for them thus saved in their sins from penalty alone.

§ 159. WHAT TRUE, IF IT WERE SUCH FOR ANY PART OF MANKIND, AND NOT FOR ALL.

2. Suppose again, that God did not design the substitution to be a provisional, and so a conditional one for all men, to be made actual for all who fulfill the condition, but to be an *actual* one for a part of them only, and that He has so declared it. In this, as in the former case, it would be for them *in their sin and guilt*, and would meet the demands of retributive justice against them without any condition to be fulfilled by them, so that no action of theirs could have any relation to it, either to secure or prevent its effect. Whatever they might do or become in bad character, they would be absolutely exempt from all penal liability for it. On the contrary, no action of those for whom it was not made could have any relation to it, either to secure or to prevent its application to them, because it was in no sense designed for them. Neither part, therefore, could with any reason or effect act in relation to it, to change its relation to them, more than they could to the man in the moon or to the steadfast northern star. Neither in principle nor effect would it be better in relation to its objects than if actual for all; while, by being exclusively for them, it would be a purely arbitrary discrimination between them and the rest of mankind, in conflict with the nature and reason of mercy and the whole nature of the case, which has been shown. But, although its effect to rescue its objects from penalty would be the same whether they knew themselves such and relied on it or not, yet supposing it *could* be different if they did know it was for them, from what it would be if they

did not, how could any of them possibly get the knowledge that they are its objects, unless by a special revelation to him of the fact? Without this, belief that they are would be without evidence, mere assumption.

§ 160. IF EITHER OF THESE SUPPOSITIONS WERE TRUE, A PROBATION IN ANY SENSE WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR MANKIND.

3. But, we reject both these suppositions not only for the reasons stated against them, but the additional special one underlying them, that the substitution in either case would make a probation in any sense impossible for mankind. For what could the objects of it in either case be on probation for, when no action of theirs could affect or relate to their future salvation from penalty more than that of the confirmed angels in Heaven could affect or relate to theirs? Of course, if the substitution is actual and for only a part of the race, the other part cannot be on probation in any sense; for their perdition is irreversibly certain; and thus no probation is possible for any of the race, and God can have no moral system and no government over them more than over the irrational animals.

§ 161. MUST BE SIMPLY A PROVISION FOR ALL ALIKE TO BE MADE ACTUAL FOR ANY, OR TO BE OFFERED TO ALL OR ANY.

We therefore hold it certain, on every ground, that the substitution, as it relates to human sinners, *as such*, must be designedly simply provisional for them all alike, and that it must be so in order to be made actual for any of them when renewed. It must be such, to be truly and sincerely offered to all alike as directly related to them and their action, the alternative for each being that, if he accepts it in the prescribed ethical way, it will be made actual for him, but, if he will not, it will avail him nothing, but will make his guilt and punishment greater. The knowledge of it is thus a mighty motive in itself, a momentous inducement and impulsion to draw and impel him to fulfill the condition, being a solid and sure basis for his faith and hope, and at the same time vastly augmentive of his fear to continue in sin. The fact, that the Son of God, moved by His infinite pity for our race of sinners despite all their hostility of heart and wrong of action against God, in pure mercy and grace to them all, voluntarily became man under the law to represent and act for them, not merely in teaching them all necessary moral and gracious truth, in declaring His Father to them, and in His whole absolutely perfect example of character, conduct, and all manifesta-

tion in His relations to them, but supremely in substituing Himself as the representative of them all in His suffering and death to rescue them from the *necessity* of suffering and dying penally as retributive justice demands, and, by doing this, to secure for them all gracious truth, agencies, and influences to bring them back to God morally, in order that God may make this provisional substitution for all actual by forgiveness for each returning one, and may, on the ground of it, give him eternal salvation and all the blessings and glories promised in the Gospel to all such as are made "meet for the inheritance of the saints in light"—this most stupendous fact in the universe is, and, through all time, must be to all who know of it, the monarch motive, compared with which all others are as asteroids or satellites to the glorious sun, to rouse in men the impulse of gratitude, to subdue their stubbornness in sin, and to allure and sway them to renounce it and yield themselves to God in faith, love, and true obedience. It is only when one is brought by this mighty solvent of sinful hearts to do this under the agency of the Spirit showing and impressing it as a designed provision for all, that it can righteously, and without positive injustice to God Himself and all good beings under Him, be made actual for him by forgiveness from God. But, as we think we have shown, if it were directly actual for all or only a part of mankind *as sinners,* it could be no motive and have no adaptation or tendency to bring its objects from sin to trust and love God, but would serve as a license to them all, and, in the case of its being for only a part, for the other part also, to continue in sin. All, therefore, would continue to experience the natural consequences of sin, and, if the substitution were for a part only, the other part would suffer its positive retributive punishment in addition, while it would be utterly arbitrary, being at war with the law, with universal moral nature which contains and issues it, with the whole moral system it constitutes, and so with all ethical justice to God and all good beings according to their natural and moral rights to each other's pure moral love, and demanded by their everlasting dues, interests, and concerns. By their sin, all men are morally *out of and in conflict with* this moral system, and the problem for God to solve was how to get all or any of them back into it consistently with all the rights, dues, interests, and concerns of Himself and the whole everlasting society *in it.* He solved it by devising and making a provisional substitution for them all, to be made actual by forgiveness for every one of them who would *truly return into it* under

the gracious motives and influences in and secured for them by the amazing measure, which thus at once looks to, guards, and secures all the rights, dues, interests, and concerns of Himself and His everlasting loyal society, and looks to and provides for the salvation and all good of as many sinners of our race as can be brought to return truly into the moral system constituted by the law in all moral natures. That is, it is at once a measure of *ethical justice* to God and all good beings forever, and of representative substitution for *retributive justice* against all human sinners, provisional for all, and actual for all who truly return to God.

§ 162. THE ATONEMENT BEING FOR ALL, ALL HAVE A GRACIOUS PROBATION.

Thus and thus only, can all have a probation; for the only one they can have is a *gracious* one, one to which they have no possible right, not even by promise, as, like life, it is given without any, in which they *may* return to God and be forgiven by Him, if they will. But as those who return and receive forgiveness are not confirmed in holiness in this life, their probation continues to its end, though under vastly better conditions than before on account both of their changed subjective state and of their objective relations to all holy truth, to God, and to His universal holy society. While, therefore, forgiveness makes the substitution actual for them, it does not make it *absolute*, as its continued application to them necessarily remains *conditional* till probation and life end together, when, if they have continued to fulfill the condition, they will be confirmed, and the substitution will be made absolute for them forever. If they should not continue to fulfill it, they would necessarily fall back under the penalty deserved by their sins. If they are still on probation in any sense, their forgiveness is in the same sense conditional, and could not, of itself, prevent such a relapse at any time of its continuance. But, while we fully hold the freedom of the will, and, therefore, the possibility and danger of such a relapse, and the certainty of it, if the forgiven were left to themselves under all the temptations which surround them, and with all the suceptibilities and tendencies to evil which still remain in them, we do not believe any of them ever *have* fallen or *will* fall into it. For the best of reasons, which we may show in the sequel, we joyfully believe that God has so arranged and provided for their conservation, that, even if at times in their course they fall into sin, they will be kept from apostasy and persistence in them, restored and preserved in habitual fulfillment of

the condition till death ends their probation, when they will be confirmed and the substitution will be made *absolute* for them forever. "Sin shall not have dominion over them; for they are not under law, but under grace."

Such, we think, are the relations of Christ's atonement to mankind, and we see not how any other or others can possibly harmonize with the nature and essential facts of the case. We believe the teachings of Scripture concerning it, when we come to examine them, will be found to harmonize with and be reflected in this view in all respects, and not with any other essentially different one.

§ 163. ALL SACRED TRUTH, MOTIVES, ETC., LIKE THE ATONEMENT, ONLY PROVISIONAL FOR MANKIND AS SINNERS.

Not only was the atonement *to* the Father as Ruler a conditional provision for all mankind alike as sinners, but all done for them, as such, along with it was of the same kind. Such in relation to them as sinners was all the truth of revelation with its measureless motives, all that Christ manifested of infinite merciful love for them in His temporal life and death, all that He continues to do and secure for them in His Mediatorial reign, all that the Father does for them graciously, all that the Holy Spirit does in His agency for them, all the workings and manifestations of God in providence, and all done for them by the Church and by Christians individually or in cooperation in their various relations. These motives, influences, instrumentalities, and agencies are the greatest conceivable or possible; and we cannot even imagine any added which could either augment them or add to their adaptation and potency to bring them to exchange, by their own free and cordial choice, their wrong for right moral action, trustful and loving obedience for sin. The whole nature of the case—of justice, of mercy, of God's relations to them and the universal society, as Ruler, and of theirs to Him and that society as essentially the same of them all alike—shows that they must be equally provisional for them all as infinite *wisdom* directs. Any limitation of them by specializing design, inconsistent with all these facts, to any restricted part of the fallen race cannot even be supposed possible. There can be no reason in God for any, and it would be necessarily arbitrary. Hence, whether all, or only a part of, mankind, capable of acting responsibly under the Gospel, could or could not be brought by all included in and connected with the plan of redemption to comply with the ethical conditions of both forgiveness and the relations to God conferred with it must be de-

cided conclusively by the self-arbitrated act or choice of each in yielding to or resisting the motives and influences brought upon him according to the wisest, best possible plan. This choice of each cannot be made for him by any other being, nor compelled, superceded, or dispensed with; for all that is morally good or bad, right or wrong, in any rational being must consist in and result from it. Of course, those not under these truths, motives, influences, and agencies of and connected with the Gospel, can only make it under such as exist for them in its absence, yet each of them must make it for himself under these, and must thus determine for himself its consequences, good or bad. Hence, as far as accountable mankind are concerned, the question of the salvation of any of them is necessarily conditional. But, as it respects those under the Gospel, the necessary condition for each of them of obtaining forgiveness and initiation by God into the relations to Him and all holy beings which follow it is his entrance by his own choice, under its truth, motives, influences, and agencies, into the right moral action and state which it requires; and then the necessary condition of his continuing in this action and state during his probation till death is habitual, watchful, militant persistence under the same as then related to and operant upon him. Conditions never cease for any in this life, because probation never does. Such is the relation of man on his side in time to all the provisions of God for his salvation. At his exit from time, he leaves temptation and probation behind, is at once confirmed, and the atonement is made absolute for him forever.

Having shown in the preceding Chapter, §§ 145–150, what is not implied in our Lord's substituting Himself for mankind to make the atonement to the Father, as Ruler, for them, and in what it exclusively consisted, we here call back attention some farther to that subject, both to expand some of the points there indicated, and to expose the futility of any objection the stupendous measure.

§ 164. BOTH THE SON AND THE FATHER HAD A PERFECT RIGHT TO ACT THE PARTS THEY DID, AND TO AGREE TO DO SO.

In § 151, it is affirmed that *our Lord had a perfect right* to become incarnate and, under the law, to be the representative of mankind, to act for them with the Father as Ruler, and to substitute Himself for them in His sufferings and death to extricate them from the necessity of suffering the punishment they deserve for their sins, or transgressions of the law, if they would return to obedience during the gracious probation granted them. *To deny that He had this*

right absolutely is to deny a fundamental principle and basis of morality, and to contradict the common sense of mankind. It is to deny that He had a right to humiliate, deny, and sacrifice Himself for our race as He did—to become, do and suffer for it all He did—to be as philanthropic, merciful, gracious, and absolutely good towards it as He was—to accomplish and secure by His substitution all He did for it, both in this world in that which is to come. All who devote themselves to labors, self-denials, self-sacrifices, and sufferings, or even death for the good of their fellow-men—Christian missionaries, martyrs, philanthropists, and others—have always done so by this right; and to dispute it is not the part of the sane. *Equally absolute was the right of the Father, in the arranged economy of redemption, to assume all the self-denial, self-sacrifice, and heart sufferings He did in fulfilling His part towards His only-begotten Son; and to dispute that He had it is equally preposterous.* Hence, as both the Persons acted throughout in perfect agreement, and as they each had an absolute right to do, the least shadow of injustice on the Father's part towards the Son was absolutely impossible. Nor was there a shadow of it, but the contrary, ineffable mercy, towards human sinners, as, by the substitution, the demand of retributive justice against them was so met as to be eternally hushed towards all of them brought, in consequence of it, into the necessary harmony with God and the universal moral society and system. As meeting this demand was, *ipso facto* meeting that of *ethical justice* to God and that society, there was not only no possible injustice in the substitution to Him and it, but, as shown in the Section referred to, a vastness of good beyond all the ethical justice which the full retributive punishment of all human sinners would secure, which no finite mind can measure.

> "O'er guilt (how mountainous!) with outstretch'd arms
> Stern Justice and soft-smiling Love embrace,
> Supporting, in full majesty, thy throne,
> When seem'd its majesty to need support,
> Or that, or man inevitably lost:
> What but the fathomless of thought divine
> Could labor such expedient from despair,
> And rescue both? Both rescue? both exalt!
> O how are both exalted by the deed!
> The wondrous deed! or shall I call it more?
> A wonder in Omnipotence itself?
> A mystery no less to gods than men!"
>
> —*Young's Night Thoughts, Night IV.*

§ 165. HENCE, BOTH WERE ABSOLUTELY JUST IN ACTING THEM.

Look closely at the case. As there was no possible *injustice* in it, how could the punishment of all human sinners more radiantly demonstrate the *justice* of God to the universal society, including Himself, both as a Person and as Ruler, than the fact that, although He infinitely desired to save them from it, yet as He could not unless He first met its demands against them, He devised and executed this stupendous substitution? How else could He so demonstrate His infinite regard for the everlasting rights, interests, and concerns of that society and Himself in and over it, and at the same time His infinite mercy towards hostile, guilty man? How else could He so demonstrate His inflexible regard for and purpose to maintain and secure to the utmost the eternal law of all righteousness in the universe as to its justice, its matter and its end, and to administer His government according to its perfect spirit and demands, both in rewarding the obedient and in punishing the incorrigibly disobedient? How else could He so demonstrate His estimation of the boundless value of the love which is obedience to the law, and of the corresponding evil of sin in itself and as related to the end of His law and government, which is the greatest good of all unfallen and all rescued moral beings? Considering all the peculiar circumstances in the case of mankind, how could He better, as well, or at all unfold and vindicate His all-perfect character, both as a Person and as Ruler, otherwise than by this stupendous measure of self-sacrificing love for them, His enemies against all cause, to rescue and save them? What shadow of wrong in any sense can there be in it to any creature in the universe? Does any one still obtrude the old, stale objection, that it is clearly unjust and an offense to the moral sense of mankind, that the innocent should be *punished* for the guilty, and His suffering substituted for that deserved by them? The perfect answer has been given again and again in both the preceding Chapter and this. What we affirm is not that Christ was *punished* for the guilty, which was not possible, but that He voluntarily, having from infinite philanthropy become their representative with the Father as Ruler, acted the consummate self-denial and self-sacrifice of equivalently *suffering their punishment* in their stead, which He had an absolute right to do, as no sane man of respectable intelligence can deny; and that He did this in agreement with the Father, who had the same right to act the self-denial and self-sacrifice He did in His part of the amazing transaction. Thus justice

and mercy, justice to the total and eternal loyal society with Himself central in it, and mercy towards hostile, guilty men, were so wedded in it, each in infinite culmination, that no creature can ever see a jar between them, or say "which of them brightest shines." Like gold in quartz, it is imbedded in the absolute consistency of the law with its justice with mercy and all its achievable good in the universe and the ages. No orb of creation moves in greater, if in equal, consistency with all the rest, nor in one half as sublime. If, from imbecility, ignorance, or worse, any lack capacity to understand this, they should at least not expose the lack, and so escape the just opprobrium incurred by parading this silly objection. Their conception of justice itself expressed in it is not that of the law, but that of an imaginary ogre, distinct from it, and without moral meaning, aim, or end, the *summum jus, summa injuria.*

§ 166. THE OBJECTION, THAT THE ORTHODOX GOD MUST HAVE BLOOD, EXPOSED.

But, though thousands of times refuted and exposed, this senseless charge of inconsistency with justice, unabashed, as often reappears with unabated audacity, even often attended by its co-mate in silliness, that "the orthodox God must have blood, if not that of sinners, then that of His own Son," the stupidity of which alone can mitigate its blasphemy. If men neither comprehend nor take cognizance of God's actual moral system, they, of course, can neither understand nor admit the atonement. But, if the law is in and from all moral natures and is therefore declared in God's inspired Word, there is a universal, eternal moral system with all its reciprocities, accountabilities, and retributions of reward and punishment, as we believe is demonstrated and developed in Part I. of this Work, then the absolute alternative for all human sinners is either the punishment of every one of them as he deserves, as liable to which our Lord declared them all "lost," or redemption from the *necessity* of suffering it by the infinitely merciful and gracious substitution for it which God has provided at such measureless cost to Himself. It is universal moral nature, the universal law in it, the universal quality of justice in the law, the universal obligation to obey it, its universal matter, its universal end, the universal rights, dues, concerns, and interests, the universal sense of desert of reward for obedience to the law and demand for it according to the desert, and the universal sense of guilt or desert of punishment for disobedience to it and demand for it according to the ill-desert;—it is all these combined,

hanging on and absolutely binding God, who, by necessity of the case, is in and eternal Ruler and Guardian of the total society, and who has in Him the same fundamental law which is in it, to maintain and administer it with unswerving regard for its quality of justice, both as ethical and as retributive, as the everlasting conservative of both its matter of moral love and its end of entire good; and to do this either by inflicting on all human sinners the retributive punishment which they deserve as ethical justice to the loyal society, or by precisely the substitution He provided and made for them. It was all these together that with united outcry made the only demand for blood—that is, for the just punishment of all human sinners—that ever was made in reference to them or to His Son as their representative substitute; and these made the demand *on God*, an absolute one, which put an infinite obligation upon Him as Ruler to comply with it, which He could not disregard without utter unrighteousness, injustice, and irreparable, ruinous, everlasting wrong to the total universe of moral beings. Not to comply with it would be abdicating His government and guardianship over them. For Him, having constituted them moral beings with His law in and from their practical reason, and so in a universal moral society and system, with all else which we have indicated involved, along with all else that is true of them individually and socially, making them liable, especially our fallen, disordered race, to such appalling danger of precipitation into moral destruction and horrors of being, even in this life, and into worse still hereafter;—for Him, having so constituted all and all involved, to leave them ungoverned, unguarded according to the universal law with its justice, to refuse to inflict deserved retributive punishment upon all sinners among them, and to cause them to know that He will not inflict it, and so that they have nothing to FEAR *from Him* for their sins, would be infinite crime and cruelty. It would be for Him to turn His back upon all in and connected with them which we have indicated, and to give them all over to the devil, or to become devils themselves, reciprocally cursing and cursed, tormenting and tormented; in whom all love, all mercy, all justice, all moral union would be forever dead, and instead utter selfishness would reign, developed in every possible way into a universal anarchy of hate, rage, conflict, and cruelty, with all the natural consequences of such a condition preying, like hell-hounds, on the sensibility and whole immortal nature of each of them *all* forever—foreshadowings of all which are constantly, daily manifest to all open eyes in the cases of myriads of both sexes

among mankind all over our world. *There is not a particle of tendency in any natural consequences of sin to bring sinners to love and obey God or even to fear Him. Nor is there any in inflicted punishment.* But the threatening of it, which has so radical a place in God's Word, and should have a corresponding one in true Gospel preaching, causes *fear* of it, without which who can appreciate the supreme meaning and importance of the message of salvation through Christ and His atonement? When this guilty fear is aroused, if the knowledge of Christ with His perfect atonement, and the offer of free and full forgiveness on its ground attends or is received with it, it is not merely like drink to the thirsty or food to the hungry to meet the realized want. But the measureless merciful love and grace of God in the "unspeakable gift" of His Son, and of the Son in becoming the Person He did and the substitute in His atoning sufferings and death for our hostile, guilty, wicked race, to retrieve them from the punitive retribution they deserve and to secure the agencies and means to bring them back to God in renewal to faith, love, and obedience, and to all the eternal glory and blessedness promised in the Gospel—these manifestations of love beyond all finite capacity of conception by both the Father and the Son, especially the Son, shown by the Spirit to all He can consistently bring to see them, constitute "the power of God and the wisdom of God," by which sin-closed hearts are opened, gratitude is evoked from them, the selfish, hardened will is melted and changed to a right one, and the whole moral nature is made a new creature in Christ, and restored to God and the eternal moral system. Thus God has done, at infinite cost to Himself, the utmost possible for Him to do to save human sinners, and all are and will be saved that can be, while none could be, but all would infallibly perish, according to the alternative of all objectors.

§ 167. THE QUESTION OF THE ATONEMENT ONE OF MORALITY—THE MORALITY OF GOD.

As we said near the beginning of this Work, the question of the atonement is one of fundamental morality—the morality of God, as well as of all other moral beings—the morality of the one universal moral law and moral system. It is a foolish assumption of objectors generally, that God is outside and independent of this law and system, so that His will is free from obligation, control, or limitation by them; that they exist only in and for His rational creatures, if not for man exclusively; and that He can regard them or not in

acting towards all or any part of these beings with an absolutely lawless freedom of option. It is a horrible assumption; for, if true, He is not a moral being, and can do no moral action. He can administer the law or not, reward the obedient or not, punish the disobedient or not, treat both alike or not, keep truth or not by mere lawless will. He can be neither just nor unjust, merciful nor unmerciful, deserving of love and honor or not, as He can be no moral actor, and can have no moral character. These objectors have no conception of a real moral system, which is necessarily founded in moral natures, having the law in and from them as a constant obliging mandate and standard of the *heart-will* and all its executive actions. Nor, as a side remark, does it ever enter the heads of many of them that, in the domain of morality, it is not the intellect that determines the heart-will to be good or evil and to right or wrong executive action; but that it is this heart-will that instigates, leads, directs, and determines the thinkings, reasonings, and judgings of the intellect, and the correlated desirings and feelings of the sensibility. "As a man *thinketh* in his heart, so is he," said James profoundly. The objections we have been noticing are specimens of the superficial thinkings and reasonings of many respecting the atonement and connected points, which, thrown out by public and private tongues and pens, float and toss on the surface of the adapted general mind as chips do on water. The objections to points connected with the atonement all imply the same assumption respecting God's freedom from the law and the moral system which is noted above, and yet uniformly involve their own contradiction. For, when objectors say, that He is *bound* or *ought* to do this, or not to do that; that He would do wrong, and be wicked and cruel, if He did that, and did not do this, they unawares assume that He is a moral being, that He is under obligation by the law in Him, and thus that He is in the universal moral society and system. Whenever they say He *ought* or *ought not* to deal with or treat human sinners so or so, they assume all just stated; but when they say He is not bound to deal with and treat them according to the law, or the demands of its justice, by which they are all intertied in that society and system with all the reciprocities of obligation and accountability they fundamentally involve, but is unrestrictedly free to deal with each of them *personally* as if not intertied in them and without regard to the law which constitutes them, and to all the rights, dues, interests, and concerns of all in them, they conflictingly assume that the law is not in Him, that He is not in that society and

system, but is free to disregard them, and so that He is not a moral being. Thus, as the ante-natal Esau and Jacob strove in the maternal womb, do these antagonist assumptions respecting God hold constant strife in the mental wombs of all objectors to the atonement and its allied points. Nor can this strife ever cease in any until they understandingly accept the fact of the atonement, in which alone all the truths respecting God as a moral being, and respecting the law with its justice in all moral natures, the moral system thus constituted, mercy and grace, are concentered and absolutely harmonized.

§ 168. QUESTIONS FOR OBJECTORS TO THE ATONEMENT TO CONSIDER.

In connection with the foregoing, we now ask objectors the questions following. How is such *really* vicarious suffering by a substitute, as we have shown Christ's was, any more or less consistent with the law or its justice than God's acting self-denial and self-sacrifice *for* sinners in any other way?—for example, as a mother does *for* her needy and suffering child, as a friend does *for* a distressed friend, or as a patriot does *for* his afflicted country? If self-denial and self-sacrifice by human persons, even for friends, win praise from all, and the more the greater they are, shall it be denied to God when He acts them to the greatest degree possible even for Him? and shall His right, power, and even moral liberty to act them be disputed? Nay, when there is no other way to rescue our world of sinners from the necessity of suffering the punishment they deserve for sin, which the first Part of this Work shows, and His infinite mercy impels the Father to act these to the degree of sending His only-begotten Son, and His Son to act them to the degree of executing all for which He was sent, consummated by "giving Himself for us an offering and a sacrifice to God" in His sufferings and death as our representative substitute to extricate us all from that necessity, on condition of our moral return to God, shall the compliance of each of these Persons with that boundless mercy for that end be objected to as in any possible way unjust, inconsistent, or unnecessary, not by angels nor devils, but by the very sinners themselves who are the objects of such mercy and cost of both? If, among men, one deserves the penalty of death for crime, how else could another suffer *for* him, so as to free him from the necessity of suffering it himself, than by dying in his stead? Or, if one can only save another from penal death by dying *for* him, if he does so is he not necessarily his substitute? How then can any

object without utter absurdity to the substitution of Christ for mankind? How is it not just as consistent with the justice of the law and the moral system constituted by it as His *helping* men in any other way, as His curing their diseases or restoring their dead to life? Since the *matter* of the law is pure moral love, and its *end* is the greatest good of God and all in the universal moral society; and since its *justice* is the eternal safeguard of *both;* by what possibility can His *voluntary* substitution of Himself in His sufferings and death for mankind to retrieve them from the necessity of suffering deserved retributive punishment, under the impulsion of His infinite philanthropy and mercy, be inconsistent in any way with the law, as to its matter, its end, or its justice? How can it be so for Him, as their representative, perfectly to render its *matter* to secure its *end* by meeting the demands of its justice, both as ethical to the loyal society and to God, and as retributive against sinners, that as many as possible of them might be saved from everlasting ruin, restored to God, and added, incalculably numerous, to the hosts which He only can count of that eternal society? How can it be less than the unapproached manifestation of the fulfillment of the law ever acted or to be acted by Christ or the Godhead, ever known or to be known by the intelligent universe? It was justice and mercy absolutely combined by the infinite self-denial and self-sacrifice of God.

§ 169. A STATEMENT BY BUSHNELL RESPECTING LOVE EXAMINED.

With these questions and all our preceding showings respecting the substitution of Christ before us, what must be thought of this respecting love:—"It does not come in officiously and abruptly, and propose to be substituted in a formal and literal way that overturns all the moral relations of law and desert?"* We ask how, when it comes in Christ to make substitution for human sinners, it comes as the quotation says any more than when it comes in some different way to rescue them from deserved evil, or than it does in *all acts and measures of self-denial and self-sacrifice* to rescue them from such evil? All acts and measures of God, whether of justice or of mercy, are necessarily not *officious*, but *official*, simply because they are executive and administrative. They are not love, but actings from it for special ends; and God's are all such according to infinite wisdom to secure the great *social ends* of the nature of social-moral beings, of the law with its justice

(*) Bushnell's V. S., p. 42.

in them, and of His government over them as such beings; so that they never can be *abrupt* in any other sense than that in which all right, benevolent, and wise *acts and measures* must be. Nor is substitution, as it really is, "formal and literal" in any other sense than that in which all acts and measures of administration must be; and as to its "overturning all the moral relations of law and desert," it is, as we have shown, the very and only thing which fundamentally supports them and keeps them from being utterly overturned, and which demonstrates that they are as firm and fixed as the pillars of the universe. It demonstrates that justice is no thing of mere invention and institution, but an essential of the law in all moral natures and of the changeless and eternal moral system; and that all the tumid sentimentalisms connected with this quotation and others which stock the whole Work it is from and its successor, and all kindred Works and sermons, are intrinsically, and especially if arrayed against substitution and the truths and facts it involves, in mortal war with "all the moral relations of law and desert," and all vital morality and theology. The objections in the quotation, and all others like them, are mere chimeras; and the position remains solid, that Christ's substitution of Himself in His sufferings and death for mankind as liable to suffer retributive punishment for their sins must be the one peerless exhibition in the history of the universe and of God Himself, on the one hand, of the absolute love with its essential justice which the law requires, and on the other, of the infinitude of His mercy and grace towards the hostile, self-ruined sinners of our race.

§ 170. IF JUSTICE AS RETRIBUTIVE IS DISCARDED, SO MUST IT BE AS ETHICAL; AND THE CERTAIN RESULT.

We have shown that the natural consequences of sin are no part of the real retributive penalty of the law for it, although abandonment of sinners to them is. The penalty is *suffering* INFLICTED by God according to their sins or ill-deserts. Its severity is not equal to all, but is proportioned to each as he deserves. The demand of justice against each is for it in this measure as ethically *due* to God and the universal loyal society both instead of the moral love he *owed* them and has robbed them of, and as the only possible reparation from him for the wrong and injury he has done them. As this due is not to God only, but to the whole society as well as to Him, it is not a mere *personal* matter to Him to forgive him, even if he should repent, since He is Ruler, and could have *no possible*

right to do so, as it would be replacing him in the society with all the rights of the obedient restored to him without its due from him being in any way met. It would be an arbitrary violation of universal justice and an eternal wrong and injury to all in the society, as it would in effect declare both sin and obedience and all their consequences of insignificant importance. It would nullify the law with its justice and so leave its matter without enforcement; and it would thus dissolve the whole moral society to monads, and the moral system to nonenity. There is, therefore, *an infinite obligation on God* to inflict retributive suffering on every sinner, unless He provides a substitute to suffer an infliction in his stead which will at least equally meet the demands of justice against him and to Himself and His universal and eternal society. We have repeated this here to have it seen that the due or debt of every sinner is necessarily *social*, so that the natural consequences of his sin, which are *personal and not social*, cannot be the payment of this social due or debt, and that its only possible payment is punitive suffering to the measure of ill-desert, inflicted by God as the necessarily responsible Ruler of the universal loyal society. *Without a substitute, the retributive suffering of all sinners as they deserve is the keystone of the arch of the universal moral system; but, with Him, His representative suffering instead of that of human sinners is at once that keystone, and the channel for the flow of the river of God's mercy and grace to all of them willing to drink its life-giving waters.* If it is *inflicted* on neither them nor Him, the intelligent universe is utterly loose from *social* accountability, whatever its countless units may do or become, a moral chaos resembling what the universe would be if the force of attraction acting by its law were abolished. If there is no justice as retributive, there can be none as ethical, and so no social-moral bond and no social-moral love. Hence, all the raptures and rhetoric of sentimental writers, preachers, and talkers about *love, love, love* of any kind, not moral, not just, not obedience to the law and its obligations, but of merely emotional, sympathetic kind, like in nature to the natural love of parents, to that of friends, to that of a patriot for his country, or to any compatible with persistent sin or even enormous wickedness, would forever lack utterance; and, instead of them, would be their opposites, if any remained uningulfed in utmost selfishness and depravity to utter them, sorrowful lamentations and fierce invectives by tongue and pen, poetic threnodies, Juvenalish and Aristophanic satires and mockeries over the race sunk and festering in inexpressible corruptions and horrors of inhumanity,

beastliness, villainies, crimes, and anarchies, raving and raging with deviltries and dynamite. Even the condition of the heathen world depicted by Paul in Rom. 1:18–32 would be universally outdone. A fig for all sentimentalities arrayed against, or not accordant with, eternal justice, both as ethical and as retributive; but life to all that truly are. The only alternative then for all human sinners was the necessary perdition of every one of them or the representative substitution of Christ to meet the demands of justice against him. But we have digressed from what we chiefly designed to say in this paragraph, and must resume it in another.

§ 171. WHY CHRIST'S SUFFERINGS MUST BE INFLICTED BY THE FATHER'S WILL, AND WOULD SAVE MEASURELESS SUFFERING.

We have shown that the penalty of the law is punishment *inflicted* by God on sinners after their probation ends according to each one's ill-desert; that Christ equivalently suffered this punishment for them all as their representative substitute according to the redemptive arrangement between the Father and Him; and that, being such a substitute, His suffering need not, at most, surpass that of any most guilty one of our race, as what would be equivalent to that deserved by one would be to that deserved by any, and would thus equal in moral potency and effect the deserved suffering of all. We have also shown that, considering His Person, His relations to God, to the universal society, and to man, and His reasons and motives, subjective and objective, for becoming all that He did, for becoming the Mediator between God and man, the representative of man to God in His whole course of obedience to its close, and in "giving Himself for him an offering and a sacrifice to God" —considering all this, His substitution had in it a moral value and potency immeasurably exceeding what the suffering by all men of their deserved punishment could possibly have had, not only to meet the demands of justice against them, but to replenish the eternal holy society with incomputable increase of numbers and of all possible good, besides throwing wide open the flood-gates of God's mercy and grace to pour abroad benefits and salvation to mankind. Now, what we wish to be specially noticed here is, that, as the punishment deserved by human sinners was to be *inflicted by God* as Ruler, it was necessary that Christ's suffering it, as their representative substitute, should also be *inflicted by Him*—the infliction in either case being by Him as Ruler, in order to have a universally *social* effect. As theirs was to be inflicted by God, so

Christ's must be to be *the same in kind* equally *social*, and so to meet the demands of justice against them and to secure its ends which are all social. It is certainly impossible in the nature of the case, that one should assume to suffer in the place of any number of others condemned to suffer the penalty of violated law, to free them from the necessity of suffering it, unless he assumes to suffer it essentially as they would. God's omniscience would infallibly see just what measure of suffering it would be necessary for Him to inflict on Christ as substitute as equivalent to that deserved by any sinner of the race, and that He would inflict, and no more. We thus see that the substitution of Christ in His suffering and death would be a measureless saving of suffering and addition of happiness forever in the universe. It is such in proportion to the whole number of mankind saved in consequence of it from all their deserved punishment, and made perfectly and eternally holy and blessed; and it must proportionally augment the happiness of all holy beings through endless ages, as also an eternal gain of pleasure and glory to God Himself, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; for each had His part in achieving it. When we come to examine the teachings of Scripture respecting the part of the Father towards Christ in relation to His atoning sufferings and death, we shall see that they were inflicted upon Him by the Father according to the everlasting plan of redemption. *As retributive justice to sinners is ethical justice to the universal society, and thus universally social, so the substitutional suffering of the former by Christ is the latter to that society, and thus necessarily equally universally social.*

§ 172. GOD NOT IMPASSIBLE.

We have all along disregarded the old dogma, broached by the heretical Noetus in the first half of the third Christian century, and adopted just after him by the great orthodox champion, Athanasius, that God is wholly *impassible*. We, of course, agree that He is incapable of physical or *essential* suffering, fully recognizing the immutability of His nature. But He is a moral being, and has the sensibility and susceptibilities of one in an infinite degree. The Scriptures abound with declarations and implications of most intense feelings in Him—of indignation and anger against sinners—of pity, compassion, and sympathy for their sufferings—of sorrow and grief for their conduct—of complacent love for all who love and obey Him—of every kind of holy emotion and passion, not necessarily peculiar to mere finite natures; and none of these can be true of Him, if He

is impassible. We must not deny nor weaken, but simply purify our conceptions of the emotions and passions ascribed to Him from the corruptions and taints which more or less pervade and pervert those of the same kind experienced and manifested by human sinners; and then we must believe theirs, compared with His, as to their measure and intensity, as mere drops of water compared with oceans. And now, what enlightened observer or subject of what are called bodily pains and torments, it matters not from what causes, does not know that it is really not the body, but the soul that suffers? The body of Christ *in itself* suffered nothing from all outrages heaped upon Him. His bodily injuries were the occasioning causes of all the pains He felt from them. As the Divine and human natures were united in Him into one Person, having one consciousness, and as His Divine nature must, as shown, have had an infinite sensibility and susceptibility, how is it conceivable that it should not have been pervaded with an infinite suffering sympathy with His human soul in His whole expiatory endurance? How is it possible that His Divine nature should have remained, like an infinite Stoic, impassible, unmoved by the terrible inflictions under which His human soul was writhing in agonies, beside which all the pains from and the death of His body, appalling as they were, were far inferior, and which that nature, yet unincarnate, had assumed to bear, and had become incarnate in great part to bear? Yet according to this notion of the impassibility of God, the only part that nature had in bearing any of them was that of supporting the human in doing it! How can this consist with a real union of the two in one Person?—with the fact that the Divine is a moral one?—with the fact, that the Person who atones for the sins of mankind by suffering as their representative substitute the penalty of the law deserved by them must be truly God as well as man, the one Mediator between God and man?—with the multiplied Scriptural assertions of the vast love of the Father for mankind in giving His only-begotten Son, His own Son, the Son of His love, and of the Son in giving Himself, to suffer all He did to expiate the sins of the whole world? —or with the whole nature of the case? If we are told that, if the Divine nature of Christ suffered, then, as it is one in essence with the Father's and the Holy Spirit's, each of these must have suffered equally with it, and, as God is omniscient and immutable, we must conclude that the whole Godhead has suffered and will suffer eternally, and thus it is inconsistent with the nature and attributes of God to suppose that Christ's Divine nature suffered, we here reply

as follows:—These difficulties are purely speculative about matters utterly incomprehensible by human minds; we encounter them equally in considering other truths concerning God; they conflict with the whole current of the teachings of Scripture concerning God; they are therefore of no weight against the position that Christ's Divine nature did suffer, as all moral natures can, as really as did His human, and in its proportion. This position is not one of speculation, but is perfectly comprehensible by human minds, and is demanded by the whole nature of the atonement, and by the facts, that God is a moral being, and, as such, must have an infinite sensibility, and that His Word teaches us that He is full of pity for sufferers, sympathizing, merciful, pleased with the obedient and angry with the disobedient, and that He has all the holy emotions and passions connected with absolute benevolence and justice. Nor would it be difficult to show, that, instead of the suffering of the Divine nature of Christ proportionally with His human, in its way, being incompatible with its perfect blessedness, it was really essential to it, and that it no more conflicts with the immutability of God than His emotions of grief, indignation, or any others. We only add, that it is our conviction, that this old dogma has, from the time of Athanasius down, wherever taught and believed, been a block in the way of understanding the doctrine of the atonement, which is fundamental to, and one of the most sublime and precious in, Christianity, the supreme manifestation of the unspeakable merciful love of God towards sinful, guilty man. The whole Church ought to rejoice with songs and shouts of jubilation, that, like the stone from the door of the sepulcher of Jesus, it has been rolled away, so that it and all willing to look may see Him in all His redeeming love and glory, and the Father and Holy Spirit with Him.

CHAPTER XV.

Whether there was an obligation on God to provide an atonement for human sinners, such as we have shown.

§ 173. THE POSITION OF THE REFORMERS ON THIS POINT NOTICED.

The question here for consideration is, whether the law in God's nature, by its obliging imperative or mandate required Him to provide a representative substitute to assume and undergo a suffering fully equivalent in moral value and potency of influence to that deserved by mankind for their sins, to be a provisional ground for the forgiveness of every one of them who would truly return to Him in the moral way of faith and obedience enjoined in the Gospel. This question lacks and demands a thorough consideration.

The Reformation was a return to the Scriptural doctrines of grace from the perversions of it. Its struggles and battles were waged with flaming zeal around these doctrines as the fortresses of Christianity; and everything was inexorably expelled from the lines of the renewed faith, which, in the Reformers' minds, was inconsistent with the radical truth, that all salvation comes to man as pure "grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus." The leaders among them were by nature of the grandest order of human souls, and still more such by their devoted allegiance to what they believed to be the true Gospel of Christ. But they were men, as it were just aroused from a profound sleep, and were not infallible. In their time, mental and moral science was yet crude, and the book of consciousness, which contains it, was little studied for the purpose of learning the true psychology. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at and noted for their disparagement, that, in their rightly fervent zeal for the doctrines of grace, and their mistaken view of the human will, as not the free self-determiner and author of its own moral choices in view of motives, and under whatever influences, and thus only responsible and deserving of praise or blame,

reward or punishment for them, they failed to make some important discriminations, to make even an approach to a reconciliation between God's sovereignty and man's freedom, and between what is true of God and what of man, made in His image as a moral nature and agent. It was a matter of course, that they should suppose and assume that the notion of grace excludes obligation on God, in any sense, to exercise it; that it was wholly optional with him to do so or not in any case; and that their view of these points should remain a settled tenet in the reformed Churches adhering to their teachings. In his Work, misnamed "Vicarious Sacrifice," Dr. Bushnell came forward asserting directly the opposite view in most unqualified terms. We had considered the matter for years before that Work appeared, and had reached the conclusions we now proceed to present. It will be seen by those cognizant of his sweeping view, that ours is very different from it. We deem this statement necessary to secure a just consideration of ours, to the presentation of which we now invite attention.

§ 174. NO OBLIGATION ON GOD TO SINNERS TO MAKE AN ATONEMENT FOR THEM, OR TO SAVE THEM; NOR TO OTHER BEINGS.

We believe we have shown conclusively that all moral beings, God included, have essentially the same law in and from their nature; that justice is the intrinsic quality of this law, which gives it its *social* character by putting each of them under its bond of obligation to render to every other his *due* of moral love and of all kinds of treatment which men call *duties;* and that, by thus binding all to these perpetual antiselfish and holy reciprocities, it constitutes them all into a universal and eternal moral society and system, with God, from the nature of the case, necessarily in them, and the responsible Ruler of the whole society and Maintainer of the system. We have shown that, as all sin is violation of the law with this quality of justice in it, it is, in principle, intrinsically antagonist to the total universal society and system with God in and over them, to all the natural and moral rights and dues of all in them, to all moral love and practical justice, and to all the interests and concerns of all in that society, including God both as a Person and as Ruler; and that its actors therefore forfeit all their rights to the love of God and of all in that society, and deserve nothing but retributive punishment according to their guilt. Consequently, the imperative or mandate in God's mind can enjoin nothing towards them as due to them on any ground whatever of justice, unless it be, that He shall

not treat any of them worse than his ill-desert and the whole end of the law demand. Hence, instead of the justice of the law being *for* them, as it is *for* all holy beings, it is turned positively *against* them and demands their punishment according to their desert. This demand must be met either by their suffering the punishment themselves, in which case they must be forever lost, or by a representative substitute, provided by God from His mercy, suffering it in their stead, in which case whoever of them will return to God during the gracious probation granted with the provision, will be saved. But, to say that He was under any *obligation* TO *them* to make this substitution is to say that they had a right to have it made by Him, and so that His making it is demanded by justice, and not purely a measure of *mercy and grace.* There never can be an obligation of justice on God or any other being *to* the objects of mercy, to exercise it *to* them; for, if there were, mercy would be no more mercy, and grace no more grace. He can put Himself under an obligation of promise to them, but the promise is mercy and grace, and the obligation is not directly one of the law, but one voluntarily assumed under it. Hence, whatever He does for human sinners vicariously or otherwise must be done without any obligation of justice upon Him to them. *Mercy, as a disposition, is the will, and, as an exercise, is the effort, to do for the guilty whatever is consistently possible to secure or promote their rescue from punishment merely for the sake of their good, and the resulting good of others.* Its direct aim is restricted to *each* of its objects. It is exercised and acted by God towards each of them to secure his good for the sake of what it is to him, and therefore is not *social* in the universal sense in which justice is. Consequently, its aim and action must consist with that of justice, so that it can be acted only when and as *wisdom* directs. Wisdom stands in eternal league with justice, and can sanction no effort of mercy for any sinner which does not consist with the rights, dues, and good of all holy beings, which justice guards. Hence, if there was any obligation on God to exercise and act mercy towards human sinners in any way, it was not one *to* them, not one to secure or promote the good of any of them irrespective of His own good and that of all holy beings. Nor could He be under any *to* the universal holy society to provide an atonement for human sinners, however much the salvation of any number of these secured by it would accord with and promote the good of that society; for it could have no *right* to call on Him to provide it, or which could, in any sense, make it *due* to it from Him. What

the law requires of Him to it is the full, unmodified, moral love, which is its matter, and His rendering this to it includes His punishing sinners as they deserve, instead of His exempting them from punishment. He could only come under an obligation to it to provide an atonement for them in the same way as to sinners themselves—that is, by a promise to it that He would, or by declaring to it His purpose to do so. It is therefore certain, that He was under no obligation *to* any created beings, bad or good, to provide one for mankind; and it is equally so, that He was under none *to* Himself *in the same sense.* For He had *no right or claim* against Himself to make it *due* to Himself to provide it. The unmodified love of Himself required by the law would have been perfectly rendered to Himself by His punishing human sinners as they deserve. If He was under the least obligation *to* the holy society or *to* Himself to provide an atonement for them, His doing so would be executing mere justice, and not mercy and grace. But is this saying that there was no obligation upon Him in any sense to provide one for mankind?

§ 175. GOD'S CREATION BY THE BEST POSSIBLE PLAN, AND WHY HE SPARED THE FIRST PAIR WHEN THEY SINNED.

To find the true answer to this question, we must consider the main facts of the whole case. Both Scripture and the whole aspect and constitution of worlds and creatures attest that God created them according to an all-including *purpose* or *plan*, as set forth in § 100;—a plan of universally correlated means and ends, and one which, we may assume with certainty, was the best possible. As this plan of the universe embraced all its parts—all its material atoms, all the force-essences with their laws which operate upon those atoms and effect their combinations, correlations, and motions, but are not inherent in or qualities of them, all life, all varieties and species of living organisms, vegetable and animal, and all varieties and species or kinds of minds, sentient, instinctive, and rational, the rational being all moral—none of all these parts could be left out of it without either the abandonment of the plan, or more or less damaging failure in its execution. But, if the plan was the best that the infinite wisdom of God could devise, we may be perfectly sure that in executing it, He never has varied from it, even to a hair-breadth, and never will, because He can never be wiser, nor have any motive to do so. By adopting the plan, He bound Himself to its perfect and perpetual execution. Neither matter nor any force with its law, which operates upon it, *exists for*, or is an *end* in, itself. The

same is true of the entire vegetable kingdom, and really of the whole animal kingdom below men, as far as this world is concerned. As far as the permanent force-essences of the universe relate to and operate upon our globe, and in it, no dwellings, engines, machinery, or instruments of man's invention are more manifestly designedly aimed to secure necessities for his existence, and advantages and benefits to him, than these are; and no less manifestly is the same true of both the vegetable and the irrational animal kingdoms. Science must recognize teleology or brand itself with willfully alienating an essential part of its constituent truth and integrity. The plain fact is, that our globe and all its contents and processes were designed *means* for the existence and benefit of man as the consummate *end* of all. He is such, because he is an *end* in himself; and he is so, because, though, as to his body, he belongs to the animal kingdom, its crown and glory, as to his mind, he is a spirit, a rational, moral, immortal nature, the peer or paramount of all other such natures, the image and likeness of his Creator. The first pair were made with a race-constitution, and thus all their posterity seminally in them; and the New Testament abundantly shows, that, as connected with Christ, the redeemed of them will outrank all other moral natures in the universe and be of supreme importance to the ever multiplying universal and eternal society. It is often asked why, when the first pair sinned, God did not cut them off before they had offspring, and create another in their stead; and we think the foregoing supplies some *hints* towards an answer. If He created the total universe according to the best possible plan, which His omniscient wisdom could devise, He created every part of it according to the same, and all the parts, not as separate from, but as correlated and intertied to each other in the everlasting whole. He must create the first pair precisely according to this best plan, if at all, though perfectly foreknowing their fall and its involved effects in all their posterity. We may infer with certainty that, if He had created them at all otherwise, the results would have been worse, probably wholly remediless. And, when they sinned, if God had cut them off and created a second pair, He could only have repeated the first, it may be with far worse results. Besides, the best plan of the whole, and of every part as related to all the others, may have required, and doubtless did require, that He should preserve the fallen pair and their foreseen race, though so damaged by their sin. We say it doubtless did require this, because He did so, despite all that He knew would be true of them, and at such stupendous

cost to Himself. But, along with preserving the race, He knew all the temptation from the devil, the world, and the flesh that would beset all the individuals of its generations, all their susceptibilities to them, the bias of their will from obedience to sin and all their evil tendencies, the selfishness of their first moral choice between obedience to the law and self-gratification, and their continuance in it until or unless regenerated, all the natural and social consequences of it, their guilt or desert of punishment for it, and all their wrong doings from it; and He knew the absolute necessity that He should *inflict* this punishment upon them, or disregard and war with the eternal law, with all moral natures containing it, including His own, with all the moral love it requires, with universal ethical justice and the total moral system constituted by it, and should thus license and favor a universal riot and ravage of all wickedness, vices, injustice, crimes, havoc of all good and happiness, and the reign of the devil complete and unopposed, with all its horrors over our whole subverted, dehumanized race, cursed and consumed by sin, or should provide a redemptive measure, including an atonement, for them, *the best one possible*, by which to retrieve as many of them as possible from sin and its deserved punitive retribution. Knowing all this, He devised and connected the plan of that measure along with that of their creation, and that of the creation of the earth and the universe—not as part of His moral government over them which is founded in their moral nature and His own, but as a measure of mercy and grace to recover as many of them as it would be morally possible to recover from their foreseen sin and all its ruinous consequences, natural, social, and retributive. As previously shown, this measure would be a provision designedly adapted for them all alike, but, as moral beings naturally possess the power of free choice in view of motives, it could avail for those only who could be morally brought to comply with its conditions—that is, to turn from sin and Satan to God by faith and obedience, for "without faith, it is impossible to please Him." We overlooked one radical point, when stating reasons a short distance back why God did not cut off the first human pair when they sinned and create another in their stead, which we introduce here. It is, that, according to His all-wise plan, He created all spiritual natures, not only rational, moral beings, but *immortal*, which is intrinsically included in the meaning of the words respecting the creation of man, that "He created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him: male and female created He them." As His nature is immortal, so must theirs be;

and, as the *principia* of their posterity were all, according to that plan, included in them, to cut them off would have been to give it up, as it respected them and their race, as not wise nor good. That He created all spiritual natures immortal is evinced by the fact that He did not cut off the angels that sinned; and so the notion of the annihilation of the incorrigibly wicked of mankind is against all the evidence of the case.* If He had cut them off, what vast evil, according to ignorant human judgment, would have been prevented! But His ways are not as ours, nor His thoughts and plans.

§ 176. WHY AN INFINITE OBLIGATION ON HIM TO DO ALL MORALLY POSSIBLE TO SAVE HUMAN SINNERS.

We have shown in a previous place that the sin and guilt of the first pair were not absolute, but greatly modified. They were in great ignorance of what sin, as disobedience to God, involved, and without any experience or knowledge by information or example of its dire consequences, signified by the threatened death it would incur. Eve was much the most susceptible to the influence of temptation. Satan, vastly superior in mind, and thoroughly practiced in craft and lies, chose her when alone to experiment upon. Scripture tells how he did it and succeeded in leading her to sin, and how she next led Adam to do the same. Plainly they were both *guilty* and objects of *pity*. They had disobeyed and "brought death into the world, and all our woe," but they were duped, and knew but little of what they did. In some respects the case of their posterity during the earlier portion of their life is even worse. They enter the world inheriting damaged natures and tendencies, by which their heart-will is biased to choose sinfully. With appetites and desires for gratifications intensely urgent; with susceptibilities promptly quick to be affected by the perception, knowledge, or imagination of objects or conditions adapted to excite them to urgent desires; with reason, conscience, and judgment at first undeveloped, like germs in new-planted seeds, and, after their development begins, imbecile as helpless infancy just born, and acquiring strength even more slowly than the infant does; with no experience of the tendencies and consequences of moral action, nor knowledge of it as such; with the influences and infections of all the manifestations of temper, spirit, character, conduct, conversation, treatment, teachings, advices, enticements, and all other modes of imparting the complex whole received from all others of all ages, much of it

(*) Tennyson's In Memoriam. XXXIV.

entirely, most of it to a great degree, stimulant to the natural evil tendencies of minds from early childhood through all youth, urging to and confirming in the selfishness of their first moral choice, and, in far the most cases, not counteracted, much less neutralized or prevented by real religious and moral teaching, training, example, and influence; with all the temptations of the devil superadded to all indicated; with all there is besides in the whole heathen world, in all its superstitions, misbeliefs, pernicious customs and corruptions, ignorance of God and holy truth, savageries, barbarisms, and horrors of inhumanity, and all there is in Christian lands of atheism and infidelity, of disregard and scorn of, and war against the Scriptural revelation and all its truth concerning God and His law, the moral system, and all His relations to mankind, and enormities of villainies, crimes, and corruptions of all kinds; and with the thought of what immeasurably worse would have been true of our total race, if God had not devised the redemptive measure along with His purposing the creation of our race, what appalling danger surrounds them! But, beyond all this, by purposing to create them moral beings, having moral reason with the perfectly just social law in it, and therefore all interbound in a universal and eternal moral system, with all its relations of reciprocity, responsibility, accountability, demands for retributive rewards and punishments according to deserts, and with God necessarily in the system and administering a moral government over all, He made it absolutely *obligatory on Himself, as subject to His own moral reason and conscience*, to inflict on every accountable actor of them all the punishment deserved by him, as ethical justice to all holy beings ever to exist with Himself in the universal, eternal society under Him demands; so that every accountable actor of the total race must infallibly "perish" and be "lost," as Christ clearly taught they would be, unless God should provide the redemptive measure. Such was the whole case before God's omniscient eye when He purposed to create mankind as He did according to His absolutely wisest and best possible universal plan; and, in view of the whole case, as we can see it, we ask, would it not have been *infinitely wrong* for Him to create our race, without purposing this measure for it, by and through which to do all possible "to repair the ruins of the fall," and to save as many of them as possible? Could His doing so possibly consist with benevolence, with mercy towards them as foreseen? Must He not have felt an *infinite obligation upon Him* to purpose, and in time to execute that measure?

§ 177. AN OBLIGATION TO RESCUE FROM ALL THIS EVIL, AND TO SECURE IMMEASURABLE GOOD, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE.

To assist in answering these questions, let us consider how immeasurable by any finite mind the good to be secured to even one sinner is, and how that of each additional one of all the countless hosts who may be saved constitutes an aggregate which the omniscience of God alone can know. The greatness of that aggregate and of each constituent of it is measured by all the difference seen by God between the condition of each of these immortals in everlasting ruin and woe from their perpetual, utter depravity and its natural consequences added to those of their sin in this life, from their endless exclusion from the universal holy society and restriction to the region inhabited by those only of all grades of reprobate character, the outlaws of the universe; and from the positive punishment their sins deserve, and their condition, if in everlasting perfection of being, character, union with God and the universal and eternal holy society with all evil characters and influences forever excluded, and in blessedness and glory unspeakable from God's all-gracious, fostering, and consummating hand. We must also consider, that God must foreknow that, by providing a redemptive measure, including an atonement, He can consistently secure this stupendous good for at least a sufficient number to justify it as worthy of it. Considering also, that His execution of this measure would involve the greatest self-denial and self-sacrifice possible for Him and would be done for them from infinite mercy alone, we are brought back to the same inquiry made above—Could there be *any kind of obligation* upon Him to adopt and execute this measure, including the representative substitution of Christ in His sufferings and death for them, to meet and satisfy the demands of justice, both as retributive against them, and as ethical to God and the universal loyal society, so as to permit a full outflow of grace towards them, and the salvation of every one of them who could be brought into the conditional moral state for forgiveness? Could His knowledge of the fact that, on the one hand, He could rescue so many of our race from utter loss in absolute sin and misery, and correspondingly diminish evil in the universe; and that, on the other hand, He could not only restore them to eternal holiness and perfect good and blessedness, but also to full union with the whole loyal, eternal society and Himself, and thus not only gratify its holy and benevolent heart and vastly augment its everlasting good, but, in their special relations to Christ, they would be of everlasting service and

blessing to the increasing universe of moral beings and of delight and honor to Him, and that He, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, would forever receive immeasurably greater pleasure and declarative glory from having saved them than He could from having punished them all as they deserve—could, we say, His knowledge of all this possibly fail to impose an obligation on Him to adopt and execute the great measure of redemption, including that of making the atonement? He is a moral being; and His moral reason containing the eternal law, His conscience, and His sensibility are absolutely perfect. Whether, then, must not that reason have issued to Himself an *obliging imperative*, *mandate*, or *dictate* to exercise and act towards our foreseen sinful, guilty, "lost" race the *benevolence*, not of justice, as towards all holy beings, but of pure mercy and grace? —that is, to prevent all the *evil* and to do all the *good* possible to them consistent with the maintenance of perfect justice, and with these ends, to do such immeasurable good to the entire and eternal, ever-increasing loyal society, and to Himself?

§ 178. THE REAL QUESTION—WHETHER THERE IS AN OBLIGATION TO EXERCISE MERCY, WHEN CONSISTENT WITH JUSTICE.

Discerning minds, then, will perceive that the question is precisely this, whether there is an obligation or obliging imperative or mandate in moral natures to exercise and act mercy, when consistent with justice, even if involving great self-denial and self-sacrifice for the achievement of its end, so long as that end is a good outweighing the evil of these. We answer it as follows: If there is not, how can there be any virtue, any worthiness of praise and honor in exercising and acting it, or in self-denial and self-sacrifice, however great, in doing so for its objects or end, or any sin in not acting it? In the nature of the case, all God's love towards human sinners must be pure mercy alone, because they have forfeited all right to it and deserve only punishment. That is, it can only be *a love of their being and its good*, despite their sin and guilt; and is not His love towards them morally virtuous and deserving of infinite praise and honor? Is it not certain that all love, not merely instinctive, merely natural affection, mere blind sympathy or sentimental gush—that is, all *moral love* or *pure good-will* from any being for others, is *moral* simply because it is, in some sense, compliance with obligation, that is, with the law, being demanded as its matter for its end, which is the real good of moral beings? This only makes it *moral*, and so, not only esthetically beautiful and amiable,

as all kinds of love are more or less in some of their aspects, but morally praise-worthy and deserving; and does not the whole world know, nature-taught, that mercy and all the self-denial and self-sacrifice it involves for its objects are *moral, virtuous, praise-worthy?* —that to refuse to act them, when consistent with justice, is somehow a violation of obligation, wrong, immoral, sin, often cruel, sometimes crime?—and that, the more impossible it is that there can be any obligation of justice *to* its objects, the more morally sublime, illustrious, and praise-worthy the exercise of it towards them is, if consistent with justice? *This obligation to love moral natures and, as far as practicable, to promote their good for the sake of what it is to them, whether they deserve such action towards them or not—that is, solely because they are moral beings,* has always been affirmed or assumed among men though so much disregarded or so defectively complied with. If men, so perverted and dulled by sin, have it affirmed in them, can it be thought that God, the all-perfect Archetype of them all, having created them in His own image, who is infinite in goodness and perfection, does not have it affirmed in Him, and absolutely binding upon Him? Besides, could He, as we maintain He did, adopt and execute in its time the redemptive measure in and through Christ and His really vicarious atonement for the sins of mankind without an obligation upon Him to do it, He perfectly knowing all it would cost Him to do it, and that His doing it would be His supreme *moral* action in the universe? If He had not done it, would He have violated His conscience? Would He have stood before His own eyes as the absolutely good and holy being which doing it would demonstrate Him to be, or not self-condemned as lacking benevolence and unworthy of His own approval and of the eternal approval and plaudits of the intelligent universe? No; we believe the position certainly true, that He was under an obligation, which no finite thought can measure, imposed by the imperative or mandate of His own moral reason or nature to adopt and execute the whole redemptive system, including the making of the atonement, if He created mankind.

§ 179. SUCH AN OBLIGATION DETRACTS NOTHING FROM MERCY AND GRACE, ETC.

This position involves no slightest depreciation of the mercy and grace, self-denial and self-sacrifice of God in devising and executing the great measure of redemption, its vicarious atonement, and all else included in it. It does not, because the obligation

impelling Him was, in no sense one of justice *to* them, or *to* any other beings, but was simply one to act the benevolence of mercy in willing and promoting, as far as that of justice would permit, and as far as would be possible, the good of human sinners purely for the sake of what it would be to them, and, doubtless, for the sake of the good which He knew would result from His doing it, and from the good which it would secure to the universal loyal society and Himself in it forever. This is really only saying in effect that this obligation upon Him from His own moral reason or nature was to act perfect benevolence *to them in that way* and along with them to all holy moral beings—that is, to do the greatest good possible to them in their condition and along with them to the total intelligent universe. The fact, therefore, of this obligation on Him demonstrates absolutely that it is only by mercy and grace that any sinner of our race can be saved. Nor can any of them with a particle more of consistency or reason claim, as his right and due, any favor from God on account of this obligation upon Him, than if there was none; and, if any of them receives it from Him, not a particle the less must he ascribe it to His mercy and grace alone. His compliance with this obligation, sphered in Himself, is simply one way of acting out His goodness, which is certainly *moral* or *righteous, absolute conformity to His eternal moral nature, or the law in and from it;* and is it any detraction from His goodness, to say that both it and His adoption and execution of the whole redemptive measure for the stupendous end stated were done in compliance with an obligation imposed by the law in His nature? Must He have no law in it, and act by none, in order to be good, and to be merciful? In fact, the whole question before us is rooted in this, whether His goodness is His most free, eternal conformity to the moral law in and from His nature, or to *nothing*, and consists in mere *arbitrary willing* without any *obliging standard*, which, therefore, could be neither right nor wrong, and be exactly contrary to all we necessarily deem right. If it consists in this, how could it have moral character, righteousness, praise-worthiness in it? The question, why He is, in any moral sense, what we call good could never find an answer. Any will, which there is no law to direct or bind, must necessarily be purely arbitrary in all its action, and cannot be *moral* in any. Is God's will such? Is it such in His moral government, in His providence, in the redemptive measure, in His assertion and administration of justice, in His mercy and grace, in His threatenings and promises, in any of His action towards moral

beings? The answer to all questions concerning this matter lies in this nutshell—He is a moral being; and, if so, is necessarily under the obligations of the eternal, immutable moral law in and from His moral reason in all His action towards His rational creatures to do the greatest good possible. He can never act towards nor treat any one of them irrespective of the obligations of that purely social law, as shown in our first Chapter and in other places.

§ 180. DEPRECIATES NOTHING, BUT EXALTS, SUBLIMES, AND GLORIFIES THE WHOLE SYSTEM OF CHRISTIAN TRUTH.

This position loosens nothing, lowers nothing, depreciates nothing, but exalts, sublimes, and glorifies everything in the system of Christian truth. Lord Bacon says, that "when man seeth the dependence of causes, and the works of Providence, then, according to the allegory of the poets, he will easily believe that the highest link of nature's chain must needs be tied to the foot of Jupiter's chair." This is his prescription for the cure of atheism; and no less is it, we add, of all the silliness of agnosticism and mere materialism. It is saying that all secondary causes, or forces with their laws, are established and maintained in linked dependence on God's omnipotent will as the primal cause and force, and operate according to the counsels or plans of His infinite intelligence and wisdom for His determined ends in the universe. So, when one contemplates the whole measure of redemption, and sees the stupendous degrees of self-denial and self-sacrifice acted in it by the Godhead, especially in the sufferings and death of the perfectly righteous Son, as the representative substitute of our race of sinners, to retrieve them from the necessity of suffering the penalty of the law as justice demands; and when he recognizes that, in all those wonders of merciful love for them, alienated from and hostile in heart to God by their sin, He has done nothing from mere arbitrary will or caprice, but all according *to His infinite* wisdom, with perfect adaptation to harmonize ethical justice to all holy beings, Himself included, with mercy to them and grace to secure all possible, everlasting good to them, and with them to the entire and eternal holy society and Himself, he will easily believe that they were His transcendent *moral acts*, and that the highest link of the chain they constitute is tied, not to the foot of His eternal chair, but to the staple in His nature, as immutable as it is, of the law's imperative to exercise mercy and grace to them, as far as justice permits, though at such measureless cost to Himself, to achieve all this boundless good. How vastly more

sublime is this fastening and its supernal pendent than that so finely expressed by the illustrious Bacon!

§ 181. NO MORAL ACTION SUPEREROGATORY.

The common view of this matter makes the whole action of God in the redemptive measure entirely *supererogatory*, because done without any kind of obligation; and it is only a logical extension of the principle assumed, to say that all action of mercy by both God and men is supererogatory. If the obligation of justice is the only one, then all such action by Him or them must be such. But, if what we have shown is valid, it is a demonstration that such action could not possibly be *moral*, whether done by God or any other moral being, and that the assertion, or even the conception of it is instrinsically absurd, and as mischievous as it is absurd. That both God and man can do actions not demanded by justice or its obligation is, we think, incontestable; but that either of them can do any *moral* action, to do which no kind of obligation binds, is, in the nature of the case, impossible. Thus our position sweeps utterly away the whole delusion of a vast store of supererogatory merits of saints in reserve for supplying the deficiences of living sinners, and every kindred notion. No saint ever lived that had any such merits. There can be no *moral* action in heaven or on earth, which is not required by, and obedience to, the law in moral natures, either unmodified or modified in the way we have shown.

Conclusion of the preceding Parts.

§ 182. SOME REASONS FOR WRITING THE PHILOSOPHICAL OR PSYOLOGICAL PARTS OF THIS WORK.

We have evolved our positions in the preceding Parts of this Work respecting the law, conscience, retributions, and some involved points from data in consciousness, and those respecting other points mainly from Scripture. We believe the former, as well as the latter, valid against all the objections urged against a positive moral government, positive retributions, substitutional atonement, and all the essential doctrines of Christianity involved in these. We had two reasons for adopting this method—one, that the principal recent attempts to subvert these fundamental doctrines have been made on an assumed philosophical basis, and should be met on the same; the other that we rejoiced in the opportunity thus presented to show that philosophy is not against, but on the side of, Christianity, even in its peculiar facts and doctrines, and really demands it as its

logical supplement; so that, whoever denies Christianity as a whole, or any of its essential parts, must assume positions at war with facts and truths of sound moral philosophy, from some of which the only logical road leads to the gulf of atheism, or, which is substantially the same, of pantheism. The grand characteristic of Christianity is, that is grounded on, embodies, and unfolds the social character of the law in and from all moral natures, and thus the social-moral character of all such natures. It does this in the mode made necessary by the fact and peculiarity of the sin of mankind; and the peculiarity of their sin springs from that of their nature, which determines their correlation to each other, to God, and to all other moral beings. It sets forth the acting out, on the one hand, of the absolutely *just good-will* of God towards Himself and the universal holy society, and, on the other, of His mercy, the only remnant of good-will possible towards sinners, in such manner and measure towards mankind as must forever be the abiding amazement of all intelligent beings. Hence, to deny any of its essential parts is correspondingly to deny the social-moral character of the law and of moral natures, and logically requires a denial of that character of both; and this involves the assumption, that the design of God in constituting rational creatures is realized in pure individualism and self-centering action; for there could really be no such thing as selfishness in them, any more than in the irrational animals. The social-moral nature of God and of His rational creatures is manifested and demonstrated in Christianity in all His own action and suffering, and in all the relations of mankind to each other, to other intelligent creatures, and to Himself; and it is asserted in the inspired revelation as the radical reason for His entire redemptive system. Nor is there another manifestation or demonstration of this transcendent fact in all the ways of God and all the phenomena of the rational universe, which compares with these, more than the light of the moon and stars does with that of the meridian sun, shining in his strength. The love of God for man, and that between man and man, and between men and all good beings, which fulfills the requirement and ideal of the Christian revelation, are simply the outflow and exhibition of the strength of the interbinding social-moral ties of their natures; and it is precisely this nature and the effect of sin upon it in man, and resultantly in God and all good beings, which made the redemptive system a moral necessity, and at the same time the unapproached and unapproachable demonstration of it and its intrinsic value. Deny Christianity, therefore,

and it fades away into comparative insignificance, as the effulgence of brighest sun-glory into the dim, glimmering light of moon and stars!

§ 183. CHRISTIANITY AND SKEPTICISM CONTRASTED. THE LATTER ONLY DESTRUCTIVE.

Christianity has, therefore, no apologies to make for its existence, its nature, or any of its facts or features; no reason to hide, or repudiate anything in or belonging to itself, as unseemly or unsanctioned by reason; no indulgence to crave before any tribunal of philosophy or intellect, more than it had when Paul preached it before the Areopagus in Athens or than reason has. For, while it is the deepest, truest, grandest, most sublime philosophy on earth or in heaven, the philosophy of God brought down from heaven in a real sense never dreamt of by Socrates or Plato, all objections to it, or to any essential element of it, are demonstrably derogatory to the moral nature of God and of all His rational creatures, to His character as infinitely good, and to all that is great, grand, and holy in the end of creation; and they essentially tend to all denial, and thus to atheism as their ultimate terminus. Skepticism, therefore, is no evidence of superiority of mind, of independence of thought or investigation, of finer natural sensibility, of any worthy quality whatever, but is, in itself, a just reproach to all who become inmeshed in its superficialities. It belongs to the *destructive*, not to the *constructive* type of mind; to the *lower*, not to the *higher* order; to one which requires for the performance of its kind of work far less reason, insight, talents, and substantial attainment, than are requisite for seeing and grasping in thought all that essentially pertains to a great moral system, the vital relations of its facts, principles, and parts, its adaptations and tendencies, its intrinsic importance, and its sure results. The *destructive* may glow with luxuriant rhetoric; the *constructive* must elaborate the intrinsic reasons and logical connections and dependences of all involved in the whole. The *destructive* may resort to all uses and tricks of wit, persiflage and ridicule in attacking some misconceived or misrepresented feature of even the grandest whole, to its temporary disparagement; the *constructive* must, like all builders, do serious, earnest, systematic, substantial work, and can only use like weapons to those of the destructive, if at all, in repelling and refuting his attacks, and then with becoming restraint. The *destructive, as such,* never achieves anything great or permanent; the *constructive* often leaves magnifi-

cent monuments behind him, more lasting than marble, and august with perennial beneficence to mankind. Skepticisms and skeptics spring up and flourish for a day, and then perish, like Jonah's gourd; Christianity and its loyal advocates and unfolders go steadily on in their Divine mission, achieving their matchless results and ends among men, unresting as the sun, with perpetual augmentation of good to man and glory to God, and with the sure destiny to bring the whole world yet under their benignant sway. Nor has anything ever been gained for Christianity, nor will there ever be, by repressing, eliminating, subtracting from, or substituting something else for, any of its constellated facts or truths to suit skepticism. "The foolishness of God is wiser than men; and the weakness of God is stronger than men;" and Christianity can only prosper by being set forth as it is, unclouded, and with all its supernal lights complete.

§ 184. WHAT FOLLOWS, IF WE HAVE PROVED AN OBLIGATION ON GOD TO MAKE AN ATONEMENT.

If we have proved, as we believe we have, that there was an obligation in God upon Himself, in the sense of an obliging imperative or mandate from His own infinite reason or nature, to exercise mercy towards guilty men, by substituting His own suffering in Christ for that due by justice to Himself and all holy beings from them, then we have demonstrated that a real vicarious atonement is the only moral one, the only one at all. We have thus turned the positions of all who object to it, either as arbitrary, having no ground in morality, as the advocates of the so-called moral atonement and others do; or as utterly inconsistent with the benevolent and righteous character of God, and revolting to the moral sense by representing Him as so inexorable, (some say, even cruel and bloodthirsty,) that He must have blood to render Him placable, as infidels, generally, and some professed Christians, ignorantly and persistently say. This last objection, always shameful to its utterers, because always either a willful, or a grossly ignorant misrepresentation of the doctrine of atonement as held by any class, has been, thousands of times, scattered to the winds from the ordinary grounds of explaining the great fact. But what becomes of *it*, or of any other, if we have established our position? They are utterly extinguished; and nothing could prove greater disregard or ignorance of what we have set forth, than the utterance of either of them against it. But, if one should really undertake to overthrow it, he must first overthrow our whole exposition of the law and its justice as in and from moral

nature, and supremely in and from God's, and then show that sin creates no necessity for retributive penal suffering by its actors, as due to God and all good beings instead of the love and its consequent good, of which they have robbed Him and them. Then he must show that, if God sees it to be consistent with justice and the law, as we have explained, for Him to exercise mercy towards them by and through the sufferings of Christ in their stead, and that He can thus save vast suffering in the universe and secure immeasurably greater good in it than would result from inflicting the deserved penalty upon them, He is nevertheless under no kind of obligation to do it, even for so stupendous an end; and consequently that, if He did do it, though with self-denial and self-sacrifice beyond finite comprehension, it would not be *virtue*, nor *moral action* at all, and therefore not *morally praise-worthy!*—that it would be action without any *moral* motive or intent! Whoever cannot show all these and more is bound to believe in a truly vicarious atonement! *Hic labor, hoc opus est.*

§ 185. THE BANE OF THEOLOGY

The bane of all theology and religion, and no less of all opposition to both as they really are, is the wild imagination that God does all things by mere arbitrary will. Men argue, that, because He is Almighty and nothing can withstand His will, He is under or controlled by no law, no constitution, no obligation of any kind in His action, but can do whatever He pleases in an utterly lawless liberty. It is true that He can and does do whatever He pleases, and that none can hinder Him; but the important omitted truth is, that He only pleases to do as the uncreated, unchangeable, everlasting law with its included justice in His own eternal nature requires; and His pleasing to do thus is precisely what renders Him, in all His doings, absolutely *righteous* and good. If there were no such law with its justice, and no obliging imperative or mandate in His nature, requiring Him to act as He does, how could He be *righteous*, or *just*, or *holy*, or *merciful*, or *good*, or *praise-worthy*, or a *moral being*, or anything but either a *characterless pantheos*, or a mere *infinite, Epicurean, soft-natured being*, having no moral reason, no regard for any distinction between good or evil action, or for the happiness produced by the former, or the misery by the latter, and no moral government over His rational creatures? All His *special acts and measures* towards His intelligent creatures, whether of government or of grace, are and must be *positive* in distinction from *natural;*

but not one of them is *arbitrary or capricious*, not one of them *by counsel or in a liberty* in the least degree devious from, or in conflict with, His eternal nature and the law with its justice in it. He everlastingly abides by this, and will not, cannot depart from, or violate it for any cause or end possible; so that He does nothing merely because He is *omnipotent* and can do as He will in any arbitrary sense, but everything because the law with its justice, matter, and end in Him and in all His rational creatures requires Him to do it. "Will not the judge of all the earth do right?" No halfway house exists, or can be built to stand on any solid foundation, between that whose builder and maker is God, which stands displayed in the perpetual light of the whole moral nature of man and of the inspired revelation of Scripture, in its peerless and changeless grandeur and magnificent glory, and the dismal desolations of atheism and all infidelity, which are worse than even those of old Babylon prophetically depicted by Isaiah.* For all other structures, houses or hovels, built by men, when essential parts of the Divine one are rejected from them, are on the sliding trend of negation and assumption which ends in the fatal gulf of atheism, and are of construction and material prone to wreck of themselves. The false in them has no cohesion with what in them may be true, dissociates from and leaves it; and their wrecks strew the world. Man's moral reason and God's revelation alike repudiate them, as destructive of all the endless interests, concerns, and hopes of man, and all the rights, dues, interests, concerns, justice, mercy, and character of God. Intelligent moral reason screams, *Avaunt,* to them all with utmost abhorrence.

(*) Chap. 13:19-22.

PART IV.

SCRIPTURAL TEACHINGS RESPECTING THE RELATIONS OF CHRIST AND HIS ATONEMENT TO MANKIND.

CHAPTER XVI.

Relation of Adam and of his sin and its personal effects to his race, and examination of Rom. 5:12–19 and of 8:18–23 in connection with Gen. 2:17 and 3:16–19.

§ 186. NATURAL CONSEQUENCES OF ADAM'S SIN CONVEYED TO HIS POSTERITY BY PROPAGATION.

We said in a preceding place that, if Adam had obeyed in his legal trial-action, not only would he have preserved the integrity of his own personal nature unimpaired, but that of his entire posterity, so that, when they came to live and act, they all consequently would also have obeyed under the secured conserving favor of God. The natural consequences in him of his obedience would have passed on into them. We discard in this matter everything not resulting from the nature and relations of man and the eternal righteousness of God—everything fictitious, arbitrary, or of mere caprice. We do not accept the theory of *Creationism*—that is, that God *directly creates* every soul for every new body propagated. We think it contradicts the true view of the race-constitution and of the natural and representative headship of Adam over his posterity. As, according to it, bodies only are propagated, it denies, in effect, that "the image of God," which belongs to the spiritual nature of man, passed from Adam to his posterity, and so the unity of "the higher species, the one spiritual humanity in all men." It does this in opposition to the obvious meaning of Gen. 1:27, 28; 5:1, 4; 9:6; Acts 17:29; James 3:9; and, in fact, to the whole teaching of Scripture involving

this matter. It lacks congruity, that, while God created Adam a being of body and soul combined into one, and enjoined propagation upon him *as such*, he and all parents of his descendants should procreate bodies only, and God should directly create a soul to occupy each of these bodies in the same vital combination with it. There is no moral nature nor character in bodies, and consequently this notion logically denies the transmission of a vitiated nature from Adam, and ascribes it directly to God, as either creating souls vitiated, or as somehow causing their vitiation by uniting them to bodies, which is or borders on an old heresy, that all corruption in souls comes from their connection with matter. Thus, on the one alternative, it makes God the direct author of their vitiation and sin, and, on the other, it subverts the true basis of morality and accountability, and even moral nature itself. Then, it is inconsistent with the inheritance by children of mental and moral traits, characteristics, and tendencies, not only from immediate parents, but from ancestors of even many generations past. It is especially so with the inheritance from Adam of the common perversion, vitiation, or depravation of mankind, which is seated in their souls or spiritual part. Besides, not a solitary passage in the Bible teaches, or even implies it. Against it, we hold *Traducianism*, properly guarded, to be the truth—that is, that bodies and souls, as united in each human person, are propagated alike in their natural union by parents, and that thus only is there a human *race* and *species*. We believe this is *taught* by necessary implication in the meaning of every passage of Scripture, to which we have referred above, and besides, especially in Rom. 5:12–19. Our meaning is not that propagation is effected by mere natural laws or forces operating independently of God; for we deny that there are any such laws or forces in any department of nature. Despite all opposing assumptions, we hold that all matter is, in itself, totally inert, having no forces nor laws *in* it; that the forces which *abidingly operate upon it* in every condition are all *force-essences* distinct from it; that all natural laws, instead of being laws of matter, are laws or qualities of these force-essences only; that these are mediums or instruments of God for producing all combinations and conditions of matter not directly caused by His will; and that all and singular they are never loose from, but are ever held fast and wielded by His omnipotent hands. But not all nor any number of these forces with their laws, being utterly void of life and mind, could ever originate either, or any living organism, vegetable, or animal. These were all originated by direct creation. Each of

them is distinct from both the others, but they are combined essential parts in the constitution of every living creature, so that it cannot exist without them all. Life is the same in all such creatures, but they are divided into distinct species by abiding peculiarities of organisms and minds, as each species is, by the same, into the two sexes; so that the race-constitution for propagation characterizes them all. But, because the constitution of every living creature embraces what we have stated, the fundamental rule of propagation is. that the constitution of every offspring must embrace the same, cannot exist without them. It is without any evidence and against all knowledge of the case, to suppose a single mind of any creature inferior to man has ever been created apart from its organism, and then added to it; and just as much that a single human mind has ever been so created. God created man, as He did all inferior species, with a race-constitution, that there should be a *human species* by propagation, not independent of, but under His own unceasing efficiency exerted according to His determinate plan of creation. Without this efficiency there could be no human, nor inferior offspring, as there could be no vegetable productions from seeds. But He exerts it uniformly according to that plan, and not outside of it. As to the objections, that this view involves the divisibility, and thus the materiality, of human souls or minds, we hold them entirely invalid. For, (1) who knows that it is inconsistent with the nature of spirit, as combined with vital organisms, having the race-constitution, that, in procreation, human parents should not convey the spiritual as well as the material constituent, the *mind* as well as the body, of a new constitution like their own, as all the inferior creatures convey their kinds of minds as well as of bodies? Who knows that God could not impart to the race-constitution of man, as well as to that of all inferior species, the capability of such conveyance? Or, that imparting it may not be the chief display of His wisdom and power in creating and perpetuating our race? Such a capability certainly is not of *such a divisibility* as belongs to matter. It in no way implies that minds or souls can be cut, torn, crushed, or disintegrated into pieces or parts by any application of force, or that they can ever cease to be the identical spiritual, personal essences or entities they are at their origin. Corporeal conveyance implies material divisibility; spiritual implies nothing of the kind, but simply the *issuance* of another spirit like itself without at all diminishing or impairing its own identical nature or essence, which is absolutely impossible to be true of matter. The minds of human

and of all inferior parents are alike entirely the same after as before procreation. (2) Instead, therefore, of the doctrine that souls or minds are propagated as well as bodies implying or tending to materialism, it does neither, but rather the contrary. As it does not involve the divisibility of souls in any material sense, but a capability, Divinely constituted, of the issuance of others without the least detriment to or impairment of their identical integrity, which is utterly unlike the divisibility of matter and impossible to be true of it, it demonstrates that human souls are intrinsically different from matter, purely spiritual. It adds force to the proof of the *essential* difference between matter and spirit, souls and bodies, furnished by the total dissimilarity of the phenomena of souls from those of bodies or matter, and by the entire drift of Scripture. So futile are these objections to the traduction of souls which have been urged since the days of Jerome in particular, in the latter part of the 4th Century. Those we have urged against Creationism ought, we think, to set it forever aside; and the quiet concerning these two opposite doctrines during the last two centuries ought to cease with the adoption of the one we advocate, since the doctrines of inherited depravity and of the relations of mankind to Adam and to Christ are so essentially involved in it, and so marred by its opposite.

§ 187. WHAT, ACCORDING TO ROM. 5:12–19, WAS THE RELATION OF ADAM'S SIN TO HIS POSTERITY.

Looking now at the passage in Rom. 5:12–19, we inquire what it teaches as to the relation of Adam's sin in his trial-action to his posterity. Was its effect *in* them substantially the same as if it had been their own? In examining this passage, we will mainly follow the New Version. What else, then, is taught in verse 12th—"Therefore, as through one man sin entered into the world, and death through sin, and so death passed unto all men, for that all sinned?"—or in verse 15th—"For if by the trespass of the one many died?"—or in verse 16th—"And not as through one that sinned, so is the gift: for the judgment came of one unto condemnation?"—or in verse 17th—"For if, by the trespass of the one, death reigned through the one?"—or in verse 18th—"So then, as through one trespass *the judgment came* unto all men to condemnation?"—or in verse 19th—"For, as through the one man's disobedience, the many were made sinners?" These citations have vastly increased force from the contrasts stated between the relation of Adam and of his transgression to his race and that of our Lord and of his obedience

and gifts to the same, especially to all who receive Him and them. In Gen. 2:17, we have God's prohibitory command to Adam with its added warning—"But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die"—"dying thou shalt die." This command he transgressed, and so became subject to the death. In the cited statements of the apostle, we have the full import of both unfolded. Neither does the brief history in Genesis, nor any subsequent revelation inform us, that God told Adam, or that he knew, that his obedience or disobedience would in any way affect his descendants or any one but himself; nor that he yet knew that he was to have either a wife or descendants. It was of no importance that he should know these things, as far as the effects of his trespass upon his posterity were concerned, as they would be the same whether he knew these or not. It was not till Eve was created that he knew he was to have posterity; and the representative relation of himself and his obedience or disobedience to them, and the effects of his action to them in either case are not unfolded till the advanced revelation of the New Testament.* It seems, however, that some knowledge of these things must have been imparted to him. What were the effects of his transgression passed down to them? The effects or consequences of sin are twofold, *natural* and *retributive from God*—the former from the nature itself of the sinner and of others to whom he is related; the latter from the infliction by God of its deserved punishment. Our inquiry here relates to its *natural* effects; and our readiest way to answer it is to seek what they must have been to Adam himself.

§ 188. ADAM AS CREATED, AND THE EFFECTS OF HIS SIN ON HIS NATURE.

All recorded concerning him shows that he was created in full manhood, adult in body and mind. He was the end and crown of God's works in the whole mundane creation. His body, the highest realization of the Creator's ideal of organic form connected with its designed uses of all kinds, was all-perfect in health and vigor, symmetry and beauty, and in adaptation to the uses of his soul as its pliant servitor and mirror, and was formed for immortality. There was nothing in it in conflict with his soul, or its rectitude and supreme, immortal good; but it was altogether harmonious with the whole grand destination of his being. As to his soul, as God cre-

(*) Rom. 5:12–19; I. Cor. 15:21, 22, 45–49.

ated it in His own image and likeness, there was nothing disordered, ill-biased, or impure in its sacred essence. All its susceptibilities and powers were in perfect adjustment; its moral reason was its center and controller; its will was morally as well as naturally free to obey the mandates of reason; its sensibility was without perverted susceptibilities and desires, and subject to its will; and its conscience shed constant approbation upon it, attested God's complacency to it, and promised His ample rewards. Thus, with all its faculties in faultless harmony, as created, it was as strong and quick to all right action as a new-created angel; and its entire natural bent and tendency impelled it to perfect rectitude—to trust, love, and obey God, to hold communion with Him, to seek and receive His blessing, and, when others of his kind should come, to render to them all dues of love and righteousness. Thus Adam's will was *virtually* or *potentially* set in perfect aptitude for moral rectitude by his constitution *before* it put forth any action whatever; so that it was certain that, as soon as God should manifest Himself to him, and teach him His relations to, claims upon, and disposition towards him, he would spontaneously trust, love, and obey Him. Such was the "original righteousness," or properly *aptitude* for it, with which he was created, though he was necessarily temptable. We add that his spiritual nature, fresh from its Creator, must have been exceedingly delicate and sensitive; so that, acting rightly, its conscience must have filled and thrilled it with a degree of happiness far surpassing any known among the best of his degenerate race; and, acting wrongly, must have shocked and convulsed it throughout, disrupting the unity of the action of its faculties, and filling it with disorder, schism, and conflict, and all their dire natural consequences; so that never again in this life, even under grace, could it be what it was in innocence and obedience. Milton represents that, when Eve eat the forbidden fruit,

> "Earth felt the wound; and Nature from her seat
> Sighing, through all her works gave signs of woe
> That all was lost!"

And again, that, when Adam eat it,

> "Earth trembled from her entrails as again
> In pangs; and Nature gave a second groan.
> Sky lower'd, and, muttering thunder, some sad drops
> Wept at completing of the mortal sin
> Original."

This wound of earth and shock and woe of nature may fitly symbolize the wound, shock, and woe of the souls of the guilty pair from the sin of each.

What now must have been the effects of that sin of Adam in and to himself? How must it have stung, tortured, and, as it were, exasperated the sensibility of his conscience, that holy center and vicegerent of God in his soul, and caused it to burst out of the native harmony which had bound all his moral faculties together; to turn in terrible antagonism against the whole essence to which it belonged; to pour through it, like tormenting venom, the sense of guilt, of shame, of regret, of self-contempt, of dread of God and His retribution, and of all good fled; to agonize it with the excruciation, as of lacerating gnawings, called remorse; to denounce its base apostasy, and foredoom it to deserved punishment; and, by all such antagonism, to drive from it all peace within and with God, all trust in and love for Him, all pleasure in His will, all sacred hope and joy in existence, all righteousness, and all power of self-recovery! All inward order was broken. Reason no longer swayed the will, spontaneously pliant and obedient to its mandates; nor controlled, by the will, the sensibility, with its desires moderate and docile. These, having broken the bounds, and all the restraints of previous righteousness being annulled, became at once imperious and turbulent; and domineering lusts and passions were then originated. Thus the sensibility,

> "Usurping over sov'reign reason, claim'd
> Superior sway;"

the will obeyed and was morally enslaved by it; and *selfishness* was the only choice and action of apostate Adam. This schism, discord, perversion involved a weakening of all the moral nature. Moral reason lost insight and clearness of vision; conscience became impaired both as judicial and as sensitive; and all the susceptibilities connected with these sacred faculties were enfeebled. God's relations to him were, by moral necessity, changed. As, on Adam's side, were conscious guilt, fear, shame, distrust, wreck of love, and initiation of selfishness, so, on God's, were holy recoil and wrath, an end of fellowship and complacent fostering influence, the determination to subject him and his fellow culprit at once to very great providential and disciplinary changes in their persons and conditions, connected with putting them on a gracious probation, and the purpose, if under His grace, they would not yield themselves to new obedience during its continuance, to inflict upon them the retribution they deserved. Such were the *immediate* effects or consequences to Adam of his transgression, and also to Eve of hers. Some of them complete, some only begun, they followed the sin of each

instantly; and, as they involved the extinction of all *spiritual life* in the souls of the fallen pair, they constituted incipient *spiritual death* in them, with liability to positive retribution after the close of their granted probation, unless restored during it. This was the very death meant in the threatening—"for, in the day that thou eatest thereof, dying, thou shalt die;" and it began *instantly,* as the aggregate *natural* consequence of sin, not as an *infliction* of God. Adam could only know the meaning of the word *die* by an inspiration of God attending the threatening; and it was doubtless from his thus understanding it, and his teaching it to his receptive contemporary offspring, who again taught it to theirs, and so on down the theistic generations, that it came to be used so commonly throughout the Scriptures to signify *the whole evil, spiritual condition induced by sin, including its penal liability.* The term *life,* as the antithesis of the term *death* in this sense, so frequent in the Scriptures from its first mention by Moses in Deut. 8:3; 30:15, 19, signifies *the whole good spiritual condition induced by obedience, including the gracious rewards promised to follow in the endless future.* Both this death and this life consist in, or essentially are, the *natural* effects or consequences of the two contrary kinds of moral action, and even God could not prevent them except by annihilating the actors of each kind.

§ 189. THREE DEATHS, BODILY, SPIRITUAL, AND RETRIBUTIVE, ANL OTHER EVILS.

We must vindicate the above. There are three deaths, one corporeal, improperly called *natural;* another *spiritual,* just shown; the third, called both *eternal* and the *second* death.* One opinion in conflict with our position is, that bodily death alone was intended in the threatening; and another is, that it meant all the three kinds. Against the first we urge the following: There is no evidence that bodily death was a *natural* effect of Adam's sin, any more than that the multiplied sorrow of Eve, her dependent subjection to her husband, the curse on the ground, its yielding thorns and thistles to Adam, his eating bread in toil and sweat all his days, and the herb of the field instead of the fruits of Paradise, his ejection from it, lest he should take of the tree of life and eat and live forever, were all such effects of it; which they plainly were not, but were all to be positive inflictions, Gen. 3:16–19. Against the other of the opinions we urge the following: This death is not the actual suffering of the

(*) Mat. 25:41, 46; II. Thess. 1:9; Rev. 2:11; 22:14, 15; and equivalently in many other places.

positive retribution deserved by sin, called the second and eternal death. For that is not to be inflicted till after bodily death or the end of probation; and it was purposely to avoid the necessity of inflicting it on the guilty pair, or on any of their race who could be reclaimed, that God put them and the race with them on a new gracious probation under the designed redemptive measure, which He indicated to them in the protevangel (Gen. 3:15) *before* dooming them to the providential and disciplinary evils, including bodily death, mentioned in Gen. 3:16–19. These evils were not included in the retributive, penal death, but were what God saw to be essential to *any successful efficiency* of the redemptive measure for the moral rectification and salvation of men, and were therefore, in a most important sense, really embraced in or auxiliary to it, being designed to be *remedial* in effect. If they would return to God under that measure, not only would they be substantially restored from their spiritual death in this life, but they would never suffer the deserved penal retribution, being justified on the ground of Christ's atonement. Yet, according to this opinion, they must, though forgiven, still suffer bodily death as if they had not returned! What kind of a forgiveness would that be? How can all this consist with itself or with a real vicarious atonement? The fact is, that neither atonement, nor pardon or justification relates to either bodily or spiritual death, but to deserved positive punishment alone, which is the second or eternal death. Justification sets this aside for all the reclaimed, while bodily death must be suffered by all, and spiritual death is only removed by the Holy Spirit. What then was the relation of bodily death to the sin, and to the spiritual death, of the first pair?

§ 190. RELATION OF BODILY DEATH TO THE SIN, AND TO THE SPIRITUAL DEATH, OF THE FIRST PAIR.

The following points seem manifest:—(1) It bore no comparison as an evil, in either severity or duration, to the eternal, positive penalty deserved by them. It ended with the last breath, was a thing of minutes, and the involved separation of the soul from the body by it was to be terminated by the providential measure of the final resurrection, whether the person should be reclaimed or not. (2) It was *deserved* by their sin in no other way than were all the other temporary evils to which they were doomed. But they were subjected to it, no more than to the others, as properly penal or retributive, but simply as made *necessary* by their sin for the ends of the redemp-

tive system. (3) The atonement was not made to save from bodily death any more than from the other temporary evils of these doomings, but, as said above, relates solely to the deserved, positive, retributive punishment. Were it a substitute for bodily death, as it must be if this was included in the retributive penalty, then pardon or justification must have rescued from this with that; but it does not, as "it is *appointed* unto men once to die." Besides, if it had been designed to be at all a substitute for it, the Scriptures would certainly somewhere have said so, whereas they have not, and their whole drift is to the contrary; and, further, no justified one would ever suffer this death. (4) All the evils of these doomings of Gen. 3:16–19, operating in connection with the redemptive provisions and agencies, become, in effect, according to the Divine design, actual goods or means of blessing to all brought to repentance, so that, to all such, even bodily death is "gain," while the suffering of the positive legal penalty can never have any such effect, and never be "gain," but eternal loss. These evils, therefore, cannot be penal or retributive, but are merely providential and disciplinary. It is no objection to this, that, in I. Cor. 15:26, bodily death is called an "enemy;" for this is a *figure*, and all the other evils are enemies in the same sense, or they could not be disciplinary. This death is so called only because it is the most formidable of all these evils; and yet even it is "gain" to the righteous. It is so because, among other reasons, it opens the way for the resurrection-body, which, fashioned conformably to the body of Christ's glory, will inconceivably excel the one that dies.*

§ 191. CONSIDERATION OF ROM. 8:18–23, AS RELATED TO GEN. 3:16–19.

It seems important here to consider the contents of Rom. 8:18–23, which plainly refers to and unfolds Gen. 3:16–19. It demonstrates that the dooms pronounced on the fallen pair, and in them on their posterity, including the curse on the ground, were not properly to penal retributions at all, not *sentencing* them to anything threatened or warned against in Gen. 2:17, but simply to the specified *providential and disciplinary inflictions* for the good of them and their race. In verse 17, the Apostle assumed that suffering with Christ was *necessary* to believers. For their support and comfort under them, he says in verse 18—"I reckon that the sufferings of

(*) See the excellent Work of the late Rev. Robert W. Landis, D. D., on The Immortality of the Soul, Part III., Chap. I., pp. 315-348, for a valuable argument on this position, essentially agreeing with our own.

this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed to us-ward." In verse 19 he declares as a reason for estimating this glory so highly, that "the earnest expectation of the *creature* [*creation* of the N. V. is too wide a term] is waiting for the revelation of the sons of God." To show the importance of this fact, he states in verses 20, 21, the condition of the creature, and why it is so waiting—"For the creature was subjected to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of Him who subjected it, in hope that the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God." In verse 22, he appeals to the general recognition of the fearful state of vanity and bondage of corruption in which the creature is—"For we know that the whole [not universe or creation, but] creature groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now." In these verses, the Greek word, which we render *creature*, as we think it should be throughout, occurs four times, and is plainly a noun of multitude. We think its meaning very plain. What, according to Gen. 3:16–19, was subjected by God to the conditions stated by the Apostle, on the basis of hope, but not willingly? It was consummately the fallen pair, and in them their race. They were the intelligent soul and *end* of all mundane nature, inanimate and animate, it having been created for, and correlated, adapted, and made subservient, to them, its appointed possessors and lords; so that they lived by it and all its ministries and supplies; and as its condition would necessarily profoundly operate upon and affect them both physically and morally, and they, by all relations to, uses of, and influences upon it would, in turn, correspondingly affect it, it was, of course, necessarily involved in their dooms, including the curse on the ground which doubtless implicated it all. But the Apostle, in his reference to those doomings, makes no separation between mankind and it any more than between their bodies and souls. He lumps them and it all into one *creature* (κτίσις); and thus, instead of passing, in silence, the intelligent, incomparably superior and most suffering part of the whole, and, by a monstrous prosopopæia, intrinsically absurd in itself, making the unintelligent, unconscious, subservient part, which, taken separately, is valueless in itself, the subject of all he ascribes to the creature, he ascribes nothing whatever to either the inferior or the superior part separate from the other, but all to the whole together. But, because mankind is the all-important constituent of the whole, he ascribes the conditions, experiences, and activities, which are mainly peculiar

to this constituent, the lower animals sharing in only the very inferior of them, to the whole, just as we do those peculiar to the soul alone to the whole man, soul and body. Brute matter has no participation in them. Thus understood, the Apostle states only profoundly important truth and fact, *when* he ascribes to the whole creature, under the dooms of Gen. 3:16–19, an "earnest expectation, waiting for the revelation of the sons of God"—that is, some such one as theirs will be; *when* he states the historical fact, that it "was subjected to vanity, not willingly, but by God upon the basis of hope," (that furnished by the protevangel and new probation of grace (Gen. 3:15), and impressed on the race by the Spirit of grace), that it would yet be "delivered from the *bondage of corruption* into the liberty of the glory of the children of God," (I. Cor. 15:42–54)—that is, into some such liberty of glory as theirs will be; *when* he declares, as commonly known from the facts of the world, that "the whole creature groaneth and travaileth in pain together (like a vast curse-laden Eve) until now;" and *when* he says, that "we ourselves also, who have the first-fruits of the Spirit (that is, who, out of the whole creature, have become children of God, and heirs of the glory to be revealed in all such), even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption (the consummation of it), *to wit*, the redemption of the body"—that is, from its subjection to vanity and the bondage of corruption by the resurrection, by which we shall be delivered into the full liberty of the glory of the children of God, and a revelation of it shall be made.

§ 192. WHAT THIS WHOLE PASSAGE SHOWS.

Thus this whole passage has pertinence to the main point stated in verse 17, that it was necessary that the children and heirs of God should *suffer* with Christ. It shows that this necessity was created by the dooms on the fallen pair and their race, including the curse on the ground—that those doomings were not, as many Commentators assume, *sentencing* that pair to the death intended in Gen. 2:17, which was spiritual and liability to positive retribution, or to anything included in it; but, on the contrary, that, as surgical operations and other severe treatments of injured or diseased bodies or parts of them are to preserve or cure them, so the inflictions of all these doomings were severities designedly *remedial and restorative* to the spiritually dead souls of mankind, being connected with *the hope* inspired by the protevangel of the redemptive measure. Not one of them was penal or properly retributive; they were all disci-

plinary or necessary means to the *greatest* or to *any* success of that measure with its new gracious probation, *and were therefore parts of the grace-scheme.* We have, therefore, in this passage in Romans the whole philosophy of the necessity for and the uses of providential and disciplinary sufferings in this life, as distinguished from retributive or penal. The relation of these to the whole creature in time, and to the new creatures or children of God forever, is revealed with great and various repetition, and with ever-increasing distinctness, through the entire progressive revelation of Scripture to its end—by sacred historians, prophets, psalmists, our Lord, the Apostles, and specially by Paul, not in this passage and Chapter only, but in numerous others throughout his Epistles. It is only from this disclosure of the necessity for, and beneficent uses and ends of, this perpetual, awful tragedy of the world, in which all the human generations have been the principal participants, and all the animal tribes, and, in only a figurative sense, inanimate nature have been subordinate sharers, that the least light comes for the solution of the profound problem why this tragedy exists, and relief from the appalling spectacle it presents—that writer, preacher, poet, philosopher, and comforter have drawn the consolations and cheering wisdom which they impart to the suffering, sorrowing, despairing, and dying. "For by hope were we saved"—that is, by that primal hope, invigorated by all the subsequent additions to it, which, despite all the subjection of the race to vanity and the bondage of corruption, has still lived on inextinguishable, an "earnest expectation" in human souls. Whatever the earthly conditions and experiences of men may be, consciously or unconsciously they look forward for rescue from all evils and for a good that shall be satisfying, and a state of being that shall be complete; and, as they know that no such good and state are possible for them in time, and that they must die, they earnestly hope and long to find it somehow after death in the boundless future. In the beautiful words of Augutus William Schlegel, in a Lecture on Dramatic Art and Literature, written probably without a thought of this passage in his mind—"When the soul, resting as it were under the willows of exile, breathes out its longings for its distant home, what else but melancholy can be the key-note of its songs?" The words of Cicero in his *De Senectute*, put in the mouth of Cato, speaking of Elysium, and those of Seneca concerning immortality, seem as if written to confirm the statements of the great Apostle in verses 19–21. Says Cicero—"O illustrious day, when I shall go to that assembly and union of divine souls, and when I shall

leave this crowd and confusion! For I will go, not to those men only, concerning whom I have before spoken, but also to my Cato [his son], than whom no better man has been born, no one more excellent in piety." Says Seneca—"It pleased me to inquire concerning the eternity of souls, yea, by Hercules, to believe. For I easily believed the opinions of great men, promising rather than proving a most pleasing thing. I gave myself up to so great a hope." As to the uses of suffering and affliction, when their end is fulfilled, says the really great moral poet Young:—

> "And have I been complaining, then, so long?
> Complaining of His favors, pain, and death?
> Who, without pain's advice, would e'er be good?
> Who, without death, but would be good in vain?
> Pain is to save from pain; all punishment (discipline)
> To make for peace; and death to save from death."—*Night IX.*

> "Amid my list of blessings infinite,
> Stand this the foremost, 'That my heart has bled.'
> 'Tis heav'n's last effort of good-will to man;
> When pain can't bless, heav'n quits us in despair."—*Idem.*

The same great lesson is beautifully taught in Gray's Ode to Adversity; in Wordsworth's Excursion; in the last two Books of Paradise Lost; and God's mysterious way of treating men in His Providential dealings with them is remarkably shown in Samson Agonistes, lines 667–709. Of course, if the beneficent ends of man's subjection to vanity are unsecured in any, it is by their own persistent sin.

In view of all thus shown against the notion, that the doomings of the first pair, and with them of their race, to bodily death were *sentencing* them to the death or to any part of it, threatened in Gen. 2:17, we urge its rejection, as not only wholly erroneous, but equally injurious in its bearings on the true view of retributive penalty; of the grace of God in placing man immediately after the fall on a gracious probation under the redemptive measure; of the designed uses or mission of providential and disciplinary sufferings, as auxiliary to that measure; of the real atonement, as a substitute for the positive penalty incurred by sin; of justification on the ground of it, as rescue from the penalty in accordance with the justice of the law; of the resurrection of the bodies of all men, good and bad, as inconsistent with the position that bodily death is the whole or a part of the penalty of sin; and of all involved and correlated truth. It is confusing, misleading, and subversive; and without basis in either Gen. 2:17 or 3:16–19. For (1) in the latter passage, it is pure arbitrariness to single out bodily death from the other dooms as all or part of the death threatened in the former. (2) There is no

exegetical warrant for taking the doomings in it as God's sentencing man to any part of the death threatened in the former. (3) In this, the *warning announcement* was—"in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." As shown, both Adam and Eve did, that very day, *instantly* die a spiritual death, while he did not die bodily for nearly a thousand years after.

§ 193. INHERITED EFFECTS OF ADAM'S SIN; ATONEMENT AND THE HOLY SPIRIT NECESSARY TO SAVE EVEN INFANTS.

We have shown the *natural effects* of the disobedience of the first pair in their souls and upon their relations to God, in contrast with what those of their obedience would have been; and also that they propagated their *species*, or entire complex nature, soul and body; and now, it seems to us, we need not make a great mystery of the transmission to their posterity of those effects, and the perversion or vitiation they involve. What else could they propagate than offspring "in their own likeness" (Gen. 5:3), having the same disorder, vitiation, and bias of will to wrong moral action, which they had? How could natures so perverted issue offspring in archetypal order of spirit?—natures in spiritual death issue offspring in the integrity of spiritual life?—natures in the relations to God of their perversion issue offspring in relations to Him of unperverted, spiritual life, and bias of will to right moral action? Well might Adam say, as Milton represents:—

> "But from me what can proceed,
> But all corrupt: both mind and will depraved,
> Not to do only, but to will the same
> With me?"

We have shown in what sense Adam could be created righteous—that, from the perfection of his nature, he would spontaneously will rightly in his first moral choice, so that his will was *virtually* or *potentially* righteous in the sense of being naturally apt or bent to right moral action before it acted morally. After the vitiation of his nature by his sin, its aptness or bent was to the opposite until changed by regeneration, as we think both his and Eve's were (Gen. 3:20, 21; 4:1, 25, in connection with 3:15). Now, just as, if they had not sinned, their offspring would have inherited their perfect nature and virtually right wills, so, as they sinned and brought the perversion of the natural effects of their sin into their nature, their offspring naturally inherited this perversion, including virtually wrong wills, so that their posterity all spontaneously choose sinfully in their first moral acting, and will do so forever if not regenerated

in time. But sin is vastly more than mere injury to themselves and each other—than the mother of only those effects which constitute spiritual death. It is manifold in wrong qualities against God, as well as against His universal moral society. It is intrinsically disbelief concerning Him, rebellion against His authority, self-will confronted against His will, the enthronement of self instead of Him, and disregard of all His rights, dues, claims, and government. It is *selfishness* against Him and all other moral beings *as such.* How, then, could God not hold and treat the fallen pair and all *actual* sinners of their race accordingly—as deserving penal retribution from Him, as in and Ruler of the universal moral society, proportional to the guilt of each? How could He, with any justice, regard and treat them as obedient, or not either inflict that retribution on every one of them, or vindicate His justice against them in some other way? As to children of Adam's race, not yet *actual* sinners, but inheriting the vitiation and potential wrong wills stated, and sure to sin as soon as they act morally, even if taken to heaven without repair, how about them, if they die before they so act? Could He possibly hold and treat them otherwise than according to what they really are, or as if they had no such vitiation of nature and will? We surely believe all of them, so dying, will be saved, but not according to the law or its justice; but by virtue of the atonement and the regenerating agency of the Spirit which it secures for them. The atonement was as really necessary to put them, as to put *actual* sinners, into right relations to God and the universal moral society. For, with their inherited bias of will to sin, making their actual sinning certain when they act morally, they are already alien, and are sure to be antagonist, to the universal and eternal moral system, and to deserve the penal retribution necessary by that system; so that their reinstatement in it is possible only on the atonement. Then, they equally need regeneration to remove their spiritual death and to institute spiritual life in them; and the Holy Spirit, secured for and given to operate upon mankind by the atonement, doubtless effects the regeneration of all children who die before they act morally. Thus they are all saved, and on the same ground and by the same agency, as all actual sinners are, who are saved. But, back of the reasons just stated, why they could not be saved on any *legal ground,* but only by the atonement and the regeneration by the Spirit given on its basis, is the fact shown by the whole Scriptural account of the case, that Adam's *trial action* was really that of all his posterity—that the *thou* in the *warning* in Gen. 2:17 was

virtually *thou and thy race.* Even the temporal dooms on the guilty pair were not confined to them; for certainly that on Eve extended to all her daughters in like conditions to the last; and those on Adam to all his sons, and mainly to his daughters too; and who will say that the curse on the ground ended with him? Nor, from the race-constitution, could it possibly be otherwise. Despite all the difference between the relation of the original pair to their offspring and that of all subsequent parents to theirs, the representative character of the relation constantly more or less reappears, not only as to temporal conditions and positions in society of offspring, but as to moral and religious tendencies and shapings of character and destiny, relations, and experiences.

We believe we have shown that the death warned against in Gen. 2:17 was entirely *spiritual,* and included only *liability* to the *penal retribution* deserved by sin, which is *eternal death,* and is, in the Apocalypse, four times called by John *the second death* (2:11; 20:6, 14; 21:8). Because this was *positive,* its infliction could be suspended, the guilty pair was spared, their race was continued, and the redemptive measure with a new, gracious probation provided for them, so that it need not, and would not, ever be inflicted upon them or any of their race, if they would comply with its necessary moral conditions. None who do so will ever suffer it, nor will others till their gracious probation ends at death. In the intermediate state, the incorrigible will be abandoned by God, separated from the righteous, and in a place of punishment corresponding to their bodiless condition (Luke 16:23–28); but they will not be subjected to the infliction of this second death till after the resurrection and judgment (Mat. 13:40–42; 25:41; Rev. 20:12–15; 21:8). Spiritual death, which is a wholly *personal* matter, came immediately into the souls of the sinning pair by necessity of their nature, not by infliction of God, while this retributive penal death, which is *social,* will not come on any by their nature, but will be inflicted by God as ethical justice to the universal, holy society, including Himself. Of course, spiritual death will be eternal in all not regenerated in time; but it is not the endurance of this retributive punishment deserved by sin, which is the second death.

§ 194. DIRECT EXAMINATION OF ROM. 5:12–19. VERSE 12 CONSIDERED.

From the foregoing, the reason is manifest why and how "through one man sin entered into the world, and death through

sin; and so death passed unto all men, for that all sinned." All sinned—(1) *virtually* in the trial-action of Adam, their natural and representative head; just as in the doomings of Gen. 3:16–19, all daughters are held to have sinned in her transgression (I. Tim. 2: 12–15), and all Adam's offspring of both sexes are held to have sinned in his;—(2) by inheriting from him the natural effects of his, including virtual wrong wills, incipient spiritual death. We must not suppose that this inheritance implies privation of *natural freedom of will*, or power to begin and continue right, instead of wrong, moral choice in view of motives; for, if it did, they could not act morally, commit *actual* sin, nor have a gracious, or any personal, probation; and there could be no redemptive system for them. However long or much they may actually sin, and form the habit of sinning, or obey, and form the habit of obeying, this *natural* power of choosing rightly or wrongly, even of changing moral choice, under motives and influences, belongs to them, as long certainly as they are on probation. It cannot longer, because it has both a *subjective* and *objective* basis, as has been previously shown. For, besides the subjective confirmation of habit, there will be no objective motives and influences to operate upon either the righteous or the wicked to induce either ever to change their radical choice.* Besides the testimony of consciousness in mankind, that, despite all their inherited bad condition, they do still possess this power of moral choice under the motives and influences which operate upon them in this life, the facts of their being under a gracious probation and of the redemptive system with its conditions, motives, and influences prove that there is no *natural necessity* that their inherited virtual wrong will should become *actual* in their first or any other moral act during their probation, or that they could not will rightly from first to last. Nevertheless, such is the force of their whole perversion, the weakness of the motives and influences upon them in it against sin, and the strength of those to it, that they all do sin from the first, and onward, except those turned from it by regeneration; and because, by doing so, they morally *sanction and appropriate* the sin and guilt of Adam in addition to their spiritual death, they thus incur the sentence to positive retributive punishment, and are necessarily forever lost, unless saved by the grace of God developed in and through the atonement of Christ. The connection of verse 12 and onward with verse 11 makes it important to observe the use of the Greek verb λαμβάνειν in verse 11, where it means

(*) See this point illustrated in § 96.

have received or appropriated, as it also does in verse 17. It is plain from the relation of Adam to his race, as naturally its head and representative, and from that of Christ to it, as supernaturally the same, and from the relation of the action of each of them, *as such,* to it, that, as there is a voluntary *receiving or appropriating* of "the reconciliation" of God to man by the atonement, and "the abundance of grace," etc., effected by Christ's action, by all who become Christians, so there is of the sin and condemnation, effected by Adam, by all who become *actual* sinners. The expression, "all sinned" (not "have sinned"), at the close of this verse, doubtless refers to the transgression of Adam, as, in effect, that of all. Says Dr. Schaff, in Lange's Commentary on Romans, *in loco*—"The aorist was chosen with reference to the past event of Adam's fall, which was at the same time virtually the fall of the human race as represented by him, and germinally contained in him." We think we have shown that spiritual death did in fact, by natural necessity, enter the world by Adam's sin and "passed unto all men because all sinned," while bodily did not so enter, and was not *penal* at all, but was *appointed* by God purely for redemptive purposes. There is no evidence that it would, but clear evidence that it would not, have come upon man at all, although fallen, if it had not been thus appointed. Medicine is given *in consequence* of disease, not as penalty for it, but to cure it. So, like all the other providential and disciplinary evils, this death is neither a natural effect, nor the retributive penalty of sin, but was *appointed* to man as a necessary part of the antidote for it or some of its natural effects. In this sense only can it be recognized as a consequence of sin, as medicine may be of disease; and, in this sense, it may be referred to as an *index and proof* that the real disease of spiritual death is universal, but no other. If alluded to at all in the term *death* in this passage, it can only be in this sense, while spiritual death is the real kind of death intended. This is evident, not only from what has been shown, but from the whole scope of verses 12–19, and from the use of the term in the same sense right on in Chap. 6:13, 16, 21, 23;—in Chap. 7:5, 10, 24;—in Chap. 8:2, 6; and elsewhere whenever this Apostle speaks of the generic effect of sin, as in Eph. 2:1, 5, and in Col. 2:13. The purpose of this passage, verses 12–19, is to exhibit in contrast, "on the basis of a vital, organic union of humanity, both in the order of fallen nature and in that of redeeming grace," the bad effects in and upon the race by the fall of Adam, its natural head and representative, and the good effects provided for, and secured in and upon all who "receive

the abundance of the grace," etc., of the obedience of Christ, the second Adam, its supernatural head and representative. According to this purpose, verse 12, which introduces the contrast, is a general statement of the bad effects of Adam's transgression in and upon the race; and verses 13, 14 are designed at once to meet a seeming objection to the statement, and to confirm it.

VERSES 13, 14 CONSIDERED.

Supplying in brackets what is implied in verse 13, it reads thus—"For until the [revealed] law [was given, 2513 years after Adam's fall], sin was in the world: but sin is not imputed when there is no law." There was no positive, or declared law over mankind all that time, just as there has been none since over the heathen, and of course they did not transgress any, just as the heathen have not since; yet there was sin in them all that time, as there has been in the heathen ever since. How it was in them we have abundantly shown, both as virtual wrong will, and as actual violation of the law in and from their moral reason when and after they began to act morally (Rom. 2:14, 15). It was, therefore, imputed to them all that time, as it has been to the heathen since, and always will be, though not as transgression of any declared, positive law or command of God, such as Adam transgressed. Having thus maintained his statement in verse 12, as to *Adam's causing sin to enter into the human world, and as to the participation of all the race in it*, the Apostle, in like manner, maintains in verse 14 his other statements in verse 12, that "death entered into the world through sin," and that "it passed unto all men, because all sinned." He declares that, although "sin is not imputed when there is no law," death, its consequence, "reigned from Adam until Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the likeness of Adam's transgression, who is a type (or figure) of Him that was to come." That is, it reigned over all, though they did not transgress a declared positive law, like that of Moses, nor a command, like that to Adam, and not, therefore, on account of such sin; which is equally true of the whole heathen world since. Hence, the fact that it did reign those 2513 years over all (and over all since), proves that sin, its cause, was in and acted by all men all that time, and so is in and acted by the whole race since, which confirms verse 12. Bodily death may be embraced in the meaning of the term "death" in this verse in the sense explained, as an *index and proof* of the universal existence of the spiritual death of mankind, which is its fundamental meaning. From

what has been shown, this must be so; but, in addition, the plain purpose of the passage, and the contrast it exhibits demand this meaning and forbid the supposition that bodily death, which, as Lange, in his comment on verse 12, says, "in itself has no biblical and ethical significance," should be in its meaning, except as stated. The death in this verse must be the same as that in verses 12, 15 (died), 17, and in all the places referred to above, and as the object of the condemnation in verses 16, 17. To suppose it to mean or to include bodily death, except as stated, is at war with the whole argument. It is not merely to swell a neither natural nor penal, but simply a providential and disciplinary appointed consequence of Adam's sin into its only or main natural effect, while the incomparably worse matter, the appalling soul-blight of that sin, which did naturally fall on and curse the total race, is either passed in silence or dwarfed to comparative insignificance, but, since, by the contrast, the measure of the bad effects of Adam's sin is the criterion by which to estimate the antithetic measure of the good effects of Christ's whole action and suffering for the race, it is correspondingly and incalculably to shrink the latter from the vastness which Paul evidently intended to ascribe to them to the mere subordinate matter of the restoration of bodily life to the bodily dead! The masterly logic of the great Apostle never formed an argument so in conflict with itself, and so intrinsically ridiculous as that. Progress through the remaining verses is now easy.

§ 195. ADAM, THE TYPE, AND CHRIST THE ANTITYPE.

Adam was "a type of Him that was to come"—the second Adam, designed to stand in a similar, but higher relation to the race—the antitype. Like the type, as to His human nature, He was directly originated by God.* Yet, as He was to come by human maternity, to be "the seed of the woman," He was organically one of the race, as Adam was. Thus originated, He inherited no vitiation, no spiritual perversion, as Adam did not; and so, while, "in all things [of true archetypal human nature] it behooved Him to be made *like* His brethren, that He might be a merciful and faithful High Priest in things pertaining to God, to make propiation for the sins of the people" (Heb. 2:17), and while He "was made flesh," a real human nature (John 1:14), He was not "flesh of sin," that is, of that nature as vitiated, but "in the *likeness* of it (Rom. 8:3), in the *likeness* of men," but archetypally perfect (Phil. 2:7). Thus,

(*) Mat. 1:20; Luke 1:35; John 1:14; Rom. 1:3, 4; Gal. 4:4.

while, as man, He was germinally directly created by God as Adam was, yet, as the seed of the woman, of David, and of Abraham, He was one of the race; and, besides being perfectly pure from inherited perversion, this human nature was in personal union with His Divine nature. Such and so qualified was this second head and representative of the race. As the first was put under a declared positive command of God, and tried under it for himself and the race, so this second "was born under [the declared positive Mosaic] law," in relations and conditions which made obedience to it incomparably more difficult, as they included His rendering it even unto enduring His atoning sufferings and death, and under it He was tried for Himself and the race. As the trial of Adam, so His was purely *legal*. He must stand in the same law-place and relations to the race in which Adam stood; so that, by meeting all the demands of the law upon Himself *and them*, both for the obedience which Adam failed to render for himself and them, and for the retributive penal sufferings or "curse," to which they were *liable* in consequence of his sin, He could, as representing them, free them from that *curse* and the conditions of the *legal* probation, and put them on a *gracious one*, or under *grace*. Thus, by or in these two representatives, the race had *two* trials or probations—the first purely legal, and a failure; the second also purely legal, and a perfect success. But, unlike the first, this was undertaken and carried through from pure mercy and grace to them, even to the endurance by its actor of the penal curse to which they were all liable. Then, besides these, they have each a *third*, secured for them by this second and successful legal one, under all the advantages, provisions, motives, influences, and agencies of the redemptive measure. Not a fair probation! Was that of the angels as good? We ask, then, that it may be distinctly noticed, that everything concerning the moral action, relations to God, and destiny of mankind is rooted in and depends on the representative relations and action of these two persons, the first *naturally*, the second *supernaturally*, the head of the race. God's whole course of government over, and dealing with, them starts from, and is determined by, the representative action of these two heads. It is by that of the first that the race is in sin, and involved in all its consequences; it is by that of the second that each of it all has a gracious probation. Christianity rests entirely on this basis, and cannot stand without it. From the race-constitution, it could not possibly be otherwise.

VERSES 15–17.

In these verses, the Apostle shows that, notwithstanding the essential correspondence of the antitype to the type; and antithetically of the action and its effects of each in and upon the race, there are momentous dissimilitudes between the two classes of effects of the two in and upon it, as to their comparative measure of greatness—those of Christ and His action far exceeding those of Adam and his action. Verse 15 says—"But not as the trespass, so also is the free gift. For, if, by the trespass of the one, the many died, much more did the grace of God, and the gift by the grace of the one man, Jesus Christ, abound unto the many," or all. This is a general statement of the contrast between the effect, *the death*, brought on all by the trespass of the one Adam, and "the grace of God, and the gift by the grace of the one man, Jesus Christ," the second Adam, in which the gracious gift is declared to *abound by much more* over the death; for the "much more," if *logical*, is so because it is certainly *real*. This statement is unfolded in verses 16, 17, in which it is divided into two branch-contrasts, each exhibiting the same excess of the grace and the gift over the death. The first is in verse 16, and is between the condemning judgment brought on all by *the one trespass* of Adam, and the free gift brought from many trespasses unto a justifying act by the one Jesus Christ. The second is in verse 17, and is between the reign over all of the spiritual death brought on all by the first, and the renewal to spiritual life, with destination to reign in heaven forever in *eternal life*, of all who *receive, appropriate* the abundance of grace and of the gift of justification provided by Jesus Christ. Accordingly verse 16 says—"And not as through one that sinned, so is the gift; for the judgment *came* of one unto condemnation, but the free gift *came* from many trespasses unto a justifying act," or act of righteousness.* Here we have the contrast of a condemning judgment of God, not only on Adam, but on all his posterity on account of his *one* trespass, and of a free gift, even to the righteous act of Christ in making His atonement as a basis of justification of all from their many trespasses. This judgment on Adam, even to condemnation of him and his race, was not the dooming of him and them to bodily death in Gen. 3:19, nor sentencing him or them to the spiritual death of Gen. 2:17, but to the positive retributive punishment deserved by his *one* sin, which includes abandonment to spiritual death. This

(*) Lange, and especially Schaff, on verse 16, in Lange's Commentary on Romans.

engulfed all; but the free gift is for the rescue of all, not from this only, but from all the condemnations incurred by *all* his and their trespasses. So vastly does the amplitude of this gift exceed the condemnation of Adam and his race for his one fall. While in this verse the contrast is between the condemnation brought on all by the fall of Adam, and the gift of grace provided by Christ for all for their justification, *in verse 17* it is between the spiritual death inherited by all from Adam, however increased by their actual sin, and the same gift of grace, as equally exceeding this death in power to rescue from it, and to impart spiritual life. It says—"For if, by the trespass of the one, death reigned through the one; much more shall they that *receive* the abundance of grace and the gift of justification reign in life through the one, *even* Jesus Christ." In vain would there be a provision for *justification*, if it were not also for rescue from *spiritual death*, the ground and source of all actual sin and its guilt, to *spiritual life*, the ground and source of all right action and its promised rewards of grace. This gift of grace effects both of these in immediate connection; but neither of them for any, except those who *receive* or *appropriate* it by faith. This receiving it is at once the initiation of this life, and the condition of justification. The latter is God's act for them, admitting of no degrees, but complete at once; the former is in their souls and wills—at first infantile, but to grow through temporal life, gradually supplanting spiritual death or its natural consequences, till at bodily death it is perfected in their souls. Then Christ will consummate His grace towards them by exalting them to share in His own dignity, power, glory, and blessedness, and they will *reign* with Him forever in *eternal life*. We thus see the meaning of the "much more" in this verse, which again, if *logical*, is also *real*, as is shown by the contrast of "death reigning through the one" with the vastly exceeding fact, that "they who *receive* the abundance of the grace and of the gift of justification" do so subjectively as well as objectively, and thus pass from death to life, and to reign in life with Christ forever. The formal antithesis would have been that *life shall reign;* but, as that would have represented life as in the same relation to them as death, a monarch foreign to their true nature, ruling them from without, it would have contradicted the very nature of *life* of any kind, which is necessarily inherent in its possessors, so that it cannot reign or discharge any function. Hence the real anthithesis is, that death, the intruded foreigner, reigns, on its one side, and, on its other, that, not this life, but its recipients will reign in it.

§ 196. THE WONDROUS LITERARY SKILL, AS WELL AS PROFOUND MORAL INSIGHT SHOWN IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THIS WHOLE PASSAGE.

Thus these three verses, 15–17, correlate anthithetically to the three preceding, 12–14, and demonstrate the vast excess of the good provided for all, and communicated to all who *receive* it, by Christ, over the evil brought on all by Adam. As verses 13, 14 are for confirmation of verse 12, so verses 16, 17 are for confirmation of verse 15. Accordingly, as verse 13 is to confirm the statement in verse 12 as to the entrance of sin into the world, and the participation of all in it, by the one transgression of Adam; and as verse 14 is to confirm the statement in verse 12 as to the fact that death entered into the world by sin, and so passed unto all men, because all sinned; so verse 16 is to confirm the statement in verse 15, that, "if by the trespass of the one the many died, much more the grace of God, and the gift by the grace of the one man, Jesus Christ, abound unto the many." It confirms it in the way we have just shown, and need not repeat. Verse 18 is to confirm the same statement in verse 15 as it respects the excess of efficacy in this same gracious provision by the same righteous act of Christ for restoring from spiritual death also to spiritual life and a destination to reign in it forever, which restoration is really accomplished in all "who *receive* the abundance of the grace and of the gift of justification" by faith. It is a great mistake therefore to suppose this whole passage treats of justification only. The purpose of these three verses is to show what they all assert, "the abundance of the grace of God, and the gift, etc.," beyond the measure of the death brought on all men by the one trespass of Adam; and this is not shown by what is done for men by the provision for, or the fact of, justification only, but by *all* that is done for them by Christ. As a matter of fact, grace does abound in rescuing from spiritual death and restoration to spiritual life, issuing in eternal life, and the endless reign of the redeemed in it, to quite as great a degree as in justification. Who can say it does not? How could the Apostle, in presenting this great contrast between the effects of Adam's fall and of Christ's obedience, omit this effect of the latter any more than justification? Besides, all in verses 16, 17 is said of the grace and gift as for all; and it is not till in this verse 17 that we see to whom they produce their *actual* effects, and what they are. It is the so common jumbling together of all the consequences of sin—its natural effects, its appointed effect of bodily death with those of the other doomings, and its positive retributive effect of inflicted punishment—alike into its

penalty, which causes failure to see the real meaning of verses 16, 17, especially of the last of them, and also, as we shall see, of those which follow.

VERSES 18, 19.

Verse 18 says—"So then as through one trespass *the judgment came* unto all men to condemnation; even so through one 'act of righteousness' *the free gift came* unto all men to justification of life." This verse, though not in exact form, is, in fact, the apodosis of verse 12. The Apostle, having shown in verses 15–17 the great differences between the effects of the contrasted acts of Adam and of Christ in and upon mankind, shows in this verse that, notwithstanding, there is an essential resemblance between the acts of these two heads and their effects in and upon them all. Its first member is substantially a restatement of the first member of verse 15, and refers, as that does, to the statements in verse 12, as to the entrance of death into the world by the sin of Adam, and its consequent universality. Its second member states the antithetic resemblance of the one righteous act of Christ and its effect of grace unto all men, to impart "justification of life" to all who receive it. This "justification of life" is the antithesis of the death meant in Gen. 2:17, both as spiritual and as liability to retributive punishment; for though, in necessary order, restoration to spiritual life immediately precedes justification, as its condition, it is constantly preserved by and through it. Thus this verse sums up and ends the contrasts, begun in verse 15, between Adam, as the originator by his one transgression of the sin and death of the whole race, and Christ, as the originator by his one righteous act, of spiritual life and justification provisionally for all, actually for all who receive them. What, now, is the relation of verse 19 to all before it in this passage, and what is its meaning? It says—"For as through the one man's disobedience the many were made sinners, even so through the obedience of the one shall the many be made righteous." In verse 12, the Apostle stated that "death entered into the world by sin" [Adam's], and "passed unto all men;" and he confirmed this in verse 14. In verses 15–18, he set forth in contrasts the provision of grace by Christ for its entire removal from all; so that, in all these verses, 14–18, *death* (the condemnation in verses 16, 18 being to it as penal) is the only matter treated of, except that it came through the one sin of Adam, and except the provision by Christ for *its* removal. It remained, therefore, to treat of the other matter stated in verse 12,

and confirmed in verse 14, that "through one man sin entered into the world," and that "all sinned;" and to show the resemblance between Adam, the type, and Christ, the antitype, in their relation to the race, as its two heads, in respect to this also. This he does in verse 19 by showing them as the sources and causes of the two contrasted conditions of the race as all sinners on the one side, and as all righteous on the other—all *potentially*, and all who receive the abounding provision *actually*. On the one side, Adam by his disobedience, on the other, Christ by His obedience are these sources and causes—the first, by and through his natural relation to his race; and the second, by and through His supernatural and spiritual relation to it. The effects of their respective acts are both subjective and objective. The *subjective* effect of Adam's sin was the inherited perversion or vitiation of nature, involving virtual wrong wills, certain to sin as soon as they act morally; and its *objective* effect was the separation it brought them all into from the favor and fostering of God which He renders to all the unfallen. The *subjective* effects of the obedience of Christ are the rectification of their wrong wills, of children that die before they enter upon a gracious probation, and of those who have entered upon it, however actually sinful, and of the perversion or vitiation of their nature, so as to make them righteous in heart; and its *objective* effect is the whole provision of grace, not only to secure all this rectification, but their justification. Both the effects of Adam's disobedience are *natural*—that is, by propagation of his damaged nature, and therefore come *necessarily* to all, while those of Christ's obedience are *spiritual and moral*, and therefore cannot be realized in and to any *actual* sinner, to whom the provision is offered, *otherwise than by his own voluntary acceptance or appropriation of it by faith*. The contrasted *objective* effects of the condemnation and the justification the Apostle presented in verses 16–18 as their chief points; and, from what we have shown, we deem it certain that the subjective only are presented in verse 19—that is, on the one side, it is sin itself, not its penalty, nor other consequences, and, on the other side, it is subjective righteousness, not rescue from penalty, nor from other consequences of sin, that is intended. The designation of Adam's sin as *disobedience to God* indicates that it was a direct rejection of His authority over him, a rebellion against His declared positive prohibitory command for the sake of his own personal gratification, an act of pure selfishness in opposition to His right to require love and obedience, so that it was a willful wrong against Him, intrinsically unjust, unrighteous, and

he was utterly unrighteous in it. Such is all sin, and such are all sinners in it. On the contrary, the designation of Christ's action, particularly His righteous act of making the atonement, as *obedience to God*, indicates that He was absolutely free from selfishness, and constantly recognized God's authority and complied with His will as purely just and righteous in requiring His loving obedience even to the sufferings and death of His *righteous act* in making the atonement for our sinful race, and that He was perfectly righteous in His whole life. The sense of verse 19 therefore is, that, as, through Adam's disobedience, the many [all, except Christ] were made *virtual* sinners, unrighteous, as already explained, and sure to be *actual* ones as soon as they act morally, so also through Christ's obedience shall the many [virtually, or as far as full provision for their restoration goes] be made [subjectively] righteous. As far as the *potencies* of the contrasted actions of the two heads are concerned, they are parallel. As all were made virtual sinners by Adam's disobedience without actual personal sin of their own; and, as no one becomes an *actual* sinner by necessity, but by his own free choice only; so all are made righteous *virtually* by Christ's obedience without any actual personal obedience of their own; and, as no one becomes an actual sinner by necessity, but only by his own free choice, so no one becomes actually righteous by necessity, but only by his own free choice. The parallel is not impaired nor changed by the fact, that, in the one case, *all* become *actual* sinners, who live to act morally, while, in the other, only *some* become actually righteous, and *some* do not, since both these classes do so by their own free choice without any necessity. Hence, neither is there any basis in this verse for Universalism, nor for an arbitrary limitation of "the many" from *all* men to the elect only. "The many" in both the cases are the same, *all*. The future tense in the last member of this verse indicates that those made actually righteous will be of all the generations to come till the end of the race. As Christ's obedience is set in antithesis to Adam's disobedience, which was an act, we think His righteous act in making the atonement is specially referred to by the term, although the obedience of His whole life was necessary to it. As to the distinction between His active and so-called passive obedience, we see no validity in it, since, in its very nature, all obedience is active. The will of God was that He should suffer and die for mankind; and He actively obeyed it in *submitting* Himself to the required sufferings and death as really as in any other obedience He ever rendered.

§ 197. IMPORTANCE OF THE TEACHINGS OF THIS WONDERFUL PASSAGE, ROM. 5:12–19.

We have now completed an explanation of this wondrous passage, which is like the ocean in its great depths, and like highest mountain ranges in its heaven-piercing heights. With marvellous brevity and skill, it presents in its statements, confirmations, and contrasts the fundamental and perpetual facts and sources of the whole history of mankind, and of God's dealings with them in His government, providence and grace through all time and forever. It is a specimen of *multum in parvo*, unparalleled in all literature known to us, and of never surpassed artistic composition. We have repeatedly and thoroughly examined the views of it and of all its parts of the principal Commentators of all sides of doctrine from Augustine down, and expressions of its teachings in creeds and symbols from the earliest presented in the three foremost Church Histories and two best Histories of Doctrines, and several Works on special or general subjects involving it; and wherein we agree or disagree with any or all of them competent readers will discover for themselves. With high appreciation of, and much indebtedness to, very many who have labored to unfold its contents, notwithstanding any disagreement their views may have with ours, we venture, with respectful deference, to bring these results of our own investigation into the great court of inquiry and revision, with the hope that they may contribute to those final unanimous decisions on the teachings of this passage, to which all true believers in its inspiration and great doctrinal and practical importance are aspiring and tending. But in all our canvassing of this passage we have kept constantly in mind the main end for which we entered upon it, which was to ascertain and exhibit the relations of the incarnate Christ to the race, and especially to the Church; and to us it is a demonstration that, by reason of the race-constitution of mankind, His incarnation was absolutely necessary to any redemptive system—that neither could an atonement have been otherwise possible, nor could the facts, truths, motives, influences, and agencies involved in and constitutive of the whole system and the highest efficiency of its grace have been otherwise evolved and made operative upon mankind. The alternative was—*Christ incarnate, or no atonement, no facts, truths, motives, influences, and agencies to renovate man, no salvation for one of them.* But, connected with this main end, we had others, some of which at least of radical importance to a correct understanding of the definite purpose and necessity of the atonement, as

the supreme and fundamental act of Christ, without which there could have been no salvation for men, no emission of any renewing grace to one of them. As far as this passage relates to Adam and the effects of his sin on himself, as well as on his posterity, it is Paul's inspired showing of the real meaning of God's *warning* to him of the result if he should disobey His command not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; and the fact that those effects so largely passed on to his posterity, added to other reasons which have been shown, proves that they were not retributions to him, in any proper sense of the word, not inflictions on him and them by God, but the natural and therefore necessary consequences of his sin. Thus our position is confirmed and established by this passage, that the natural consequences of sin are not retributions, not punitive inflictions by Him for it, not *social* in design, as real retribution is, but simply *personal*, and by necessity of nature; and consequently atonement can have no direct relation to them, nor any *direct* effect to set them aside or arrest them. But sin, which is *selfishness*, is against God and the universal and eternal moral society, is violation of the universal and eternal law of that society and of God in it and its Ruler and Guardian, which by its quality of justice is purely social, so that true retribution is necessarily social; and, therefore, among the natural consequences of Adam's and all sin is always an incurred liability to and demand for real retribution from God himself according the measure of ill-desert as He sees it, which must be met and removed provisionally for Adam and all sinners, or they must all eternally suffer it. This is confirmed and certified in this passage by the fact that, in all His action for man, the chief part was His "act of righteousness" (δικαίωμα), of *ethical justice* to God and the universal holy society for sinners, as a basis for their justification. Besides these points, we think our retrieval of Gen. 3:16–19 from the distortion of turning its doomings into sentencing Adam and Eve to suffer what was warned against in 2:17, and our exposition of Paul's plain development of its meaning in Rom. 8:17–23 are of vast importance both theologically and practically—especially practically in a world so full of suffering under the doomings of God, providential and disciplinary, and so needing the consolatory explanations of them by the inspired Apostle.

CHAPTER XVII.

Atonements of the animal sacrifices of the Levitical Law; the origin and general use of such sacrifices among the nations; and the relation of those of the Levitical Law to the Atonement and all the relations of Christ to mankind, to God, and to the universal moral society.

§ 198. NOTHING IN ALL GOD'S DOINGS TOWARDS MANKIND ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS.

We have all along proceeded on the basis that God does nothing from a merely arbitrary or capricious will, but correlates and adjusts all His plans, measures, and courses respecting mankind to His own and their moral natures and relations; and we hold that He did so in the matter of the atonement no less than of His legislation and government. In our remaining investigations of this great subject, we will pursue the same course, strictly avoiding every assumption or position included among or kindred to the following:—That, because God is omnipotent, He might have done so or so—might have made moral beings without natural freedom of will or power to sin; under no moral law or government, or one differing to any degree, even to opposition, from that which they are under, as to either the precept, or the penalty, or both of the law, or as to the natural consequences of obedience or disobedience to it, even to contrariety of the actual ones, or to none at all;—that, consequently, not the nature of God and of other moral beings, but His mere arbitrary will makes any action what we call right or wrong, good or bad, or moral at all, while it could have made it directly the contrary; and that this will determines all about what the desert of reward or of punishment of either kind of action shall be, or whether there shall be any at all of either kind, or whether He will either reward or punish;—that, consequently again, though mankind have broken this arbitrary law and incurred liability to suffer its threat-

ened penalty, there is nevertheless no *necessity* for their punishment, if only they will repent, since, by the same arbitrary will, He can set the penalty aside by simply forgiving them;—and, finally, that there was no necessity for the incarnation of the Son of God, for an atonement, for any of the provisions of the redemptive system, for a Divinely inspired revelation of the truths, facts, and motive certainties that system involves, in order to restore sinners to their sundered relations to God, to the forgiveness of their sins, to their moral renovation, or to anything else requisite to their full retrieval and everlasting blessedness. For any holding these and such like notions to talk of any real justice, righteousness, holiness, or even of mercy or grace as related to these, is only an imposture of words voided of their true meaning. So to talk is logically to destroy all basis for judging or criticising anything in God's course towards mankind; for what absurdity it is to criticise the confessedly arbitrary or capricious! Is there any standard, are there any principles, when arbitrariness is assumed as the basis of God's action throughout, with which to compare and judge concerning it, and by which it can be pronounced right or wrong, good or evil? Hence, the holders of such notions are constantly fluctuating, assuming and rejecting, affirming and denying essentially the same things concerning God, forgetting that He asked Israel, through His prophet, "Are not my ways equal?"—that is, equitable, just, right, according to the law as the standard of all moral action? In opposition to all such superficial, subversive notions, we steadfastly adhere to the position, that, as the moral nature of God and man contains and affirms the law with its sanctions of positive reward for unfailing obedience, and positive punishment for disobedience, so not only does that nature, containing and issuing the law, approve the substitution of the sufferings and death of God's incarnate Son for those deserved by human sinners, but demands it and all involved in it on the part of God. We therefore proceed to consider in what the atonement consisted as taught in the Word of God.

§ 199. WHEN THE REDEMPTIVE PLAN WAS DEVISED, AND WHAT IT INCLUDED.

The plan of redemption was devised by God, along with that of creation, for the retrieval of man foreseen as fallen, and to begin development and effect immediately after the fall of the first pair. It included His sparing them and in them their race, and putting them under a new and gracious probation, with the hope inspired

by the promise of the serpent-bruising seed of the woman in connection with the doomings of Gen. 3:16–19. It included His whole providential course with the race to the end of time. It was specialized in His calling Abraham, in His promises to him, and in His covenant with him and his seed, both natural and spiritual, including Christ; and further in choosing Jacob's descendants to be His peculiar theocratic people, among and through whom to prepare the way for the advent of the promised "seed" of the woman and of Abraham; and still further in raising up Moses for all his work, especially to be the medium through whom to give His law, moral, civil, and ceremonial, as a dispensation to that people, not only for all its effects to them till Christ should come, but for its subsequent effects to all people and nations which should receive the Gospel till the race ends. It included His whole course with them to their final dispersion, yet in continuance; and His sending them all their illustrious succession of inspired prophets and writers to declare to them His will, threatenings and truth, and to furnish the whole series of the Holy Scriptures. They were to be instructed and trained intellectually, morally, theologically, religiously, and in sacred conceptions and language down their generations, not only for their own benefit, but, in order that, after Christ should accomplish His earthly mission, when the Gospel should be promulgated, its truths and facts, by the help of all these, could be easily taught and made effective wheresoever it should be made known. As to the Jews, down all their generations, while they could be directly taught their *duties* to God and man by precepts and prohibitions, they could not, in the nature of the case, be so taught the great social relations between men *as sinners* and God as *the righteous moral Ruler*, nor any of the peculiar facts and truths involved in the eternal plan, "the mystery which was hid from ages and generations," which was to be and was made manifest in and through Christ "in the fullness of time." They could be taught these only in a rudimental, shadowy way by the *representations or language of symbols*, embodied in their history, in persons somehow prominent and public officially or otherwise, in actions of a public kind, and in religious institutions, rites, ceremonies, functionaries and instruments—all of which, while incorporated or occurring in their constituted organization and their general history, represented more or less essential principles and features of, and were prefigurations, signs, resemblances, or types of, "the good things to come" in the great antitypical realizations of the plan of Christ and of His peo-

ple. These symbolizations were, therefore, in their very nature, also *prophecies* of what was to be unfolded in the glorious future; and, generally speaking, it can be truly said that that selected race were a typical people, their country was typical, and all God's arrangements for their government, His course towards them, and His religious institutions for them abounded in types and shadows, representing, doubtless, as perfectly as possible, the great realities to come. Pre-eminently is this true of the whole sacrificial system of the Levitical Law, which was specially the *child-conductor to a teacher* to lead men to Christ. It is, therefore, of great importance for a clear understanding of the doctrine of the atonement, to ascertain the real meanings of the teachings of this law—of its typical symbols and representations.

§ 200. MEANING AND USE OF THE WORD ATONEMENT—NOUN AND VERB.

The word, *atonement*, occurs in our old version of the New Testament only once, in Rom. 5:11, where it is an erroneous translation of a Greek word which means *reconciliation;* but is corrected in the New Version. In the Old Testament version, the verb, *to atone*, and the noun, *atonement*, are chiefly used to translate the Hebrew verb, כָּפַר, and noun, כַּפֹּרֶת. This Hebrew verb signifies: 1. To *cover*, to *overlay*, which is probably its original meaning; 2. *To cover over sins*—that is, to forgive, to pardon; 3. As causative, *to cause to forgive*, or *to obtain pardon*—that is, (a) *to expiate, to atone for*, an offense; (b) to *make expiation or atonement* for an offender or transgressor, *to free him from guilt;* (c) to *appease*, to *placate*, to *propitiate* the one offended. The verb and noun occur 154 times. In 13 instances, it appears to refer directly to its original meaning, to *cover;* in 12, to the second meaning, *to forgive;* and in 129, to the third meaning, *to make atonement*. Of these last, 80 are rendered atonement in our [the old version, and we suppose in the new], and 49 by nouns and verbs of a cognate signification. Its customary meaning is, *to make atonement, to expiate*. As a verb, it means, *to cover*, or *to cause to cover, sin;* as a noun, it means, *a cover for sin or guilt*. In his volume of "Select Discoveries," Boston, 1851, pp. 41, 42, S. E. Dwight gives the following very valuable foot-note, which it doubtless cost him much patient labor to prepare: "As a *verb*, in the following passages, it is translated, *to make an atonement*. Ex. 29:33, 39, 37; 30:10, 10, 15, 16; 32:30; Lev. 1:4; 4:20, 26, 31, 35; 5:6, 10, 13, 16, 18; 6:7; 7:7; 8:34; 9:7, 7; 10:17;

12:7, 8; 14:18–21, 29, 31, 53; 15:15, 30; 16:6, 10, 11, 16–18, 24, 27, 30, 32–34; 17:11, 11; 19:22; Num. 5:8; 6:11; 8:12, 19, 21; 15:25, 28, 28; 16:46, 47; 25:13; 28:22, 30; 29:5; 31:50; II. Sam. 21:3; I. Chron. 6:49; II. Chron. 29:24; Neh. 10:33.

As *a noun*, it is rendered *atonement* in Ex. 29:36; 30:10, 16; Lev. 23:27, 28; 25:9; Num. 5:8; 29:11.

As *a verb*, it is used in *a similar sense* in Num. 35:33; I. Sam. 3:14; Ez. 43:20, 26, where it is translated, *to purge, to cleanse:* in Lev. 6:30; 8:15; 16:20; Ez. 45:15, 17, 20; Dan. 9:24, where it is rendered *to reconcile, to make reconciliation*, but should be rendered to make atonement: in Gen. 32:20; Prov. 16:14; Ez. 16:63, where it is rendered, *to pacify, to appease*, because an atonement, an expiation, procures *forgiveness*, or *pacifies anger*.

As *a noun*, it is used in *a similar sense* in Num. 35:31, 32, where it is rendered *satisfaction:* in Ex. 21:30, where it is rendered *a sum of money, i. e., a fine*, as giving satisfaction for an injury: in Ex. 30:12; Job 33:24; 36:18; Ps. 49:7; Prov. 6:35; 13:8; 21:18; Is. 43:3, where it is rendered *a ransom*, and in all but the two last, denotes *a ransom for the life*, because an atonement *released* or *ransomed* from punishment: in Ex. 25:17–22; 30:6; 31:7; 35:11; 37:6–9; 39:35; 40:18; Lev. 16:2, 2, 13–15, 15; Num. 7:89, where it is rendered (Sept. ἱλαστήριον) *mercy seat, i. e., the place of expiation*, or of receiving *pardon:* and in Amos 9:1 (בַּפְתּוֹר by mistake for כַּפֹּרֶת), where it is rendered *altar*, or *that on which the atoning sacrifice is offered.*" These Discourses possess very great merit in many respects, although not according with our view of the nature of the atonement.

With these meanings of the Hebrew verb and noun before us, we are prepared to examine the Levitical Law, to ascertain what, according to it, constituted a COVER or ATONEMENT for sin. But there are four cases of a cover or atonement for sin without the sacrifice of animal life, which we must first dispose of.

§ 201. FOUR CASES OF THE USE OF THE WORD ATONEMENT WHEN IT DOES NOT MEAN ANIMAL SACRIFICES.

Three of these are legislative, one merely a recorded occurrence. In two of them, the atonement was made in money. The *first* is that required in Ex. 21:28–30. If an ox, known by his owner to push with his horn, and yet not kept in by him, killed a man or woman, the general law required the ox to be stoned and his owner to be put to death. But in certain cases, the owner might pay a

sum of money as a *ransom, cover,* for his life. If it was a servant that was killed, the fine went to his master. This atonement was not to God, and has nothing to do with our inquiry. The *second* case of atonement in money is found in Ex. 30:12–16, and acted upon in Num. 31:48–54. When a census of the Israelites was taken, every man of twenty years old or above was required to give half a shekel as "a *ransom, a cover,* for his soul unto the Lord," "an offering unto the Lord to make an atonement, *cover,* for their souls," "that there be no plague among them, when thou numberest them." The word occurs *four* times in the passage in Ex. This shekel was called the *cover* or atonement money of the children of Israel, and was "appointed for the service of the tabernacle of the congregation." It was thus virtually the same as the sacrifices furnished by it, which made atonement for the lives of the people, and so does not conflict with the position that the Levitical Law required the *substitution* of a life for an atonement. The *third* legislative case of atonement without the actual sacrifice of animal life is in Lev. 5:1–14, where the four offenses of not disclosing the truth when adjured as a witness, of touching a carcass, of touching the uncleanness of a man, and of designedly not doing what one had sworn to do are prescribed for. If the offender in any of these ways was too poor to bring a lamb, or even two turtle-doves or two young pigeons, he was required to bring, instead, the tenth part of an ephah of fine flour for a sin-offering. The priest took a handful of it, and burnt it on the altar as a sin-offering, and made an atonement, *cover,* for him; and his sin was forgiven. This flour was substituted for the regular sin-offering of an animal sacrifice on account of his extreme poverty, as mercy on God's part; and, because it was a substitute for that, it does not conflict with the fact that atonement could not be made to God without an animal sacrifice. The *fourth* case, not legislative, but an incidental occurrence, is in Num. 16:41–50. The whole congregation of Israel murmured against Moses and Aaron, on account of the destruction of Korah and his company, which caused the anger of the Lord to be kindled against them, so that thousands of them were falling under it. To arrest the destruction, Moses said to Aaron, "Take thy censer, and put fire therein from off the altar, and lay incense thereon, and carry it quickly unto the congregation, and make atonement for them: for there is wrath gone out from the Lord; the plague is begun." Aaron did so, and made atonement for them, and he stood between the living and the dead; and the plague was stayed. In this terrible emergency, instead of delaying

to go through a regular sin-offering, Moses, doubtless Divinely impelled, directed Aaron to substitute the censer and incense for it; and God mercifully accepted the substitution. *In form*, the case was exceptional; *in spirit*, it was not a departure from the rule of the law, and in no way conflicts with it. Of the last three cases, Dr. S. E. Dwight says: "They are all the cases which I have been able to find, in which it can be even supposed that an atonement was made to God without the sacrifice of life." "These cases, I think, will satisfy no one that the Levitical Atonement did not imply the substitution of a life." We have profited by his examination of these and the two folfowing cases.

There are two instances of atonement recorded as made by the sacrifice of human life. The first is in Num. 25:1–13. In that case, when Moses called on the judges of Israel to slay every one his man of those guilty of whoredom with the Moabitish women, Phineas, grandson of Aaron, rose up and took a spear in his hand, and went after an Israelitish man who brought a Midianitish woman into the camp, and thrust them both through; and the plague was stayed, after twenty-four thousand had died. And God blessed him, "because he was jealous for his God, and made atonement for the children of Israel." Taking the lives of these guilty persons was the atonement; and they were recognized by God as substitutes for the rest of the yet living people. The other case is that of II. Sam. 21:1–9. It was an atonement made, not to God, but to the Gibeonites, who themselves sacrificed, *as anathemas*, seven of Saul's sons, "because he slew the Gibeonites," in violation of the treaty made with them by Joshua. It was a public punishment for a great public crime; and, after it, the famine which had oppressed the land for the crime was stayed. While these two cases exhibit the general nature of atonement, the latter very feebly, yet, in them, the word is not used in its proper Levitical import.

§ 202. SCRIPTURAL STATEMENT OF WHAT THE ATONEMENT OF AN ANIMAL SACRIFICE CONSISTED IN.

In Lev. 17:11, we have a direct, definite statement of what constituted the atonement made by sacrificing animals, as required by the law: "For the life of the flesh is in the blood: and I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls: for it is the blood that maketh atonement by reason of the life." Fairbairn,* commenting on this passage, says: "The grand reason for

(*) See his Typology of Scripture, Vol. II., pp. 304–306—fifth edition.

the singular place which, in the hand-writing of Moses, is assigned to sacrifice by blood, is expressed in the Epistle to the Hebrews, where it is said, that, 'without shedding of blood, there is no remission,' consequently no peace or fellowship with God for the sinner." * * * "And the full and correct import of this passage [Lev. 17:11] is to the following effect: 'You must n t eat the blood, because God has appointed it as the means of atonement for your sins. But it is the means of atonement, as the bearer of the soul. It is not, therefore, the matter of the blood that atones, but the soul or life which resides in it; so that the soul of the offered victim atones for the soul of the man who offers it.' The passage, indeed, is intended simply to provide an answer to two questions: Why they should not eat blood? viz., because the blood was appointed by God for making atonement. And, why should blood have been appointed for this purpose? viz., because the soul or life is there, and hence is most suitably taken for the soul or life of man forfeited by sin. This is also the only sense of the passage that can be grammatically justified;" which he shows.

§ 203. THOSE SACRIFICES AND THE THEOCRATIC GOVERNMENT OF GOD OVER ISRAEL FOR THEM ONLY IN THIS WORLD.

Not only all the different kinds of sacrifices presented at the altar, but other things not presented there, were called by the general name of offerings (corbanim). These included the ransom-money which furnished supplies for the atonement-services of the sanctuary (Ex. 38:25; 30:16), and other occasional offerings for the same end (Num. 7:3; 31:50), and contributions for the support of the ministers of the sanctuary—tithes, first-fruits, and free-will offerings. *Corban* literally signifies a *gift*, and anything solemnly dedicated to a sacred use; and all these *corbanim* were required or encouraged by God from Israel to support and give sacred importance in their estimation to His house, which he had placed among them for their supreme, perpetual good. That good consummately depended on the sacrificial offerings to Him at His altar, the blood, or the soul in the blood, of which was given by Him expressly to make atonement *to Him* for their souls forfeited by sin. These offerings were the burnt-the sin-the guilt-or trespass-the peace-offerings, and the meal-offering as a supplement to the last two. All these offerings were enjoined on the Israelites as the theocratic people, under the special, temporal, theocratic government of God over them, and not as under His universal and eternal moral government.

The whole Levitical Law, with *its* retributions, especially of punishment, its atonements for violations of it, its forgivenesses, its purifications and cleansings, and its priests, while based on and adapted to the eternal moral law and government, as far as it related to these, was only for that theocratic people in their temporal, organic relations to each other, and to God as their Theocratic Ruler *in this world;* and, therefore, while it was a real law and administration for them, it was, throughout, so devised and adapted as to prefigure and be typical of Christ in His redeeming mission and of its effects in time and forever, as related to God's universal and eternal law and government over mankind as related to Him and the universal society. In itself that Levitical system never effected the forgiveness, spiritual purification, and salvation of any one, as the Epistle to the Hebrews distinctly shows, but, by its typical prefiguration of the real redemptive system, it doubtless contributed to secure these results to great multitudes of that peculiarized people until Christ came. Considered in itself, apart from its typical character, the inspired teaching is clearly to the contrary.* The theocratic law and government were *confined to that people, in this world, and were only for a time;* and the forgivenesses secured by its sacrifices were only for sins as against that law, not as against His eternal law, though all who truly repented of them as against this, as well as that, were also forgiven for them as against this on the ground of the atonement of Christ prefigured by these sacrifices (Rom. 3:25; Heb. 9:15). As said elsewhere, that people, during that time, excepted no others ever were or will be under that law and government, but all, that people included, always have been and will be under God's eternal law and government, modified in application to them in this life by the one great atonement of Christ for their sins, to rescue them from subjection to the penalties of this eternal law in connection with their restoration to righteousness by the means it secured, and on the conditions the Gospel prescribes. This law and government and the atonement for sinners against them, therefore, no more pertain to that people than to all other races and nations. Understanding readers can thus see the necessity and reason for our course in the first part of this Work, in investigating and unfolding what the universal law and its real retributions are, especially in the clear light of all that Scripture teaches concerning them, but also in the light of consciousness and the known action and manifestations of

(*) Rom. 3:20; 5:20; 7:8, 13; Gal. 3:19, 21, 23. Respecting the Levitical sacrifices, see Heb. 7:18, 19; 9:9, 10; 10:1, 4–11, and numerous other places.

the common conscience of mankind, and their moral intuitions and judgments.

§ 204. THE SIN-OFFERING.

In considering the animal sacrifices, we begin with the sin-offering. This related to sin *as against God, a direct violation of His will and authority;* and, therefore, while it was an actual expiation or atonement to Him for violators of the theocratic law in the ways specified, it was the leading prefiguration of the great expiation or atonement for the sins of the whole world against God by the offering and sacrifice of our Lord Jesus Christ. Its special relation to sin in this radical aspect is indicated by its distinctive Hebrew name, חַטָּאת, *chattah*, the exact rendering of which is *sin*. Bush says that, in the Septuagint version of the Pentateuch, this word is translated by the Greek word ἁμαρτία, *sin*, in more than 80 places, in all which it is rendered *sin-offering* in our English version; and Dwight says that in that version of the O. T., ἁμαρτία, in at least 114 instances, denotes *a sin-offering*. It was never applied to any sacrifice before the time of Moses (Ex. 29:14), and is entirely peculiar to the Levitical Law, the great end of which was to arouse a consciousness of "the sinfulness of sin," and of the necessity for its expiation, as represented in that law, in order to the sinner's acceptance by God. It was offered when persons committed acts of sin specified, or were in conditions resulting from, connected with, or implying it, as the following specifications show:—

1. When any committed the following aggravated sins:—(1) When a witness was adjured, or put under oath, to disclose the truth, and yet kept it back (Lev. 5:1). 2. When one swore rashly (Lev. 5:4). 3. When any one, the High Priest, a ruler, or a private person, sinned against any of the commandments of the Lord, doing what ought not to be done against any of them, *unwittingly, or through inconsiderate error.** 4. When, on the great day of the yearly atonement, the High Priest made an atonement for himself and his house (Lev. 16:3, 6, 11–14). 5. When consecrations were made, as they implied separation from sin or its taint to holy services or uses:—(1) Of the priests (Ex. 29:10–14). (2) Of the altar and the tabernacle (Ex. 29:36, 37; 30:10; Lev. 16:15–19).

(*) See Acts 3:17; Eph. 4:18; I. Pet. 1:14. Lev. 4:2, 13, 22–35; Num. 15: 27–29.†

(†) See Magee on Atonement and Sacrifice, Vol. I., Essay XXXVII., pp. 239–244, and note on pp. 241–243. Outram, Dis. I., Chap. XIII., pp. 152–154. Fairbairn on Typology, etc., Vol. II., pp. 327–329.

6. When one was cured or recovered from a disease:—(1) From leprosy (Lev. 14-19, 31). (2) From a running issue (Lev. 15:14, 15, 29, 30). (3) When a woman was purified after child-birth (Lev. 12:6, 7). "The language of the law, in these cases, taught them to regard diseases as consequences of sin; and the fact, that, when one recovered from a peculiarly painful and defiling one, God required him to present, besides a thank-offering, a sin-offering also, to make atonement for his sins, most impressively reminded him, that he deserved death at the hands of God. That the Jews regarded it in this light is obvious, not only from the language of Scripture, but from the common testimony of their distinguished writers"* (Dwight varied). 7. When sacrifices were offered for ceremonial uncleannesses:—(1) For touching the carcass of an unclean animal (Lev. 5:2). (2) For touching the uncleanness of men (Lev. 5:3). In both these cases, if the touching was hidden from the one who did it, when he became aware of it he was to be guilty of it, and was to offer a sin-offering for his cleansing (Lev. 5:6–9). (3) For breach of the Nazarite vow (Num. 6:1–21).

This offering was to be made *regularly* for the whole people at the following "set feasts"—the New Moons, Passover, Pentecost. Feast of Trumpets, and that of Tabernacles (Num. 28:15–29,38), Also on the great day of the annual Atonement, when the two goats were offered (Lev. 16). Also when the whole congregation sinned through ignorance (Lev. 4:13–21; Num. 15:22–26).

The animals and ceremonial of this sin-offering were the following:—For private persons, the animal was to be a female kid, or a lamb; also for the discharge of the Nazarite from his vow, and the purification of a leper—or, as a substitute in cases of poverty, two turtle-doves or two young pigeons; or, if any poor persons could not furnish these, a little flour, without oil or incense. For a ruler, it was to be a male kid. For the congregation, or the High Priest, on ordinary occasions, it was to be a young bullock; and on the great day of the annual atonement, they were to be, for the congregation two goats, and for the High Priest a bullock. All the animals must be without blemish, typically perfect; and the value of the

(*) See Magee on Atonement, etc. Dissertation 33 Vol. I., pp. 95, 96—partly quoted by Dwight in a footnote; and indorsed by Him, not quite correctly, we think. Gen. 3:16–19 and Rom. 8:20–23, as also Rom. 5:12–18, I. Cor. 15:21, certainly teach that all sufferings are consequences of sin; but these are partly of the sin of our first parents, partly of the sins of others, and partly of our own; some of them natural consequences of the sin of the first pair, some of that of others, and some of our own. The Scriptures do not teach us, that "the sufferings which we ourselves endure are [all] chastisements for our *personal* sins."

offerings grew according as the offerer was a private person, the whole congregation, or a ruler, or a High Priest, that of the latter being highest on the scale—thus indicating degrees of responsibilities and of guilt in the offerers according to their positions, or number. When the offerer brought his victim to the altar, he was to lay his hand on its head, doubtless with confession and prayer, and then kill it. Its blood was carefully caught, and the peculiarity of the sin-offering was in the uses made of it. If the offering was for a private person, or a ruler, "the anointed priest" (High Priest) was to take of the blood with his finger, and put it on the *horns* of the altar; and then pour the remainder at the bottom of the altar. As the altar was the special meeting-place of God and His people, its horns were emblems of His omnipotence, which would keep and save them, if they met Him there in the appointed way of atonement and in the proper spirit. If, on account of poverty, one brought two turtle-doves or two young pigeons, the priest was to sprinkle of the blood of the one for the sin-offering upon the *side* of the altar, and wring out the remainder of it at its bottom. If the offering was for "the priest that is anointed," or for the whole "congregation of Israel," he was to take some of the bullock's blood into the Holy Place of the Tabernacle, to dip his finger in it, and to sprinkle of it seven times *before the Lord, before the veil of the Most Holy Place*, in which God dwelt; then to "put some of it upon the horns of the altar of sweet incense before the Lord"—that is, before that veil; and then to pour all the remainder of it at the bottom of the altar of burnt-offering before the Tabernacle. When, on the great day of annual atonement, the High Priest offered the prescribed sacrifices for himself and his house, and for the whole congregation, he first killed a bullock for a sin-offering for himself and his house; then, having burnt incense in the Most Holy Place before the Lord, he took of the blood and sprinkled it with his finger upon the mercy-seat on its east side, and then before it with his finger seven times. He then killed the goat of the sin-offering for the people, and did the same with its blood in the Most Holy Place, which he had with that of his bullock, and thus made atonement for the Holy Place, "because of the uncleanness of the children of Israel, and because of their transgressions in all their sins." He then went out of the Most Holy Place to the altar of incense before it or the Lord, and made atonement for that, taking of the blood of the bullock and of the blood of the goat and putting of each upon the horns of that altar round about, and sprinkled of the blood with his finger upon

it seven times, to cleanse and hallow it from the uncleanness of the children of Israel. He then laid both his hands on the head of the live goat, confessed over him all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions in all their sins, putting them upon his head, and sent him away by an appointed man into the wilderness, bearing upon him all their iniquities into a solitary land, who was to let him go there. The fat of the bullock and of the killed goat was burnt on the altar of burnt-offering, and the whole remainder of their bodies was carried out of the camp and burnt. These atonements for the priests and the whole people were to be made annually in the seventh month, on the tenth day of the month, to expiate all their iniquities of the preceding year. Such were the sin-offerings, and the atonements were only accomplished when, after the imposition of hands on the heads of the victims, death was inflicted on them, and their blood was used as shown. The life-blood of the victim was given to and accepted by God as a *substitute* for the life of the guilty offerer, forfeited by his sins; and the acceptance was ratified by the burning of the fatty parts as a sweet savor unto the Lord.

§ 205. THE GUILT- OR TREPASS-OFFERING.

This offering, אָשָׁם, *asham*, *guilt-* or *trespass-offering*, was always for individuals who were guilty of wrongs done to others, and to God as Ruler and Guardian of their rights and interests. Lange says,* "Trespass is wrong done to another (whether God or man), and involves not only sacrifice for its sin, but also amends for its harm." "The *asham* expresses that man has become guilty, liable to punishment, towards Jehovah or towards his fellow man; and the emphasis lies so strongly on the liability to punishment, that the same word denotes at the same time satisfaction." Guilt, as such, is the entire effect of sin in its cosmic sphere, from the bad conscience even to death, to Sheol, to Hell." "Sin is like a stone cast into a lake; guilt like the wave-circles which go out from it, the circumference of that evil center." This sacrifice was offered in the following cases: 1. When one committed a trespass, and sinned through ignorance or inadvertence in the holy things of the Lord (Lev. 5:14–16); in not paying his full tithes; in neglecting to redeem his first-born; in appropriating the first-fruits to his own use; or in eating parts of the sacrifice which pertained to the priests. Besides bringing to the Lord a ram without blemish,

(*) See Comm. on Lev., in beginning his comments on 4:1–35—5:1–13.

he was to make compensation in money, according to the priest's estimation, with a fifth of the value added. 2. When one transgressed any prohibition of the Lord in the law unconsciously (Lev. 5:17-19), he was to bring the same offering, according to the priests' estimation of its value. 3. When one dealt falsely with his neighbor in a matter of deposit, or of bargain (pledge), or of robbery, or oppressed him; or had found that which was lost, and dealt falsely therein, and swore to a lie, he must restore it in full, with the addition of a fifth part of its value, and must bring the same offering, a ram without blemish, to the Lord, whom he had wronged by transgressing His law in wronging his neighbor (Lev. 6:1–7). 4. When a man had illicit connection with a bond-maid, betrothed to another, but not free, he was to bring the same offering, and when the priest made atonement for him with it, he would be forgiven (Lev. 19:20–22). 5. When a leper was to be purified (Lev. 14:12), and when a defiled Nazarite was to be purified (Num. 6:12), a trespass-offering was sacrificed in connection with a sin-offering—*a he lamb*.

This statement shows that the guilt-offering differed from the sin-offering. 1. In being only for the *specified sins of individuals*. 2. In the character of the sins, as consisting in some *fraud* or *wrong* against man, and so against God also, for which restitution, except in the cases under 4 and 5, must be made to those wronged, and to God through His priest as a substitution for his deserved punishment. In the cases excepted, it was made only to God. 3. The fact, that a sacrifice to God was required for these sins, in addition to restitutions to the wronged, shows that their aspect as sins against God, which could not be forgiven without atonement, was not overlooked, but merely set forth less prominently than that of the sins for which the sin-offerings were made. 4. This sacrifice was called the guilt-offering, because it signified the fact that the sins designated created a *guilt-debt* to men, and to God with them, as theocratic Ruler, which could only be cancelled by restitution to men and sacrifice to God in addition. We might almost call it the offering for the *guilt of dishonesty*. 5. In all the cases, except that of the leper and the Nazarite, the offering required was the same, a ram; and the mode of the offering was much less solemn and significant than that of the sin-offering, "the blood being only sprinkled round about upon the altar" (Lev. 7:2). 6. In the cases of the leper and Nazarite, a he lamb was the offering, instead of a ram. These were to bring this offering, because they owed a guilt-debt to the people and to God—the leper, on account of his disease, viewed

as a special consequence of sin and dangerous to them, as well as preventive of his duties to them, and the Nazarite, on account of his ceremonial defilement; so that both had violated the duties they owed as members of the theocracy, and had shed a bad influence upon it.

Such were the requirements of the law respecting the sin-offering and the guilt-offering; the former for sin in its intrinsic nature, viewed as directly against God, and hence the fundamental sacrifice of all; the latter, a closely connected adjunct to it referring directly to the sins specified against men and so against God as Theocratic Ruler, as wrongs against them creating a guilt-debt to them in their theocratic organization under God and to Him. These two offerings *covered*, expiated, atoned for, all sins that were *pardonable—all not presumptuous, or committed with a high hand.* If these were offered as required, the promise was that they should be forgiven; if not, "there was no remission," and the presumptuous despisers "died without mercy."

§ 206. THE BURNT-OFFERING. NOT ORIGINATED BY THE LEVITICAL LAW, BUT BY ADAM, TAUGHT BY GOD.

It is not important here to develop the Scriptural teachings respecting the burnt-offering and the peace offering; but we have a few things to say respecting them, especially the former. We refer to the passages concerning them (Lev. 1:2–17; 3:1–17). One thing to notice is, that, as far as the imposition of the hands of the offerer on the victim's head, his killing it, and the sprinkling of the blood round about upon the altar by the priest were concerned, this offering had the characteristics of the sin-offering, and it was "to make atonement for him.* This offering was not only for individuals, or, by itself or along with the sin and guilt offerings, for the whole people, but was the constant daily morning and evening sacrifice for the whole people. It was not originated by the Levitical Law, as the others were, but evidently by some direction or inspiration of God to Adam, and not by any instinctive impulse, guess or reasoning of his. It is plainly assumed in the first chapter of Leviticus, that it had been a standing custom of individuals to offer it; and Scripture tells us that it had been offered by Abraham (Gen. 22:1–14), by Noah (Gen. 8:20), and by Abel (Gen. 4:4)—a *ram* by Abraham

(*) See Magee, Vol. I., XXXIX., pp. 262, 263. Vol. II., LXVII., pp. 24 26. Outram, Dis. I., Chap. X.; also Chap. V., pp. 125, 126. Fairbairn, Typology, etc., Vol. II., pp. 347, 348. Lange's Lev. Int. and Chap. I.

(Isaac's question in verse 7 clearly showing that he knew the custom, and that a lamb was the usual victim); "of every clean beast, and of every clean fowl" by Noah; and "of the firstlings of his flock" by Abel — all the animals being of the kinds afterwards required by the Levitical Law. Sacrifice no more begins with Abel's, than with Abraham's or Noah's, but is spoken of in his case as much as in theirs as according to custom. We see not how the inference can be avoided that it originated with Adam. How or when? We can see no shadow of reason for supposing that he was led to peform it by any "instinctive impulse" under "the sense of guilt and lost communion with God," or by any mere self-sprung feeling; or that he ever invented it. As permission had not been given him, as far as we know, to eat animal food, or to kill any creature, by what conceivable psychological process could even a guess have entered his mind, that it would be pleasing to God to kill and offer animals, especially sheep, as sacrifices to Him? How, without *some kind of a revelation or direction from God*, could he have any conception whatever of animal sacrifices, and of these offered on an altar? Or, if such a conception could possibly have sprung into his mind, how could it seem other than unnatural, cruel, and revolting to inflict the pain and suffering of death upon innocent creatures, not even rational, to pour out their blood, and to burn up their bodies on an altar?—how otherwise than utterly absurd, to do so to either placate or please God, without authority or license from Him? What relation could he, or any one since, discern between such use or abuse of innocent animals, whether called eucharistic, votive, precatory, propitiatory, or expiatory, and God's claims on him for gratitude, or against him for penal sufferings deserved by his sins, or for anything else? What could such offerings be, but mere guess-work, instead of which throwing stones or tearing up rose-bushes would have been just as good? — an exceedingly risky venture of experiment, with much greater reason to fear incensing or displeasing God by such destruction of innocent animals, than to hope to please and appease Him by such unauthorized immolation? To us, therefore, the supposition that Adam originated these offerings without Divine direction of some direct kind is utterly incredible and unreasonable.*

The standing reason for this supposition and against the origination of sacrifice by God is the absence of a command from Him to Adam to offer it. In the article on "Sacrifice," in Smith's Dic-

(*) Magee, Vol. I., pp. 378-391, Essays LIV-LVIII.

tionary of the Bible, the author says: "Sacrifice, when first mentioned in the case of Cain and Abel, is referred to as a thing of course; it is said to have been brought by men; there is no hint of any command given by God. This consideration, the strength of which no ingenuity has been able to impair, although it does not actually disprove the formal revelation of sacrifice, yet at least forbids the assertion of it, as a positive and important doctrine." In a foot-note, he presents some more of the same kind of reasoning. He states the facts of the case correctly; but, like Mephiposheth, his conclusion is lame in both its feet—in what it denies and in what it assumes. The strength of the facts no ingenuity has ever been exerted to impair; his conclusion none can impair, because it has no validity to impair. The true reasoning is this: The recorded facts show that sacrifice did not originate with Cain and Abel, but with Adam, who was still alive when they made their offerings, and with him either by or without Divine direction. The objections urged above to the latter alternative, as well as positive reasons for a Divine authorization, show this alternative unreasonable and absurd, and that the other must be true. The objection, that no command of God requiring it is recorded, is of no weight, because there may have been one, though not recorded among the brief sketches of the first part of Genesis, and because, as we think, a direct positive command was not given, but directing instruction; for it was plainly important, that the guilty pair in their condition, and their descendants until a nation should be prepared to observe the commanded institution of sacrifices, should recognize Him as granting or conferring upon them, as an act of mercy and grace, a great privilege and benefit; and further, because there seems to have been no set times for making the offerings, but doing so was left to the promptings of their own hearts or consciences as special occasions of any kind might move or urge them to it.* The first chapter of Leviticus shows that this *voluntary* character of the burnt-offering was partly preserved in the Levitical Law. It is among our wonders, that such a man as Lange should have adopted the notion of the merely human origination of sacrifice, the opposite of which we deem of great importance, viewed in connection with the eternal plan of redemption and the consummate sacrifice of our Lord Jesus Christ.

(*) Magee, Vol. I., pp. 381–385, Essay LVII. Fairbairn, Typology, etc., Vol. I., chap. IV., pp. 287–300. Valuable note of John Allen, translator of Outram, on pp. 18–22.

§ 207. THAT SACRIFICE WAS ORIGINATED BY ADAM UNDIRECTED BY GOD, GROUNDLESS AND UNREASONABLE.

Glance at the case. How can it consist with any fit conception of God's eternal plan of redemption for mankind foreseen as fallen, including His whole course towards them, and specially the incarnation and sacrificial death of the Son, to suppose that, although He designed in it the whole institution of sacrifices typical of Christ, as making the great fulfilling, antitypical one for the sins of the world, and its results;—that, although the burnt-offering was the foundation of that institution, and the others were distributed from it;—that, although it had been recognized by God as the special medium of access to Him and mode of securing His favor from Adam down, He having furnished a ram for it to Abraham, having accepted Noah's as "a sweet-smelling savor," and "having had respect to Abel and to his offering;"—that, although these offerers of it always built altars to offer upon, and offered the "clean beasts and fowls" which were afterwards required in the distributed sacrifices of the Levitical Law;—and that, although no other ground of approach to, and acceptance by, God was ever revealed to mankind than that of sacrifice; yet it was not originated by God, but by Adam by some inexplicable freak or process of his own uninspired, undirected, guilty mind; and God forthwith adopted and constituted that guess or invention of Adam, including the altar, the kind of creature, and the mode of sacrificing it, to be such for the whole race until the final day! To us it is utterly incredible and absurd to suppose any such thing—to suppose that the origin of sacrifice and of all the sacrificial types of the expiatory sufferings and death of Christ for the sins of the world was not embraced in the eternal redemptive plan and in its execution in time, but left to the mere blind, groping guess of the one first guilty, sin-darkened man—to make the supreme plan of God hinge on such a contingent guess! Suppose Adam had not *guessed* this seemingly unreasonable, unnatural way of animal sacrifice, but something else! What course would God then have taken? We are told that Abel offered his sacrifice *by faith*, and was therefore witnessed to by God that he was righteous. But how could he offer it *by faith*, if he did not know that God had authorized it? On what ground could he act it in offering what and as he did? Or could Cain, if he had offered just what and as Abel did?

Essentially the same objections are equally valid against the notion of Spencer that the Levitical Law of sacrifices was given to

the Israelites by Moses, not because they were embraced as symbols and types in God's redemptive plan, as the Epistle to the Hebrews and other Scriptures plainly teach and imply, but because the Israelites, having been accustomed to such in Egypt, were so infected with a superstitious regard for them that they "could neither be safely prohibited, nor, amidst the daily growth of superstition, be left to the choice of every individual;" so that, to prevent disastrous corruptions and perversions, this Law, prescribing the victims, the time and modes of sacrificing them, and all relating to them, was given out of indulgence to the prejudices of that people, and to guard as much as possible against abuses.*

§ 208. A CLUE TO WHEN GOD TAUGHT ADAM TO OFFER ANIMALS IN SACRIFICE—THE KINDS AND HOW.

We believe we have a clue to the time when God in some way *directed* or *taught* Adam, not only to offer animals in sacrifice, but the kind or kinds of them, and the generic meaning of the rite. It was when He made for the guilty but repentant pair "coats of skins, and clothed them" (Gen. 3:21). He had placed them on the basis of the redemptive system by the promise of the serpent-quelling seed of the woman (verse 15), which He immediately followed with the stern doomings of verses 16–19. Adam's faith in the promise so lifted him above even the doom to bodily death, that he "called his wife's name Life (*Havah*), because she would be the mother of all living," doubtless using this term in its highest significance. It is manifest that Eve also thus seized the promise by faith (Gen. 4:1). But they must leave Paradise, and go out into the rough brake of the rude, wild world, where their wretched fig-leaf coverings, witnesses of their guilt and shame, would utterly fail to serve their need. As before the doomings, God, to support them under them, gave them the promise of the serpent-queller, so now, before expelling them, in order to support them under the terrible trial of their expulsion, He demonstrated His merciful and gracious care for their welfare and comfort by fittingly clothing them (Gen. 3:21). It is not said in what manner God did this, but probably in a way which would be to them a kind of *object-lesson* how to do it, or by teaching them to do the whole themselves. Unless God somehow instructed Adam to kill the animals, he would not have dared to do it; and it

(*) Outram, Dis. I., Chap. I., §§ 7 10, pp. 22 30; also Translator, John Allen's note against this notion, pp. 28, 29. Magee, Vol. I., Essay XLVII., pp. 335–345.

is improbable that God would have instructed him to kill them for their skins, and not also what to do with their carcasses, that they should not be left to rot in Paradise, but put to some good use, especially when He might have taught them to procure clothing from other materials. His care for them in thus clothing their bodies would inspire faith in them that He would also care for them in all other ways necessary for their real good. But we cannot think that this care for their bodies, and its natural impression on their hearts was all, or even the chief part of God's entire provision for them at that time; for to clothe their bodies without also providing for their souls would have been a very small matter, especially as they were just to be launched into the wild world to live and propagate their race of sinners in it, under all the severities of their dooms, also propagated along with the spiritual vitiation of their sin and all the resulting evils in time and the liabilities to retribution beyond time—all known to God, who was acting on His own knowledge. His eternal plan of redemption was based on the designed sacrifice of the seed of the woman as "the propitiation for the sins of the world," by which the serpent's head was to be crushed. It was in that plan, as the Epistle to the Hebrews and other Scriptures abundantly teach, to symbolize and typify that one great, real sacrifice for sin, until the fit time for making it, by sacrifices of animals, not only from the giving of the ceremonial law through Moses to the prepared nation of Israel, but, as already shown, from before the offerings of Cain and Abel; their object from the first being to impart all the light, hope, and encouragement possible to Adam and to all down till the great antitypical sacrifice should be made. Is it not then beyond any reasonable doubt, and simply a matter of course, that, before expelling the fallen, but then repentant, believing pair (Gen. 3:20; 4:1), God would impart to them, especially to Adam as the natural head of his race, and therefore most fittingly before any of them were born, such an elementary knowledge of vicarious sacrifice as the basis of all forgiveness and acceptance by Him, as they were capable of receiving, and would, in some adapted way, teach and lead him to offer designated animals as such sacrifices upon an erected altar? Does not every reason of relation, fitness, authority, influence, and type demand that the origin of the rite should be connected with Adam, and not with any one of his sons or natural descendants? For what kind of race-relation, propriety, authority, influence, or type could the rite possess, if its origin were connected with one of them? The others would almost certainly have opposed

and rejected it; while, if originated with him before any of them were born, and they were taught concerning it and accustomed to its performance from childhood by these first parents and by succeeding ones, they would naturally recognize it as sacred and authoritative, as children always do religious customs and institutions observed by their parents, at least during their earlier years; and, when they would come to act for themselves, they would, according to this tendency, practice as they did. This view alone accounts for and explains all the facts connected with the case—*how* Cain and Abel came to bring offerings to the Lord while their parents were living, as a matter of course—*why* Cain's was not, and Abel's was, accepted; Cain's being a willful substitution for the Divinely authorized, expiatory animal sacrifice of his father, and offered, of course, without repentance and faith, while Abel's was that of his father in its atoning significance, he thus "by faith offering unto God a more excellent sacrifice than Cain," so that God had respect to both *him* and *it*, but not to *Cain* and *his*—*why* Noah, having received the transmitted knowledge of this Divinely authorized sacrifice, offered it after his egress from the ark—*why* offering the same kind in essentially the same way was carried on and continued by his descendants, wherever they scattered and settled, as families, tribes, and nations—*why* Abraham, Melchisedec doubtless, Job who probably lived in the patriarchal times, Moses before he received the law (Ex. 17:15), Jethro (Ex. 18:12), Balak (Num. 22:40), and Balak and Balaam (23:1–5), offered the same, all on altars—*why* Moses placed this kind of sacrifice foremost and fundamental in the list of those of the Levitical Law as a matter of course, and as that from which all the others were distributed—*why*, in the earliest periods, fathers of families and heads of tribes and clans were their priests—*why*, later, kings, as possessing the same rights, were, not rarely, recognized as priests by their office—*why* afterwards the priestly office was generally established among the nations as a distinct and sacred one, its peculiar function being to offer animal sacrifices, commonly the original kinds of animals, or including them, and to do so in essentially the original way—and *why* well nigh the entire human race, not sunk in barbarism, has always relied on these sacrifices as expiatory to propitiate God or the gods. The key which fits so many locks, and alone opens any of them, must be the only right one; and, without this, all the facts mentioned, occuring from the morning of the race down through thousands of years, and pertaining to so many persons and nations, are inexplicable

mysteries. To us, therefore, it is certain that animal sacrifices were originated with Adam by a direct authorization of God.

§ 209. THIS ADAMIC SACRIFICE WAS NOT MERELY EUCHARISTIC, BUT EXPIATORY.

That this, which we name the Adamic sacrifice, was not merely eucharistic, nor expressive of the self-devotement of the offerer to God, but typically expiatory, signifying a vicarious basis of forgiveness of sin and acceptance with God, is not doubtful. In Gen. 4:4, it is said: "the Lord had respect unto Abel and *to his offering;*" and, in Heb. 11:4, the reason is given, that "*by faith* Abel offered unto God *a more excellent sacrifice* than Cain." Faith is trust, confidence in, reliance upon God on the ground of some revelation or declaration by Him to us, including or implying invitations and promises to assure us that He is disposed to be merciful and gracious to us; and, without such a ground, it is impossible for any of mankind, all consciously sinners and guilty, to exercise any real faith in, love of, or obedience to Him. Faith comes from hearing, or objective communication only; and what is heard must be some gracious revelation or disclosure, which faith accepts just as given. What ground of faith had Cain and Abel? No other than their father had, the promise of the serpent-bruising seed of the woman, followed by God's clothing him and Eve with coats of skins, in connection with which, as we doubt not, He instructed them to offer the bodies of the animals on an altar, as sacrifices for their sins, as the ground of His forgiving them, His acceptance of which with full favor to them He showed by sending fire upon the sacrifices to consume them.* God also, we think, instructed Adam at the same time, that such sacrifices were to be made in future by him and his descendants whenever a special sense of need of forgiveness and help should press them; and offering them was thus made an established custom. Adam and Eve, of course, taught their children respecting the great promise of grace and its sacrificial supplement; and accordingly Abel by faith brought and offered his animal sacrifice as the ground of his acceptance with God, which Cain, in willful unbelief, refused to do, but substituted an offering, not sacrificial, "of the fruit of the ground." He thus acted a denial of his need for, and a defiant rejection of, the revealed ground of faith and Divine acceptance; and his sin with its guilt was left like a terrible wild beast couched at his door, waiting to rend and devour him, while Abel by offering

(*) Magee, Vol. I., No. LVII., pp. 388-391.

in faith was testified to by God, as *righteous*, (δίκαιος)—that is, *justified by his faith*, "God bearing witness in respect to, [or over] his gifts," doubtless by sending fire upon and consuming them.* By thus manifesting His respect unto him and to his offering," He recognized him as *righteous*.†

§ 210. THE BURNT-OFFERINGS OF NOAH, ABRAHAM, ETC., NOTICED.

That the burnt-offerings of Noah (Gen. 8:20), were designed by him to be *expiatory* seems to us manifest, not only from the fact that he evidently knew the circumstances of the origin of such sacrifices, and their significance in relation to men as sinners and to their promised deliverer, also of Abel's offering, and not improbably of such offerings not unrepeated during the 1,600 years since Adam by the pious line, but because, as he was now the new natural head of the race, and fully knew why the Flood had drowned all but him and his family, and that his and their sin exposed them to like destruction, he desired to secure His forgiveness and favor in this hereditary way. As the burnt-offering was an undivided unit containing all the others, until its distribution by the Levitical Law, Noah's design in his great aggregate offering was doubtless complex, including with that of expiation that of thanksgiving and that of a special dedication of Himself and his whole family to God. His aggregate offering "of every clean beast and every clean fowl, as burnt-offerings on the altar" was, we think, under Divine direction. The expression in verse 21 of God's pleasure in the sacrifice, that "He smelled the sweet savor" of it, is applied by Paul directly to "the offering and sacrifice" of Christ to God for us (Eph. 5:2), which distinctly proves the chiefly expiatory character of Noah's offering.

The case of the burnt-offering of Abraham (Gen. 22:1–13), is one of the supremely wonderful matters contained in the wonderful Book of God. Without enlarging on it here, we notice only the following respecting it. This command of God to Abraham shows the latter's knowledge of this race-long rite of burnt-offerings, how it was executed, and its religious and moral purposes. But, instead of the regular animal, the command now was: "Take now thy son, thine only son, whom thou lovest, even Isaac, * * * and offer him * * * for a burnt-offering." This command was to prove or test his faith in and obedience to Himself. At the critical moment, when,

(*) Lev. 9:24; Judges 6:21; I. Kings 18:38; I. Chron. 21:26; II. Chron. 7:1.

(†) Magee, Vol. I., pp. 58–62. No. LXIII., pp. 476–479.

in intent, Abraham had already offered his dear, consenting son, his hand, uplifted with the knife to slay his son, was arrested by the Divine prohibition of the act from behind him; and, turning to the place of the voice, he saw "a ram caught in the thicket by his horns;" and he "took the ram, and offered him up for a burnt-offering in the stead of his son"—a *textus probans* for vicarious sacrifice. The chief design of God in this wondrous offering, so full of significance for the true Israel of God in all after-times, was doubtless that it should be a most impressive type of the great offering up by the infinite Father of His only-begotten Son (John 3:16), the Son of His love (Col. 1:13), as an expiatory sacrifice for the sins of the world. The type was symbolically the same as the antitype; and the correspondence of the latter to the former is plainly referred to in the remarkable passage in Rom. 8:32, and also in John 3:16.

That the burnt-offerings which Job regularly offered for his sons (Job 1:5), and those which his three guilty friends were commanded by God to offer for themselves (42:8, 9), were expiatory is incontrovertible.

The conclusion from this survey is, that the burnt-offerings were the only kind offered to God by those who continued in the theistic faith during the 2514 years before the giving of the Levitical Law; and that the common understanding concerning them always was, that they were expiatory, so that, when offered in faith, they were regarded as the ground, not only for obtaining forgiveness of sins, but for securing acceptance of thanks for benefits, and help, of prayers for help when needed, and of vows made and kept. The heathen retained essentially the same view of them when they offered them to their false deities, deriving it doubtless from the primitive instruction.*

When this one primitive sacrifice of the burnt-offering was separated into all the others prescribed in the Levitical Law, so as to symbolize all the distinct objects before symbolized by it alone, still, because it was the original and fundamental one, and because of its remaining comprehensive significance, it was placed first in the Law. While the sin- and guilt-offerings were covers or atonements for the positive sins designated as their objects, the burnt-offering was for those constantly recurring failures and faults of heart and life of those standing in the covenant, which, although not causing exclusion from it, or, as we would say, from the Church, would wound their conscience, mar their peace with God, induce self-condemnation and unhappiness, and would need forgiveness from God along

(*) Magee, Vol. II., No. LXVII., pp. 24–26.

with repentance and consecration of heart and life in the future. In Lev. I., where it is prescribed for individuals standing in covenant relations, as a privilege granted to any disposed to offer it, its original voluntary character is retained, the victims to be offered and the mode of offering them being alone prescribed; while in Ex. 29: 38–46; Num. 28:3–6; and Lev. 6:9, it is required to be offered every morning and evening for the whole covenant people, and, during the night, when the altar was free from other use, to be consumed so slowly as to last till morning. It "was always accompanied with a meal and drink offering, through which the worshipper pledged himself to the dilligent performance of the deeds of righteousness." It was also to be offered in connection with a sin-offering on the great day of atonement, with the three principle annual festivals, and on other occasions.*

§ 211. THE PEACE-OFFERINGS—ALSO EXPIATORY.

These were sacrifices of thanksgiving or praise, of a vow, and of free-will, the first of which was clearly the most important. The fact, that they were all offered with the imposition of hands and the sprinkling of the blood of the victims upon the altar round about, shows that, like all the other bloody sacrifices, they were fundamentally related to the offerer as a sinner, and so had an expiatory character. They were the symbolical basis of the acceptance of thanks or praise, the vow, the prayer, or the free seeking after God, which they expressed. Says Bähr, approvingly quoted by Fairbairn,—"The reference to sin and atonement discovers itself in the most striking and decided manner, precisely in regard to that species of peace-offerings which was the most important and customary, and which might seem at first sight to have least to do with such a reference, viz: in the praise-offering. The Hebrew word, *todah*, comes from a verb, which signifies as well to confess to Jehovah sin, guilt, misconduct, as to ascribe adoration and praise to His name.† The confession of sin can only be made in the light of God's holiness; hence, when man confesses his sin before God, he at the same time confesses the holiness of God. But, as holiness is the expression of the highest name of Jehovah, the confession of sin with Israel carries along with it the confession of the name of Jehovah; and every confession of this name, as the front and center of all Divine manifestations, is at the same time glory and praise to God. Accord-

(*) Bush, Introduction to Chap. I. of Leviticus.

(†)Comp. Ps. 32:4; I. Kings 8:33; Josh. 7:19.

ingly, the Hebrews necessarily thought in their praise-offerings of the confession of sin, and with this coupled the idea of an atonement; so that an atoning virtue was properly regarded as essentially belonging to this sacrifice."*

§ 212. CONCLUSION THAT ALL THE ANIMAL SACRIFICES WERE EXPIATORY, AND SO PROPITIATORY.

Such is the list of the animal sacrifices prescribed in the Levitical Law; and the conclusion is inevitable by every principle of sound interpretation, that they were all designedly either exclusively or radically expiatory, not one of them *merely* eucharistic, votive, or self-consecrative. (1) As to those of the sin- and guilt-offerings, they were to be made by those who had sinned and were guilty to make atonement or a cover for them, as a basis of their forgiveness. The lives of the offered animals were substitutions for their lives forfeited by their sins, or for the punitive sufferings they deserved; and, without their offering these, they had no remission, while, with their offering them, they always had it. Hence, these offerings were purely expiatory. (2) The same is shown to be radically true of all the animal sacrifices by the requirement of the imposition of the hand of the one offering for himself, of the priest representing the whole congregation, and of each of the elders representing it, upon the head of the animal to be offered. The significance of this symbolical act is stated in only one place (Lev. 16:21, 22); but it doubtless had the same significance when done in connection with any animal sacrifice. It reads—"And Aaron shall lay both his hands upon the head of the live goat, and confess over him all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions, even all their sins; and he shall put them upon the head of the goat, and shall send him away by the hand of a man that is in readiness into the wilderness: and the goat shall bear upon him all their iniquities unto a solitary land: and he shall let go the goat in the wilderness." The two goats together made the one sin-offering of that great annual atonement for Israel, both being necessary to represent symbolically the whole character and designed effect of atonement by substitution, although one animal alone, except when birds were used, was a sufficient representation on all other occasions not so expressive. By the priest's confession of their sins and putting them on the head of the goat by laying his hands on it, he most emphatically acknowledged their guilt or desert of the penalty of

(*) Fairbairn's Typ., Vol. II., p. 354.

them and signified their repentance of them, while he transferred the necessity of suffering the penalty to the vicarious animal. This passage positively declares the transfer; and, in verse 26, the goat is represented as even *polluting* the one who took it away into the wilderness so that he had to "wash his clothes and bathe his flesh in water" before he could return into the camp. He also must do the same who carried the bullock and goat, which had been offered for sin-offerings, out of the camp and burnt them, as if they were utterly *polluted* by the sins of the whole people being transferred to them. By these sacrifices, an atonement was made for all Israel to *cleanse* them, that they might be *clean* from all their sins before the Lord—that is, from all the penal liabilities they had incurred by their sins; for in this sense only could they be cleansed from them. These annual sacrifices, therefore, were purely expiatory. That laying the hand on the head of the animals of the guilt-offerings was also done, though not mentioned, is well nigh certain, mention of it being omitted on account of the close relation of that to the sin-offering.* If confession of sin always accompanied this act, which can hardly be doubted, what else could it mean, than that the animal was offered as an expiation of the offerer's sin—that, by its dying *in his stead*, he escaped the penal death which he deserved, being forgiven? Having, by this expiation, obtained forgiveness, the way was open for his thanks or praise, his vow, his prayer, or self-dedication to God to be accepted by Him, without which they could not possibly be.† (3) The same is shown to be true of all the animal sacrifices by the use made of their blood. The offerer, having laid his hand on his victim's head and confessed his sin, closing, according to Jewish commentators, as fully shown in the last reference, with the petition,—"Let this be my expiation," killed it by shedding its blood, which contained its life or soul, thus substituting it for his own forfeited by his sin, the priest, having caught the blood, used it in the ways prescribed for the different offerings, which we have seen, thus symbolically signifying that the atonement was accepted, and that God's wrath or justice against the offerer (or, if it was offered for many, or for the whole congregation, against them) was satisfied, and he or they had forgiving acceptance by God on account of the substitution of the animal's life for his or theirs forfeited by sin. (4) The fact, that under the Law "without the shedding of blood" in the appointed way, "there was no remis-

(*) Fairbairn, Vol. II., p. 312; Magee, No. 39, pp. 256, 263.

(†) Fairbairn, Vol. II., p. 314. Magee, Vol. I., No. 33, pp. 191, 192.

sion," confirms and demonstrates the expiatory character of all the animal sacrifices. It shows that the Israelitish people could have no acceptance with God, except on that basis.

It is thus certain that all these sacrifices were purely *substitutional or vicarious*, and therefore *expiatory*.* As they were thus offered by God's requirement to save those for whom they were offered from the death or penalty which they deserved and must otherwise have themselves suffered, it is simply a matter of fact, that they were sacrificed *in their stead*, or as their *substitutes*, and therefore as *expiations* for their sins. So, if, instead of an animal, a *person* were offered by Divine appointment to save others from a penal death or punishment, which they have deserved and must otherwise suffer, it is simply a matter of fact, that *he* dies *in their stead* or as their *substitute*, and as an *expiation* for their sins, and that his death is the conditional ground of their forgiveness, its *sine qua non*. By no possibility could Christ die *for the benefit* of mankind in any sense of, or including, saving them from penal death or punishment, deserved by their sins, except as their *substitute* and on purpose to make expiation for their sins.

§ 213. THE PRIESTLY OFFICE OF THE LEVITICAL LAW.

It is specially important to notice the priestly office. It culminated in the High Priest, the others being merely his aids in executing it. We are expressly told in Heb. 5:1, that "every high priest, taken from among men, is ordained for men in things pertaining to God, that he may offer both gifts and sacrifices for sins." The office originated in the necessities of men as sinners, and is one of mediation between them and God for their advantage. It was to secure *His* reconciliation to them, and as a consequence, *theirs* to Him; and it was mainly exercised in offering expiatory sacrifices or atonements to Him for them. Hence, *the priest was a representative of his fellow-men, and acted for them as mediator with God in offering gifts and sacrifices, and in intercession to Him for them.* By virtue of their office, it belonged to the priests officially to be recognized by God as His friends and familiars in a most peculiar sense. They were admitted by Him to relations, intimacies, and intercourse, not permitted to others; to eat with Him, as it were, at His own table; to "draw near to Him;" and, by offering sacrifices and intercessions to Him for their fellow men, to secure His reconciliation and favor to them. The office was not of human, but of

(*) Select Discourses of S. E. Dwight, D. D., pp. 54, 55.

Divine origination. It had special respect to God Himself, that is, to producing such effects *in* Him and His relations to the represented people, that He could consistently forgive their sins and restore them to His favor. The sacred records of its origin clearly show what is distinctly asserted in Heb. 5:4, that "no man taketh this honor unto himself, but he that is called of God, as was Aaron;" and, in verse 5 it is added—"So also Christ glorified not Himself to be made a high priest; but He that said unto Him, Thou art my Son, to-day have I begotten thee." It is manifest from this how essentially the priestly differed from both the prophetic and the kingly offices; for these had special reference to men, the prophet making known to them God's attitude, counsels, will, and commands, and the king ruling and directing them, counseling and acting for their common good. We are clearly taught in the Epistle to the Hebrews, as well as in many other places of Scripture, that the Levitical priesthood and its functions were symbolical and typical of the priesthood and functions of our Lord Jesus Christ.

§ 214. RELATION OF GOD'S THEOCRATIC GOVERNMENT OVER ISRAEL, AND OF THE LEVITICAL PRIESTS, ATONEMENTS, AND FORGIVENESSES TO HIS MORAL GOVERNMENT OVER ALL MEN AND MORAL BEINGS, AND TO CHRIST, HIS ATONEMENT, AND FORGIVENESS ON ITS GROUND.

As God's Theocratic Government was only over that one people and confined to them in this world, its declared sanctions, like those of human governments, were to be administered in this world; and, of course, the Levitical priests, sacrifices, and forgivenesses were only for them in this world, and had no efficacy beyond. They certainly had a great value and influence for that people; but their supreme value and importance were in their typical design, in what they prefigured and, as if constant object-lessons, *represented*.

The expiatory animal sacrifices for freeing transgressors of the Theocratic Law from bodily death *represented* the expiatory sacrifice of Christ for freeing the world of sinners against God's eternal law and government from everlasting penal death. The priesthood connected with the Theocratic government to serve at its earthly altar in behalf of transgressors against it *represented* Christ, the Great High Priest, officiating before God at the heavenly altar, in connection with God's eternal moral government, in behalf of all human sinners within the reach of grace. The forgiveness of transgressors against the former, freeing them from its penalty of bodily death, granted graciously on the basis of expiation by the vicarious

death and blood of animals, *represented* the forgiveness of sinners against the latter, freeing them from its penalty of endless death, granted graciously on the basis of expiation by the vicarious death and blood of Christ. But no symbol or type can, in all respects, represent its antitype. It is beyond doubt, that subjects of God's *Theocratic* government, having transgressed, might be and perhaps often were *theocratically* forgiven by complying outwardly and formally with its required conditions of sacrifice and confession, though not really doing so in heart, while they still continued unforgiven for the same sins, as subjects of God's universal moral government. But, on the other hand, although the expiation of the Levitical Sacrifices only availed to free their offerers from the Theocratic penalty of bodily death or punishment, yet those who offered them with genuine repentance obtained also forgiveness of their sins as they related to God as universal Moral Governor; but, as such, He forgave them on the basis of the real, antitypical propitiation of Christ, typified by those Sacrifices (Rom. 3:25; Heb. 9:15). With such repentance, they doubtless obtained this consummate forgiveness equally, whether they understood the symbolical and typical prefiguration by those Sacrifices of the future atonement of Christ for "the sins of the whole world" or not. But we think the really pious of them did *generally* understand more or less this prefiguration by those Sacrifices, and so, by faith in the great future atonement, did consciously receive full forgiveness from God as *Moral Governor*, no less than as Theocratic. When David exclaimed, "Blessed is he whose transgression is forgiven, whose sin is covered. Blessed is the man unto whom the Lord imputeth not inquity, and in whose spirit there is no guile," (Ps. 32:1, 2), his exultation was not merely because the Theocratic penalty was forgiven, but because the incomparably worse one of endless death, symbolized by the bodily, was also *covered* by the great anti-typical atonement of Christ. Nor was his exultation simply because this was true in his own case, but because it was also true of all the really pious Israelites. Of course, their understanding of what was thus typified was defective, compared with that of intelligent Christians; but it was real and precious to them, as it made their religion one of faith and hope, supplied them with most inspiring motives, and gave them strength and courage for the great inward and outward conflicts, which their relations to God and to the whole heathen world compelled them to maintain. But, doubtless, the realities typified were all along increasingly discerned by the inspired prophets and leaders of the people,

and, as declared by these, were accepted and realized by the true Israel among them.

§ 215. WHY FUTURE REWARDS AND PUNISHMENT WERE NOT INCLUDED AMONG THE SANCTIONS OF THE THEOCRATIC LAW.

The reason why future rewards and punishment were not among the declared sanctions of the Theocratic Law was not that Moses and his people did not believe in the immortality of the soul, and in these; for, by necessity of their nature, mankind have always spontaneously believed in both it and them. It was, that that Law and Government were necessarily restricted to them in this world, although designed throughout to be symbolical and typical, so that its temporal retributions, like all else in it, were representative of those which are eternal. Those, therefore, could not be sanctions of the Law, either as temporal or as typical. How could the animal sacrifices typify the sacrifice of Christ to redeem the world of sinners from *future* punishment, if this had been made a sanction of the typical law itself? It would have made the type and its antitype identical, and thus the type a nullity, by making the relation essential to its nature impossible. From the nature of the case, future retributions, being *antitypical*, could not be incorporated in a law, which was designedly *typical*—certainly not, as far as they and a way of rescue from them were concerned. Nothing can be a symbol and type of itself; and, if the penalty of God's universal government were also that of His typical government, which was confined to that one people and to the period before the advent of Christ, then this common penalty could be typical of nothing; and, if bodily death is included in the penalty of sin under God's universal moral government, then neither could this death, as part of the penalty of transgression of the Theocratic Law and government, be typical. And, further, as the animal sacrifices of the Theocratic government were to rescue transgressors of its law from its penalty, and did so when properly offered, then, if its penalty and that of God's universal moral government are identical, they rescued them from it, as that of the latter, as really as from it, as that of the former; and, if so, what need or place was there for the sacrifice of Christ? and how could *they* be typical or *His* antitypical. The certain fact is, that it was only because the Theocratic government, its penalty, and the expiatory sacrifices to rescue from that penalty were all for this world only, and merely till Christ should come, that they were or could be symbolical and typical of God's universal

moral government, its penalty, and the expiatory sacrifice of Christ, to rescue from that penalty. In our exposition of Rom. 8:18–22, in connection with that of Gen. 3:16–19, we showed that bodily death was not included in that threatened in Gen. 2:17, but was "appointed," "laid up" (Heb. 9:27), to Adam and his race for Providential and disciplinary purposes connected with the redemptive system, promised germinally in Gen. 3:15. But the doom to it, and so itself, were in consequence of Adam's sin in eating the forbidden fruit; so that it was made a perpetual proof of the sin of the race and symbol of the real penal death, to which all are exposed. We think this shows just why God could and did make it, as He could not, if it was included in the real penalty, the type, in the Levitical Law, of that penalty, and of substitutional rescue from it by animal sacrifices, which were types of rescue from the real penal death by the sacrifice of Christ.

In this investigation of the Levitical Sacrifices, we have omitted that of the Passover (Ex. 12:3–10; Lev. 23:5, 6; Num. 9:10–14). We have no doubt that it was a real expiatory and typical sacrifice, as well as commemorative of the preservation of the first-born of the Israelites, when those of the Egyptians were destroyed. Our reason was, that we could only assert our view of it without noticing the controversies concerning it; and that, in establishing the expiatory and typical character of the other animal sacrifices, we really establish the same respecting this.*

§ 216. CONCLUSION OF THIS CHAPTER—NO THEORY TRUE WHICH DENIES THAT THE LEVITICAL SACRIFICES WERE EXPIATORY.

What we have shown in this lengthy Chapter demonstrates that no theory of the design of the Levitical sacrifices, which denies that they were substitutional and expiatory, and thus the conditional ground of Divine forgiveness, and makes them simply expressions of *subjective* states or exercises of any kind towards God, whether that of Maurice, or any other, can possibly be true. It is true, that those who offered them were required to do so in a proper state of mind towards God, not to express this, whether it was gratitude for His benefits, or repentance for sins, or inward consecration, or any other, but to produce such an *effect in His mind and on His relations* to them and to the whole people, as their Theocratic Ruler, as

(*) For unanswerable arguments that the Passover was such a sacrifice, see Magee, Vol. I., No. XXXV., pp. 213–229. Fairbairn, Vol. II., pp. 442–448. Crawford, * * * respecting the Atonement, pp. 96, 97, 500.

would make it consistent for Him to forgive them, releasing them from the penalty they deserved and restoring them to their forfeited place among His people. The sin- and the guilt-offerings were never made for any other purposes; and this was the radical one of all the others. The *direct* designed end of the two named was never *in* the offerers, never *subjective*, but always wholly *out* of them, *in* God and in His relations as Theocratic King; and the radical end of all the rest was the same. If we consider that God instituted them as the chief part of His Theocratic Law, and required the people to offer them just as prescribed as long as the Theocracy should last; and the vast importance attached to them, as shown by the law itself, armed with such sanctions, and by all the connected facts—that the priesthood was ordained with all its sacredness and authority to serve the people in offering them—that the Tabernacle, succeeded by the temple, which was the very *heart* of the Theocracy, was constructed according to a pattern given to Moses on the mount by God Himself to be a fitting place for offering them—that no sins could be forgiven to any of that people, except on the condition of offering them with confession—and that we are already taught that they were designed by God to symbolize and typify the great real sacrificial offering of Christ, the High Priest, and the Tabernacle or temple, heaven; if we consider all this, what else than utter absurdity is it, to reject the only purpose all these sacrifices ever had, as all this demonstrates, and to attempt to substitute for it one they never had, as a *direct* one? It is to attempt to convert what God designed to be for that people *causes* or *means* of producing *effects in* Himself as related to transgressors and to the whole Theocratic people under Him, as Ruler, into mere expressions towards Him, not as the Ruler, of the subjective states or exercises of the transgressors, having no aim to avert deserved punishment by, and to propitiate Him! Being such, they could neither be causes of those states or exercises, nor of any effects in God or His rectoral relations, which He could not as well see and have without them; so that, if this was their purpose, it was one they had no adaptation to accomplish, and really did not accomplish. Instead of having any such importance in them and in all connected with them, as we have shown, they had none at all; and, instead of there being any good reason why God should have instituted the whole Levitical system, including all mentioned, there was none. It was establishing a mountain, which was to be in constant labor, and yet never to bring forth even a ridiculous mouse.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Teachings of the Epistle to the Hebrews concerning the Priesthood of Christ and the Purpose of His offering Himself to God as a Sacrifice.

§ 217. THE FIRST TWO CHAPTERS THE FOUNDATION OF ALL THAT FOLLOW; THE THREE OFFICES OF CHRIST; HIS HIGH PRIESTHOOD.

This Epistle is an inspired exposition of the typical meanings of the sacrificial offerings of the Levitical Law, and of their antitypical fulfillments in the priesthood and sacrifice of Christ, and in the results of these. Its teachings are, therefore, inspired guides to a correct understanding of all other New Testament teachings concerning the design of the sufferings and death of Christ and all other essential points connected with them.

The foundation of a correct exposition of this great document is laid in the first Chapter—in its assertion and proof of the Divinity of Christ, that He was very God, the Creator of the worlds and the upholder of all things by the word of His power; and in the second Chapter, that He became incarnate for the definite purpose, that, "by the grace of God, He should taste death for every man" —that "it behooved Him in all things to be made like unto His brethren, that He might be a merciful and faithful high priest in things pertaining to God, to make propitiation for the sins of the people." Except for this purpose, there is not a particle of evidence, that He ever would have become incarnate.

Three offices are ascribed in Scripture to our Lord—those of prophet, king, and priest. Of these, the first two are acted towards men, the third, towards God for men as sinners. As prophet, He teaches the truth and will of God related to men and the destiny of the world. As king, He discharges the functions of an infinitely wise, just and benevolent Ruler for the greatest possible good of His people and the world. As priest, He transacts with God for men "in things pertaining to God," offering sacrifice and intercession

for them, and, as Mediator between God and them, securing from Him all possible favor to them. This Epistle is specially didactic concerning His priesthood and sacrifice, and all symbolized and typified in the previous dispensations, especially the Levitical; and it is our pre-eminent instructor concerning His priesthood and other points connected. In it, Christ is *seven* times called a *priest*, and *ten* times a *high priest;* and in numerous comparisons of Him and His priesthood with Melchizedek and his, and with the Aaronic priests and theirs, in direct arguments to prove that He is a priest, in ascriptions to Him of absolute qualifications to be one, and of His fulfilling the peculiar functions of one, we are positively taught, not only that He is one, but one in a far higher sense than the Levitical priests were or could be in, being only shadowy types of Him. Nothing can be more certain, than that this Author intended to teach that Christ is a priest, not in any figurative, metaphorical, but in the real, normal sense; and that He is in all respects immeasurably superior to all others ever appointed among men—the only all-perfect, consummate one that ever acted with God for men.

From Chapter 2:9–18, in verse 17 of which Christ is first called a High Priest, the author draws the hortatory inference of Chap. 3:1, 2, in which he repeats the designation—"Wherefore, holy brethren, partakers of a heavenly calling, consider the Apostle and High Priest of our confession, even Jesus; who was faithful to him that appointed him, as also was Moses in his (God's) house." If Christ is not a High Priest in *fact*, but only in a figurative sense, what analogy is there between Him and Moses, whose office was a real one, as an appointed servant of God in His Theocratic house, when He was not faithful as a High Priest at all? How could the comparison between them, continued to verse 7, in which the transcendant elevation of Christ above Moses is shown, be rationally instituted? Any process of exposition or reasoning, which would set aside the fact of Christ's priesthood, would equally that of His prophetic or kingly office, and all asserted in Scripture respecting His Divine-Human Person, His relations *as such* to God and man, and all His functions as the Saviour of men—yes, everything that men are unwilling to believe—for example, that He was *sent* by God, His *Apostle.*

In Chapter 4:14, 15, the author says: "Having then a great High Priest, who hath passed through the heavens, Jesus the Son of God, let us hold fast our confession. For we have not a High Priest that cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities; but one

that hath been in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin." The adjective, *great*, indicates His whole superiority to Aaron and His successors, which is afterwards unfolded, especially as He was "the Son of God." His greatness is shown farther by the words—"who hath passed through the heavens," so that, "being exalted above all finite beings and localities," as Moll says, He occupies His rightful place upon the throne of God in full participation of the Divine majesty and glory. Verse 15 shows that, notwithstanding this exaltation, He is not beyond the deepest sympathy with human infirmities. By His pure human nature, and His experiences of temptations in all points like those of mankind while on His earthly mission, He is capable of, and has profound fellow-feeling with mankind in their weaknesses, trials, temptations, and sorrows. By what principles and rules of interpretation can all this concerning His priesthood be construed otherwise than in the most normal, real sense?

§ 218. THE DEFINITE PURPOSE OF THE HIGH PRIEST.

Chapter 5:4 states that "every high priest, taken from among men, is appointed for men in things pertaining to God, that he may offer both gifts and sacrifices for sins;" being one "who can bear gently with the ignorant and erring, for that he himself also is compassed with infirmity; and by reason thereof is bound, as for the people, so also for himself, to offer for sins. And no man takes the honor [of this office] unto himself, but when he is called of God, even as was Aaron." This statement relates to the Aaronic high priests according to the Levitical Law. Verses 5–10 relate to Christ and His priesthood. Verses 5, 6 show, from two Old Testament passages, that He, no more than they, arrogated His office, but was appointed by His Father to be "a Priest forever after the order of Melchizedek," not of Aaron. Verses 7, 8 show that, like the Aaronic high priests, he was "taken from among men;" and, by referring to His terrible experiences, His "prayers and supplications with strong crying and tears" in Gethsemane, they set forth His full participation in human infirmities, and thus His perfect qualification to sympathize and "bear gently with others in their distresses, even 'with the ignorant and erring,'" but especially with all who accept Him as their High Priest. "For His godly fear" shown in perfectly submitting to the will of His Father through all His agonizing "prayers and supplications with strong crying and tears," He "was heard;" and thus "though He was a Son, yet learned He obedience

by the things which He suffered; and having been made perfect," by His obedience even to His atoning death and His exaltation to heaven, He became unto all them that obey Him the author of eternal salvation; named of God a High Priest after the order of Melchizedek. How absolutely real and void of figure is this entire statement!

§ 219. CHRIST A HIGH PRIEST AFTER THE ORDER OF MELCHIZEDEK, AND WHAT IT PROVES.

In Chap. 6:20, it is said—"Whither as a forerunner, Jesus entered for us, having become a high priest forever after the order of Melchizedek." On these words, Delitzsch beautifully says—"As the Aaronic high priest, after he had, in the outer court, slain the bullock as a sin-offering for himself and his house, and then slain the goat as a sin-offering for the congregation, entered with the blood of the slaughtered victim into the typical holiest of all, so Jesus, after offering up Himself in sacrifice upon earth, and shedding on earth His own blood, has entered into the heavenly holiest of all, in order thereby to accomplish, once for all, an expiation on our behalf, and there perpetually to represent us; but, at the same time (Chap. 10:19–21), in order to break the path and to open the way for us, who are eternally to be where He is. That He thus, in His entrance on our behalf, is at the same time our precursor, this it is which distinguishes Him from the legal High Priest of a community that was absolutely excluded from the inner sanctuary. And not only this, He is not merely High Priest, but also King; and He is a High Priest not merely for a season, but forever."

Having thus referred to Ps. 110:4—"The Lord hath sworn, and will not repent, Thou art a priest forever after the order of Melchizedek," as fulfilled in Christ, the author shows, in Chap. 7:1–10, the peculiarities of the narrative in Gen. 14:18–24 concerning Melchizedek, both as to what is, and as to what is not stated in it, and how, by reason of these, he was a type of Christ. After showing how, according to that record, he was *assimilated* typically to the Son of God, the author shows next, that he was *above* the great patriarch, Abraham, who had received the promises, and *above* the Levitical priests descended from Abraham, who recognized his *superiority* by giving him tithes and receiving his blessing; and that, as he was outside and independent of the Israelitish race, and of the Theocracy established through Moses for special and temporary purposes, he represented the human race, including all Abraham's descendants,

and was thus the type of a universal king and priest. The inference for readers to draw is that Christ, so typified, is a High Priest vastly superior to the Aaronic.

At verse 11, he begins to draw conclusions of corresponding importance. One is, that the appointment of this Melchizedek priest proves the incompetence of the Levitical priesthood to secure human salvation; and another is, that therefore it was necessary that there should be also "a change of the Law;" for it confined the priesthood to the line of Aaron. But Christ, shown to be the Melchizedek priest, is of the tribe of Judah, of which "Moses spoke nothing concerning priests." Thus the Levitical priesthood and Law were set aside together. This change he proves farther by the fact that this Melchizedek priest "has been made, not after the law of a carnal commandment, but after the power of an endless life," so that, by disannulling that commandment, "a better hope is brought in, through which we draw near to God." Then, farther still, the priests of the Law were made without an oath [of God], "but this High Priest with an oath by Him that says of Him, The Lord sware, etc.; by so much also has Jesus become the surety of a better covenant." He proves the superiority of this High Priest farther yet by the fact that the Levitical priests were many in number by their successive deaths, while He abides, and His priesthood is unchangeable. He proves the same lastly both by His absolutely sinless character and His being made higher than the heavens, so that "He needed not daily, like those high priests, to offer up sacrifices, first for his own sins, and then for the sins of the people. For the law appointeth men high priests, having infirmity; but the word of the oath appointeth a Son, perfected for evermore." Never was there a more absurd pretence of interpretation than that of attempting to whiff away all the teachings of this Epistle, which we have noted respecting the actual, real priesthood of Christ, by declaring it only figurative, or it and His sacrifice together mere "*altar-forms*."

§ 220. CHRIST THE ANTITYPE OF THE LEVITICAL HIGH PRIEST. WHERE AND IN WHAT COVENANT HE MINISTERS.

Chapter 8:12 says—"Now, in the things which we are saying the chief point is this: We have such a High Priest, who sat down on the right hand of the throne of the Majesty in the heavens, a minister of the sanctuary and of the true tabernacle, which the Lord pitched, not man." We here think with Dr. Kendrick, translator of

Moll's Commentary in the Lange series on Hebrews, in his inserted remarks on verse 3, that the author, having concluded his presentation of Christ as the Melchizedek priest, predicted in Ps. 110:4, enters now upon a presentation of Him as the antitype of the Levitical high priests, evidently recurring to what he had said in Chap. 5:1. Here, as there, by saying—"every high priest," he points to the whole series of Aaronic high priests; and this is proved further by his going on to show how immeasurably inferior to and different from Him they were in all respects, although typical of Him. Says Dr. Kendrick—"I think, however, that it will be found that a close analysis will sustain the view that the passage is neither parenthetical, nor irrelevant, nor incidental, but introduces the grand thought which forms the theme of discussion through this and the following Chapter, and that in fact this states, and states in its proper place, what is the vital point of the whole Epistle. Christ's Melchizedek Priesthood has been previously considered; now comes the consideration of His Aaronic *high*-priesthood. This is vital to the subject; for His mere Melchizedek priesthood, however intrinsically majestic and glorious, would be of no avail to sinners; He must minister in the heavenly sanctuary as the counterpart of Aaron, the Levitical high-priest, and, as such, in correspondence with the relation, *He must have something to offer*. What this is, is the point now to be stated, and of which the author *only apparently* loses sight, the point towards which he pursues a constant, though somewhat indirect course, from this to Chap. 9:11." With this last sentence our view does not concur, as will be shown. Following this with a statement of the author's course of thought, he closes by saying—"Thus verse 3 of Chap. 8 formally introduces the topic around which the whole discussion turns from this point to Chap. 10:19, where, in reality, the grand argument of the Epistle terminates."

We now trace the author's argument as briefly as possible. He first states the general proposition—"For every high priest is appointed to offer both gifts and sacrifices," and then proceeds to argue from it—"Wherefore it is necessary that this High Priest also have somewhat to offer. Now, if he were on earth, he would not be a priest at all, seeing there are those who offer the gifts according to the law; who serve that which is a copy and shadow of the heavenly things, even as Moses is warned of God when he is about to make the tabernacle; for, See, saith he, that thou make all things [all the *altar-forms* included] according to the pattern showed thee in the mount." But, by being High Priest in the heavenly sanctu-

ary, "Christ has obtained a ministry the more excellent [than theirs], by how much also he is mediator of a better covenant, which has been enacted upon better promises." Then, after stating that, "if the first had been faultless," there would have been no place for a second, he quotes the prediction of Jeremiah (Chap. 31: 31–34), that, in the last days, a new one, incomparably better than the old, would be substituted for it, and what it would be. As these two covenants are connected with and dependent for fulfillment upon the two priesthoods, he legitimately argues from them and their contrasted results, the incomparable superiority of the ministry of Christ, the High Priest in the heavens, who is the Mediator of the new, over that of the Levitical high priests in the earthly sanctuary, who were mere performers of the legal services connected with the old, which though, as well as the new, founded on Divine promises, was yet, even by these, proved imperfect and ready to vanish away.

§ 221. THE GREAT IMPORT OF THE REFERENCE TO THE TWO COVENANTS.

But there is a radical reason for his reference, at this stage of his argument, to these two covenants and their comparative characters, so fundamentally connected with the two priesthoods, which most of the commentators fail to see, and none of them, as far as we know, has distinctly apprehended and unfolded. Verse 3, as Chap. 5:1, asserts that the function of every high priest is "to offer gifts and sacrifices," and these, as expiatory, are to free sinners from the necessity, on condition of their coming into the required *subjective* state, of suffering the punishment incurred by their sins. This the Levitical high priests could not do for the Theocratic people, guilty of sin, by the sacrifices they offered. They could only secure the *temporal* forgiveness of the particular transgressions of those for whom they offered them. They could not, by their ministry, effect in them any *subjective renovation.* The promises of the covenant connected with their ministry were all conditioned on obedience to the imposed commands or will of God without prevenient and renovating grace to lead and aid them to it in any such degree or sense as that in which it is imparted in the new dispensation. As, therefore, the sacrifices of those high priests were not effective for the forgiveness of sin as against God's eternal moral government, nor for the internal renovation of sinners, the promises of the covenant connected with them were comparatively of quite inferior importance, being only of temporal forgiveness for viola-

tions of the Theocratic Law, and outward purifications. In contrast, Christ, by His more excellent ministry in the heavens, secures, not only *full forgiveness* of all sinners, who truly apply to Him for it, as violators of God's eternal law and government, but the subjective renovation or purification of their hearts and characters, with peace of conscience and hope of eternal life and glory; so that His ministry incomparably excels theirs. He secures both these for them—the first by *offering* His perfect expiatory sacrifice to God for their sins, and the second, on the basis of this, by His further *ministry* of mediation for them and of sending the Holy Spirit to exercise His agency upon them, who "puts God's laws into their mind and writes them on their heart," and by securing to them all the other results mentioned in Jeremiah's prophecy. Neither of these, but only copies and shadows of them, could the Levitical high priests effect. It is plain, then, that the introduction of the matter of the two covenants and of the quotation from Jeremiah, occupying verses 6–13, is not introducing something foreign to the author's main point, not a digression from, nor an illustration of it, but is a most important and strengthening part or auxiliary demonstration of it. For the point in verse 3 is not, as Moll thinks, "the necessity of priestly functions and acts to be accomplished by Christ," and that "He needs consequently for the exercise of them a heavenly sanctuary," etc.; for verse 2 asserts that He *is* a High Priest "on the right hand of the throne of the Majesty in the heavens, a minister of the Sanctuary, even of the true tabernacle, which the Lord pitched, not man," to only a copy and shadow of which (verse 5), the Levitical high priests ministered. It is to show the measureless superiority of His priesthood over theirs. Verse 3 states what is common to them and Him; and verses 4 and 5 show why He could not exercise High Priestly functions on earth, and does in the heavens according to verse 2. In view of the fact that He exercises them there, the object of the statement in verse 6, that "He hath obtained a more excellent ministry [than theirs], by how much also he is the mediator of a better covenant, which has been enacted upon better promises," is, that, by quoting the prophecy of Jeremiah respecting a new and incomparably better covenant than the Levitical one, he may demonstrate from the Old Testament the measureless superiority of the heavenly High Priesthood of Christ, the Mediator of the new one, over that of the Levitical high priests, the servants of the old one in the earthly tabernacle, the copy or figure of the heavenly, just as before, by quoting Ps. 110:4, he had dem-

onstrated the same superiority from the Old Testament. The measure of the superiority of the covenant connected with and mediated by Him over that connected with and served by them is that of the superiority of His priestly ministry over theirs. But, by the quotation from Jeremiah, he unfolds the fundamentally important fact respecting His priestly ministry, that, while He, as well as those priests, must have somewhat to offer for expiation of the sins of the people, His offering alone is such, that, through its virtue, He effects what they never could, and what, not being effected, the offering would be futile, viz., *subjective purification from sin.* That is, He effects both expiation for men with God, and the subjective renovation of all that obey Him; and that He does both, as far as the application of the expiation is concerned, at the same time is insisted upon throughout the whole contrasted comparison of His priesthood with theirs.* It is precisely by this more excellent priestly ministry than theirs, to the measure of His being the Mediator of a covenant so much better, and enacted on so much better promises than theirs, that the author demonstrates the vast superiority of our Great High Priest in heaven over those on earth. He uses the word λειτουργια, *ministry*, to signify that High Priestly functions are not confined to the one of offering an expiatory sacrifice, but from this, as their root or basis, spread out into all His farther doings by which sinners are inwardly rectified, perfected, and brought to possess "the promised eternal inheritance." Such, we believe, is the true view of this passage.

§ 222. CONTRASTED EXHIBITION OF THE MEANS, WAY, AND EFFECT OF THE FULFILLMENT OF THE TWO.

The beginning of Chap. 9 is connected with what precedes, and presents a contrasted exhibition of the means and way of securing the fulfillment of the two covenants. Verse 1 is a concession respecting the old one, with an intimation that it will be shown to be of limited value. It says—"Now even the first covenant had ordinances of divine service, and its sanctuary of this world;" and this is followed by a description of the tabernacle throughout, and of most of its apparatus (vs. 2–5). Into the first part of the tabernacle, the priests entered daily, "accomplishing the services (v. 6); but into the second [part] the high priest alone, once in the year, not without blood, which he offereth for himself, and for the errors of the people" (v. 7). A statement follows of what the Holy Ghost

(*) 9:9, 13–15; 10:1, 10, 14–18, 19–22.

thus signified, in which the tabernacle is called "a parable or figure for the time present; according to which are offered both gifts and sacrifices that cannot, as touching the conscience, make the worshippers perfect," the whole ritual being only "imposed until a time of reformation." In all this statement, the writer, as Dr. Kendrick rightly maintains, uses the historical present, not to indicate his own time, but that of the tabernacle and the services in it, including that of the substituted temples. But the significant import of the statement is, that the rigid exclusion of all the people from the tabernacle, and of all the priests, except the high priest, from the Holy of holies, and of even Him from it, except on an appointed annual day, symbolically showed that free access to God was not secured to them by the Levitical institution, nor, on account of their sin and guilt, was possible, but that *all*, people, inferior priests, and even the high priest, really included, were separated from God, despite all that the functions of that institution could accomplish for them: and further, that the Levitical priesthood and entire ritual were, in respect to the eternal realities of man's relation, as a sinner, to God and His real moral government, merely figures or typical representations of what was to be accomplished in and by the one only real priesthood and ministry of Christ; and so could not effect either expiation for sin as against God's eternal law and government, or regeneration of heart and character. Of course the covenant, connected with all these, was equally defective and destined to give place to a new and better one.

In contrast with the contents of these verses, 1–10, the author now passes on to show the realities, of which the old tabernacle, priesthood, and entire ritual were only types and shadows. As it was by means of the earthly tabernacle that those priests performed all their ministry, so it is by means of "the greater and more perfect tabernacle, not made with hands, that is to say, not of this creation," that "Christ having come a High Priest of the good things to come," "nor yet by means of the blood of goats and calves, but by means of his own blood, entered in *once for all* into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption" (vs. 11, 12). The heavenly Holy Place, typified by that of the earthly tabernacle, is that in which God is represented as dwelling, and into it Christ has entered with His own blood, as an atonement for the sins of the whole world. In verses 13, 14, we have an argument from the less to the greater, to show why His blood has procured eternal redemption:—"For, if the blood of goats and bulls, and the ashes of a heifer sprinkling

them that have been defiled, sanctify unto the cleanness of the flesh; how much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered Himself without blemish unto God, cleanse your conscience from dead works to serve the living God?" On account of all thus set forth in contrast with verse 9, "he is the mediator of a new covenant, that, a death having taken place for the redemption of the transgressions that were under the first covenant, they that have been called may receive the promise of the eternal inheritance." Redemption is literally deliverance from captivity, bondage, or exposure to death by the payment of a required ransom-price; hence here from subjection to both the penal consequences and the bondage of sin by the ransom-price of the expiatory death or blood of Christ. The Levitical priests could pay no such ransom-price by their sacrifices for those under their ministry and its covenant, so that there was no redemption for any by them. But Christ, the true antitypical High Priest, paid it by offering Himself, His blood, and life, His death having taken place, for all sinners, including all under the old covenant, and back to the primal pair (Rom. 3:25). What a measureless contrast!

§ 223. ADDITIONAL CONTRASTS. A NUT INFRANGIBLE BY POST-MORTEM PROBATIONISTS.

He begins the passage in verses 18–22 by saying that "even the first covenant was not dedicated without blood," and closes it by saying that, "according to the law, I may almost say, all things are cleansed with blood, and apart from shedding of blood there is no remission." In verse 23, he asserts the necessity that "the heavenly things themselves" should be cleansed "with better sacrifices than these" Levitical ones. Verses 24–26 exhibit the facts respecting the High Priestly sacrifice of Christ, still keeping up the contrasts between Him in making it and them in making theirs. He did not, as they did, "enter into a holy place made with hands, like in pattern to the true; but into heaven itself, now to appear before the face of God for us; nor yet, that He should offer Himself often," as the Levitical high priest entered the holy place of the tabernacle every year with blood not his own; and he shows what would have been necessary for Him to do this. "But now once," he says, "at the end of the ages has He been manifested to put away sin, *i. e.*, its penalty, by the sacrifice of Himself." Verse 27 is one which post-mortem probationists should well consider; for to us it is decisive against them. "Inasmuch as it is appointed unto men once to die,

and after this cometh judgment," not further probation for any; so (v. 28) Christ also, having been once offered to bear the sins of many, shall appear a second time, apart from sin [that is, without a sin-offering] to them that wait for Him, unto salvation." There are numerous reasons why Christ could offer Himself but once. It was both entirely unnecessary and absolutely impossible. It was unnecessary, because His being offered once was perfectly sufficient, and while no number of repetitions of it could make it more so, they would on the contrary imply its insufficiency. It was impossible, because His blood and life being offered and His body given to death, it was restored from death a "body of glory" immortal, so that He cannot come again in the flesh, and pour out His blood to be offered in Heaven as atonement for sin. Besides, as the new covenant was enacted when He, as the great antitypical High Priest, offered Himself, and all the typical priests with their offerings and the connected old covenant were then annulled, He could in no way alter or improve this covenant or anything else by offering Himself again. Then, as death, appointed unto all men, is the finality of their probation, to be followed by the judgment, so the offering of Christ once to bear the sins of many was the finality of sacrifice by Him, to be followed by His appearing a second time without sin, to them that wait for Him, unto salvation. As the expression, "without sin," plainly refers antithetically to "was offered to bear the sins of many," we hold that it can mean nothing else than "without being a sin-offering," and the whole preceding from verse 26 demands this sense, while it and the nature of the case exclude any other. We hold, too, that "without," and not "apart from, sin" of the new version, is the correct rendering of the Greek word in this place. The latter gives no clear sense. To "bear the sins of many" is substitutionally to suffer their punishment, and the word "sins," in this standing form of expression, does not mean transgressions or violations of the law, but the penalties or punishments they incur, which is its sense in scores of places in the Levitical Law in both the Hebrew, and its Greek Septuagint translation, and so in our English versions of the Bible.

§ 224. WHY CHRIST VOLUNTARILY CAME TO DO THE WILL OF GOD

In Chap. 10:1–4, the author renewedly asserts the utter incompetence of the Levitical sacrifices to "make perfect them that draw nigh." He specially refers to the great annual sacrifices offered continually for the priests and the people. To confirm this asser-

tion respecting them, he adduces two passages from the Old Testament, which teach the same. The first is from Ps. 40:5–8. We hold that David was the author of this Psalm. Our author here ascribes the passage quoted to Christ as if spoken by Him upon His entrance into the world, to show why and the purpose for which He comes. The *why* is in the words—"Sacrifice and offering thou wouldst not, But a body didst thou prepare for me; In whole burnt-offerings and sacrifices for sin, thou hadst no pleasure;" the *purpose* is in the words—"Then said I, Lo, I am come (In the roll of the book it is written of me), To do thy will, O God." As God had commanded these sacrifices and offerings, we must, of course, understand the expressions, "thou wouldst not," and "thou hadst no pleasure" in the qualified sense, that, while they were necessary for training and typical purposes for that people during their continuance, He would not have them and had no pleasure in them either as substitutes for obedience or as in the least necessary and valid for either expiation of sin or renovation of sinners (as against God's eternal, moral law and government), nor for any purposes beyond the time of their continuance. As effective for the real redemption of men, He never had nor could have any pleasure in them, not even when He appointed them. But when the time for their antitypical fulfillment by Christ and His one all-sufficient, everlastingly valid expiatory sacrifice came, God would not have them and could not have pleasure in them any longer in any sense or degree; and, by that one sacrifice, utterly discarded and abolished them. "He thus took away the first, that He might establish the second" (v. 9). "By which will of God, we have been sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all" (v. 10). Verse 11 introduces another contrast between the Levitical high priest and Christ, the antitypical one. That "priest *stands* day by day ministering and offering oftentimes the same sacrifices, which can never take away sins; but He when He had offered one sacrifice for sins forever, *sat down* on the right hand of God; from henceforth expecting till His enemies be made the footstool of His feet. For by one offering He has perfected forever them that are sanctified." That one *stood* every day, without rest, doing over and over the same things, and really never accomplishing their chief end; this one did His by one offering forever, and then *sat down* a royal-priest on the right hand of the throne of the Majesty in the heavens in everlasting reposeful exemption from repeating it, and yet accomplished by it the end for which He did it—the perfection of them that are sanctified by

the remission of their sins and the enactment of the new covenant in and with them (vs. 15–18).

§ 225. WHAT THIS MASTERLY EPISTLE, THUS REVIEWED, DEMONSTRATES.

Now, if any truth or fact can possibly be expressed in language, so that it can be understood and known; if there are any definitely settled principles and rules of interpretation, by which the actunl matter of fact, the historical, the literally true can be distinguished from the not fact, the fictitious, the figurative, the false; if there is any way to know what is valid in reasonings, in comparisons and contrasts, and in the relations of symbols and types to the symbolized and antitypical; if all that can be expressed in language is not of uncertain meaning; then does this review of this masterly Epistle respecting the Priesthood and sacrificial offering of Christ, and of the relation of these to the Levitical priests and their sacrifices, as their types, and to all connected with their ministry, establish beyond all rational denial or doubt the fact, that Christ is, in the most normal and true sense of the word, a *Priest*, and the only absolutely real one that ever existed; and that His sacrificial offering is, in the same sense, and in no other, the only absolutely real and effective one for the salvation of any sinner that was ever offered. A priest is a *representative* of men, of all for whom he acts, appointed by God to act *with Him* for them, and to do so, as the supreme part of his function, by offering appointed sacrifice for them for the expiation of their sins; but, to accompany this with intercessions for them, so that He is a *mediator* between God and them. Such was Christ, who alone obtains from God for any of them from Adam down forgiveness of sin and all favor. All other priests ever appointed by God have been, and have been called, such only as types or prefiguring symbols of Him, who in the Divine purpose, was both their archetype and their antitype. The function of the Aaronic priests pertained only to the Israelitish people under God's temporal and temporary Theocratic government, which itself was typical of His universal and eternal moral government; but the priestly function of Christ pertains to all mankind as related to this eternal government, and the fundamental thing in it was His offering Himself once as an all-sufficient, unrepeatable expiatory sacrifice for the sins of the whole world. All else centered in and sprung from this; and, in establishing His Divinely appointed priesthood, this inspired author established all that pertained to it, and thus the fact of His

one all-sufficient offering for the redemption of all men from the penalty and the perversion of sin on condition of their coming to Him. Hence, the so-called "altar-forms" were instituted and named as copies and shadows, designed symbols and types, necessarily exceedingly imperfect, but the best that infinite wisdom could devise, to represent immeasurably superior realities, facts and functions, in the archetypal and antitypical; so that the priestly office, sacrificial offering, expiation, propitiation, reconciliation of God to men, and cleansing of them from their sins and their punitive consequences, of our Lord Jesus Christ are not things of figure, but facts and verities, of which the so-called altar-forms are only copies; and to make these copies the only realities, or to turn the realities themselves into copies or figures, is not only to violate the first principles of interpretation, but to undermine the very Gospel itself, leaving every one to determine its contents simply by caprice.*

§ 226. SUPPLEMENT TO THE FORGOING EXPOSITION.

Derivation of the use of words and phrases in the New Testament respecting Christ's sufferings and death for the sins of mankind from the Septuagint Greek Version of the Old Testament, and the importance of recognizing this.

Although the vicarious, expiatory sacrifice of Christ is demonstrated by the teachings of this Epistle, so that further proof of it is really in excess, yet the knowledge of the fact and truth stated in our caption is not only intrinsically valuable, but highly important for a valid exegesis of numerous passages in the New Testament. It is manifest from the teachings of this Epistle, that their language is, to a very great extent, derived from the language and ritual of the Levitical Law, and mainly from the Septuagint Version of that Law, and must be interpreted accordingly. That is, the antitypical is expressed in the language and mode of the typical, made perfectly familiar and as if native to the Apostles and all the writers of the New Testament, as to the Jews very commonly, and to our Lord Himself. When those writers spoke of the Priesthood and sacrifice of Christ, they commonly did so in the language of that version to express them, as God doubtless designed they should. To keep this in mind is an essential requisite of interpretation in the case; and, in our farther investigations, we shall constantly proceed in accordance with it. To interpret the teachings concerning the antitypical without reference to those concerning the typical, so as to give them

(*) Magee, Vol. I., No. XXXI., pp. 186–188; also pp. 46, 47.

a meaning alien to these, is to empty them of their true meaning, and is false exegesis. No one can, in a scientific sense, thoroughly or to any high degree, understand the Gospel, except as he likewise understands the Levitical ceremonial law, although it is equally true that he cannot so understand that law, except as he so understands the Gospel; for they are interwoven, interdependent correlates. *Novum Testamentum in vetere latet; Vetus Testamentum in novo patet.* Hence, to determine the real meaning of the language, when it is said that Christ offered Himself and was offered *for sins*, that He offered Himself a sacrifice *for sins*, that He gave Himself for *our sins* and for us, that He laid down His life for us, that He bore *our iniquities*, that *the iniquities* of us all were laid upon Him, that He takes or bears *the sin* of the world, that He was *made sin*, that He suffered *for sins*, that He died for *our sins*, that He is the propitiation for *our sins* and for those of the whole world, that He shed His blood for the *remission of sins*, that He ransomed, redeemed, and purchased us with His blood, that He purifies or cleanses us with His blood, and that He made reconciliation for *the sins* of the people—when these and other similar things are said, we must have reference to the corresponding typical language and sacrificial rites of the Levitical Law in interpreting them, and must interpret them under their light and guidance. This seems to us plain common sense in the case; and we should do so the more, because all required by the law, the construction of the tabernacle, the Aaronic priests and all their sacrifices and ministrations constituted a systems of designed symbols and types, which were also *really embodied prophecies*, to find fulfillment in and through Christ. The truth and importance of these remarks are fully attested by the teachings of the Epistle to the Hebrews, just examined.

Proceeding now, as proposed, we specially notice the Greek expression *περὶ ἁμαρτιας*, "for sin," and its plural, "for sins," since it is used, not only in Heb. 10:6,8, 18; 13:11, but in Rom. 8:3; Gal. 1:4 (best authorities); I. Pet. 3:18; I. John 2:2; 4:10. In the Levitical Law, the Hebrew word חַטָּאת, *chattah*, means *sin*, then *punishment* deserved by it, and then a *sin-offering* as a substitute for the punishment, in which sense it is constantly used. In the Septuagint Greek translation, the word *ἁμαρτία* represents it in all these meanings, and in at least 144 instances in the last of them, *sin-offering*. After the Babylonish Captivity, instead of the Hebrew, the Hebrew-Aramaic language had come to be the common or general

one of the Jews. But, as a result of the conquests of Alexander and of the settlement and general diffusion of the Greeks, occasioned by these, in all parts of Western Asia, in Egypt, and on the adjoining coast of the Mediterranean Sea, and also partly as a result of the great dispersion of Jews in all those countries and in cities in them, and of the consequent intercourse and contact into which they were brought with the Greeks, the Greek language had, long before Christ came, come into very common use among the people in all those regions, including the Jews among them, and in Palestine as one of those countries, though of course it was everywhere more or less corrupted and modified by the vernacular language. A translation of the Old Testament into Greek, thus modified or changed, was begun as early as about 280 years before Christ, and the last part of it was completed about 180 before Him, which had early passed into general use among the Jews both abroad and at home.* The prevalent extent to which this translation was commonly used in the time of Christ and His Apostles is shown by the fact that the quotations from the Old Testament, made by Christ Himself, by the Apostles, and by other writers of the New Testament, were mainly at least from it; and "its language is the mold in which the thoughts and expressions of the Apostles and Evangelists were cast." The translation of the Pentateuch was made first, and is much better than that of other parts; and it was from this that the great mass of the Jewish people learned the Levitical Law, and from it that the Apostles and New Testament writers expressed the great truths of the Gospel, of which the Epistle to the Hebrews is an example. Rev. William Selwyn, D. D., author of the Article on the Septuagint, referred to in our note, quotes from Mr. Grinfield, whom he calls "one of the most diligent students of the Septuagint," that "the number of direct quotations from the Old Testament in the Gospels, Acts, and Epistles may be estimated at 350, of which not more than 50 materially differ from the LXX. But the indirect verbal allusions would extend the number to a far greater amount." Now, considering all thus presented, as the Apostles and Evangelists were Jews and thus fully imbued with the language of the Old Testament in this Version, and as they fully believed that Christ was the Great Fulfiller of the types and shadows of the Levitical Law, is it not absurd to suppose that they would use the language of the

(*) Smith's Dic. of Bible, Vol. III., Art. Septuagint, pp. 1200–1210. Also, Vol. I., Art. Helenist, pp. 783, 784. Also, Winer's New Test. Grammar, Part I., Revised Ed. Schaff's His. of the Apostolic Church, § 153· Language and style of the New Testament.

law in this Version, when they spoke of the Priesthood and sacrificial death of Christ to atone for sin, in all such expressions as we have quoted, in any other sense than the literal one, in which they are used in it? Is it not the only rational inference in the case, that they would so use them? We accordingly find the Apostle Paul using the term ἁμαρτία in this sense in II. Cor. 5:21—"Him who knew no sin, He made to be sin for us." In the first clause, he uses the term *sin* in its primary sense of actual transgression of God's law; in the second clause, he plainly does not use it in this sense, nor in that of punishment of the guilty, but in that of "sin-offering for us," the only one it can have in the place; for, in no other sense, could he possibly be made sin for us, or for any other object. It is no objection to this, that the word is thus used in two different senses in the two clauses, since it has these two senses, and besides, it is frequent in Scripture to use the same word in two senses in two clauses.* Nor is the use of the term *sin*, as meaning "sin-offering," inconsistent with Scriptural usage, as Kling asserts in his commentary *in loco* (Lange Series), but as we have shown, it is exactly according to it in the Septuagint Version of the Old Testament, which the Apostle thoroughly understood and used. Nor is there any inconsistency between this interpretation and the contrast —"that we might become the righteousness of God in him;" for it is the only interpretation which is consistent with that contrast. Neither side of the contrast asserts an abstraction, but each a concrete reality—not a *subjective*, but a *constitutive condition*. Christ's being constituted sin, a sin-offering, for us was the necessary *objective condition and means* of our becoming *objectively righteous*, as it respects the penal demand of the law against us, by justification through faith in him, and, as a consequence, *subjectively righteous* by our reconciliation to God, initiated and maintained through the same faith, by the Spirit brought to men by that sin-offering. His being made a sin-offering for us is the *ground* of our justification, and, as a consequence, of all else. Nor is it of the least importance whether the Apostle has used the term *sin* elsewhere in this sense or not; for it is so used in Heb. 9:28, and it is certain that he used it in the place under consideration with perfect knowledge of its multifold use in the Septuagint in this sense, in which it is not used in any other which could at all fit in this place. In what other possible sense could Christ be made sin? And, if not in this, how could

(*) Mat. 16:25; Luke 17:33; John 12:25; Prov. 3:34; II. Sam. 22:26, and elsewhere.

He, made sin in any other, make an expiation for us, or our sins? and how could He make this, if His being made sin did not imply being made a substitution for us, as a sin-offering does? Is expiation without substitution possible? Certainly not, nor without a sin-offering. And yet Kling denies that *sin* here means *sin-offering*, and that Christ's being made sin for us is to be "taken in the sense of substitution;" but, none the less, surprisingly, immediately affirms what we believe is a plain contradiction, that the clause expresses "the notion of the ἱλασμὸς, propitiation," and that "it is in the work of *expiation*, that we must find the basis of the work of reconciliation!"* Enough on this text, II. Cor. 5:21. Now, what is the meaning of περὶ ἁμαρτίας or its plural? The phrase is also taken from the Septuagint translation of the law, in which it is usually employed when the Levitical Sacrifices are said to have been "offered for sins," and *sacrifice*, or its plural is understood before it. Its meaning in all the places referred to at the beginning of this paragraph, when applied to the sufferings and death of Christ for our sins, is determined by this origin, and it is, that, by these, He made a sacrifice for our sins or for those of the world. It can mean nothing else. As, in all the places referred to, the action of Christ in making His sacrifice is *against* sin or sins, περὶ means *on account of, because of* it or them, and signifies that His making it was necessary to remove it or them from sinners. And, as the word *sin* or *sins* with περὶ cannot mean *sin-offering*, it must mean specially *deserved punishment;* and, as His sacrifice for it or them is to save from this punishment for it or them, it was necessarily in the place of the suffering of that punishment by sinners themselves, and, therefore, both *substitutional and expiatory*, as all the sacrifices of the Levitical Law were. Conceding that Rom. 8:3 means *on account of sin* in a general sense, it must nevertheless really involve this. As *our sins*, not His own, were the cause or reason of *His* sufferings, they had the same relation to ours which our own sufferings would have, if the punishment were inflicted upon ourselves; and what else is this in reality than substitution?

(*) After the above was written, an Article was published in the Bibliotheca Sacra, in Andover, in the October number of 1877, by Prof. John Morgan, D. D., in which he adopts the interpretation we here oppose. But he has added nothing to give it validity, simply assuming that the righteousness intended is entirely *subjective*, for assuming which he has no good ground. For Paul prevailingly uses the term to signify *objective* righteousness or justification, and he overlooks, as Kling does, all that we have shown respecting the derivation by the Apostles of all such terms from the Septuagint translation of the Levitical Law, and the whole Old Testament. But his Article is extremely faulty in other respects. We do not

CHAPTER XIX.

EXAMINATION OF IS. 52:13–15; 53:1–12.

As we have carefully examined the Levitical Law concerning animal sacrifices and the typical design of offering them, of the priesthood, and of all else connected with them, and also the teachings of the Epistle to the Hebrews concerning their antitypical fulfillment in and by the Priesthood and sacrifice of Christ, so we now proceed to examine with the same care the teachings of the great prophecy of Isaiah contained in the Chapters referred to in the above heading. These three portions of God's inspired revelation are His three chief witnesses before men concerning His intent and purpose in His great measure for their salvation by the atoning sufferings and death of our Lord Jesus Christ; and their testimonies, separate and combined, are the fundamental ones of Scripture for a correct and thorough understanding of this consummate subject. Those of the first of these witnesses are first in importance, no less than in time, and are the underlying basis and the source of the special character of those of both the others, and of all the particular testimonies concerning the same matter in both the Old Testament and the New. But those of the passage of Isaiah before us are also of vast importance in their relation to very many of the particular testimonies of the New Testament as the source of their forms and special characters; so that, in order to a correct and thorough understanding of these, it is essential to possess a like understanding of them. It is for this reason that we undertake an examination of the testimonies of this prophetic passage, since those who reject the

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see wherein it differs essentially from the views of Dr. Bushnell; and his overlooking the whole teaching of the Epistle to the Hebrews respecting the typical character of the ceremonial law in reference to Christ as a Priest, and His sacrifice, and making the atonements of Moses and Phinehas the best representation of Christ's, and also his making atonement consist in obedience, instead of in inflicted suffering, are entirely erroneous. The Scriptural Doctrine of justification is as wholly irreconcilable with his view as with Dr. Bushnell's.

substitutional atonement of Christ invariably undertake to nullify them respecting it.

§ 227. MARVELOUS CHARACTER OF THE BIBLE AND OF THIS PROPHECY.

The Bible is a marvelous book, and among the many marvels it contains, one of the most conspicuous is this 53d Chapter of Isaiah. It is the highest peak in the whole range of prophetic descriptions and delineations concerning Christ and what He should undergo during His mission among men. It was written over 700 years before He came, probably within 200 after Homer composed the Iliad. From the definiteness of its numerous declarations of the manner in which Christ would appear among men and would be regarded and treated by them—of His faultless character and conduct, His patient submission to the wrongs and outrages they would heap upon Him, His sufferings and the circumstances of a most unrighteous, cruel, and ignominious death they would inflict upon Him, His honorable burial, despite that death and the design of His enemies to the contrary, of the part acted by God towards Him in all His sufferings to and after His death, of His implied resurrection, and subsequent moral and spiritual victory and sway over people, nations, and mighty Potentates, increasing in all following time—from all these, it seems rather a *history* of the real facts of His case, than a *prophecy* of them for men to read through the generations of seven centuries until the Great Fulfiller should come. No mere human sagacity, conjecture, or imagination could forecast or scheme out the essential history of one to come at a future time, much less after so many centuries, containing such an assemblage and series of distinct, minute, mostly unheard of and unlikely particulars, and foretell them as true of him with the least probability that they would even *approximately*, much less actually really be fulfilled in him after so long a period. Nor could an imposter, if at any time in those seven centuries he had attempted to pass as the one thus foretold, possibly have made himself even seem to be in the relations and under the conditions stated, and the subject of all the particulars specified. To no other person who has lived since this passage was written by the great prophet can it possibly apply; and all the attempts of rejecting Jews or skeptical critics to make the Jewish people as a whole, or the pious part of them, or the prophetic order, personified, or any particular person, except Christ, at any time in those centuries, its designed subject bear their refutation on their preposterous faces, and are intrinsically rediculous. Christ,

and no other, suits the die prepared so long before to stamp him. But it has fared with this prophecy, as with Him, at the hands of rejecters, who have misconstrued it, passed false judgments on its meanings, and attempted to "set it at nought" and to destroy it as a prophecy of Him. All their attempts have been vain. For centuries it has been like some great fortress at a point vitally important for the protection of a nation or a city, for and against which battles have been fought almost continually; and this, because those engaged in the conflict have been for and against Christ and His atonement. But it is a fortress that never has been and never will be lost; nor even damaged by its assailants, because no efforts can ever rob language of its true meaning. Despite all the endeavors of pseudo-criticism to the contrary, we confidently hold that Isaiah alone was its real author; and we now proceed to examine it.

Chap. 53 ought to have begun with the last three verses of Chap 52, which introduce the topic continued to 53:12. In these three verses God is introduced as the speaker, addressing the people who read or heard the prophecy concerning the Messiah, whom He designates "my servant," and calls them to behold. In verse 13, He declares the greatness of His future exaltation. In verses 14, 15, He places in contrast with His first condition, and the astonishment of many at him which it would cause, which the prophet depicts in a parenthesis, the peerless spiritual elevation and power He would attain, and the effects and impressions these would cause to many nations and kings. Such is the prophet's introductory statement of the theme of Chap. 53:1–12.

We must think the interpretation of those who take 53:1 as intended by the prophet to express what the Israelite people say respecting the report or announcement made to them concerning this Servant of God and His hand or power in Him not the correct one. We must believe with Calvin, Hengstenberg, and many others, that the prophet himself is the speaker, though as if in company "with all the heralds of the Messiah." He speaks as if present with the Jews when Christ was, witnessing their unbelief and how they regarded and treated Him and his own announcement or report concerning Him and God's power in Him. He may also have seen in prophetic vision how great masses of the world in following generations would maintain the same blind unbelief and essential course respecting Him.

Verse 2. The prophet, still speaking as if among the Jews from the coming of the Messiah till after the close of His earthly mission, states figuratively how He came and how He appeared to them on

account of so coming, which was in perfect contrast with their imaginary expectation of what it would be.

Verse 3 states how He was consequently regarded, despised, and treated with scorn by them. Verses 2, 3 together apply clearly to Christ, and to the people and rulers of the Jews, and to no others, as all in the Gospel naratives demonstrates.

In verses 4–10, the prophet, speaking for himself and as if for all who have become believers and attained correct views of Christ against the false ones of His despising, abusing, persecuting enemies, states *why* He was such a one—that, according to God's design, all respecting and in Him and His course, for which they despised, persecuted, and inflicted sufferings upon Him, was without any fault in Him, and wholly for them and all sinners to save them from the punishment deserved by their sins, *He being a substitute and sacrifice for them.*

§ 228. MEANING OF THE HEBREW VERB נָשָׂא —OF THIS VERSE—AND OF MAT. 8:17.

Verse 4 is the portal to those that follow. It begins to show what was true of Him. "Surely he hath borne our griefs, and carried our sorrows" is the first half of the verse. Lowth renders it—"Surely our infirmities he hath borne: And our sorrows, he hath carried them." Hengstenberg renders it—"But he bare our sicknesses, and took our pains upon himself." We may see for ourselves by examining its chief terms, beginning with the Hebrew verb נָשָׂא, *nasa.* According to Gesenius (Heb. Lex.), it primarily means, *to take up, to lift up, to raise,* as one does a weight or burden. Then very frequently it means, *to bear, to carry.* Then, it means, *to endure;* and hence, *to bear with,* that is, *to suffer, to permit* (Job 21:3). Then, when followed by עָוֹן, *sin, guilt, iniquity, crime,* it means, *to bear it,* that is, *to suffer the punishment of it.* If one takes on himself to bear the sin or guilt of another or others, it is to bear or suffer its punishment. He refers to Is. 53:12; Ez. 18:19, 20, to which we add Num. 14:33; 30:15; Lam. 5:7. *To bear one's own sin* is to suffer its punishment himself.* Then it means *to expiate* the sin or guilt of one or many by a sacrifice as a priest does (Lev. 10: 17); and *to forgive* or *to pardon sin* (Ps. 32:5; 85:3; Job 7:21; Gen. 50:17). The adverb *away* is no part of the meaning of this verb, unless in that last specified. Even in that, it is to depart from its

(*) Lev. 5:1, 17; 7:18; 17:16; 19:8; 20:17, 19, 20; 24:15; Num. 5:31; 9:13; 14:34; 18:1; Ez. 23:35; Job 34:31.

essential meaning to say that either to expiate, as a priest does, or to forgive signifies or includes *to take away*. The real meaning of both these expressions is, according to the radical one, *to take up, to lift up, to raise off* the guilty one, the burden of punishment deserved by him. Certainly, *away* never belongs to it when its object is *sin, iniquity, transgressions*, or *disgrace, reproach, shame*, or anything deemed punishment for sin. Magee says—"We find it, when joined with the word *sin*, constantly used throughout Scripture, either in the sense of forgiving it, on the one hand, or of *sustaining*, either directly or in figure, the penal consequences of it, on the other. Of this latter sense, I find not less than 37 instances, exclusive of this Chapter of Isaiah, in all which, bearing the burden of sins, so as to be rendered liable to suffer on account of them, seems clearly and unequivocally expressed. In most cases it implies *punishment* endured or incurred: whilst, in some few, it imports no more than a representation of that punishment; as in the case of the scape-goat, and in that of Ezekiel lying on his side, and thereby *bearing the iniquity, i. e.*, representing the punishment due to the iniquity, *of the house of Israel.* But in no one of all this number can it be said to admit the signification of carrying *away*, unless *perhaps* in the case of the scape-goat, Lev. 16:22, and in that of the priests, Ex. 28:38 and Lev. 10:17; and of these no more can be alleged, than that they *may* be so interpreted. To these instances of the word *nasa* connected with *chattah, navon*, sins, iniquities, etc., may fairly be added those in which it stands connected with the Hebrew words, meaning *disgrace, reproach, shame*, etc., of which there are 18 to be found: and in all of them, as before, the word is used in the sense of *enduring, suffering.* The idea, therefore, of a *burden to be sustained* is evidently contained in all these passages. Of the former sense of the word when connected with *sins, iniquities, offences*, either expressed or understood, namely that of *forgiving*, there are 22; in all which cases the nominative of the word *nasa* is the person who was to grant forgiveness. To *forgive*, then, on the part of him who had the power so to do; and to *sustain*, on the part of him who was deemed actually or figuratively the offender, seem to exhaust the significations of the word *nasa*, when connected with sins, transgressions, and words of like import."* He states, as the result of his investigation of this word, "That the word *nasa*, when connected with the word sins, or iniquities, is throughout the entire Bible to be understood in one of these two significations: *bearing, i. e.*, sustaining, on the one

(*) Magee, Vol. I., No. 42, pp. 300, 301.

hand; and *forgiving*, on the other; and that, in neither of these applications does there seem to be any reason for interpreting it in the sense of bearing *away;* nor has any one unequivocal instance of its use in that sense been adduced."* Respecting this word, Hengstenberg says—"Some would translate it *abstulit, removit,* but in opposition to the whole context [*i. e.*, of v. 4], and the parallelism with סָבַל. The members are entirely synonymous, and only differ in words. Moreover, the verb *nasa,* in connection with sin, elsewhere means, *to bear it* or the punishment of it; see Ez. 18:19—"The son shall not bear the sin of the father." Num. 14:33; Lev. 5:1; 20:17. Alex. φερει. Sym. ανελαβε."†

The Hebrew word, rendered *griefs* in our version, primarily means *sickness, disease;* then *anxiety, affliction, grief.* We omit references as unnecessary. It is never rendered *sin* in our version. In the Septuagint it is rendered ἁμαρτιας, *sins,* in this place. But Magee says—"There seems little reason to doubt from what Dr. Kennicott has advanced in his Diss. Gen. § 79, that this is a corruption which has crept into the later copies of the Greek; the old *Italic* (as collected from Augustine, Tertullian, and Athanasius), as well as St. Matthew, reading the word ασθενειας, and thereby proving the early state of that version. Besides, Dr. Owen mentions two MSS., that read at this day ασθενειας, and one μαλακιας. * * * I find also, that, in 93 instances, in which the word here translated ἁμαρτίας, or its kindred verb, is found in the Old Testament, in any sense that is not entirely foreign from the passage before us, there occurs but this one in which the word is so rendered; it being in all other cases expressed by ασθενεία, μαλακία, or some word denoting bodily disease."‡ He shows by many other authorities that the Hebrew word here denotes bodily diseases or infirmities, and not "griefs." "There can be no doubt," says Barnes, *in loco,* "that Matthew has used the passage, not by way of accommodation, but in the true sense in which it is used by Isaiah." Magee, inconsistently with what he abundantly proved as to the meaning of *nasa, hath borne,* expresses the opinion that, in this place, it includes in its meaning the adverb *away;* but Hengstenberg rightly denies it. The sense of the clause, then, is—"He hath borne our *sickness,* or *bodily infirmities.*"

(*) Magee, Vol. I., No. 42, pp. 309, 310.

(†) Christology, Vol. I., p. 514.

(‡) Magee, Vol. I., p. 287.

§ 229. MEANING OF THE HEBREW VERB סָבַל, SABHAL.

Let us consider the next clause, or member of the parallel—"And carried our sorrows." The Hebrew verb, rendered *carried*, is *sabhal*. According to Gesenius' Heb. Lex., it primarily means, *to bear, to carry, i. e.*, heavy burdens; then tropically, *to bear the sins, sorrows*, etc., of any one, *i. e.*, to suffer the punishment which another has deserved, as in this clause, in verse 11, and in Lam. 5:7. Magee says—"The word, or its derivative noun, occurs in 26 passages of the Old Testament, one of which is the verse now under examination: two others relate to sins—one the 11th verse of this Chapter; the other, Lam. 5:7; and the remaining 23 belong literally to *bearing burdens on the shoulders*." He adds proof beyond measure from Scripture, the Jerusalem Targum, and numerous old versions and interpreters, as well as from others down to his own time, that the verb means simply and only *to bear, to carry* burdens, whether literal or figurative, and never includes the meaning *away*, although that may be a consequence.* The Lexicon admits no other meaning.

It is unnecessary to name the Hebrew noun rendered *sorrows* in our version. It primarily means simply *pain;* and then figuratively *pain of mind, sorrow, grief.* It is in this sense, that it is to be understood here. Barnes, on the clause, says: "Perhaps the proper difference between this word and the word translated *griefs* is, that this refers to pains of the *mind*, that, of the body; this to anguish, anxiety, or trouble of soul; that to bodily infirmity and disease." Hengstenberg says: "*Our sickness, our pains* are an image of the outward and inward sufferings, which the Messiah should undergo in our stead, and thereby deliver us from the punishment of our sins." Magee says: "The antithetical clause relates, not to bodily pains and distempers, but to the diseases and torments of the mind;" and having referred to a number of Scriptural texts, in which "it is evidently so interpreted," and adduced numerous authorities of greatest weight, that this is its only proper meaning here, he adds: "I find, that of about 30 passages of Scripture, exclusive of the one at present before us, in which the word, or its kindred verb is found, there is scarcely one that bears any relation whatever to bodily disease."† Beyond intelligent question, the clause means: "And our *sorrows* he hath carried"—*i. e.*, as a burden. *Away* does not belong

(*) Magee, Vol. I., p. 287.

(†) Magee, Vol. I., pp. 288, 289.

to the verb in it; nor does it mean *removing*, or anything but *bearing* or *carrying* a burden.

§ 230. MATTHEW'S GREEK OF CHAP. 8:17 AN EXACT TRANSLATION OF IS. 53:4.

According to this showing of the meaning of the language of this 4th verse, the passage in Mat. 8:17 renders it exactly according to the original Hebrew. He translates *nasa* in the first clause by λαμβάνειν, *to take, to take upon one's self, to assume, to bear,* and the noun, incorrectly rendered *griefs* in our version, as it properly means *sickness, diseases,* by ασθενειας, *infirmities, sicknesses;* and he translates *sabhal* in the second clause by βασταξω, *to bear, to carry,* and the noun, incorrectly rendered *sicknesses* in our version, as it properly means *sorrows* by νοσους, which, in its secondary sense, means *pains, sorrows, evils.** The Greek verb λαμβάνω is the one by which *nasa* is constantly rendered by the Seventy in those cases in which the actual bearing of sins, *i. e.*, of their punitive consequences is concerned; and, in none of these does it ever mean *bear away*, but simply bear. Now, when we remember that it was the common belief of the Jews, as we have shown in a preceding place and in the note there, that sicknesses or bodily ailments are punishments from God for sin, we see exactly why this verb, instead of one meaning *to take, or bear, away,* or *to remove* sin, was used by Matthew; and why Isaiah used *nasa,* which means only *bear* or *carry.* If sicknesses or bodily infirmities are Divine punishments for sin, then, as sinners themselves, bear them as a burden, just as they do their sorrows, so Christ can take them on Himself, or bear them in the same, and in no other way. This Isaiah prophesied the Messiah would do, and Matthew quotes him in an exact translation.

§ 231. HOW ONLY CHRIST TOOK AND BORE THE SICKNESSES AND SORROWS OF MEN.

How did Christ do this? We answer, first, not by curing them miraculously; for He cured comparatively very few even of the Jews, and they only of those living while He wrought miracles, whereas the clause under consideration is unlimited in application. He took or bore those of each, especially of each believer, of all the generations of mankind—of each not cured, as really as of each cured, by miracle—a consideration universally overlooked, as far as we know, by interpreters of this translated quotation by Matthew

(*) Rob. N. T. Lex.

from the prophet, and yet radically important to a correct understanding of it. For, it is on the ground of the assumed limitation of the application of this quotation by Matthew to those only who were miraculously healed by Christ, that the translation of both *nasa* and λαμβάνω by *bearing away* or *taking away*, is founded to support the denial of the vicarious import of both these words. Matthew makes no such limitation. His object in the quotation is simply to show from the miraculous cures wrought by Christ, including the casting out of evil spirits by a word, that He was really the Messiah predicted by Isaiah, 53:4, and throughout the prophecy. He neither says nor implies that these miraculous cures are the *way* in which He would or did bear or take men's sicknesses; for they are not the *way* in which He bears or takes those of the bulk of mankind or of believers. It was simply to show, that they were done by Him in the way predicted by the prophet, and so that He was the Messiah foretold by Him. That *way* the prophet shows through the remainder of the Chapter; and, as Matthew afterwards (Chap. 20:28, with which compare Is. 53:10) records the words of Christ, that "he came to give his life a ransom for many," he could not here intend to deny that fundamental fact, and to substitute for it that of merely miraculously curing the bodily ailments of comparatively a few in the brief time of His ministry. Let this be noted, that our sicknesses and sorrows are not stated as all He bore, nor that He bore them by curing them; for He did this by His Divine power without suffering, whereas bearing, as shown, is entirely suffering. The words can have no other sense in this place. But He actually did perform those miraculous cures; and therefore, *secondly*, in answer to the question at the beginning of this paragraph, His bearing or taking our sicknesses and sorrows was not done by His sympathizing with, or entering Himself into, them by fellow feeling with the sufferers. Doing this would not cure them, however it might comfort and inspirit them to endure them. To make Christ's doing this what is meant by His bearing them is to reduce it to a very trivial matter in comparison with the great importance attached to it by the prophet's specializing it in connection with the preceding and following context. When He bore our sins, the burden was simply their penal consequences; and it was to provide a ground and means for their total removal from us. He no more did this in the cases of those whom He miraculously cured during His ministry, than in those of all believers and potentially of all men. *It was only on the basis of the atonement, which He came*

into the world to make for the sins of all men, that He wrought all His miraculous cures and ejectments of possessing devils, as well as His raisings of the dead to life. These miracles were simply *results beforehand of that atonement;* and, except on its basis, not one of them would or morally could have been wrought. They were therefore visible *proofs and demonstrations* of the reality of His bearing the sins of men in His soon-coming vicarious suffering, the virtue of which was the same as if He had already endured it, and which itself was doubtless ever present to His mind in working them, as the cost to Himself of so doing. He thus anticipatively bore them vicariously, which was the ground of His removing them miraculously. His sympathy with those whom He cured, freed from possessing devils, and restored to bodily life, was only a part of that infinitely greater sympathy He had with all mankind, which led Him to give His life a *ransom, i. e.*, an atonement, a cover, for many; and those restoring acts were only specimens and preludes of all He would do for them, especially for believers, to the end of time, and for the latter in the resurrection and forever.

We have thus a clear explanation of these words of the prophet in perfect consistency with all their context, and no less of Matthew's quotation of them in consistency with the same; and, as to the formula, "that it might be fulfilled," etc., by which Matthew introduces the quotation, every interpreter knows how he commonly uses it, and that it in no way invalidates this exposition of the first part of this verse, which we close with the remark, that Christ's *carrying our sorrows* must also be understood as equally unrestricted in application, and therefore in the same radical, vicarious sense; and the more because βαστάζω can only mean just what the Hebrew verb sabhal does, *i. e., to bear* or *to carry*, as a burden.

§ 232. INTERPRETATION OF THE SECOND PART OF IS. 53:4.

This interpretation of the Apostle's quotation of the first part of Is. 53:4 is further established by the second part—"yet we did esteem him stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted"—*i. e.*, on account of His own sins, not ours. When did the people, representing whom the prophet here speaks, thus *esteem* Him? Plainly just when He bore our sicknesses and carried our sorrows. Was that when He was working His miraculous cures and ejecting wicked spirits? Certainly not, for there is no evidence or reason to suppose, that His doing these works caused Him any bodily suffering whatever, or that He had any more sorrow then than at other times. We have

no information that He ever was sick; and the records of His special sorrows all ascribe them to Him at times when He was not working miracles at all (Mat. 26:37, 38; Mark 14:34), except when He raised Lazarus from the dead, and then their cause was independent of the miracle. Probably they were less then than commonly, because He had pleasure in all the good He accomplished by them to the bodies and souls of suffering sinners. As to His bearing our sicknesses and carrying our sorrows by sympathizing with, or entering Himself in feeling into, our woes, which by some is made the whole of it, and which Dr. Bushnell pronounces "the most natural and certainly great and worthy meaning for the passage from Matthew," we do not dispute that He did so, nor that His sympathy was exceedingly great; but, as said before, compared with the momentous reality signified by the prophet's language, it is like a hillock beside a mountain, or the moon beside the sun in his glory. Then, what kind of consistency is there between this interpretation of the clauses of this verse, as quoted by Matthew, and the words of the prophet following them, which can mean nothing else than that, although Christ would do what these clauses assert, yet, on account of His doing those very things, the hostile mass of the nation would esteem or regard Him as one "afflicted of God, smitten and tormented of God," as Hengstenberg translates the words? What reason would His doing this furnish why the unbelieving people should thus esteem Him? None whatever; so that this interpretation of the words, *bore* and *carried*, in the clauses, totally destroys the reason assigned by the prophet why they would thus esteem Him, which is, that He would bear their sickness and carry their sorrows. If the clauses are not the reason why they would so esteem Him, all connection of sense between them and their so esteeming Him is wanting, and the sublime prophet talked incoherently in expressing the verse as he did. And further, if the whole verse is not taken together, and in the only sense it can then have, which is what we have stated, what possible connection and coherence of sense is there between it, and all the remaining verses of the Chapter, which assert that, in all He endured, He suffered and was treated by God as the substitute of men? In short, to interpret the first two clauses of the verse as merely expressing Christ's sympathy with us in our sufferings is utterly inconsistent with its remainder, and with the whole chain of the Chapter from beginning to end.

A little more respecting Dr. Bushnell's way of treating Mat. 8:17. He says, p. 43 of his Vicarious Sacrifice—"It is remarkable

as being the one Scripture citation that gives, beyond a question, the exact *usus loquendi* of all the vicarious and sacrificial language of the New Testament." We reply, it gives *one usus loquendi* out of many, and nothing more, as our preceding examinations have abundantly shown. Every expression, such as the following, belongs to the *usus* as much as those of the citation—"to give His life a ransom for many"—"He gave Himself for us an offering and a sacrifice to God"—"He once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust"—"He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world"—"He is set forth a propitiation through faith in His blood"—and many others besides those in Is. 53:5, 7, 12. This assertion of the Doctor is therefore baseless; but is a specimen of many others which stock his pages. We waive special notice of any more of them found in pp. 42–46 of his work, because in what we have shown respecting the meaning of both the prophet and Matthew in the passage referred to we have sufficiently refuted them all; and because additional refutation of them will appear in our examination of the remainder of the Chapter.*

§ 233. RELATION OF V. 4 TO VS. 5–12.

The prophet began with the bodily and temporal consequences of sin in verse 4, because, by the Jewish law and the consequent universal belief of the Israelitish people, these were punishments for sins, and because they were matters of experience and observation to all, so that he might, in the sequel, go on to unfold all that Christ's bearing and carrying these involved, and *how* He did this. Thus verse 4 stands in the same kind of relation to the eight which follow in which Rom. 5:12 does to the seven which follow it: and the eight show that He bore and carried human sicknesses and sorrows by bearing and carrying a burden incomparably heavier, the positive punishment of the sins of men, and that He did this by suffering substitutionally a full equivalent for it. They thus carry on the development, in two counter lines, of the whole tragic case begun in verse 4—that of God's design and part in the subjection of the Messiah to all His sufferings, and that of the willful refusal of His malignant persecutors to recognize and admit that design and part, and of the malignant hatred and cruelty with which they treated Him. Verse 4 is more, therefore, than a prologue to the swelling act which follows. It is its vital, all-involving beginning, as the

(*) Crawford's Atonement, p. 41.

young tree is of the same tree grown to its largest proportions. Nor can any one who overlooks this vital, organic connection between it and verses 5–12 have any true understanding of the whole, or of the main constituent parts, of the passage. In examining verses 5–12, we will, when it seems important, state what we deem is the true sense of the Hebrew words without writing them, unless it may seem absolutely necessary, leaving it to scholars to judge of our correctness in interpreting.

§ 234. OUR SUBSTITUTE IN ALL HE SUFFERED—MEANING OF CHASTISEMENT.

Verse 5. "But he was wounded for our transgressions; he was bruised for our iniquities: the chastisement of our peace was upon him; and with his stripes we are healed." The word rendered "for" here means, "*on account of*," because it denotes that our transgressions were the occasioning cause or reason why He was wounded or pierced. In saying "*our* transgressions," the prophet classes himself with all sinners on whose account Christ was pierced. The word rendered "bruised" in the second clause primarily means, *to crush;* in the passive, *to be crushed, broken in pieces, beaten small;* and figuratively expresses the most terrible sufferings of body and of mind. It was in being thus wounded on account of our transgressions, and crushed on account of our iniquities, and not in His sympathetic feeling for us, that He bore and carried the burden laid upon Him, which was ours. The noun rendered "*chastisement*" properly means *that*, or *punishment*. It is from a verb which primarily means, *to chastise, to correct, to punish with blows, strokes* (Deut. 22:18; I. Kings 12:11, 14. "My father chastised you with whips," etc.)—especially, to express correction of children by their parents (Prov. 19:18; 29:17); and of men by God often (Lev. 26:28). "Of our peace" means, by which our peace with God is secured; and "upon Him" means, as a burden, which He bore in being pierced on account of our transgressions, and crushed on account of our iniquities; and, from the nature of the case, His sympathetic feeling for us could not be this burden of chastisement or punishment. This is always *inflicted;* that never. The noun rendered *stripes* means *that, weals, bruises*—the marks or prints of blows (Ex. 21:25, twice; Gen. 4:23; Is. 1:6; Ps. 38:5; Prov. 20:30; Jer. 13:23). It indicates exactly the marks on Christ from being beaten, buffeted, and scourged. "We are healed" should be—"it is *healed*, or *healing has resulted, to us*. *Healed* figuratively expresses deliver-

ance from the penal consequences of our sins. The substitution of Christ's sufferings in the way expressed for those we must otherwise have endured ourselves is the very bone and marrow of the whole verse; and His sympathetic feeling for us was no part of what was substituted.

§ 235. HIS SUBSTITUTION FURTHER DECLARED—INIQUITIES OF ALL THROWN ON HIM.

Verse 6. "All we, like sheep, have gone astray; we have turned every one to his own way; and the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all." The prophet here assigns the cause which moved Jehovah to subject Christ to His sufferings, and Him voluntarily to undergo them. It was the lost and miserable condition of mankind, wandered and severed from God, and God's infinite compassion and desire to rescue and save them. Under the imagery of sheep without a shepherd, and exposed to all dangers and destruction, the miserable state of mankind estranged from God and apostate in sin and error is strikingly depicted. The rendering of the Hebrew in the words—"And the Lord has laid on him," is inadequate. The primary meaning of the verb in them is, *to strike upon or against, to impinge*. It involves the sense of some person or thing striking forcefully upon or against another, as with a blow, or as by a weight thrown upon him. Here it means that Jehovah caused to fall, or threw upon Him the iniquity, *i. e.*, the penalty of it, of us all. It expresses clear substitution in suffering the punishment deserved by the sin of all who, like sheep, have gone astray—*i. e.* of all men, and nothing else. As in the preceding verse it is said the chastisement or punishment of our peace was on Him, this one tells us that Jehovah, not men, put it upon Him by throwing or causing to fall upon Him the iniquity of us all. No distortion of language can make it mean or imply any reference to Christ's sympathetic feeling for man; for how could Jehovah throw that, or cause it to fall, like an impinging weight or heavy blow upon Him? Besides, as far as sympathy is implied, it is ascribed, not to Christ at all, but to Jehovah. It was by Him that the weight or blow was made to fall on Christ.

§ 236. HIS PERFECT PATIENCE AND MEEKNESS IN HIS SUFFERINGS.

Verse 7. "He was oppressed, yet he humbled himself and opened not his mouth; as a lamb that is led to the slaughter, and as a sheep that before her shearers is dumb; yea, he opened not his

mouth." Hengstenberg says—"The prophet had commenced, verse 2, the description of the sufferings of the Messiah; in verses 4–6, he had digressed, in order to assign the causes of these severe sufferings. He now resumes the description, and sets before us in this verse the perfect meekness and patience of the great servant of God in his distress." Lowth render the beginning of this verse—"It was exacted, and he was answerable;" and Vitringa, Michaelis, Dathe, Kinöl, Jähn, and the Jew, Kimchi, agree in "it was exacted." Hengstenberg says: "This interpretation has certainly much to recommend it," adding—"for the punishment of sin is very commonly represented under the image of the exaction of a debt," although he prefers the rendering—"He was abused." He renders the following words—"but he suffered patiently," in agreement with Jähn and Steudel. It is not important for our purpose to examine the verse farther. Its obvious purpose is to set forth the perfect meekness and patience of Christ under His appalling abuse and sufferings; and be it observed, that there is nothing in it which can mean His sympathetic feeling for sinners. We only add the words of Hengstenberg—"With reference to this verse, John the Baptist calls Christ (John 1:29), the Lamb of God. Compare I. Pet. 1:18, 19; Acts 8:22, 35."

§ 237. HOW HE WAS CUT OFF BY MEN, YET WOULD HAVE A VAST POSTERITY.

Verse 8. "By oppression and judgment he was taken away; (but who can declare his posterity?); for he was cut off out of the land of the living; for the transgression of my people was he stricken." The general meaning of this verse is, that the sufferings of Christ were brought to a close by His being, after an iniquitous trial, cut off out of the land of the living, though not from having a vast posterity. For *prison* we substitute *oppression;* and *judgment* means a *judicial decision* or *sentence, i. e.*, to punishment. The verb rendered "*was taken*" may mean here, as it does elsewhere, a violent leading away to punishment; but probably, according to the parallelism, it means that He *was taken away, i. e.*, out of the land of the living, as it is said in the parallel—*was put to death.* As to the parenthetic question—"who shall declare his generation?" as it is not important to our purpose, we merely say, in passing, that we think the opinion, out of many, that, anticipating what is said in verse 10, it means—"who can estimate the number of his posterity?" is the true one. The verb "*was cut off*" never means a peaceful, ordi-

nary death, but always a violent, premature one, as in Dan. 9:26—"After threescore and two weeks shall the Messiah be cut off, but not for himself." Doubtless, when Daniel expressed this, he had this place of Isaiah in his mind. In the clause—"for the transgression of my people," Isaiah includes himself among them. These words assign the Divine reason *on account of* which He was stricken, or literally "*the stroke was upon him.*" In this verse, as in all the preceding, no reference is made to the sympathetic, or any subjective feeling or state of Christ respecting men in their woes, but only to what was inflicted upon Him.

§ 238. HIS HONORABLE BURIAL, DESPITE THE DESIGN OF HIS ENEMIES, WITH THE REASON.

Verse 9. "And they made his grave with the wicked, and with the rich man in his death; because he had done no violence, neither was any deceit in his mouth." Hengstenberg translates—"They appointed him his grave with the wicked; (but he was with a rich man after his death;) although he had done nothing unrighteous, and there was no guile in his mouth." The sense, as he states it, is —"not satisfied with his sufferings and death, they sought to insult him, the innocent and righteous one, even in death, since they wished to bury his corpse among criminals. It is then incidentally remarked that this object was not accomplished. Christ was entombed by Joseph of Arimathea, who is here called, as in Matt. 25:57, a rich man." If this is doubtful to any, see Nägelsbach's comment *in loco* in the Lange series. It is probably correct, as the whole verse pertains to the spirit of Christ's enemies against him, and the treatment He received from them. It is not important to our purpose to notice it further.

§ 239. JEHOVAH SUBJECTED HIM TO HIS SUFFERINGS—HIS SOUL AN OFFERING FOR SIN, AND THE RESULTS.

Verse 10. "Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him; he hath put him to grief: when thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin, he shall see his seed, he shall prolong his days, and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in his hand." This verse declares God the prime Causer of the Messiah's sufferings, their design, their fruit and result, and His restoration to a perpetual life. Its sense is, that His sufferings have been inflicted upon Him, not for any sins of His own, nor by His enemies, acting independently of any design or control of God; but, according to God's infinitely wise and benevolent

purpose. While He permitted them to act out their wicked will against Christ, He overruled and guided their action to be put forth precisely as it was, and subjected Him to it, in order out of and by their evil to accomplish, by the atonement which His sufferings and death would make for the sins of mankind, and by all the grace it would secure for them, the infinite good of the salvation of immense multitudes of them, of vastly augmented, everlasting blessing to all holy creatures, and of unlimited and perpetual pleasure and glory to Himself. In this sense and for this incalculably great reason, "it pleased the Lord to bruise him, and to put him to grief;" and for this same reason, He *voluntarily* came on purpose to be subjected to this bruising and grief, just as He was "when His soul [*i. e.*, He] made an offering for sin"—for the marginal reading in our version, and not that in the text, is, we believe, (against Nägelsbach,) the true one.* The Hebrew word, *asham*, means, first, *guilt*, desert of punishment for transgression (Gen. 26:10; Jer. 51:5); then, transgression itself, or sin (Num. 5:7, 8); and then, *guilt-offering* (Lev. 5:19; 7:5; 14:21; 19:21). In our examination of this word, as used in the law [§ 205], we saw that, when signifying an offering, this and the sin-offering were essentially the same—*i. e., were for an expiatory covering or atonement for sin.* It was to expiate the *guilt* or *debt* of sin; and the prophet says that, when Christ shall make this offering, "he shall see his seed," etc. In these clauses, he expresses the crowning reason and end of Christ's sufferings. In this suffering, He was to be an *offering for sin* (περὶ της αμαρτίας) *to cover, to atone, to make expiation, for it.* Hengstenberg says—"According to this passage, Paul affirms, II. Cor. 5:21, God has made Christ to be ἁμαρτία, *a sin-offering*, whereby we become righteous before God, as in Rom. 8:3, God has sent Christ περὶ της αμαρτίας, *for a sin-offering*, and Christ is called ἱλασμὸς, ἱλαστήριον, a propitiatory sacrifice for all sins, Rom. 3:25; I. John 2:2; 4:10. Compare Heb. 9:14." The language of this verse could never be applied to any martyr; nor to any other one than Christ; nor to Him as suffering for us merely in sympathetic feeling; but to Him only as suffering all He did for us as *mediately* and *immediately inflicted* upon Him by God Himself, with His most free consent and obedient co-operation in submitting to it, as our Great High Priest, to atone for the sins of the world. The results and promised rewards are more fully expressed in the next two verses.

(*) Magee, Vol. I., No. XXVII., pp. 163 174; Hengstenberg, Barnes.

§ 240. JEHOVAH SPEAKS AND DECLARES THE RESULTS.

Verse 11. "He shall see of the travail of his soul, and shall be satisfied: by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many; for he shall bear their iniquities." Jehovah is represented as again speaking, the first time since Chap. 52:13-15. The noun rendered *travail* signifies labor, toil, *i. e.*, wearisome labor, Eccl. 1:3; 2:11; tropically of the mind, Ps. 73:16; then, *trouble, vexation, sorrow,* (Gen. 41:51; Deut. 26:7; Job 3:10; 16:2; and here). It includes the two-fold meaning of *labor and suffering*, and indicates all that the Messiah did and endured in accomplishing the great atonement. Because of this travail, *i. e.*, labor and suffering of His soul, "*He beholds*"—it is not said what, but doubtless the fruits and rewards of it indicated in the previous verse; and, with the sight of them, He shall satisfy Himself for it all, as the farmer does for all his toil and weariness with the sight of an abundant rewarding crop. Beholding the hosts of millions of mankind, of all nations, generations, and ranks eternally saved, blessed, and unspeakably aggrandized, all the good to the intelligent universe, and all the pleasure and glory to God produced by their salvation, He will estimate this consummate, eternal result amply worth all He did and suffered to secure it; and He will forever rejoice that He paid the requisite price, though so vast and terrible, to secure a good so exceeding all finite comprehension; especially, because otherwise our entire race must have perished, the intelligent universe must have suffered an eternal loss and evil as great as the good effected, and God must have lacked all the pleasure and glory of that good secured, and of the contrasted evil prevented. Besides, His gratulation and joy must be eternally augmented by all the results to Himself He will forever possess and contemplate. "By or through His knowledge" —*i. e.*, men's knowledge of Him, as made known to, and believingly appropriated by, them, as their Saviour, Jehovah says, "shall my righteous servant justify many." As the next line is the parallel of this, and gives the ground or reason for the justification, and as it is something which Christ will do *for* "the many," because He will bear their iniquities, the *justifying* must be understood, not in a *subjective*, but in a *forensic* sense—*i. e.*, that He will *forgive* their sins, remit their *penalty*, and treat them *as if* they were legally righteous.* The *justifying* is opposed to the *condemning*, not to *sinning*, and is the act of the one absolving from punishment, not of the one ab-

(*) Deut. 25:1; I. Kings 8:32; II. Chron. 6:23; Is. 5:23; Ex. 23:7; Ps. 82:3; Prov. 17:15; Is. 50:8, and many other places.

solved. Christ, though perfectly righteous (verse 9), nevertheless equivalently suffered the penalty of sin, and He therefore bestows justification upon all who believingly repent, restores them to the favor of God, and treats them, *as far as penalty is concerned, as if* they had not sinned, but were subjectively righteous and deserving. See verses 5, 6, especially, "by His wounds we are healed." The last clause assigns the reason—"And he shall bear their iniquities," (*sabhal*)—*shall carry*. This verb, as we saw (verse 4), never means bear or carry *away*, but simply as a burden; and to bear sin or iniquity, or the plural of these, *always* means to suffer the penalty of it or them, and nothing else.* These expressions are technical, legal formulas, invariably meaning, *to suffer penalty;* and they mean just that, and nothing different, when another than the guilty one or more suffer it instead of Him or them (Lev. 19:17; margin; Num. 14:33, 34; Lam. 5:7; Ez. 18:19, 20; Is. 53:11, 12). The sons are spoken of as *bearing the sins* of their fathers in all these citations, except the first and the last. In none of them, can it be pretended that the meaning is, that the sons bore them *away*, or anything else than that they *suffered their punishment*. *Sabhal* in Lam. 5:7, and *nasa*, in all the rest, are the verbs to express this bearing.† We think Henstenberg made a decided mistake in accepting the position of Gesenius, that "all the preceding and following futures in verses 11, 12 refer to the state of exaltation" [of the Messiah], and in his consequent interpretation of *sabhal, carry*, in this line, because it is in the future. He says—"The Messiah takes upon himself the sins of every one who, after his exaltation, fulfills this condition"—[of having the knowledge of Him mentioned in the preceding line] "*i. e.*, He causes His own vicarious obedience to be reckoned to him, and imparts to him forgiveness. *He will bear their sins* is the same, only under a different image, as *He will justify them.*" We deny the sameness; to justify is not to bear in any sense. The mistake (Nägelsbach also makes it) is in making the *prophetic future* of Christ's sufferings and death that of His subsequent everlasting exaltation. He bore sins *once*, when He suffered and died, and never has nor will again to all eternity. Not a hint is there here about His bearing them as consisting in His suffering with men in sympathetic feeling.

(*) Ex. 28:38, 43; Lev. 5:1, 17; 7:18; 17:16; 19:8; 20:17, 19; 22:16; Num. 5:31; 14:34; 18:1, 23; 30:15; Is. 53:11; Ez. 4:4; 18:19, 20; 44:10, 12—to bear sin or sins, Lev. 19:17, margin; 20:20; 22:9; 24:15; Num. 9:13; 18:22, 32; Ez. 23:49; Heb. 9:28; I. Pet. 2:24.

(†) Magee, Vol. I., pp. 310, 312.

§ 241. JEHOVAH DECLARES HIS REWARDS.

Verse 12. "Therefore will I divide him *a portion* with the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong; because he poured out his soul unto death, and was numbered with the transgressors: and he bare the sin of many, and made intercession for the transgressors." Jehovah still speaks, declaring the rewards He will give, and *why* He will give them, to the Messiah. We think the rendering in our version of the first two clauses of this verse is essentially the correct one, as the prepositions before the words rendered *great* and *strong* plainly correspond, and should be brought into the translation. As the great and mighty among men always had, before Christ's death, divided the spoil of the nations among themselves, and would afterwards strive to do so, it has vast and fine significance, that Jehovah asserts that, after Christ's most ignominious and appalling sufferings and death, as if one of the worst and basest of criminals, He, the Almighty and absolute Disposer, would Himself reward Him by dividing the spoil to Him with them, giving Him, as the imagery implies, the Conqueror's share, what the Romans called the *spolia opima*, leaving to them the very inferior remainder. It is Jehovah that divides it to Him; and the language does not imply that the portion divided to Him would be of the same kind as that divided to the great and mighty of the world. It would be both different and incomparably superior, as the whole history of true Christianity shows it has been; so that even many of the great and mighty have been and will be themselves part of it, as the whole Church, and all the results of its and His influence are parts of it. If, in the short time of a little over eighteen centuries, His portion has become so immense and inestimable, what will it become in even half as many to follow?—or, in five? What, when the kingdoms of this world shall become the kingdom of Christ? What, in all the eternal ages? The remainder of the verse presents the meritorious reasons *why* Jehovah will so reward Him. (1) Because *He poured out His soul unto or in death.* The language is taken from that used in the law respecting the animals slain in sacrifices, whose blood contained their life or soul, and was poured out and caught by the priest to be sprinkled, on the great day of atonement, before the mercy-seat in the Holy of holies, then on the altar of incense in front of the veil, and its remainder on the altar of burnt-offerings in the court in front of the temple. Christ was both priest and sacrifice, and poured out His blood, life, and soul, to atone for the sins of the world (Lev. 17:11). (2) He *was, or suffered Himself to be,*

numbered with the transgressors. Although perfectly obedient, He suffered Himself to be so numbered by men, and by the plan of God, *as if* one of the worst among them, in order thus to work out His great atonement. (3) *He bore* [aorist] *the sin of many.* What an illustration it is of the effect of adopting a false principle of interpretation, that so grand a scholar as Hengstenberg should be led, by adopting that of Gesenius already noticed, to interpret the aorist of *nasa* here, as "determined to be the *future* by the context, in which the exaltation is the subject of discourse," so as to make it correspond with the future *sabhal* in verse 11 and refer to Christ's exaltation, which is not even mentioned, and at most is only implied as one part of the rewards to be given Him, instead of making both the words express, as they plainly do, the preceding fundamental, meritorious reason of those rewards! The consequence is, that, by making Christ bear sin in His exaltation, He makes His bearing it mean only *forgiving it,* of which meaning there is not, as we have shown, another instance in the Bible, when the word is connected with sin or iniquity. Sin is borne only by suffering its penalty, whether by the sinner himself or by a substitute, and it was thus only, as the whole Chapter shows, that Christ bore the sins of many. (4) *He made intercession for the transgressors.* The verb here rendered, "*made intercession,*" is the same which in verse 6 is rendered, "*hath laid,*" and, as here used, means, in addition to praying for them, presenting Himself before the Father with all His merit and claims on account of all He has done and endured to redeem them, and securing for them all the favor and assistance necessary for their complete salvation, eternal glory and blessedness (Heb. 7:25; 9:24; Rom. 8:34; I. John 2:1). Of these four specifications, the first three set forth the main parts of His atoning sufferings and death, and the fourth what He continually does to make the others effectual for the complete salvation and glorification of as many as possible of the transgressors; and in none of them is there any reference to His suffering with men in sympathetic feeling for their woes or miserable state.*

To this exposition of this wonderful prophecy, we add the following remarks:—

1. It is essentially an inspired exhibition of what was symbolically typified by the animal sacrifices of the Levitical Law, as is manifest from the language from that law applied to the great predicted

(*) Hengstenberg's Chris., Vol. I., pp. 484-499, 537-560; Barnes' Int. to his comments on the Chapter.

sufferer. The expressions—"he hath borne our sicknesses and carried our sorrows"—"the chastisement of our peace was upon him"—"the Lord has caused to meet on him the iniquity of us all"—"for the transgression of my people, the stroke was upon him"—"when his soul or he shall make an offering for sin"—"for he shall bear their iniquities"—"he hath poured out his life or soul unto death"—and "he bore the sins of many," are all derived from that law, and clearly show that the prophet meant to set forth the Messiah in His sufferings and death as the antitype of the sacrifices of that law—how the great reality would correspond to and fulfill the typical symbols.

§ 242. CHRIST NOT A MARYTR, BUT A VOLUNTARY SUBSTITUTE FOR SINNERS IN ALL HE SUFFERED, ETC.

2. It proves that the sufferings and death of Christ were not those of a mere martyr, who fell a victim to the malignity and violence of persecutors, being unable to escape from their murderous hands, but were entirely *voluntary* on His part and in obedience to the determinate counsel and righteous will of Jehovah. It thus proves, that they were not for any sin or fault of His own, but for the sin of mankind—that they were for the advantage or benefit of mankind by being *in the stead* of the penal suffering deserved by them to save them from it, and were, therefore, purely vicarious or substitutionary, as no mere martyr's nor patriot's ever were—that they did not consist at all in His sympathetic feeling with the woes or miserable state of mankind, but entirely in what was inflicted upon Him from without—that it is only on the basis of this substitution that any of mankind can be saved—and yet, that, in themselves, His sufferings and death secure the salvation of none, but are merely *provisional* for all, until by His prevailing intercession, as the Great High Priest, such transgressors as can consistently be brought to receive salvation on their basis, do so, and are forgiven; the forgiveness making the substitution *actual* for all such. To deny this substitution is to deny the whole fundamental meaning of this prophecy, as the expressions quoted from it above and its whole tenor clearly show. It is to deny that Christ was, in His sufferings and death, either sacrifice or priest, since by the law the very purpose of the priestly office was to offer sacrifices to God with intercessions for the transgressing people; since, in the nature of the case, all sacrifices were substitutions, and nothing else; and since intercessions were grounded upon them. The sympathetic feelings of the typical

priest for his fellow-men were exceedingly important as a personal qualification for his office (Heb. 5:2), but in no way belonged to the sacrifice, nor affected its validity for its objects, the sufferings and death of the victim being *wholly inflicted*. So those feelings of Christ were inexpressibly important to men (Heb. 2:17, 18; 4:15), as a qualification for His priestly office, but were no part of His sufferings and death as "an offering and a sacrifice to God for men for a sweet-smelling savor" (Eph. 5:2). These were *entirely inflicted* upon Him from without; and, as neither in this prophecy, nor any where in Scripture, are those feelings of Christ for mankind ever even alluded to when His sufferings and death *for* them are spoken of, it is not only purely arbitrary to attempt to make them constitute His vicarious sufferings or any part of them, but it is to make His *inflicted sufferings and death* to no end and of no account, and Jehovah unreasonable and unjust in subjecting Him to them (Acts 2:23; 4:28; Rom. 4:25; 8:32), by "causing to meet or rush upon Him the iniquity of us all," "bruising him," "putting him to grief," causing him to be "pierced for our transgressions," "crushed for our iniquities," and to suffer "the chastisement to secure our peace" with Himself; and it is to make Christ Himself voluntarily undergo them all equally to no end and without reason. They did not come upon Him as mere incidental results of the malignity of His murderous persecutors, as those of martyrs come upon them, but as inflictions to which He was subjected by the purpose and sovereign will of Jehovah; and it was as such only that He voluntarily and obediently endured them, "bearing the sin of many." He tells us Himself that it was in obedience to that will and for the purpose of enduring them, that He came into the world. Hence, to deny that He suffered and died as a substitute for men, to rescue them from the necessity of themselves suffering the punishment deserved by their sins, is not only to make nonsense of this whole prophecy and of all Scripture which declares that He suffered and died in our stead and for us, but it is to impugn the justice and character of God who subjected Him to the infliction—to deny the very foundation of Christianity—to reduce the immensity of the love of both the Father and the Son for guilty men to a comparatively meager measure—to make justification in the proper sense of the term impossible—to substitute for it the uncouth thing, fitly expressed by the uncouth word *righteousing*, which means, not freeing men from penalty and treating them *as if* personally righteous on the ground of atonement made for their sins by Christ, but making them *subjectively* righteous

by mere moral influence—and to put in the place, by all this, of the real Gospel of Christ another, which is not another.

§ 243. PASSAGE FROM MAGEE RESPECTING THIS CHAPTER AND ITS IMPORTANCE.

3. As the last of these remarks, we quote a passage from Magee. He says—"I have gone thus extensively into the examination of this point, both because it has of late been the practice of those writers who oppose the doctrine of atonement to assume familiarly, and *pro concesso*, that the expression *bearing sins* signified in all cases, where personal punishment was not involved, nothing more than bearing them *away*, or *removing* them; and because this Chapter of Isaiah contains the whole scheme and substance of the Christian atonement. Indeed, so ample and comprehensive is the description here given, that the writers of the New Testament seem to have had it perpetually in view, inasmuch as there is scarcely a passage in the Gospels or Epistles, relating to the sacrificial nature and atoning virtue of the death of Christ, that may not obviously be traced to this exemplar: so that, in fortifying this part of Scripture, we establish the foundation of the entire system. It will consequently be the less necessary to inquire minutely into those texts in the New Testament which relate to the same subject. We cannot but recognize the features of the prophetic detail, and consequently apply the evidence of the prophet's explanation, when we are told, in the words of our Lord, that "the Son of man came to *give his life a ransom for many*" (Mat. 20:28); that, as St. Paul expresses it, "he *gave himself a ransom for all*" (I. Tim. 2:6); that "he was *offered to bear the sins of many*" (Heb. 9:28); that "God made *him* to be *sin for us, who knew no sin*" (II. Cor. 5:21); that "Christ *redeemed us from the* curse of the law, *being made a curse for us*" (Gal. 3:13); that "he *suffered for sins, the just for the unjust*" (I. Pet. 3:18); that "he *died for the ungodly*" (Rom 5:6); that "*he gave himself for us*" (Titus 2:14); that "he *died for our sins*" (I Cor. 15:3); and "was *delivered for our offences*" (Rom. 4:25); that "*he gave himself for us an offering and a sacrifice to God*" (Eph 5:2); that "we are *reconciled to God by the death of His Son*" (Rom. 5:10); that "his blood was *shed for many for the remission of sins*" (Mat. 26:28).—These and many others directly refer us to the prophet, and seem but partial reflections of what he had previously so fully placed before our view.*

(*) Magee Vol. I., pp. 317, 318.

§ 244. PASSAGES IN THE NEW TESTAMENT, IN WHICH NASA AND SABHAL ARE TRANSLATED INTO CORRESPONDING GREEK VERBS.

We close this Chapter by calling attention to some passages in the New Testament in which the Hebrew verbs *sabhal* and *nasa*, which express the very life of this prophecy, are translated into corresponding Greek verbs which signify precisely what they do in it, the purpose and sacrificial character of Christ's sufferings and death, and which thus show that the prophecy related to and was fulfilled by Christ in undergoing them. We first notice I. Pet. 2:24—"Who himself bore our sins in his own body on the tree." He uses the Greek verb ἀναφέρω, which means the same as both the Hebrew verbs mentioned, as they stand in Is. 53:11, 12, but here specially for *sabhal* in verse 12, from which he evidently quotes; and, by the way, the meaning he gives it plainly disagrees with that given it by Gesenius, etc., referred to above. The Greek verb primarily means *to bear upward, to carry up, to lead up, i. e.*, from a lower to a higher place; and then, *to take up and bear, to take from another upon one's self;* in the New Testament, spoken metaphorically of sins, *to bear the punishment of sin, to expiate*, as in this verse. It therefore often has the sense of *offering up* a victim, as *carrying it up* to the altar. Applied to Christ, it properly means that He *bore* or *carried up* the burden or penalty of our sins to the cross, and suffered it there. Peter took it from the Septuagint translation of *sabhal* in Is. 53:12. It is used in that translation in Num. 14:33, to render *nasa*, where it is said that the children of the rebellious Israelites shall *bear* their whoredoms, *i. e.*, suffer the punishment of them; and, in verse 34, to express that the offenders themselves shall bear those very sins, which verse 33 says their sons should likewise bear. Calovius says—"The cross of Christ was the lofty altar to which, when he was about to offer himself, he ascended laden with our sins."*

Heb. 9:28 says: "So Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many," plainly referring to Is. 53:12, and using the same Greek verb, which Peter uses, to render the same Hebrew verb, taking it from the Septuagint version, as he did. All therefore shown respecting it in the passage from Peter applies equally to it here. But we remark, in opposition to Moll on the passage, that, as Christ appeared the first time to bear sin by suffering its penalty for men, the words—"he will appear the second time *without sin*," must mean, *without bearing* it or *being offered for* it. The antithesis demands this meaning, and with the whole nature of case, admits no other,

(*) Stuart's Com. on Hebrews, Excursus 19.

"*Without sin,*" therefore, must mean, *without a sin-offering.* Is. 53:10 is undoubtedly referred to in the expression.

§ 245. PROPER TRANSLATION OF JOHN 1:29, EXCLUDES AWAY FROM TAKES.

John 1:27, spoken by John the Baptizer to his disciples, and probably to others around him, says: "Behold the Lamb of God which takes away [bears] the sin of the world." The article before *lamb* indicates the one specially appointed; and "*of God,*" that it was peculiarly His sacrifice, one selected by Him, (Rev. 5:8; 13:8). Is. 53:7 predicted that the Messiah should be *as a lamb,* which is led to the slaughter, *i. e.,* for a sacrifice, as the whole connection shows; and to this passage and the whole connected prophecy, the Baptizer doubtless refers. Lange, on this verse, says: "The Messianic import of the passage named [Is. 53:7] cannot be evaded, and the particular features suit," (Mat. 8:17; Acts 8:32; I. Pet. 2:22–25). Isaiah, in writing that 7th verse, doubless referred to the lambs offered in sacrifice according to the law, and the Baptizer probably had these also in his mind. The words rendered—"which takes away the sin of the world," prove that he meant that Christ, as the lamb, was to be offered as a sacrifice, as this prophecy of Isaiah, the typical sacrifices of lambs, and numerous other inculcations of the Old Testament, with the spirit inspiring him to understand them, had clearly taught him. The meaning of the Greek verb αἴρω, used in this clause, is primarily, *to raise, to raise or lift up, to take up to carry, to carry;* then, *to take up and place on one's self, to take up and bear, i. e., to bear, to carry;* then, *to take up and carry away, i. e., to take away, to remove, i. e.,* by carrying; and then, *to take away, to remove,* the idea of *lifting,* etc., being dropped. No one supposes it has the last of these meanings here. Both our versions place the third in the text, the second in the margin. The question is, should it be rendered here *takes away,* or simply *takes, bears, carries?* It is agreed by the ablest interpreters that this verb here is the equivalent of the Hebrew verb *nasa,* when followed by *sin* or *sins,* iniquity or iniquities, as in Is. 53:12 and often in the law; and this understanding of it is demanded by the fact that this word is here followed by "sin of the world" as its object, just as that verb is by sin, iniquity, etc., in all the places referred to. The whole clause is simply a translation of Isaiah's—"he bore the sin of many," *world* being substituted for *many.* Now, we believe we have shown in our exposition of Isaiah's prophecy, that *nasa,* followed as

stated, never means *to take* or *bear away*, but simply to *bear*, *i. e.*, as a burden, *to endure* the punishment of sin, iniquity, or of plurals of each; and we think the Greek verb here can mean nothing else. For, in addition to what we have said, it is not true in fact that Christ "takes *away* the sin of the world." This is only done by regeneration and forgiveness in the case of believers, and not in that of any others. The term *sin* in the singular number indicates that of the entire race, not of a part of it, as one monstrous mass, which He took upon Him and bore as a burden by suffering its penalty *provisionally* for all, *actually* for all whom He foreknew as brought to faith in Him. The adverb *away*, added to *takes*, spoils the whole conception, and substitutes, we believe, a derogatory and misleading one, Lange in his comment on the passage to the contrary notwithstanding. We deny his statement that offering for sin and the vicarious expiation involve the idea of taking away, carrying off; they lay a basis for doing this, and nothing more. Tholuck's view is the same with ours, and Olshausen labored in vain to set it aside. Bloomfield has, in our view, clearly and conclusively established it in his Notes on the Greek New Testament, *in loco*. The assertion is, that Christ is God's sacrificial victim, and thus takes on Himself or bears the sin of the world; and, if we should hold that *world* here means the *elect* only, still the rendering—"takes *away* the sin of the elect," would not be sustained by the Scriptural usage of *taking, bearing, carrying sin*, which never includes justification and regeneration, but simply enduring its penalty. It is very remarkable, that, in the Apocalypse, the Apostle John calls Christ the Lamb 28 times; and 4 times he characterizes Him as *a lamb slain*, adding in 5:9 and "hast redeemed us to God by thy blood." Also, that Peter, I. Pet. 1:18, 19, tells believers that they "were redeemed with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot." Why did they so designate and characterize Him? Doubtless, from their remembrance of this indicative description of Him by John the Baptizer. They plainly thus refer to Him as the great sin-offering for the world; and hence all these designations and characterizings confirm our interpretation—"Behold the Lamb of God, which takes upon himself, bears the sin of the world." Taking *away* or *removing* sin is done, not for the world nor for the elect in mass, but for each individual brought to believe; and it is effected, not by the atonement itself, which only lays the basis and secures the agencies and means of it, but by these. But the atonement is for all while in sin, and was done *once* for all, never

to be repeated. Speaking figuratively, the atonement was a *wholesale* transaction, while taking *away* or *removing* sin is a *retail* transaction, done *in* and for individuals and repeated in the case of every separate convert.

If, against the foregoing interpretation of John 1:29, we are pointed to I. John 3:5—"And we know that he was manifested that he might *take away* our sins," and are told that, in it, the same verb, αἴρω, which we have said does not mean *take away* in that verse, is plainly correctly so rendered in this, and, therefore, should be so rendered in that, we answer as follows: We believe that, in this, it is correctly rendered *take away*, but not in that; for, in this, there is no special reference to Christ's sufferings and death as a sacrifice for sin, as there is in that, and the whole connection demands that we should understand *take away*, in this, in a purely ethical sense. The words—"He was manifested," merely express the fact of His incarnate appearance and mission among men; and the words—"that he might take away our sins," express the purpose of His manifestation, as it pertained to the spiritual deliverance of all who would become His from their actual sins. Nothing is said of His being a lamb, an offering, a sacrifice, a propitiation, of His sufferings and death, or by what means he takes away our sins; and the plural *sins*, with the whole connection, shows that the Apostle did not mean the penalties they deserve, but all the different kinds of them actually committed. And by saying "*our* sins," he restricts them as only those of believers, not those of the world. The passage, therefore, is simply a general statement of the *ethical end* which Christ came into the world to accomplish in all brought to receive His salvation, namely, their purification from all their actual sins. In John 1:29, he is presented as the *Atoner* by bearing the penalty of the sin of the world; in this verse, as the *Purifier* of believers from their actual sins; and the verb mentioned is used in it in its *fourth* sense of "*taking away, removing*, the idea of lifting, etc., being dropped." It neither asserts nor denies anything respecting the atonement of Christ; but, as the Apostle had referred to that in Chapter 2:2, he assumes it here; and, as, in 2:1, he had declared that, "if any man [a believer] sins, we have an Advocate," etc., he declares what, *as such*, He was manifested to accomplish for all believers.

Entirely to the same effect is I. John 1:7—"The blood of Jesus Christ, his Son, cleanseth us from all sin." The atoning virtue of Christ's blood is here asserted, but not as the ground of forgiveness

or justification of believers, who alone are spoken of, but as that of their *purification* or *sanctification* from all sin. Braune, in his Comm., *in loco*, says well—"The reference is not to remission of sins, or the pardon of guilt, but to the cancelling of sin and redemption from it."

We close this Chapter with a quotation from Mr. Townsend, cited by Bloomfield in his excellent note on John 1:29—"In support of the doctrine of Atonement there is more authority than for any other revealed in the Jewish or Christian Scriptures. It was taught in the beginning of the patriarchal dispensation, the first after the fall, in the words of the promise, and in the institution of sacrifices. It is enforced by the uniform, concurrent testimony of types, prophecies, opinions, customs, and traditions of the Jewish Church. It is the peculiar foundation and principal doctrine of the Christian Church in all ages, which has never deviated from the opinion that the death of Christ on the cross was the full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice, oblation, and satisfaction for the sins of the whole world."

CHAPTER XX.

Examination of the Greek prepositions ἀντί and ὑπέρ in passages concerning the sufferings and death of Christ for the salvation of human sinners; and the teaching of Scripture that these were necessary to their salvation.*

§ 246. THE PREPOSITION ἀντί.

In its primary, local sense, this preposition means, *before, in front of, over against;* figuratively, *barter, exchange,* in which one thing is given *for, instead of,* another, and so takes its place (eye *for, instead of,* eye, tooth *for, instead of,* tooth, Mat. 5:38). In the Septuagint translation of the Old Testament, it is often used in this strictly-substitutional sense, of which use the following passages are specimens. "God hath appointed me another seed *instead of* Abel" (Gen. 4:25). "Joseph gave them bread *in exchange for* horses and flocks and cattle" (Gen. 47:17). "Wherefore have ye rewarded evil *for, instead of,* good?" (Gen. 44:4). "Aaron died, and Eleazer his son ministered in the priest's office *in his stead*" (Deut. 10:6). "And Abraham went and took the ram, and offered him up for a burnt-offering *in the stead of* his son" (Gen. 22:13). "And the king was much moved, and went up to the chamber over the gate, and wept: and as he went thus he said, O my son Absalom! my son, my son Absalom! would God I had died *for, instead of* thee, O Absalom, my son, my son!" (II. Sam. 18:33). Both the last passages are striking instances of the substitutionary meaning of this preposition. In the New Testament, the following are examples of its use: "Archelaus reigned in Judea *in the room* of his father Herod" (Mat. 2:22). "Eye *for, instead of,* an eye," etc. (Mat. 5:38). "If he ask a fish, will he *for, instead of,* a fish give him a serpent?" (Luke 11:11). See also Rom. 12:17; Mat. 20:28 in connection with Is. 53:12; Mark 10:45 in the same connection; I. Tim. 2:6, referring to both

(*) When these or other Greek prepositions stand alone, they will commonly be printed in English letters, except in captions.

Is. 53:12 and to Christ's words. In Mat. 20:28 and Mark 10:45, the substitutionary meaning of the preposition is strengthened by the word λυτρον, *ransom* before it, which itself means substitution, the ransom-price *for* their forfeited souls. Lange says that λυτρον here equals *copher*, and refers to Ex. 30:12; Num. 35:31; Prov. 13:8. "This price of redemption he gave *anti*, and not merely *huper* in the wide sense, *i. e.*, instead of, in exchange of, or as a substitute" (Mat. 17:27; Heb. 12:16). Alford says the expression "is a plain declaration of the sacrificial and vicarious nature of the death of our Lord." On I. Tim. 2:6, Van Oosterzee, says in his Comm., *in loco*, Lange Series — "ἀντίλυτρον, somewhat stronger yet than the usual λυτρον (Mat. 20:28), since the idea of exchange, which lies in the substantive itself, gains special force from the preposition (Matthies). In connection with this noun, *huper* is not, in this place at least, simply to be understood *in commodum* (Huthur), but here the idea of substitution must be firmly held. The one ransom weighs more than all the souls in whose place it is reckoned, and here too the souls are spoken of as παντες, *all*." This is the undeniable import of this passage. In opposition to Dr. Washburn, his translator, who tries to set this import aside, quoting Coleridge, we maintain that the substitution of Christ was not and could not be *subjective*, what he calls, "Christ in us and we in him." In what conceivable sense could it be *this* for *all* or for *any* not already in Him, or for one at all? There is nothing vicarious or substitutional either for all or for those *united* to Christ, and no exchange about it. But the reality, denied by him, was Christ's subjecting Himself to God's justice against men *in their stead* to ransom them from it; and it was as purely *an objective fact* as giving a money-ransom for any number of persons to redeem them from captivity or death is. No subjective theory of this momentous reality has the least validity.

§ 247. THE PREPOSITION ὑπέρ.

This preposition before the genitive of ἁμαρτία is often in the New Testament substituted for περί, as in Heb. 9:7; 10:12, where reference is made to Lev. 16:3, 5, 6, 9, 11, 15, 27, prescribing the offerings to be made *for* (περί) sin by the High Priest once every year. It primarily means, *over, or above the place* where anything *is* or *moves*, yet not in immediate contact with it. In its secondary sense, when governing the genitive of objects affecting persons, it may signify either "for the benefit of," or "*in the stead of*," or both these together, as the nature of the case determines; so that, *of*

itself, it does not determine which. Liddell and Scott, in their Greek and English Lexicon, give under No. 5 of its meanings, when it governs the genitive, *for, i. e., instead of, in the name of,* ὑπέρ εαυτου, *in his stead*, Thuc. 1.141." Donegan says—"*for, i. e., in place of*," and makes the same reference. As Prof. Crawford says, in his Work on the Atonement, p. 22, numerous instances occur in the Greek Classics, in which the phrase, ἀποθνήσκειν ὑπέρ τινὸς, is used to signify "dying instead of a person;" and, in Note A of his Appendix, p. 493, he quotes passages from Raphelius* and from Valkenarius, which establish the position by a number of classical quotations, to which he adds seven others from the Alcestis of Euripides, showing the interchangeable use of *anti* and *huper* in an unquestionable case of substitution. In the New Testament, Paul, in his Epistle to Philemon respecting his servant Onesimus, says—"Whom I would have retained with myself, that, *in thy stead* (ὑπέρ σου), he might minister unto me in the bonds of the gospel" (verse 13). As Onesimus would not have ministered to Philemon, nor *for his benefit*, but to Paul *for his*, instead of Philemon, his master, *huper* plainly cannot here signify nor include the meaning, *for the benefit of*, but must exclusively mean, *instead of, as a substitute for* (*vice*). Winer, in his N. T. Gram., revised edition, p. 383, says—"In most cases, one who acts in behalf of another, takes his place (I. Tim. 2:6; II. Cor. 5:15); hence *huper* is sometimes nearly equivalent to *anti*, *instead*, *loco* (see especially Eurip., Alcestis, 700), Philem. 13; Thuc. 1,141; Polyb. 3, 67, 7)." We say that in Philem. 13 it is *entirely* equivalent to *anti*. Respecting II. Cor. 5:30, in which ὑπέρ χριστου occurs twice, Winer says—"propably *huper* means both times *for* Christ, *i. e.*, in his name and behalf (consequently, *in his stead*);" to which he adds several references to classical authors. As an ambassador acts in the place of his sovereign, so Paul declares himself acting as Christ's ambassador in His stead, so that substitution is necessarily involved in the declaration. In verses 14, 15, he says—"For the love of Christ constraineth us; because we thus judge, that one died for all (ὑπερ παντων), therefore all died; and he died for all (*huper*) that they which live should no longer live unto themselves, but unto him who died and rose again *for* them." He judged that Christ's dying *for all* (ὑπέρ παντων) was virtually the same as their own dying under the penalty for their sins would be—that is, was *representatively vicarious*. Plainly *huper* has essentially the sense of *anti*, *instead of*. One died *instead of* all dying penally. As He was the

(*) Magee, Vol. I., p. 185, quotes the same.

supernatural head and representative of the race, His dying for all was as if they all penally died in and with Him; and, as He rose and lives again in the same relation to them, they all rose with Him to a new gracious probation, and all of them who receive Him actually rose and live in and with Him spiritually. In Rom. 5:6–8, *huper* occurs four times with precisely the same meaning; and while "*for the benefit of*" is certainly in that meaning, "*in the stead of*" is just as certainly in it. Verse 6 asserts that "Christ died *for* (*huper*) the ungodly." To show the extraordinary character of God's love for mankind as sinners and enemies, evinced by Christ's dying for them though such, the Apostle, in verse 7, supposes two cases, in which one man might be willing to die for another from love for him, in their general relations. One is the case of a man strictly *just* towards others. *For* (*huper*) such a man, he says "scarcely would any one die." The other is the case of a man having the known character of a kind, generous, beneficent man towards all. *For* (*huper*) such a man "some one might even dare to die," and would thus evince the highest love for him. But the love manifested by God towards mankind incomparably surpasses even this, because, while they were sinners and enemies against Him, Christ died *for* (*huper*) them. Even in the case of the *just* man, there would be something in his character to inspire love for him; much more in that of the *good* man; but, in that of our race, there was nothing in their *character* to inspire it, but exactly the opposite to the highest degree. Yet God so loved them *as beings*, that His beloved Son even died *for* (*huper*) them, that they might not penally die. That is, He died *in their stead for their supreme benefit.* Thus, in all these four instances, *huper* includes *anti* in its meaning. As, in the supposed cases of the *just* and of the *good* man, the substitution would be for the beneficial end of saving them from bodily death; so in the case of mankind, sinners and enemies against God, the substitution was for the beneficial end of saving them from the penal death demanded by the law; and the meaning, "in the stead of," can no more be excluded from the preposition in all these cases than can that "for the benefit of." * This preposition has this same two-fold meaning in Gal. 3:13—"Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse *for* (ὑπέρ παντων) us: for it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree." The curse of the penal demand of the law was upon all; He took it on Himself and bore it instead of all, and thus redeemed all *provisionally*, and all

(*) Tholuck on Romans *in loco*. Also, Olshausen and Lange.

believers *actually*, from it. The benefit proceeds wholly from the substitution, so that they are essentially implicated in each other, and equally signified by this preposition. The word redeemed itself has really the same duplicate meaning. So, in John 11:50–52, this preposition has the same two-fold import of *benefit by substitution* each of the three times of its occurrence. It has it when Caiphas says to the Sanhedrim—"Nor do ye take account that is expedient for you that one man should die *for* (*huper*) the people, and that the whole nation perish not"—that He should die *in its stead*, to do it *the benefit of* saving it from perishing. Says Lange in his Comm. *in loco*—"The *huper*, *in commodum*, *for the benefit of*, becomes also *anti*, *instead of*, in consequence of the concluding clause—"and that the whole nation perish not." As the Apostle uses it twice in his remarks, in verses 51, 52, it plainly has exactly the same duplicate meaning of *benefit by substitution*. It has the same in John 10:11—"I am the good shepherd: the good shepherd layeth down his life *for* (*huper*) the sheep"—also in verse 15—"I lay down my life *for* (*huper*) the sheep." As his laying down his life for them could be for their benefit in no other way than by saving their lives, the preposition, in both places, can only mean *for their benefit by substitution*. Lange, *in loco*, says—"The *huper* is here synonymous with *anti*. The shepherd dies that the flock may be saved"—*i. e.*, from dying. But *huper* embraces the sense of benefit to the flock by substitution more distinctly than *anti* could. In John 13:37, 38, *huper* has the same two-fold import in each of the verses; and also in 15:13. Also, in I. John 3:16 twice. See, also, John 6:51; Rom. 16:4; I. Tim. 2:6; I. Cor. 5:7; 15:29; Gal. 2:20; Eph. 5:2, 25.

§ 248. ὑπέρ ALWAYS HAS THIS DUPLICATE MEANING WHEN USED IN STATING THAT ONE DIES TO SAVE OTHERS FROM DYING.

In view of all thus shown, it is certain that those interpreters are in error who deny that *huper* ever has the meaning of *anti* in the New Testament, and maintain that, when used to express the relation of Christ's death to mankind, it always and only means, *in commodum*, *in behalf of*, *for the benefit of*. It has neither of these meanings alone in any of the passages examined above, but has them both together in all of them, except Philem. 13, where it exclusively means *anti*, *in the stead of;* and we maintain that, *whenever used to express the relation of Christ's death to mankind, it invariably signifies both substitution and for the benefit of, or for the benefit of by substitution.* This is confirmed by several considerations. One is, that, in all the

instances cited from the Greek classics, *sixteen in all,* by Raphelius and Valkenarius, and by Prof. Crawford, it has this twofold meaning. It has it in all the passages from Zenophon cited by Raphelius; it has it in the one instance from Hyginus, in the two from the argument of the drama of Euripides, and in the one from Plato cited by Valkenarius; and it has it in the seven from the Alcestis cited by Prof. Crawford. Says Valkenarius—"It should be known and well observed, that ἀποθανειν ὑπέρ τινος signifies, not only in the New Testament, but also in profane writers, *to die in the place of another, mori loco alterius.* so that Christ certainly not only died *for our advantage* (*in commodum nostrum*), but did not refuse to undergo death *in our place* (*nostrum loco*), which we had merited." He says again—"The phrase, ἀποθανειν ὑπέρ τινος, or τινος ὑπέρ ἀποθανειν, not in the New Testament only, but also among Greek writers, signifies not only *to die for the benefit of another* (*in commodum alterius mori*), but also *in the place of another* (*loco alterius*), so as thus to undergo a *vicarious death* (*vicariam mortem*)." * Another consideration is, that, as Tischendorf says—"There is something in the preposition itself which makes it more suitable than the other (*anti*) for describing the death which Christ encountered for us; for no one denies that the chief thing to be considered in this matter is, *that Christ died for the advantage of men;* and this indeed was so done by His dying in the room of men. Now, for the conjoint sense, both of advantage and of substitution, *huper* is admirably used by the Apostle. Winer, with his usual accuracy, holds that it is improper, in important passages where the death of Christ is discussed, to take *huper* as simply or exactly, equivalent to *anti;* for undeniably it corresponds to the Latin *pro* and to the German für. But as often as Paul teaches that Christ died *for us*, he did not wish, according to my judgment, that from the notion of *substitution* that of *advantage* should be disjoined; nor did he ever wish that from the latter, although it may be exceedingly obvious, the former should in this form of expression be excluded."† We add also the following from a posthumous Work of Dr. F. C. Baur—"As the death of Christ in relation to God is an act of satisfaction, so in relation to man it is substitutional. That Christ died ὑπέρ ημων, *for us*, is the expression most commonly used by Paul to indicate the significance of His death for men. From the preposition *huper* by itself, the notion of *substitution* cannot be inferred; but just as little can this notion be

(*) Crawford's Atonement, Appendix pp. 493-495.

(†) Doctrina Pauli de vi mortis Christi satisfactoria.

excluded from it. The two notions, that which was done for men, and that which was done in their stead, pass over into each other." He says—"II. Cor. 5:15 contains most distinctly the notion of *substitution*" among five other passages referred to, and adds—"The Apostle draws from the proposition, *εἰς ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀπέθανεν* (*one died for all*), the immediate inference, *ἄρα οἱ πάντες ἀπέθανον* (*then all died*). Christ not merely died *for them*, but also *in their stead*, as the one in place of the many—who even because He died for them and in their stead, did not actually die, but are only regarded as dead in Him, their substitute. What happened to Christ happened objectively to all." He then unfolds the idea of the passage.* Another consideration is found in all the other proofs that Christ's death was substitutional, along with the fact that *huper* does, in the passages considered, certainly mean *substitution for benefit;* for, if the vicarious character of Christ's death is clearly and manifoldly taught in other forms of language, as well as by the use of this preposition so many times over, it is the only warranted inference, that it has this duplicate meaning whenever used to signify the relation of Christ's death to mankind as sinners. While there is no ground in or out of this preposition for the position that the benefit to men is or could be without substitution, there is, as we have shown, both in its use and out of it, positive proof that it is by, and could not be without it; and this *huper* invariably expresses when it signifies the relation of Christ's death to mankind. Denial of substitution therefore finds no support, but positive refutation, from this preposition.

§ 249. NECESSITY FOR THE SUBSTITUTIONAL SUFFERINGS AND DEATH OF CHRIST.

It is either asserted or implied in all Scripture concerning the matter, that there was an absolute *necessity* created by the sin of mankind, that, if they or any of them were to be saved, Christ must make an atonement to God for them by suffering and dying for them as He did. This necessity, thus created, is a moral one, arising from the law in all moral beings which constitutes them all, God included, into a universal and eternal moral society and system, as we believe the First Part of this Work demonstrates; and as God is in and eternal Ruler of this society and system, the whole force of this necessity was exerted upon and held Him in its unyielding, holy grasp. Penally perish all human sinners *must*, or Christ *must* come

(*) Crawford, pp. 21-26. Appendix, pp. 495, 496.

and make an atonement for them, as He did. Moral necessity compelled to one or the other alternative, and barred Him away from any other option.

This necessity is implied in all passages like the following:—"Who was delivered up for our trespasses" (Rom. 4:25). "God, sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and *as an offering* for sin, condemned sin in the flesh" (Rom. 8:3). "I delivered unto you first of all, that which I also received, that Christ died *for* our sins according to the Scriptures" (I. Cor. 15:3). "Who gave himself for our sins, that he might deliver us out of this present evil world" (Gal. 1:4). "But he, when he had offered one sacrifice for sins forever, sat down on the right hand of God" (Heb. 10:12). "Because Christ also suffered for sins once, the righteous for the unrighteous, that he might bring us to God" (I. Pet. 3:18). "He was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities" (Is. 53:5). "For the transgressions of my people was he stricken" (Is. 53:8). These and all other such passages, whatever peculiarities of meaning may distinguish them, all agree in implying and assuming that the reason why our Lord was delivered up by the Father and gave Himself up to His sufferings and death was that there was an *absolute necessity* created by the sin of mankind, that He should undergo them, in order that all or any might be saved. Their sin raised a barrier between them and God's favor, immovable and impassable by them, and only removable even by God by the sufferings and death of Christ *in their stead.* These were not to render God merciful towards men, but were *from His infinite mercy towards them,* that He might by them provisionally remove that barrier and righteously exercise that mercy to the utmost degree of wisdom. His adoption of this substitution demonstrates—(1) that the demands of justice in all moral reason against sinners could not be set aside by His mere will, but must be met and satisfied by an adequate substitution as a basis for His forgiving them;—and (2) that He could devise no other such substitution than, or at least inferior to, that of the sufferings and death of His incarnate Son. As He does nothing unnecessary to its end, it is certain that He would not have devised this one, if any inferior one would have served the purpose. We do not believe He could have devised a greater one, nor consequently any other to serve the purpose; and we therefore hold it for perverted reverence, when men say it is presumptuous to suppose or maintain that God could not as well have saved men in some other way, or even without any such means,

if He had willed to do so. In saying thus, they assume the false principle, that it was a mere matter of will with God whether to save men by this measure, by some different one, or without any at all, which implies that He is not really a moral Being, having the same social-moral law in Him, which is in all moral natures created by Him, with all its obligations of justice and subordinately of mercy eternally binding on His infinite conscience and morally ruling Him to absolute righteousness in all His courses, measures, and actions towards them; that, therefore, He is not in the universal and eternal moral society and system, and ruling that society according to that system as rooted in His own eternal nature, but is free from all its demands of justice, both as ethical towards all loyally in that society and as retributive against all violators of that system; and consequently that it is absurd to say that He is morally just or unjust, righteous or unrighteous, morally benevolent, morally wise, morally good, morally merciful, or that He can act morally at all, or can have any real moral character. No; the absolute certainty is, that He is a Moral Being in and over the universal moral society created by Him, having the same law in Him which is in all in it, ruling it in perfect accordance with that law and the system it constitutes, which is one of perfect justice and therefore of perfect moral love; and that, in devising and adopting all His courses and measures related to that law and universal system, as that of the atonement pre-eminently is, He *wills and acts* in strict compliance with the requirements of that law and system as His infinite wisdom sees and guides for the best possible achievement of their obligations and ends. He never *wills arbitrarily or capriciously*, but always just as the mandates of the eternal law in Him require, executing them according to the best methods of His infallible wisdom. Now, considering that the measure of the atonement involved such infinite self-denial and self-sacrifice of both the Father and Son, we think the presumption entirely belongs to those who say as we have stated. We think this the more, because the Scriptures, when speaking of this measure, constantly assert or clearly imply what is manifest from the nature of the case, that God, in order to save men, was under a necessity to do it just as He did. To us they clearly assume that this was the only way His infinite wisdom could devise to meet and remove the greatest moral difficulty in the universe or the ages. If men would only discard the foolish notion, that, because God is omnipotent, He can do anything in the realm of mind, as He does in that of matter, and would consider how, in the Scriptures, He is

set forth as having acted in all pertaining to this measure according to counsel and wisdom, devising and adapting means and courses to secure His benevolent and just ends, how would His *moral* attributes, not His omnipotence, and all His procedures in this measure burst forth on their eyes with an ineffable splendor! How would all antagonizing reasonings, speculatings, assumptions, and objections vanish like morning mists shot through with the radiant arrows of the sun! We know of scarcely an objection to the fact of the substitutional death of Christ which does not, at bottom, imply the assumption, that the whole fact of God's planning and executing the redemptive measure was merely a matter of His will in the sense we are opposing, instead of one according to the law in His eternal nature.

§ 250. PASSAGES TEACHING A NECESSITY FOR THESE FOR THE FORGIVENESS OF SINS.

The first of these passages is John 3:14–17. Our Lord declared to Nicodemus the necessity of regeneration; and he was incredulous. He therefore told him that He spoke what He knew and testified what He had seen; and he asked him—"If I told you earthly things, and ye believe not, how shall ye believe if I tell you heavenly things?" Then in an obscure way, He indicated His own Divine nature and consequent knowledge of what He affirmed, and proceeded to declare to him the heavenly things in verses 14–16: "And as Moses lifted up," etc. These words epitomize the whole Gospel, and the substance of our Lord's knowledge and sight of the heavenly or Divine things to which He had referred. Of these things He gives a brief outline in these verses—(1) That mankind are in a ruined condition, and must all perish forever, unless rescued in time—(2) That they cannot retrieve themselves, and God only could do it—(3) That He could do it no otherwise than by the infinite self-denial, self-sacrifice, humiliation and suffering of His Son, indicated by His being "lifted up" and "given"—(4) That He *so greatly loved* them as *moral natures*, that He yielded to the necessity created by their sin, and, in order to provide for a basis for their salvation, "gave His only begotten Son"—*i. e.*, to be lifted up and to die on the cross for them (John 8:28; 12:32)—(5) That this gift, of itself, saves none of them from perishing, but, by provisionally removing the demands of punitive justice against all, opens the way for their salvation, so that whosoever of them believes on Christ shall not perish, but have eternal life." The demand of God's justice

against sinners was not a thing of His will at all, but of His nature, and put Him under an absolute moral necessity to meet it, either by subjecting them to its everlasting execution, or His only-begotten Son to meet it equivalently in their stead. Moved by the infinitude of His pity and merciful love for them, He adopted the latter alternative, despite all the measureless cost it involved to both Him and His Son, that they might escape perishing and have eternal life by believing on the Son. If there were no such sacred demand of justice against them, how could either His love for them, manifested in this infinite substitution, be *so* great, *so* boundless, or we possibly justify the Father in making it? Look at the case. The question is, how can we justify the Father's treatment of His only-begotten and absolutely obedient, righteous, perfect Son,* if He was not, in their Divine arrangement, the substitute of "the world" of man? Christ declared His course and conduct were in obedience to His Father's will and command, fulfilling the work He gave Him to do;† and His sufferings and death were undergone in this obedience.‡ It is distinctly taught that He was subjected to them by the determined design and will of the Father; and that He was sent by Him and came into the world purposely to undergo them.‖

§ 251. NO MARTYR EVER DIVINELY TREATED AS HE WAS.

As far as the part acted by men was concerned Christ was a martyr, but not as far as that acted by the Father was concerned. He never so treated any human martyr. However martyrs have been outraged by men, they were once sinners and enemies against God, and therefore, as far as their relations to Him were concerned, they deserved to be left to their endurances. Yet He never forsook them, but was ever present with them in all their bitter ordeals, supporting, cheering and blessing them—often sending His angels to visit and minister to them. How radically different His course towards Christ, so related to Him in nature, so absolutely perfect in character, so deserving all that His omnipotence could do for His protection against all attempts of devils and men to injure Him! How does it distinguish His case from that of all martyrs? In their case, we can clearly see that God is just in permitting men to

(*) Is. 53:9; Luke 23:41; John 8:46; Acts 3:14; II. Cor. 5:21; Heb. 4:15; 7:26, 27; I. Pet. 2:22, 23; 3:18; I. John 2:1; 3:5.

(†) John 4:34; 5:30; 6:38; 9:4; 17:4.

(‡) Mat. 26:39, 42; John 10:18; 12:27; Rom. 5:19; Phil. 2:8; Heb. 5:8; 12:2.

(‖) Luke 22:22; Acts 2:23; 4:28; Rom. 8:32; Mat. 26:37-44.

inflict sufferings and death upon them; but, in His, if we consider Him simply as a subject of moral government, we can see no justice whatever in God's even permitting His enemies to make Him a martyr. If God fails to preserve even a mere creature of stainless obedience, much more one so related to Him in nature, and of such absolutely perfect character as Christ was, from utter wrong and outrage, how is it possible to vindicate Him as just? Why then did He permit men and devils to work their direst will upon Him, and to drive Him out of the world on a cross? Why, beyond this, did *He* treat Him as He did, not sparing, but delivering Him up to all the outrages He suffered, refusing to hear His thrice-repeated, agonizing prayer that the cup of His coming sufferings might be taken from Him, and forsaking Him in the extremity of them on the cross? Was the Father just in all this treatment of Him? These questions must be answered in the court of eternal justice, and can be answered nowhere else? The Son most certainly had a perfect right *to give Himself up* to all He endured either as a martyr or as a substitute for men, if He saw that He could thus accomplish a good for them which would outweigh the evil to Himself. To deny this would be to deny that He had a right to be perfectly benevolent, and to practice the self-sacrifice necessary to its exercise. But, if He was merely a martyr, outraged and crucified by men, by what principle of justice ever recognized on earth, had the Father a right to treat Him as He did, or not to interpose and rescue Him? We reverently, but solemnly deny that He could have any such right, and therefore that Christ could have been designed by Him to be, or was, merely a martyr, or anything else than a substitute in His sufferings and death for mankind, as He had a perfect right freely to choose to be, while the Father had an equally perfect right both to *agree* with the Son to act the part He did towards Him, and to act it for the same infinitely benevolent end with all the self-denial and self-sacrifice it would cost Him. As Christ could have been such a substitute only by an absolutely free agreement between the Father and Him, that each should act His own precise part throughout, the execution of their parts demonstrates a greatness of merciful love for man as vast as their infinite nature, and immeasurably surpassing all creaturely comprehension. Those who deny the substitution may labor to the world's end to vindicate the Father's course towards the Son, *as revealed*, without ever succeeding; for it can be done on no other ground; and they certainly should either do it, or forever abandon the denial as impliedly charg-

ing Him with the greatest wrong towards Christ ever acted in the universe; and they only make the matter worse, if they deny the Scriptures concerning it. They must also necessarily dwarf their own conception of the love of both the Father and the Son, while those who intelligently believe the fact of the substitution must conceive of that love as immeasurably great and amazing. No puny, so-called moral theory, which, in its very nature, is a denial of God's justice and morality, can ever explain and vindicate His revealed treatment of His Son, or exhibit more than a mere shadow of the love of both for man. Those who make Christ's obedience to His Father in undergoing His sufferings and death the atonement, can never escape this argument. His obedience was in no sense an atonement according to any teaching of Scripture. It was simply in order to His making one. It was consummated in His submitting to suffer and die; that *His sufferings and death*, as a substitution for those deserved by human sinners, might *expiate* their *sins* and propitiate God to them, and so might open the way for the full egress of mercy and grace to them by satisfying provisionally the demands of justice in Him against them. Christ's obedience did none of these things. If it did, why need He suffer and die besides? and how was the Father just in subjecting Him to His sufferings and death. How could His obedience be for our *sins*, or meet any demands or ends of justice against men for them? Every so-called moral view is intrinsically absurd, as well as against Scripture.

§ 252. OTHER PASSAGES IMPLYING NECESSITY FOR THE SUBSTITUTION OF CHRIST.

The passage in I. John 4:9, 10, which is plainly a living echo of the words of Christ just considered, fully confirms what we have said concerning them. "In this was manifested the love of God towards us, that God sent his only-begotten Son into the world, that we might live through him. Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son as a propitiation for our sins." God sent Him into the world to be a propitiation for our sins by expiating them, only because it was necessary that He should do this, that we might live. We have shown that propitiation and expiation are essentially identical, the latter being a sacrificial satisfaction made to God for the sins of men, by which they are conditionally freed from the necessity of suffering their penalty, and the former being its effect on the mind of God as rendering, or permitting Him to be not merciful, but propitious to them. By thus meeting the

demand of justice against them, it gives full outflow to His previously existing mercy towards them. According to Scripture, there is no propitiation of God, no expiation of sin against Him, except by sacrifice, by the shedding of sacrificial blood; and, in the nature of the case, the sacrifice made is always substitutional, the life of the victim instead of the life of him for whom it is offered; so that, when Braune, in his Comm. on I. John, Lange series, says, in commenting on 2:2—"neither substitution is mentioned here, nor the manner and means how this propitiation is accomplished and brought about," he only says what is true of the expression, not of what it necessarily assumes and implies. The expression is a sacrificial one, derived, as every such one is, from the Septuagint Greek version of the Levitical Law; and by it, John could mean nothing else than that Christ is the propitiation for our sins by being an expiatory sacrifice for them; and neither Braune's statement that "He is Himself the propitiation," nor Düsterdieck's, quoted by him, that "it is really existing in his Person," has any proper meaning, or is true. It was accomplished by His *special act* of offering Himself once for all, by His one obedient, righteous act of sacrificing Himself on the cross for the expiation of the sins of the whole world.

We have the same expression, with the same meaning, in Chap. 2:2 of this Epistle—"And he is the propitiation (ἱλασμὸς) *for* our sins; and not for ours only, but also *for* the sins of the whole world." In what other possible sense, than that of being an expiatory sacrifice for them, could He be a propitiation, that is, of God towards man, for the sins of the whole world? Except believers of the successive generations, they are all sinners and enemies against God, and far the greatest part of them continue such through life—not only all the heathen, but even in Christendom. On all such "the wrath of God abideth" (John 3:35). It "is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold back the truth in unrighteousness" (Rom. 1:18). "But after thy hardness and impenitent heart treasurest up for thyself wrath against the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God; who will render to every man according to his deeds: To those who by patience in well-doing seek for glory and honor and incorruption, eternal life: But to those who are contentious and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation, and wrath, tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that doeth evil, of the Jew first, and also of the Gentile" (Rom. 2:5–9). These and numerous other passages show that the wrath or justice of God

against persistent sinners is not *actually* set aside by the propitiation of Christ, and that it is only *provisionally* for them. How then is or can He be the propitiation for their sins, except in the sense stated? What else can the expression mean, except this?

§ 253. Ἱλάσκομαι AND WORDS FROM IT IN THE NEW TESTAMENT FROM THE SEPTUAGINT VERSION OF THE LEVITICAL LAW.

In Heb. 2:17, the verb ἱλάσκεσθαι has the same sacrificial import—"to make expiation for the sins of the people." It does not express doing something to render God *merciful or gracious* towards men, but something by which the penalty they deserve, and which God's wrath or justice demands, may be set aside, so that He can consistently act as such towards them, which led Him to make the expiation, towards them. The propitiation was made by Christ, as a merciful and faithful High Priest, not to man, but to God; and the expression —"to make expiation *for* the sins of the people" is only slightly varied from many others in that version of the Levitical Law and other parts of the Old Testament. It is designed to show that Christ made it, as High Priest, by offering Himself as an expiatory sacrifice for mankind, as the offerings prescribed in that typical law were made by its priests to expiate the sins of the people under it. In Rom. 3:24, 25, is the following—"Being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus: Whom God has set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood for a manifestation of his righteousness, on account of the passing over of sins previously committed in the forbearance of God." The word here rendered *propitiation* is ἱλαστήριον, a neuter noun from the adjective ἱλαστήριος, *propitiatory, expiatory*, from the verb ἱλάσκομαι *to appease, to propitiate, to expiate*. This neuter noun may mean the same as ἱλασμός, *expiation, propitiation*, or an *expiatory sacrifice* (θῦμα, a *victim, offering*, being understood), or *mercy-seat* (capporeth). The cover of the ark in the Holy of holies was so called in the Septuagint version 26 times, as in Ex. 25:18, 19, 20, 21, etc.; and it is so called in Heb. 9:5, the only time, except in this verse, in which the word is used in the New Testament. As to its precise meaning here, critics differ, and their various views are presented by Lange in his Comm. on Romans, *in loco*, of which he adopts the meaning *mercy-seat* as sprinkled with the blood of expiation. He says—"It (in this sense) unites as symbol the different elements of the atonement." As the word "redemption" and the clause "in his blood" are both connected with this one, it evidently includes the meaning of pro-

pitiatory sacrifice, if it is not confined to it exclusively, as we think it is, so that it differs little whether this or mercy-seat in Lange's sense is adopted. The blood of Christ did not atone by its mere matter, but by containing His life or soul which was offered to God as an expiatory sacrifice for the sins of the whole world (Lev. 17:11); and it was the price of the redemption (ἀπολύτρωσις), which is in Christ Jesus. He was both priest and sacrifice, and offered Himself to God for men in His crucifixion (Heb. 9:14, 28; 7:27; Eph. 5:2). The Father did not offer Him, for this he did Himself; but He *set Him forth publicly* in His crucifixion as an expiatory sacrifice for the sins of mankind who had lived before He suffered, as well as who should live afterwards to the end of time; and He did this for a manifestation of His *righteousness* both in executing His justice, and so maintaining His law in the expiatory sacrifice made by Christ, and in exercising His mercy and grace towards all who believe in Christ on the basis of that sacrifice; in order "that He might be just and the justifier of him who is of the faith of Jesus"—*i. e.*, that he might plainly appear and be recognized by men in this twofold aspect of the Just One and the Justifier of sinners who believe. This end of God's design in the manifestation shows clearly the true expiatory meaning of ἱλαστήριον. Thus all these passages (I. John 1:2; 4:9, 10; Heb. 2:17; and Rom. 3:24), in which the verb ἱλασκομαι and the nouns from it are used, evince that Christ's death was an expiatory sacrifice for the sins of men, and He thus strictly a substitute in His sufferings and death for sinners exposed to the penalty of their sins; and of course that this substitution was absolutely necessary in order to their salvation.

Says Dwight—"In the Greek of the Septuagint, כָּפַר is rendered by the verbs ἱλασκομαι and ἐξιλασκομαι, both meaning, *to make atonement, to propitiate*, in 81 instances; and by their derivative nouns in 39 more;* and by the words Λυτρον † and εισφορα, both

(*) Εξιλασκομαι, *to make atonement*, occurs in 78 instances: Gen. 32:20; Ex. 30:10, 15, 16; 32:29; Lev. 1:4; 4:20, 26, 31, 35; 5:6, 13, 16, 18; 6:6, 30, 37; 8:15, 34; 9:7, 9; 10:17; 12:7, 8; 14:18, 19, 21, 29, 31, 53; 15:15, 29; 16:6, 10, 11, 16, 17, 17, 18, 20, 24, 27, 30, 32, 33, 33, 34; 17:11, 11; 19:22; 23:28; Num. 5:8; 6:11; 8: 13, 19, 21; 15:23, 26, 26; 16:46, 47; 25:13, 31, 50; 35:33; Deut. 21:8; I. Kings 3: 14; II. Kings 21:3; I. Chron. 7:49; II. Chron. 29:24; 30:19; Neh. 10:33; Prov. 16: 15; Ez. 16:62; 43:20, 26; 45:15, 17, 20; Dan. 9:24.—Εξίλασις, *atonement*, occurs in Num. 29:11—Εξίλαμα, *atonement*, in I. Kings 12:3; Ps. 48:7.—Εξιλασμος, *atonement*, in Ex. 30:10; Lev. 23:27, 28: 25:9; I. Chron. 28:11.—Ἱλασκομαι, *to make atonement*, occurs in *three* instances, Ps. 64:3; 77:42; 78:9.—Ἱλασμὸς, *atonement*, in Num. 5:8.—And Ἱλαστήριον, *mercy-seat* in the 25 instances already recited in a preceding note." Page 56 of his Select Discourses.

(†) Λυτρον occurs in Ex. 21:30; 30:12; Num. 35:31, 32; Prov. 6:35; 13:8. Note on same page as that above.

denoting *atonement, ransom,* and by αλλαγμα, *substitute,* in 10:—in all 130. These facts are sufficient to prove that these verbs and their derivatives ἱλασμὸς, ἐξιλασμὸς, etc., as *nouns,* are the appropriate words in the Greek for rendering the word *caphar, to make atonement,* from the Hebrew."* On pages 57–59, we think he clearly establishes the position that the noun ἱλαστήριον in Rom. 3:25 means not *mercy-seat,* but *propitiatory sacrifice* or *atonement.* In a footnote on page 58, he quotes from Magee, p. 166, Vol. I., who in a footnote there quotes from Michaelis (Marsh's translation) as follows:—"Josephus, having previously observed that the blood of the martyrs had made atonement for their countrymen, and that they were ὡσπερ ἀντιψυκον (victima substituta), τῆς τοῦ ἔθνους ἁμαρτίας, continues tinues as follows, literally translated—"And by the blood of these devout men, and the *atonement* (ἱλαστήριον) *of their death,* Divine Providence saved Israel." Dwight also says—"And when Chrysostom uses it as a propitiatory gift ('The Greeks sent a *propitiatory gift* to the Trojan Minerva'), we feel assured that Paul meant in this passage, Rom. 3:25, 'Whom God set forth to be *an atonement*—or a propitiatory sacrifice—*for the remission of sins.*' The Apostles, therefore, simply use the sacrificial language of the Septuagint version of the Old Testament, as antitypically fulfilled in the sacrifice and atonement of Christ, in the passages we have just been considering."

§ 254. PASSAGES—THAT WE HAVE REDEMPTION AND ARE BOUGHT BY, THROUGH, OR WITH THE BLOOD OF CHRIST AS OUR RANSOM-PRICE.

This is taught in the passage just considered (Rom. 3:24, 25). Verse 24 says—"being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus;" and verse 25 explains how the redemption is effected. Christ is "set forth publicly a propitiation through faith in his blood;" and this, "that God might Himself be just and the the justifier of him who has faith in Jesus." Eph. 1:7 says—"In whom we have our redemption through his blood." Col. 1:14 says—"In whom we have our redemption;" the clause, "through his blood," is unauthorized in this verse, but certainly implied. Heb. 9:15 says—"And for this reason he is the mediator of a new covenant, that, a death taking place for the redemption of the transgressions that were under the first covenant, those called to the eternal inheritance may receive the promise." In these four passages, the word rendered redemption is ἀπολύτρωσις, which liter-

(*) Select Discourses, pp. 56-59.

ally means the *deliverance* or *retrieval* of prisoners of war or others *from* (ἀπὸ) a state of bondage, danger, or misery by the payment of a *ransom* (λυτρον or ἀντίλυτρον) as an equivalent for them. When used to express the deliverance of men from their condition as sinners in bondage to sin and its involved penal consequence, the ransom which procures it is uniformly declared either expressly, or in language certainly implying it, to be the blood of Christ, which is His life or soul (Lev. 17:11). Λυτρωσις, *redemption*, the preposition ἀπὸ, *from*, being left off, is used in the same sense. Heb. 9:12. "Neither by the blood of goats and calves, but by his own blood, he entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption." The verb λυτρόω, formed from the noun λυτρον, a *ransom*, means *to release on receipt of a ransom, to hold to ransom*, but is not used in the active voice in the New Testament. In the middle voice, it means *to release by payment of a ransom, to ransom, to redeem;* and, in the passive, it means *to be ransomed, redeemed.* It is used in the middle voice in Titus 2:14—"Who gave himself *for* (*huper*, for our benefit by substitution), us (*i. e.*, on the cross), that he might redeem us from all unrighteousness, and purify unto himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works." Says Van Oosterzee, in his Commentary, *in loco*, Lange Series—"There is certainly a distinction between the original significations of *huper* and *anti;* but that here, at least, the idea of substitution cannot be set aside is evident from what immediately follows: that he might *redeem* us, etc. For when Christ gives himself a ransom (λυτρον), he gives his soul as a ransom *in the stead of those* who otherwise would not be redeemed from the enemy's power." He also justly says—"It is downright rationalistic arbitrariness to maintain (DeWette), that, in passages like these, what is spoken of is not atonement, but exclusively moral purification. Paul knows of no other purification than that which comes from faith in the atonement, and through the actual appropriation of it." In this interpretation, the ablest Commentators concur with him. Christ gave *Himself*, His *blood*, His *life*, His *soul* to the Father, not to Satan or any other power, to meet the demand of His wrath, or of justice in His infinite nature, in order that, by that price, He might *redeem* or *ransom* us from the penalty of our unrighteousness, and resultantly from all our unrighteousness itself, and so purify us unto Himself. The atonement is the gate through which all grace securing renewal and holiness comes. This verb is used in the passive sense in I. Pet. 1:18—"Forasmuch as ye know that ye were not redeemed with corruptible things, *as* silver and gold [paid by men

for the redemption of captives, etc.] from your vain manner of life, handed down from your fathers; but with the precious blood of Christ, as of a Lamb without blemish and without spot." This "comparison of the blood of Christ with silver and gold proves that the verb rendered *redeemed* must be taken in its original sense" (Fronmüller) of release by payment of a ransom. All our remarks on its meaning in the preceding verse apply to it here. The redemption of those addressed by Peter was by the payment of the ransom-price of the blood of Christ, the great antitypical Lamb of God, substituted for their own endurance of the penalty deserved by their sins; and their redemption from this resulted in that from their vain manner of life. The words rendered silver, gold, and blood, being in the Dative, express the *instrument* by which the redemption is effected (Winer's Gram. of N. T., p. 216). The Greek verb, εξαγοραζω, *to purchase out, to buy from*, is used in the same sense in Gal. 3:13. "Christ *redeemed* [bought us from] the curse of the law, having become a curse for us"—*i. e.*, for our benefit by substitution (*huper*). In I. Cor. 6:20, "For ye are *bought* with a price"—*i. e.*, from the curse and bondage of the law and the power of Satan for God, to be His, not your own. In 7:22, "Ye are *bought* with a price: become not ye the servants of men." In Rev. 5:9, "And they sing a new song, saying, Thou art worthy to take the scroll, and to open the seals of it: For thou wast slain, and *hast redeemed* (didst buy) us to God with thy blood out of every tribe, and tongue, and people, and nation." In Gal. 4:5, "That he might *redeem* them that were under the law"—*i. e.*, from its curse and bondage. Of course, this verb, as well as the preceding and its kindred nouns, is used figuratively in a moral sense. The purchasing or buying from, as well as the redeeming, is not strictly like the commutations or exchange transactions primarily signified by the word; but each of these words and the nouns, ransom and price, as used in these passages, express facts *so essentially analogous* to those, that, while there are differences between them as literal and as figurative, their essential meaning is entirely preserved, and they as really and fittingly express the moral as the literal. Sinners are condemned to suffer the penal curse of the law; they morally *owe* that suffering to God and His holy universe by the demand of eternal justice; they are with this indebtedness in bondage to the power of sin and Satan; they cannot, by any possibility, deliver themselves from this penal curse and debt to justice or from this bondage; and Christ, by assuming their place, suffering this curse and giving His own precious

blood which contained His life, His soul, as a ransom or price for them, redeemed them on condition of their faith, bought them for God from their whole evil condition as sinners, including even their bodies in the resurrection. In some of these passages, this price or ransom is stated; in others of them not, but necessarily implied, because whenever mentioned, it is this. The Greek verb περί ποίεομαι, middle voice, is used in essentially the same sense as the two preceding in Acts 20:28. "The church of God [or of the Lord] which He has *purchased* or *acquired for Himself* with His own blood." In many other places, the blood of Christ is specially indicated as the means of redemption, ransom, deliverance from all the evil of sin.* Says Moll on Heb. 9:11–15—"This ransom-price is the *blood* of Christ as of an entirely spotless lamb (I. Pet. 1:19; Eph. 1:7; Col. 1:14), and is here, as always in Scripture, designated as a price divinely offered; so that the idea of the ransom-price as paid to Satan (Origen, Basil, and others to St. Bernhard) is to be totally rejected." "In that we have been sold under sin (Rom. 7:14), we have become helpless victims of the *wrath*, or *avenging justice of God*. Against this we are, according to the Hebrew mode of expression, *covered* by the blood shed for us, which, as *sacrificial blood* has an expiatory significance. The redemption can thus, on the one hand, be conceived as the payment of a λυτρωσις, [*ransom*]; on the other, as a ἱλασμὸς, [*atonement, expiation*]. It is invariably effected by means of a *substitutionary satisfaction* and by a *perfectly valid expiation*. The efficacious element in the blood lies, not in its matter or substance, but in *the life which moves in it, and which, by means of a special act, not connected with the course of nature, has been yielded up to death*, Lev. 17:11. Since, then, the crucifixion of Christ falls not under the category of the slaughter of an innocent person, or of the murder, for the ends of justice, of a righteous man, but under that of the surrendering up of His own person at once freely and in accordance with the purpose of God (Tit. 2:14; I. Tim. 2:6), the significance, power, and efficacy of this death must correspond entirely with the *peculiar nature and dignity of the person of Jesus Christ*. He Himself, however, expressly indicates (Mat. 20:28), His death as *the substitutionary offering of the ransom-price*. On account of the nature of His person, consequently, the vicariousness must be complete, the satisfaction all-sufficient, the ransom actual and eternal." We have made these quotations from this fine expositor

(*) Rom. 5:9; Eph. 2:13; Col. 1:20; Heb. 9:14; 10:29; 13:12, 20; I. John 1:7; 5:6; Rev. 5:9; 7:14; 12:11.

on account of their eminent truth, clearness, and important discriminations respecting the Scriptural teachings on this fundamental subject.

§ 255. PASSAGES DECLARING THAT HE GAVE HIS LIFE FOR US.

All these passages teach the same doctrine of substitution. The way in which he gave Himself or His life was by voluntarily dying on the cross for us. Mat. 20:28, "Even as the Son of man came—to give his *life* a ransom for (*anti*) many." Mark 10:45, the same. John 6:51, "The bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for (*huper*) the life of the world. 10:11, "The good Shepherd giveth his life for the sheep." Verse 15, "I lay down my life for the sheep." 15:13, "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends." Gal. 1:4, "Who gave himself for our sins." 2:20. "The Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me.' Eph. 5:2, "And hath given himself for us an offering and a sacrifice to God for a sweet-smelling savour." Verse 25, "As Christ also loved the Church and gave himself for it." I. Tim. 2:6, "Who gave himself a ransom for all." Titus 2:14, "Who gave himself for us, that he might *redeem*," etc. The *life* of Christ in these passages means the same as his *blood* in those of the preceding paragraph, as, according to Lev. 17:11, the life, which includes the soul, is in the blood, which the word "*himself*" implies. Christ's giving *himself*, or His *life* or *soul* for the life of the world, or for the Church, us, or Paul, is plainly done by Him as the great antitypical High Priest, making "an offering and a sacrifice of Himself, or of His blood, life, or soul to God" "for our sins" (Gal. 1:4; Eph. 5:2), and thus a ransom (Mat. 20:28; Mark 10:45; I. Tim. 2:6; Titus 2:14); and in being thus a sacrifice and a ransom He was necessarily a substitute for (*anti, in the stead of*) many—*of the world provisionally, of the Church and each true member of it actually.* It is a gross contradiction of terms and sense to deny that a person, a victim, a life which is given as "a ransom *instead* of many"—"for all"—"that he might *redeem* us," etc.—"for the life of the world"—"for the sheep"—"for the Church," or "for us," or "for me"—"for friends or enemies"—"for our sins"—and as "an offering and a sacrifice to God," is a substitute from the nature and necessity of the case; or to say that it could possibly be so given, if not such. The conceptions and principal terms of these passages are plainly drawn from and based on those of the law and of prophecy respecting Christ, embodied in those of the law. For *ransom*, see Ex. 21:30; 30:12;

Num. 35:31, 32; Prov. 6:35; 13:8 (Septuagint); for giving or laying down His life, see Lev. 17:11; Is. 53:10, 12; for "giving Himself for our sins," and "an offering and a sacrifice to God for a sweet-smelling savour," see the Levitical law on sacrifices; for substitution, it is radically involved on all ransom and sacrifice *ex necessitate*.

§ 256. CHRIST, AS HIGH PRIEST, OFFERED HIMSELF TO GOD, A SACRIFICE FOR THE SINS OF MANKIND.

That Christ, as High Priest, offered Himself to God as an offering and a sacrifice for the sins of mankind is often asserted in the New Testament. Eph. 5:2, quoted above. Heb. 7:27, "Who needeth not daily, as those high priests, to offer up sacrifice, first for his own sins, and then for the people's: For this he did once for all, when he offered up himself." 9:14, "How much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without spot to God," etc.? 25, "And not that he may offer himself often, as the high priest entereth into the holy place every year with the blood of others: For then must he often have suffered since the foundation of the world: But now once in the end of the world [ages] hath he been manifested to put away sin by means of his sacrifice." 28, "So also Christ was once for all offered to bear the sins of many." 10:10, "In which will we have been sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all." 12, "But this one, after he had offered one sacrifice for sins, forever sat down on the right hand of God." 14, "For by one offering he hath perfected forever them that are sanctified." "He declared that His blood was shed for the remission of sins," Mat. 26:28. This language is simply that of the typical law applied to Him as its great fulfilling antitype. He, the Great High Priest, offered up *Himself* on the cross *to God* as a sacrifice for the sins of the people, thus bearing them *in their stead*, as the typical sacrifices bore the sins of those for whom they were offered, being their *substitute*, in suffering for them. There is nothing *figurative* in the language, as our examination of he teachings in the Epistle to the Hebrews concerning the priesthood and sacrifice of Christ, and their reality as typically prefigured and shadowed out in the priesthood and sacrifices of the ceremonial law clearly certified; and to attempt to get rid of the momentous reality by calling the inspired declarations of it *figurative* is nothing but the recklessness always engendered by the adoption of an antagonist theory, which can in no other way be even plausibly main-

tained. The passages are purely affirmative of fact and didactic; and, if their language is *merely* figurative, their writers either lacked common sense in asserting them, or intended to deceive and mislead their readers, as, according to this supposition, they most certainly have generally done. All canons of interpretation are struck down by such arbitrary substitutions of figures for literalities, and fancies for facts; and criticism is turned into the art of disinheriting the true meanings of the words and sentences of authors by supplanting them with false ones foisted into their place. In offering Himself as a sacrifice, He did what He came to do, what He was sent by the Father to do, what His Father willed and required Him to do, and acted in pure obedience (Heb. 10:5–10).

§ 257. PASSAGES CONCERNING THE SUFFERINGS AND DEATH OF CHRIST.

In immediate connection with these passages, we refer to those concerning His sufferings and death on the cross. That He fully knew that it was the chief part of His mission to suffer and die as He finally did according to the will of His Father is clearly manifest from Mat. 16:21; 17:12; Mark 8:31; 9:12; Luke 9:22; 17:25; 22:15; 24:26, 46; John 3:14; and that He did so in fulfillment of the types and prophecies of the Old Testament is declared by Peter in Acts 3:18; I. Pet. 1:11; and by Paul in Acts 26:22, 23; 17:3. As to the fact, purpose, and end of His sufferings, it is said in Heb. 2:9, 10, "But we see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the angels because of his suffering of death, crowned with glory and honor; that he by the grace of God might taste death for every man. For it became him, for whom, etc., in bringing many sons unto glory, to make the Captain of their salvation perfect, *i. e.*, as a Savior, through sufferings." In 5:8, 9, "Though he was a Son yet learned he obedience from the things which he suffered; And being made perfect, he became the author of eternal salvation unto all them that obey him." In 9:26, "For then must he often have suffered since the foundation of the world: but now once in the end of the ages hath he been manifested to put away sin by means of his sacrifice." In 13:12, "Wherefore Jesus also that he might sanctify the people with his own blood, suffered without the gate." In I. Pet. 2:21, it is said—"Because Christ also suffered *for* (*huper*) us." Chap. 3:18 says—"For Christ also hath once suffered *for* (*peri*), on account of, sins, a just person *for* (*huper*), the benefit of by substitution, (confirmed by προσαγειν following), unjust persons, that he might bring us to God, being put to death in the flesh," etc. Chap. 4:1 says—

"Forasmuch then as Christ hath suffered *for* (*huper*, for our benefit and 'in our stead,' Fronmüller) us in the flesh." Chap. 5:1 says—"I—a witness of the sufferings of Christ." Now, looking at these passages, we see that, in the first of them (Heb. 2:9, 10) the death which Christ "tasted for (*huper*) every man" was suffered by Him when "He gave Himself an offering and a sacrifice to God for us," and was therefore sacrificial and so substitutional." It became God, in bringing many sons unto glory, to make the Author of their salvation perfect through sufferings"—that is, to qualify Him perfectly by subjecting Him to His sufferings as a sacrifice for their sins, to be the Author of their salvation. See 5:8, 9. In Chap. 9:26, Christ's suffering once "to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself" is set in contrast with the repetitious suffering of the victims, with the blood of which the Aaronic high priests entered yearly into the Holy of holies. By the statement, His suffering is here made identical with His own sacrificial death. Let this be noted against Dr. Bushnell's assertion * that the Old Testament "makes nothing of the pain of the victim," "the pains of the animal." As if the Law did not require it to be *killed*, *slain*, *put to death*, and it could be subjected to this, and its blood, with its life or soul in it, could be poured out without pain, even death-agony! Did they chloroform the animals before killing them? As if, provided the blood and soul of the animal could have been somehow extracted from it without putting it to the agony of death, it would have served at all as atonement! It was by the inflicted *pain* of death, that its blood, soul, life was given to make atonement; and, when he says—"there is no vestige of retributive quality in the sacrifice"—"no compensation in the sacrifices. They are not satisfactions, nor any way linked with ideas of satisfaction—no man's lamb pays for his sin. They are never offered as a legal substitution," one is compelled to put on the brake hard, to keep from characterizing the bold assertions as they merit. If the animals were not sacrificed for the transgressors, as required, *must these* not suffer the declared penalty of their sins? If they were, were not the transgressors exempted from suffering it by forgiveness on the ground of these? What else, in the world, is this, but pure legal substitution? than legal compensation and satisfaction for their sins? than the lamb or other animal offered paying for the sin of him who bought it? If God, the Theocratic Ruler, would not forgive transgressors, except on the ground of these sacrifices being made for them, as He would not,

(*) Forgiveness and Law, p. 66, and p. 87.

and would forgive them on that ground, what sheer nonsense and folly it is to utter such denials! The "retributive quality" of course was not in the animal sacrificed, but in its being representatively substituted in its sufferings and death for the retributive sufferings incurred by the transgressor as declared in the Law. There was no such "quality" in the sacrifice of Christ, as it pertained wholly to the deserved sufferings of human sinners, for whom He representatively substituted Himself in it, of which the animal sacrifices were only "types and shadows," the real meaning of them *as such* never having entered the Doctor's mind. What could he understand by the inspired words—"without shedding of blood there is no remission." Bold denials and assertions are easily made, but cannot set aside truth and fact, nor hide want of knowledge of Scripture and of the valid mode of exegesis by which to find its real meaning.

§ 258. PASSAGES WHICH SPEAK OF CHRIST'S DYING AND DEATH FOR MANKIND.

We first adduce Rom. 5:8, which says—"But God commendeth his own love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us." We have already shown that in this, as twice in verse 7, *huper* must mean *for the benefit of by substitution.* Verse 9 confirms this by saying—"Much more then, being now justified by his blood [*i. e.*, His substitution], shall we be saved from the wrath *of God* through him." Rom. 14:15, "Destroy not with thy meat him *for* whom Christ died." I. Cor. 8:11, "The brother for (διά) whom Christ died." 15:3, "Christ died *for* our sins." II. Cor. 5:14, 15, "Christ died *for* all" is said twice, and "who died *for* them" once, *huper* in each case. I. Thess. 5:10, "Who died *for* us." Heb. 2:9, "The suffering of death," and that "he should taste death *for* every man" are said of Jesus; and it was "by the grace of God" towards men, that Jesus tasted death for each of them. 9:15, "He is the mediator of the new covenant, that by means of a death, for the redemption of the transgressions," etc. From all we have shown, it is manifest that, in all these places, Christ's *dying* and *death* must be understood in the *sacrificial* and *substitutional* sense. He, as the Great High Priest, offered Himself *to God in dying for men,* for their *sins,* to save them from the necessity of dying penally, that "we might be saved from the wrath of God," the demand of justice in God, "through Him"—that His dying was *for the benefit of men* by the substitution of Himself in it for them. His death, therefore, His blood, His offering Himself to God a sacrifice, His suffering for

us all have essentially the same meaning. All the passages which speak of His cross, the cross of Christ, and His being crucified for us signify essentially the same. For cross and cross of Christ, we refer to I. Cor. 1:17, 18; Gal. 6:14; Eph. 2:16; Phil. 2:8; Col. 1:20; 2:14; Heb. 12:2—for crucified, to I. Cor. 1:13, 23; 2:2; Gal. 3:1. In Gal. 3:13, it is said—"Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us: for it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree." The curse of the law is its penalty for sin, and Christ redeemed us from this by becoming a curse for us by His death on the cross, His hanging on the tree of the cross for us. In what possible sense, not nonsense, could His obedience be His becoming a curse, or redeem us from the curse of the law, or be hanging on the tree of the cross, or anything else than His expiatory death on it for our sins, as Deut. 21:22, 23 shows that one hanged on a tree was so hanged in punishment for his sins.

We thus close this lengthy Chapter on the teachings of the New Testament, additional to those of the Epistle to the Hebrews, on the substitutional purpose and end of the sufferings and death of our blessed Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. In the ensuing Chapter, we will first present three certain inferences from the showings in this and the three preceding Chapters respecting this momentous subject.

CHAPTER XXI.

Positions certified by the whole foregoing review of the Scriptural teachings concerning atonements, especially that of our Lord Jesus Christ for the sins of mankind.

§ 259. POSITION FIRST, THAT THE ATONEMENT OF CHRIST WAS MADE EXCLUSIVELY TO GOD.

It is made certain by the whole array of these teachings that the only immediate purpose and end of the sufferings and death of Christ were to make an atonement *to God* for the sins of mankind —to produce such an effect *in* Him, and so *in His relations*, as Ruler, to the universal and eternal society under Him, that He could justly suspend or waive the execution of the demand of His holy wrath or justice against them for their sins during this life of gracious probation, that whoever of them will fulfill the required conditions will be freely forgiven on the ground of it, and of it alone. This effect made it perfectly consistent for Him to *exercise* mercy and grace towards them in all ways accordant with His infinite wisdom and their freedom and mutual relations, to communicate to them His inspired Word, to send His Holy Spirit to exert His influences upon them, to institute the Church with its ministry, to administer His Providences, and by all these means and agencies to bring as many of them as possible to comply with His offered terms of salvation. Thus all that is embraced in what is called *the moral-influence theory* of the atonement, and much more, instead of being it, or any part of it, is wholly *in consequence of* its effect in God and on His relations to the universal society; while it was in no sense *to* men, nor directly to produce any effect whatever *in them*. As His holy wrath or justice was aroused against them by their sins with its sacred demand for their deserved punishment, and this demand must be met, or the whole moral system and society be everlastingly wrecked, to meet it and so to provide for their rescue

from it as far as possible He, moved by His mercy, devised the atonement of Christ, as a representative substitution for their deserved punishment, to be *to* Himself both as *expiation for their sins* and a *propitiation of Himself towards, or reconciliation to, them*, in the sense that He could consistently act towards them as stated above.

§ 260. POSITION SECOND, THAT, IN ITSELF, IT WAS NOT TO PRODUCE ANY EFFECT IN HUMAN SINNERS.

In and of itself, therefore, the atonement was not designed to produce any moral effect whatever in sinners—never has done it, never will do it, never can do it; and the so-called *moral view* of it is totally unscriptural and absurd. It was "an offering and a sacrifice to God" by our Lord for *the sins, the violations of the law by all men*, to produce *in* Him and *on* His relations as in and over the universal and eternal moral society the effect stated *for men*, and for nothing else. And, as it could be for *sins* in no other possible sense than for the punishment deserved by them, it could be for them in no other possible sense than that of a *substitute* for that punishment, which is only saying, that its end was simply to meet and satisfy the demand of justice in the law, as it is in the mind of God and His rational creatures against sinners. This is the only true moral view of it; but *it was the morality of the Godhead—of the Father, as universal moral Ruler, and of the Son, acting and suffering as the representative and substitute of our world of guilty, lost sinners. It was the all-surpassing moral action of Godhead in all the ages past and to come;* for He can never repeat it, since, even if there possibly should occur another such occasion, there could never be another incarnation, without which it never could be acted. All real morality consists in acting inwardly and outwardly as the eternal law requires —that in the heart being ever the same; that outward, though *from* that within, being ever according to varying relations and occasions. That within is real moral love of moral beings; and this love towards all of perfect obedience is perfect *ethical justice*, because their natural and moral rights to it are perfect, so that it is entirely their *due*. Towards those who have sinned under mitigating circumstances, it is modified to mercy, because they have forfeited their rights to it, so that it is only love of their nature and its possible good, or merely benevolence to them. Towards all who have sinned absolutely or without mitigating circumstances, it is reduced to a mere will or disposition to treat them *no worse* than they deserve in

inflicting upon them the punishment which justice, both as ethical towards God and the whole moral society, and, to the same measure, as retributive towards them, positively demands. As acted out, it is doing all possible for the highest good of all ever obedient in the universal and eternal society and system, and for the retrieval and salvation of human sinners. Neither they, nor any other creature or creatures, could possibly meet the demands of justice against them, either as ethical towards God and the whole society under Him, or as retributive towards them; and, unless these were met, they must all be punished as these demand. God only could meet them; and, as the only constraint upon Him to do it must have been His infinite pity, His mercy, and the obligation to exercise it, if the demands of justice permitted, the case was plainly this, that these alone constrained Him to make the stupendous intervention of the incarnation and atonement of Christ to render the exercise of mercy consistent with the two demands of justice which we have shown.

§ 261. WHEN GOD, UNDER THE CONSTRAINTS JUST STATED, PURPOSED THIS MEASURE.

They constrained Him to purpose it, not when Christ was sent to execute it, but when, "before the foundation of the world," He foresaw the fall of the first pair and of their race in them, if He should spare them. It was then that, although He perfectly foreknew the whole history of the dread catastrophe of the fall and its ruinous entail of consequential perversion and curse upon the race, yet, for the highest and peerlessly best universal and eternal ends of His whole creation, He determined to create the first pair and to continue their race. But, moved by infinite pity for them, as foreseen, and by an obligation of His own moral reason or conscience to do the best morally possible to rescue and save them, He, at the same time, determined to execute the whole measure of redemption for them, though involving such infinite cost of self-denial, self-sacrifice, humiliation, suffering, and sorrow to Himself. This, we believe, is essentially a true expression of what Scripture reveals on this supreme matter. *Of course, in this statement, God means the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, the Godhead; for nothing of it could be true, if God is unipersonal.* It was because "God so loved the world" foreseen, that He devised this measure, and that, when His predestined time came for executing it, "he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have eternal life." His way of executing it shows that no other was

possible, and that, as the atoning sufferings and death of Christ were a sacrifice offered by Him *to* God for the sins of the world, they were and could be for no other direct, immediate purpose than to be a provisory substitution for the retributive punishment deserved by their sins and demanded by the justice of the violated law. It is justice in the law, which is the one vast container that holds, the one great shield that guards, the one mighty bond that binds together the universally common, reciprocal interests, concerns, rights, and dues of all embraced in the whole eternal moral society and system, including God Himself, who is the Author and Ruler of all; and for Him not to maintain this absolutely unimpaired, or to disregard it in the slightest degree would be utterly *immoral*, a fundamental and eternal wrong or injustice to that whole society and Himself, and subversive of His just and benevolent character forever. On the other hand, because perfectly maintaining it is conforming to the eternal law, of which it is an intrinsic quality, doing this is absolute righteousness in Him, as it is maintaining the universal obligation to render perfect moral love to each other in perpetual interchange, which is pure ethical justice, by which alone the interests, concerns, rights, and dues of every one and all can be perfectly maintained. What, then, can God's execution of the measure of the atonement by the substitution of Christ in His sufferings and death to meet the demands of justice against all human sinners, both as ethical towards the whole everlasting moral society and as retributive towards them, be, but the peerless moral transaction of even God Himself?—especially when it is considered that it was done in behalf, not of friends, but of human sinners, all His enemies against all reason to the contrary, and with such infinite self-denial and self-sacrifice of both the Father and the Son? This is the only *moral view* of the atonement; and the so-called moral view of it is only a view of its *consequential* influence and effects on portions of successive generations of mankind substituted for it in all its unspeakable moral grandeur and glory. In rejecting this, it rejects the law itself, as having the quality of justice in it, and thus a social-moral character, by which alone the intelligent universe is bound together into one moral society and system, and turns it into a mere thing of the will of God, instead of being founded in His eternal moral reason or nature, and so implanted in the moral reason or nature of all created moral beings; and it thus robs it of any real principle or ground in moral nature. This view is therefore both immoral and anti-moral, a poor starveling mockery of the real, Scriptural one. The whole

case is thus manifest. The universal and eternal moral system, constituted by the law, immutable as God, and absolutely glorious with His glory, is in no sense set aside, superseded or impaired by the redemptive measure. It is not Christianity, nor strictly a part of it. Christianity is solely God's eternally devised best possible measure to redeem human sinners from the condemnation and curse of that system, incurred by their sin, and to restore them to harmony with it, and besides, to aggrandize and endow the restored with consummate good and glory in the endless future. Whoever, therefore, rejects it rejects the one only rescue and restorative possible, the one only *remedy* devised by God for the plague and curse of sin, and with it all the boundless love, mercy, and grace of God it demonstrates and displays; all grounds, either in this demonstration and display, or in the promises and invitations connected with it, of faith in God or of warranted hope for any good or for escape from the destiny of all in persistent conflict with the eternal, unchangeable moral system. Infidelity is immoral mania; and that alike, whether it be positive and declared or practical disregard of the one only *remedy* provided with such infinite love and at such infinite cost of the Triune God.

§ 262. THIRD POSITION, THAT THE TWO PRECEDING ARE CERTAINTIES RESPECTING IT AGAINST ALL THEORIES.

3. We have been asked many times—"What theory of the atonement do you adopt? What theory of it do you think is true?" and some say—"There are so many theories of it, that we don't know, or we hardly know, which of them is true, or what to believe concerning it." Our response is this: In such questions and sayings, the term, *theory*, is used in the sense of *hypothesis*, and has no real application to the subject of the atonement, nor has it in any of its senses. The proper question is, what is the Scriptural teaching or doctrine concerning the atonement? When this is asked, we believe we have shown, that the whole range of this teaching, typical, antitypical, declaratory directly and in sure implication, relational to other teachings dependent from and connected with it, uncontradicted by any, basal to all pertaining to the salvation of human sinners, necessary to a realization of the infinite pity, merciful love, and grace of God, absolutely righteous and so moral, is unequivocally that Christ in His sufferings and death was a substitute provisionally for the whole race of human sinners, to exempt them from the necessity of suffering the punishment deserved by their sins, if, dur-

ing the gracious probation of this life, they comply with the required ethical conditions. Every view of it in conflict with this teaching is unscriptural and false, a mere human guess or invention. Men neither know nor can know anything whatever about it, except what the Scriptures teach. If anything can be decisively expressed and settled beyond reasonable doubt by human language, when taken in its obvious meaning according to the known usage of any particular language, or the established canons of interpretation, nothing else is more frequently, variously, and certainly taught in Scripture than what we have shown it teaches concerning the sufferings and death of Christ as a provisory atonement *to* God *for the sins* of mankind —that is, as a substitution for the penal suffering deserved by them for their sins, so that, if they would comply with the declared conditions of its being made an actual one for them, they might escape the endurance of that suffering. We can think of no possible way, in which this could be taught more explicitly than it is in the Scripture with such abounding repetition and variety of modes. And just as definitely and positively is it taught, that there was no other way in which a single sinner of the whole race could possibly be saved from suffering the penalty of his own sins. The great motive reason which impelled each Person of the Triune Godhead to assume and execute His part in the stupendous transaction was infinite pity and merciful love for mankind *as beings*, all irretrievably lost forever *as sinners*, unless rescued in this one way. According to the Divine plan, the human and Satanic actors, who vented their measureless malignity and madness upon Christ in the all-surpassing tragedy of His sufferings and death, only performed the parts they did by the infinitely wise permission and over-ruling Providence of God for the accomplishment, in opposition to their design, of the ends of His own infinite mercy and grace towards mankind. But His sufferings inflicted by their outrages upon His body were evidently vastly less than those of His human soul and sympathetically of His infinitely susceptible Divine nature. It was by the *price*, the mighty sum of them all, that He *redeemed* human sinners, and not by any mere sympathetic feelings for them. It was "the travail of His soul," and "His pouring it out even unto death," which, as "the lamb of God," He took upon Himself and *bore* till He could cry—"*It is finished*," which alone constituted the atonement *to* God for "the sins of the world," and thus conditionally redeemed, ransomed, bought them all from the demands of justice against them.

§ 263. SCRIPTURAL TEACHINGS RESPECTING THE EXTENT OF THE ATONEMENT.

In Chapter XIV., § 154, we showed from the nature of the case what the extent of the atonement must be; and our purpose here is to show that the position taken there is precisely that of the Divinely inspired Scriptures. John 3:16, 17 says—"For God so loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him might not perish, but have eternal life. For God sent not his Son into the world to judge the world; but that the world through him might be saved." As to the meaning of the term world here, Schaff says in a note in Lange's Comm. on John, at verse 16—"*World* means in the Scriptures and in popular language (1) the whole universe; (2) the earth; (3) all men (so here); (4) the present order of things as distinct from the future world; (5) the ungodly world, in opposition to the kingdom of God, and as subject to Satan, who is called the prince of this world" (John 12:31). But it never means *the elect* or *the saints*, which would be just the reverse of the last mentioned signification. If it had this meaning here, Christ might have said: "God so loved the *world* * * * that the *world* (instead of *whosoever believeth*) might not perish." The universality of God's merciful love and the all-sufficiency of Christ's atonement (which, however, must not be confounded with its actual *efficiency*), is most clearly taught here, and in such passages as I. Tim. 2:6; II. Pet. 3:9; I. John 2:2 (which illustrates our passage): "He is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours *only*, but *also* for the sins of the whole *world*." Nothing in professed exegesis can be more baseless and arbitrary than to impose upon this word in either of the four places in John 3:16, 17, or in the one place in I. John 2:2, the meaning *elect*, or any other whatever than *mankind entire as in sin*. It would be just as warranted and no more groundless and opposed to its true sense, to say it means the Arabs, the Esquimaux, or any other people or part of mankind. Nay, to say it means this is not as utterly contradictory of its real import, as it is to say it means the elect, because it certainly signifies, in all these cases, those perishingly in sin, and needing an atonement that they may be saved. In them all, it means such only; and to make it mean *elect* is to substitute for its true meaning one it never had, merely to support a dogmatic assumption, equally in conflict with truth. One error demands another. Besides, in the passage in I. John 2:2, in which, we doubt not, the Apostle designedly expresses the real import of John 3:16, the whole last part of the verse is anti-

thetic to "for *our* sins" in the first part; and it could not be more strongly expressed in so few words. "Not for ours only" denies that the propitiation was for believers only; "but *also*" signifies that it was for the sins of the whole world *besides;* "whole" strengthens world, adding positiveness to the idea of *universality, the entire mass of mankind.* It thus cuts off the possibility of any limitation. In John 4:42 and I. John 4:14, Christ is asserted to be "the Saviour of the *world.*" In the first of these verses, the words were uttered by the Samaritans, but are clearly endorsed by John as correct. In the second of them, John himself speaks with utmost emphasis—"And we have seen and testify, that the Father sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world." If His atonement was a designed provision, for the world, this characterization in both these places is, in a profound sense, true; if not, but for the elect only, it is not true in any sense, but false. Equally decisive with all the foregoing passages are the following: Heb. 2:9; Rom. 5:18, 19; II. Cor. 5:14, 15; I. Tim. 2:6. The first of these, Heb. 2:9, says, "that he by the grace of God should taste death for every man." These words express the designed universality of the atonement in the strongest form, by distributing mankind into individuals, for every one of whom Christ tasted death. They utterly exclude any limitation whatever. The second of them, Rom. 5:18, says—"As through one fall, *judgment came* upon all men to condemnation; so also through one righteous act, the gift came upon all men unto justification of life." The contrasted relation of the one fall to all men, as bringing condemnation unto them, and that of the one righteous act to all men, as bringing the gift of grace unto justification of life unto them, are exactly parallel in universality. No limitation is possible in the latter case any more than in the former. Verse 19 presents the same contrast of universality, "the many" in the one case being precisely equal to, and as universal as "the many" in the other. The third of them, II. Cor. 5:14, 15, says—We "having judged this, that if one died for all, then all died: And he died for all," etc. The *motive* which led Christ to die *for all* was His merciful love for them; but His dying was judicially *in their stead for their advantage.* Because He thus died as the representative substitute of all, it was the same in effect *as if* every one of them also judicially died when He died, *i. e.*, suffered the penalty themselves of their sin. "The all" (οἱ πάντες) did not die when He did either *literally* or *morally*—not even if *all* be cut down to *some, the elect,* which no sound principle of interpretation will permit to be done; and hence the only sense in which it

is or can be true, that all died when He did, is the judicial and vicarious one; and because "they which live" are mentioned antithetically to "the all," the "all" must be taken in its proper, universal sense. The fourth of them, I. Tim. 2:6, says—"Who gave himself a ransom for all." In verse 4, the Apostle had declared the will of God, not His *effective*, but His *urging, merciful will*, apart from necessary conditions to be fulfilled by them, that all men should be saved—not some, nor all classes of men, but all individuals of the race; giving this as the great reason why "supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgiving should be made for all men" by Christians (verse 1). Verse 5 asserts as the ground reasons why God so wills, (1) that He is only *one*, implying that He is therefore equally the God of all races and nations, having the same interest in, and relations to, all as His creatures and lost sinners; since, if there were more Gods than one, one for every race and nation, their several wills might differ, none of them willing any to be saved, but such as were specially related to him as their Creator or otherwise; (2) that there is only "*one* Mediator between God and men," whose will, therefore, must be identical or in perfect harmony as to its objects with that of the one God; since, if there were more mediators than one, which would imply a plurality of gods, their several wills would differ with those of the different gods; so that to pray to any of the plurality of gods through the mediator peculiar to him would be absurd, while, because there is but one God, who wills all men to be saved, and one Mediator between Him and all men, to pray for all must be "good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour." This, moreover, is made the more manifest by the fact that this one Mediator is "the *man* Christ Jesus," and therefore naturally and morally alike interested in and related to all men; and further, by the additional, crowning fact, that He voluntarily "gave Himself" [*i. e.*, in atoning sufferings and death], "a ransom for all"—a ransom instead of, and for the advantage of, all. Hence, not only the clause under consideration of itself, but the entire connection and argument absolutely exclude any limitation of those for whom Christ's death was a ransom, and demand the meaning of *the totality of mankind*.

There are a number of other passages which we might adduce in support of this position, but those presented settle it beyond any successful controversy and make reference to others entirely unnecessary. Nor do any which speak of Christ's sufferings and death as an atonement for the sins of the elect, without reference to the

rest of mankind, in the least conflict with the truth taught in these, that it was for all. For, of course, if it was for all, it was for any part of the race; and the fact that it was for all alike as a provision is in no way or degree inconsistent with the fact that it was designed to be *actual* or for *application* only to those whom God foreknew, elected, and gave to His Son as His reward for making it. In the nature of the case, it could not be made *actual* by forgiveness to any who would persist in sin to the end of their probation, or except to such as should by regeneration be fitted to receive its Divine application, which is by forgiveness.

§ 264. A CITATION FROM TRENCH'S SERMONS REFUTED.

We have before referred to the view of Dr. Washburn, translator of Van Oosterzee's Commentary on I. Timothy in Lange's Series, appended to the comment on Chap. 2:6, and expressed our earnest objection to it, and to that of Coleridge which he quotes. We here notice a passage from Trench's Sermons, of like purport, which he appends to Van Oosterzee's 5th Doctrinal and Ethical Remark on the Mediatorship of Christ, following his comments on verses 1–7 of that Chapter, "which," Dr. W. says, "sets forth the living view of the mediatorial sacrifice, as it is distinguished alike from any forensic theory of imputation, and any denial of it on moral grounds." It is this:—"Could God be well pleased with the sufferings of the innocent and holy? What satisfaction could He find in these? Assuredly not: but he could have pleasure—nay, according to the moral necessities of his own being, he must have the highest joy, satisfaction, and delight—in the love, the patience, the obedience, which those sufferings gave him the opportunity of displaying. * * * [We omit two of the sentences quoted, as not important to our purpose, and add the last of them.] Christ satisfied herein, not the Divine anger, but the Divine craving after a perfect holiness, righteousness, and obedience in man." We have very high respect for this author, and it greatly surprises us to read such sentences from his pen. For, if he designed them as a solution of the problem of the atoning sufferings and death of Christ, not only has he entirely missed the real mark of difficulty in it, but he has directed his aim altogether away from it. No one can suppose rationally that God, or any good being, can have pleasure of any kind or degree in the suffering of any creature, much less of any moral being, however guilty, vastly less of a perfectly holy one, immeasurably less of His Eternal, all-obedient, and holy Son, for its own sake or in itself.

But the fact to be explained is, that God, notwithstanding what we thus say and fully believe, notwithstanding His own infinite, eternal love for and pleasure in His Son, and that Son's absolute and eternal holiness, continued without flaw in His incarnate obedience and consummated so amazingly in yielding Himself to His atoning sufferings and death, *did* eternally foreordain that *He* should undergo these, though so infinitely disagreeable to Him in themselves, as fundamental in the plan of redemption for mankind foreseen as sinners, while the Son also eternally designed to come in the fullness of time on purpose to undergo them—that the Father, accordingly, sent Him into the world, when the time came, consummately for this very purpose, and He came for the same—that it was really the Father Himself, as the sovereignly *willing, all-controlling agent*, who subjected Him to them, piercing Him for our transgressions, crushing Him for our iniquities, inflicting the chastisement to secure our peace with Himself upon Him, causing to meet or laying upon Him the iniquity of us all, bruising Him, putting Him to grief, delivering Him for our offences, not sparing His own Son, but delivering Him up for us all, forsaking Him in the acme of His suffering, making Him to be sin for us, who knew no sin, making Him a curse for us; while it was of the Son's own most free will, that "He gave Himself for our sins, * * * *according to the will of our* God and Father," making His soul a sin- or guilt-offering, pouring it out unto death, carrying the iniquities and bearing the sin of many, giving His life a ransom for many, for all, redeeming us from the curse of the law to God by His blood, buying and purchasing them with His blood, being obedient unto death, dying for us, suffering for us, the just for the unjust, giving Himself for us an offering and a sacrifice to God, being the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world, being such that God might be just, and the justifier of him who believes in Him, expiating our sins, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, etc. While the human actors in abusing, bruising, and crucifying Him acted out their own malignant will without the least compulsion or constraint from God; still, in all their atrocious part, they were simply doing "whatsoever His hand and counsel determined before to be done." Our Lord Himself told Pilate—"Thou couldest have no power against me, except it were given thee from above," as He had before told the Pharisees and Jews to whom He spoke the parable of the Good Shepherd—"I lay down my life." "No man taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have

power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again. This commandment have I received of my Father." The primary and determining agents in the stupendous transaction were not human, but the eternal Father by His sovereign will, commandment, providence, and personal course towards the eternal Son, incarnated that He might suffer and die as He did, and the Son in all His part, consummated by giving Himself up to this mission and laying down His life of His own absolutely free choice and obedience to His Father's will and commandment, that He might thus be a "propitiation for the sins of the whole world." The human monsters, who, as Divinely permitted and used instruments, abused and crucified Him, had great *pleasure* in His sufferings; but *it is not said in all Scripture that the Father had any pleasure whatever in them, during, before, or after their endurance*, although it was He that bruised Him and put Him to grief. We cannot, therefore, understand why Trench should at all propose and discuss the question of the quotation from him; for it is not involved in the doctrine of atonement in any way whatever, and is no Christian problem. Inflicted suffering is never for its own sake, but always for an end beyond itself, as medicine or surgery is. It is always to moral beings for penalty of sin, for discipline, for the benefit of others, or for the vindication or maintenance of the honor, authority, rights, or other interests of God; and it is never *greater*, probably always *less*, in amount or degree, than the good secured by it. Nor, recurring to the quotation, did God have any pleasure, joy, satisfaction, or delight in the love, patience, and obedience, which those sufferings of Christ gave Him the opportunity of displaying, *for their own sake, or in themselves*. For the love, patience, and obedience of Christ, displayed in His sufferings, no more than the sufferings themselves, were *for their own sake*. They were all *for an end or ends beyond themselves—i. e.*, they were displayed by Him acting *ministerially in fulfillment of His mission and for its accomplishment*, and not acting *unofficially;* and, therefore, like his sufferings, they were *executive means* of an end beyond themselves, as in the nature of the case executive action must be. God, consequently, could have no pleasure in them, any more than in the sufferings, except as *means*. The end or ends of the love, patience, and obedience displayed, as of the sufferings, is beyond and above them, and give them all their importance. Nor did Christ, in these, "satisfy the Divine craving after a perfect holiness, righteousness, and obedience in man." For, as they were *means* to an *end* or to *ends* beyond, above, more important and more valuable

than they, which was not, nor included, the satisfaction of any such craving, it was no part of the object of God in inflicting, or of Christ in enduring, those sufferings, to satisfy it. There is nothing to support this notion in all the language of Scripture directly relating to the end of Christ in enduring, or of the Father in inflicting, those sufferings, and it is mainly against and absolutely intolerant of it. That end was outside of the Divine will, so that it could not be *directly* or *immediately* accomplished by it. It was one which, for accomplishment, put both the Father and the Son under *an absolute necessity* of fulfilling the parts they respectively did, the one in inflicting, the other in enduring; and the love, patience, and commandment of the Father in subjecting the Son to His sufferings cost Him infinite self-denial and self-sacrifice, as really as the love, patience, and obedience of the Son in enduring them cost Him the same. "God *so loved* the world, that he gave *his only-begotten Son*, that whosoever believeth in him might not *perish*, but have eternal life." The solution of the real problem proposed in this quotation is as far from the true one, as the antipodes are from us; and our object in considering it, as we have, is that here, at the close of our canvass of the Scriptural teachings concerning the suffering and death of Christ, we might the better see what they all show is the only true one.

§ 265. THE TRUE SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION CONCERNING THE SUFFERINGS AND DEATH OF CHRIST.

This question is not in reference to the obedience of Christ, nor to any moral qualities or excellences He displayed, but to His sufferings and death. It is, for what end or ends did He endure these? The general answer is, not for any pertaining immediately to Himself, but for one or more pertaining wholly to mankind. The Father gave Him and He gave Himself to endure them, that man might not *perish*, might not be *lost*, might be *delivered from the wrath to come*, might be *saved from wrath*, might *have eternal life*, might be *redeemed from the curse of the law*, etc. He gave Himself *for* us, died *for* us, *for* all, tasted death *for* every man, gave His life a ransom *for* many, gave Himself a ransom *for* all, redeemed, bought, purchased us with His blood, shed it *for* many for the remission of sins, was made sin *for* us, carried the iniquities and bore the sin of many, gave Himself *for* us an offering and a sacrifice to God, appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of Himself, was once offered to bear the sins of many, made reconciliation *for* the

sins of the people by Himself purging our sins, is the propitiation *for* the sins of the whole world, etc. These and many other Scriptural expressions prove incontestably that the immediate, foremost thing designed by both Father and Son was specially by the Son's sufferings and death, as a sacrifice to God, to save mankind from the *necessity* of themselves suffering the penalty of their sins, on conditions required. They prove that Christ endured them *in the stead and for the advantage* of all men, substituting Himself for them, as the representative of them all, that He might save them from suffering the penalty incurred by their sins, the *wrath* (ὀργὴ) of God, the *wrath* to come. They also prove, beyond any evasion, that, to have this efficiency for man, His sufferings and death were designed to produce a direct effect on God Himself in relation to human sinners—that, by being an *expiation* for their sins as an offering and sacrifice for them, they *propitiated* Him towards them. That is, by removing His holy *wrath* or demand of justice against, they secured the exercise of His *merciful favor* to, them.

And here we ask, if there was no demand of justice that men should be punished according to their sins, and if the sufferings and death of Christ were not to meet and satisfy this demand, what was or could be *the absolute necessity for them*, in order that men might be saved? That there was such a necessity for them, the Scriptural teachings demonstrate. The alternative was, either these, or all men must perish. Then, God eternally purposed and willed them in His redemptive plan. He sent His Son into the world purposely to undergo them and under His positive will and command to do so. He prearranged for them from the fall of man till He sent Him, and foretold them in manifold prophecies, types, and institutions as predestined and necessary; and, as the designing, all-controlling cause, He really inflicted them. The Son came incarnated purposely to undergo them; He repeatedly referred to the prophecies and types of the Old Testament to show that He was destined to, and must, undergo them; He declared again and again that it was the will and command of His Father that He should, and that His doing so was in obedience to that will and command; and He declared at numerous times and in numerous modes that it was necessary that He should undergo them in order to save lost men from perishing, to be a ransom for them, and that they might have remission of sins and eternal life. The Apostles unanimously, constantly, and in various modes asserted and assumed that they were necessary in order to the remission of sins, being instead of the penal

sufferings deserved by men, and a propitiation to God to reconcile Him to them, that they might be delivered from the wrath to come. In our examination of the Levitical Law, the Epistle to the Hebrews, the 53d Chapter of Isaiah, Rom. 5:12–19, and numerous other passages in the New Testament which plainly refer to that Law, and that prophetic Chapter, and many others not specially referring to them, we have seen and shown that their incontestable teaching is, that Christ suffered and died as the representative substitute of our guilty race, as a sin-offering and sacrifice to cover or atone for their sins, so as to relieve them from themselves suffering their penalty—that, in and by His sufferings and death, He carried and bore, that is, endured, the penal suffering deserved by their sins—that He thus *expiated* them and was a *propitiation* to God for them—that thus only was God *reconciled* to man, and remission or forgiveness of their sins, by which they are freed from liability to suffer their penalty, made possible and certain to every one of the race who would "receive the reconciliation" and become reconciled to God in turn. It is therefore radical in the Scriptural teachings, that Christ's sufferings and death had their *immediate end* in God—were to effect a change in His attitude and consequent action towards human sinners by changing His moral relations to them, as obnoxious to the demand of His justice, both as ethical to Him and His universal, eternal society and as retributive towards them. They related to the penalties which that duplicate demand made it incumbent on Him to inflict on them for their sins; and it was to meet and satisfy that demand, and thus to lay a basis for actually setting the penalties aside for all of them who would comply with the declared conditions, that Christ, as the representative of the race, substituted His own sufferings and death for those they would endure if those penalties were inflicted on themselves. It was *absolutely necessary*, if all or any of human sinners were to be saved, that Christ should do this, and that the Father should send Him under the law and His command to do it; for justice is the eternal basis and guardian of all moral love, order, peace, and welfare in the universe, and without it none of these can possibly exist. Therefore, not to inflict deserved penal suffering on sinners, nor on a substitute for them, and to treat them as if they had not sinned, but had been obedient, would be consummate injustice and infinite sin in God, with the sure result that all love for Him, and all reciprocal moral love between His rational creatures, all order, harmony, and happiness must forever perish, leaving only anarchic chaos and destruction. We thus

see both the *necessity* that Christ should suffer and die, and that He did so to meet and satisfy the demand of eternal justice in God and all moral natures against mankind as sinners. Nor can any other *necessity* for His sufferings and death, nor any other *end* to be achieved by them be even imagined by the deniers of the substitutional atonement which, by any inventive showing, will consist with the whole range of the Scriptural teachings which we have exhibited. For, according to all these deniers, the end for which He endured them was not in God at all, but in men, not in the *nexus* of a social-moral system and society, but individually, not as liable to any positive penalty at all for their sins, but to their mere natural consequences only, all which contradicts and nullifies the sense of the whole congress of those teachings, and thrusts into them instead one as alien and adverse as the soul of the basest coward on earth would be, if thrust into the place of the soul of Achilles or any grander hero. And, as His sufferings and death could only be to act as a solvent on the sin and enmity of those to whom they were made known, so as to win *them* to abandon their sin and with it its mere natural consequences, they could have no relation whatever to the rest of mankind who have no knowledge of them, and could in no sense be for their sins or them! How can all that is asserted in those teachings respecting the *necessity* of His enduring them, as "an offering and sacrifice *to* God" for the sins of our race, to accomplish *with and in Him for them* all that they declare, possibly consist with their being merely such a solvent *upon and in men?* how with His being merely an example for men of perfect obedience, or merely a Divinely sent moral and religious teacher, or anything else than what they assert? We cannot but pity the man or men who cannot see and understand the moral grandeur and glory displayed by the Father and the Son in executing their parts of the stupendous measure of the atonement "for the *sins* of the whole world," as asserted in all these Scriptural teachings, and, in opposition, try to convert the *obedience* of Christ or the mere *sympathetic love-actings of God* for men into atonement, which neither of them is in any true sense, whether called *moral* or *vicarious*.

CHAPTER XXII.

Examination of what is called the Governmental Theory of the Atonement.

As some of the greatest and best men and theologians of the Christian Church, followed by a large portion of it, have held and do hold this Theory, we find ourselves constrained to indicate wherein we deem it defective. With sincere deference to the great and good adherents of this view, we here invite patient attention to our reasons for regarding it as defective.

§ 266. STATEMENT OF THIS VIEW.

It makes the necessitating reason for punishment and the atonement lie, not in the demand of the law with its justice, as it is in the nature of God and all created moral beings, but in what is essential to the nature of a government *instituted* by God, of His mere will, over His intelligent creatures, as necessary to prevent sin and its ruin and to secure obedience and its good among them to the greatest degree possible. It is a *devised* government of benevolence to them, and of *devised* justice, especially punitive, only as necessary to maintaining and carrying it on. It is a creation of the benevolent will of God, acting according to His infinite wisdom; and its whole legislation and administration are products of the same will and wisdom. The sanctions of its law, both of rewards and punishments, are wholly for its maintenance as a polity, being designed and adjusted entirely with reference to that, being devised and administered to *express* to mankind and the intelligent universe God's estimation of His law and government and of obedience to them, His abhorrence of sin and displeasure at sinners, and His determination to maintain His law and government, and so His rectoral authority and honor, by inflicting on incorrigible human sinners the penalty which He has attached to His law—the end of the *expression*

of both threatening and executing it being, as much as possible to deter from sin, and to conserve in obedience. The object of the atonement is, of course, to *express* this same cluster of ends; and, as the execution of the threatened penalty to secure this is called *public justice*, so the provisional substitution of the sufferings and death of our Lord for that execution was for the same *public justice*. We think this is a substantially correct statement of this view as to its positive contents. But, to understand it clearly, we must notice what it involves of both assumption and rejection. First, then, according to it, neither the penalty to be inflicted on men for their sins, nor the sufferings and death of Christ in its stead was to meet and satisfy any demand of justice in the nature of God and other moral beings against sinners; for it involves a denial of such a demand. The cluster of ends stated excludes this; and, since the penalty is not inflicted on men in this life of probation, nor till after the resurrection and judgment, only the threatening of it and the atonement, as far as known and understood by them, are *expressions* to them or to other moral beings, before the penalty is inflicted, of the ends of either. But the whole effect of the *expressions*, whatever they are, must ever be *entirely in and upon them, and not at all in and upon God*. As far as the cluster of ends stated relates to Him, it is not *as a Person*, having PERSONAL *rights, dues from, or claims upon*, His rational creatures, which sinners have violated and trampled upon, for doing which they *owe* penal suffering to Him, but only *as a Ruler*, having OFFICIAL *rights, authority, responsibilities to discharge and honor to maintain;* so that neither the penal sufferings to which they are liable are at all retributory, nor are those of Christ instead of them *as such*, for any sin or wrong against Him as a *Person* or a *moral Being*. Nor, since the *expression* of that cluster of ends, whether made by the penal sufferings of sinners themselves or by those of Christ in their stead, is not *to* God even as Ruler, but to men and His other subjects only, is it designed to have, or can it have, any effect *in* Him even as Ruler. As His government is thus simply a polity devised in His wisdom and constituted by His mere unobliged will, both the threatening and the execution of its penalties for sin, and the measure of the atonement were adopted as essential to its best possible administration, both for preventing evil and for securing good. As the atonement is a measure to make it consistent with the law and the government which God has thus instituted, both it and the threatening and execution of the appointed penalty for sin are for the cluster of ends we have noted by the *im-*

pression on His subjects which these *expressions* of those ends make —that is, they are solely to meet the demands of what is called *public justice*, which is only what the public good requires for its best protection and promotion.

§ 267. STATEMENT OF WHAT WE HOLD TO BE THE TRUE VIEW.

In Part I. of this Work, it is shown that justice is an intrinsic quality of the law as it is in and from the nature of God and all created moral beings; and that it makes the love enjoined *due* from God and every other moral being to every other one, not having forfeited the natural right to it, and from all supremely to God. That is, justice in the law in all makes the obligation to render the love enjoined universally reciprocal; so that not rendering it to God and every other one is really robbing Him and every one of that due, and is fundamental injustice to every other one, and supremely to God, both *as a Person and as Ruler of all.* It is also shown, we think, that, in principle, ethical and retributive justice are one; and that, according to the moral reason and conscience of mankind, retributive penal suffering is due from, or owed by, all sinners to God and the universal society under Him as the correlative or substitute for the *due* of love, of which they have robbed Him and them. It is shown that justice is thus the all-binding social *nexus*, and that it cannot be done or violated towards God or man without being, *ipso facto*, done or violated, in principle, towards all moral beings. Justice or injustice done to one necessarily *distributes* itself, in principle, to every other one on earth, in heaven, and in all worlds and ages. In a most real sense, the whole intelligent universe is the object of all ethical justice and injustice—that is, of all moral action, and consequently of all rewards and punishments. This principle is neither strange nor strained. It is recognized and acted upon in all civil governments. The perpetrator of murder, arson, burglary, theft, or any other crime against one or a few is held guilty of having in principle committed it against the whole civil society, and to be the injurer and enemy of all in that society, and is judged and punished accordingly. But human governments are extremely defective, and from ignorance and many limitations cannot administer perfect justice according to this recognized principle, if they would, while God can and will. For justice, both as ethical and as retributive, respects Him immeasurably more than it does all creatures, because, in His nature, rights, dues, interests, character, and all relations to them, He is infinitely superior to them all together.

It respects Him *Personally* and as Creator, because, by His natural and all other rights, supreme love and all it involves of reverence, homage, and all obedience and treatment are absolutely *due* to Him from every one of them; and, besides all they do justly or unjustly to Him, whatever they do either way to one another is also, by measureless transcendence, done to Him as *due* or violation of *due* to Him. Then, it respects Him as Moral Ruler of all, having the responsibility to Himself of so ruling as to secure the greatest possible love and all good in His universal and eternal dominion. For, whoever treats one or some of his fellow subjects justly or unjustly, in principle not only treats them all in the same way, but also God Himself, both as a Person and as Ruler, in an incomparably higher degree. In either case, He *rewards* him, not only as having so treated his fellow subjects, but also Himself supremely, according to the only rule, not arbitrary, but applicable and really just in any proper sense of the word—that is, *according to the measure of his actual desert, as He sees it*, and not to secure *an invented justice called public*, which is really not justice at all, none certainly to God, and none demanded by the law towards His universal society. If the dues of justice are not secured to God according to His rights, interests, and concerns, since His and those of His subjects are necessarily intertwined by the same law in them, how can theirs be, and thus the one consummate end of the universal law, society, and system be? It is for the sake of this end that retributive punishment is inflicted to secure those dues; and, therefore, if it can be secured better or even equally without its infliction on sinners, this can be waived, and they can be saved on return to obedience. But, whenever the infliction *must* be made, it primarily and directly respects the demand of justice in God Himself, called His wrath and by other names, and then the demand of the same in all finite moral natures, especially all holy ones, its object being to meet and satisfy these demands for the sake, and as part, of the end stated.

§ 268. WHAT WE HAVE IN THIS STATEMENT.

In this statement, we have an absolutely just Ruler, just moral government, and just public justice, guarding and maintaining the fundamental ethical due of universal reciprocal love, and so the consummate good of God and His loyal universe against all the injustice of sin and sinners, and not a mere *analogy* of a human ruler, government, and public justice, operating by mere prudential positive sanctions and expression to accomplish administrative ends.

According to it, the infliction of retributive suffering has a real, definite, absolutely just measure and end, which is the greatest possible good of God and as many as possible of His rational creatures to all eternity: Whereas, according to the theory under consideration, the infliction has only the vague, indefinite, political end of *expressing* to those creatures the cluster of ends we have stated, and is made, not because sinners *deserve* to be punished, nor because their penal suffering, according to the *measure* of their actual ill-desert, is *due* to God and those creatures, but merely to uphold and maintain that cluster of ends. But this statement has farther confirmation. We have shown that justice is not a thing of institution, but of moral nature; that enacted law and instituted government, Divine or human, can neither make nor unmake it; and that no government nor institution can be valid, except as it is founded upon it; so that none can be a thing of mere will, Divine or human, or other than simply an authoritative embodiment of the applications of the ethical and retributive demands of justice to moral beings in their relations to each other and to it. While these applications are numerous and various beyond finite thought, there is and can be but one justice, which is the root or trunk from which all these shoot forth as branches, just as there is but one Divine nature; and it is as eternal and changeless as that nature which contains it. It rules God absolutely in all His acts and courses to which it applies in the sense in which His nature does, because it is demanded by His nature; and His love and all His voluntary action are always within and according to its behests and ends, never thwarting nor disregarding them. Nor is the law, which includes it, a creation of, or changeable by, His will; but it is a rule of action for Himself and for all His rational creatures, issued by His own nature and by theirs created like His. All His moral action is absolutely according to it, and to its applications to those creatures in their relations to each other and Him, and to Himself as related to them. It required Him to have a perfect moral government over them, and to administer it in perfect accordance with all the applications of His law to them and to Himself as related to them, and so that "justice and judgment should be the habitation of his throne;" and He has no option to do otherwise any more than He has to be unholy or not good. It follows that, as justice is fundamental in the law and one, it cannot be set aside nor varied from in any degree, but must be strictly adhered to and acted out in the special mode of every application of the law; so that *real public justice is His acting as Ruler precisely according to all*

its applications to His subject rational creatures, and to Himself as related to them—especially in the administration of retributions, and more especially still of penal.

§ 269. WHAT MUST BE TRUE OF PUNISHMENT.

Now, in view of all this, what must punishment be? Sinners have done *direct* injustice to some of their fellows, and, in principle, to all intelligent creatures; and they *owe* corresponding penal suffering to each one, both of the few and of all, so that it is *due* from them to each and all. It is the responsibility of God to each and all, as Ruler, to inflict it upon each sinner because he *deserves* it and it is *owed* by and *due* from him to every other subject of God's government; because inflicting it for these reasons is necessary to guard and promote the reciprocal love and all the good dependent on it of all loyal sufferers of his wrong; and because it is an absolute *right* of each of these sufferers that God shall inflict it upon the sinner, or do something fully equivalent, in order to secure to Him and all of them their *due*, and so their everlasting good and glory. Thus the infliction is not a mere act of rectoral policy for *impression* on the loyal, not an expression of anything, but a real exaction from the sinner of what He absolutely *owes* to Himself and to each and all of the loyal subjects of God's government for the end of their greatest possible good. It is a real and perfect public justice, because it secures the whole due and the highest possible good of the universal and eternal loyal public. Everything which, according to the governmental theory, the infliction is designed to *express* to the whole public, is, according to this, which we believe is the only correct view, actually secured to the highest possible degree, and beyond that, the demand of real justice, both as ethical and as retributive, is perfectly met and satisfied. But is this the whole justice of the case? By no means. For all the injustice of the sinner, done directly and in principle against any and all in the universal realm, was also, by measureless transcendence, against God as Ruler of that realm. It was disobedience to Him, disregard and defiance of His authority and rectoral rights, and outrage on His honor as sovereign; for all which penal suffering is deserved by and due from him to all his fellow subjects together. All sin is consummately against Him; and what can be more false, than that it matters not what of it sinners commit against Him, no penal suffering for it is deserved by them and due to Him—not even as Ruler? Is not asserting this the same as saying, that really there is no such thing

as sin against *Him?* that all sin is such only when committed against fellow creatures? For, against whomsoever it is, it does *deserve* punishment, does make this *due* from sinners to God and them, or the voice of universal conscience and common sense is a delusion and a lie. Yet, if punishment is made a mere *expression* to God's realm of moral beings, and not the *exaction* of a *due* of retributive justice from sinners; if what it *expresses* is not that justice demands that they shall suffer penally *as they deserve*, not only for their sins against their fellow subjects, but transcendently for them as against God, the infinite Ruler; if it is simply to *show how* He esteems His enacted law over all and obedience to it, *how* He abhors sin and is displeased at sinners, and *His determination* to maintain His law, government, authority, and honor as Ruler for the benefit of His realm, then, there is in it no recognition of any *right* or *claim* of God against sinners to be secured by it—of any penal suffering *deserved* by them or *due* from them to Him for all their sins against Him, even as Ruler—or of any principle of intrinsic justice whatever. And, because it is not demanded by such a principle, inherent in God, and all other moral natures, it is merely a thing of Divine will and institution, of device or invention in order to a devised or invented government, and therefore purely *arbitrary* in the sense of being simply a thing of will. As its end is the *benefit* of the great public, for which it is invented, it is not for God at all, even as self-constituted Ruler, otherwise than *as it is an instrument* essential to His governing. But, even this is not the whole case; for God is not only the universal Ruler, but a moral Being, a Person, having all the rights, claims, and susceptibilities of one, and having, as one, the eternal, uncreated law inherent in His nature, with its matter of love, its quality of justice, and its end of well-being, by which He is a *social*-moral Being, and in the universal and eternal moral society and system. He is the *Creator* of all that exists besides Himself—of all matter and all irrational creatures for the sake of the rational; and He created all with reference to that society and system. He constituted rational creatures with the law in them which is in Himself, that they might be moral and of course social beings like Himself, and thus capable of being like Him in character, of loving Him and being morally loved by Him, of intimate fellowship and communion with Him, of being happy and blessed in union and communion with Him and of being objects of His eternal complacency. The justice of the law demands that they should love Him supremely, rendering Him all reverence, homage,

honor, gratitude, and obedience perfectly and perpetually as *due* to Him by absolute right and claim. He is also their constant Preserver and Benefactor; and for being such they *owe* Him all possible gratitude and devotion. All this He *deserves*, and it is absolutely *due* to Him from them by the justice of the law. How do they regard and treat Him personally in return? They render Him nothing of all they owe Him, but rob Him of all love, gratitude, reverence, homage, and honor. They disregard His rights, deny His claims, decline and spurn society with Him, turn away from and treat Him as an enemy, and are rebels and enemies in heart against Him, not even liking to retain Him in their knowlege, caring nothing for His feelings, interests, and ends, and steadily opposing them. They are His enemies precisely for the reasons for which they ought to love Him, and their enmity against Him is the strongest ever entrenched in creature hearts, the most unreasonable and invincible. It is partly because as their Ruler He claims and commands their obedience, partly because of the holy perfection of His character, and partly because He declares that He will punish them according to the *desert* of their sins. Now, do they *deserve* no punishment from Him for all this flagitious attitude, spirit, and action against Him as a Person, their Creator, Preserver, and Benefactor? Is no penal suffering *due* to Him *Personally* for their injustice and wrong against Him as a Person, additional to what is *due* to Him as Ruler and to His universal realm? Is He the only being in the universe against whom sin goes for nothing? No; exactly according to all this, sin against *Him* is the measure of the punishment they deserve for it, and of the suffering by it *due* to Him from them; and, if Christ has not suffered it in their stead, they must suffer it themselves in addition to that due to Him as Ruler and to His whole loyal realm. Evidently then, no mere governmental theory at all meets the case. As God rules all, not for their sake only, but for His own, so He rewards and punishes, not only or mainly for the sake of His creatures as subjects or as creatures, but transcendently for His own.

§ 270. WHAT THE SCRIPTURES TEACH RESPECTING GOD'S REASON FOR, AND END IN PUNISHMENT?

Do the Scriptures teach what we have thus stated as to God's reason for, and end in punishment? We are sure they do not teach the mere governmental theory. It is truly remarkable how comparatively little is said in them of sin as against men or any creature,

and how much is said of it as against God, and no less so, how uniformly punishment is threatened and declared to be strictly retributive—to every one according to His works—never to be an *expression* to created moral beings of anything. Let every one turn to the word *sin*, noun, or verb, in *Cruden's*, or any other full Concordance, and go through all the passages in which it occurs, and he will see that wherever it is used in a general way, and even when it is mentioned as committed in injuring man, it is always against God, and not merely against His law, government, or subjects. The same is true of other words meaning essentially the same—iniquity, wickedness, ungodliness, transgression, disobedience, and others; and it is implied in the requirement of repentance towards God, and in the fact that He alone can forgive sins. As to punishment, the fundamental principle of its infliction by God set forth in all the Scriptures is that it will be always exactly retributive, or according to the deeds or deserts of sinners.* We have referred to this long array of passages, to which many more might be added, to show how uniformly, unequivocally, and fundamentally Scripture teaches the doctrine of exact retributive punitive justice—that punishment will never be inflicted by any other rule than that of the actual guilt or ill-desert of sinners. There is not a hint in all these or any other passages, that it will be for any other *direct* purpose than to meet and satisfy the demand of God's *wrath* (ὀργή) against them. We have shown that His wrath is no mere emotion or passion, but the demand of His retributive justice against them; and it is not at all adequately nor correctly expressed by the commonly substituted weak, effeminate word, *displeasure*, which tends to keep up the erroneous and perverting notion that it is simply emotional or passional. It would be utterly dishonoring to Him and inconsistent with His infinite holiness and perfection of character to make this the *determining cause* of His will to punish sinners; for this, from its very nature, He could suppress or modify, if He chose. That cause, therefore, can be nothing else radically than the demand

(*) See Job 34:11; Ps. 28:4; 62:12; Is. 3:10, 11; Jer. 17:10; 32:19; Mat. 16:27; Rom. 1:18; 2:5-12; 14:11, 12; II. Cor. 5:10; Gal. 6:7; Col. 3:25; Rev. 2:23; 20:12; 22:12. See under noun *recompence*, and verb, *recompense*, Deut. 32:35; II. Chron. 6:23; Ps. 94:1; Prov. 12:14; Is. 59:18; 3:11; 65:6, 7; Jer. 25:14; 50:29; Lam. 3:64; Ez. 7:3, 4; 9:10; 11:21; 16:43; 22:31; Hos. 12:2; Joel 3:4, 7; Heb. 2:2; 10:30. See under *reward*, noun and verb, II. Sam. 3:39; Hos. 4:9; Mat. 16:27; II. Tim. 4:14; Rev. 18:6. See under *repay*, Deut. 7:10; Job 21:30, 31; Is. 59:18; Rom. 12:19. See under *punish*, Jer. 21:14; Hos. 4:9; 12:2; Amos 3:2; II. Thess. 1:6-9; Heb. 10:28, 29. See under *render*, Job 34:11; II. Chron. 6:30; Prov. 24:12; Ps. 28:4. See under *vengeance*, Deut. 32:35, 41, 43; Rom. 3:5; 12:19; II. Thess. 1:8; Jude 7.

which we have mentioned, which is just as absolute as that of His *ethical justice*, or as His holiness and benevolence, to which it is eternally essential. That inflicting punishment to meet this demand will produce governmental effects for God's whole realm forever is certain, as, from the social-moral nature of all in that realm, and the fact that all the recipients of the infliction are His subjects in it, it could not be otherwise; and that He will not inflict it to meet this demand merely for the sake of meeting it, but as the necessary fundamental means of securing the end of the law, which is the highest possible good and glory to Himself and endless well-being in that realm, belongs also to the nature of the case from the nature of the law. His *design*, therefore, is and will be to inflict it as strictly retributive, strictly according to the measure of the actual ill-desert of its objects, as He sees it, strictly to meet and satisfy the demand of justice in Himself and all other moral natures and in the law from them, for the consummate end of that law. That end is partly in his subjects, but incomparably more in Himself, not only as an absolutely just Ruler, but as a moral Being, a Person, who, aside from being a Ruler, is their Creator, Preserver, and supreme Benefactor. It is not in the least against this, if men cannot *now* fully comprehend it; for the day of judgment is "the day of wrath and *revelation* of the righteous judgment of God," and *then and ever after* it will be comprehended by the whole realm of intelligent creatures. The *principle* of it they all *do* see, comprehend, and assert in relation to those who wrong them or others, when they are unperverted by any selfish interest, or any conflicting, assumed theory, ethical or theological, which they have fixed upon concerning it.

§ 271. EASY TO SEE, THEN, WHAT AN ATONEMENT MUST BE.

Now, if the foregoing is correct, it is easy to see what an atonement must be. Christ, as the representative and substitute of mankind, must *bear* or *endure* in their stead, to an equivalent degree, the infliction of suffering and death which *they deserve*, so as perfectly to meet the demand of retributive penal justice against them. The *immediate end* of His endurance must be precisely the same as that of theirs, in order that its effects in and upon God, and those of the knowledge of it in and upon the whole realm of intelligent creatures may be the same as those of their punitive sufferings would be; and that end is a full meeting and satisfying the demand of retributive, penal justice against them, *provisionally* for them all, *actually* for all of them who will receive it, pre-eminently as that demand is in

God, and subordinately as it is in all created moral beings; so that He and they will forever concur in saying, that "justice is absolutely maintained firm," even if He should forgive the sins of the whole of them on the necessary ethical conditions. In no other way, can His sufferings be a substitute for those of their punishment; for, if His were a mere *expression* of the cluster of ends presented in the governmental theory to God's realm of rational creatures, by what possibility could they be a substitution for those *deserved* by sinners and *due* from them to Him and that realm? It matters not that the expression was made by a Divine and awfully tragic catastrophe, that catastrophe was not designed to be a substitution, in any sense of that word, for the penal sufferings of sinners, but to be simply a mode of *object-teaching*, by which God symbolically shows or represents to His subjects that cluster of ends. Substitution is possible only if there is a demand of retributive punitive justice against sinners that they must suffer as they deserve for the ethical injustice which they have done against God and His realm. Their suffering is the correlative of the love of which they have robbed Him and His realm, and must balance it. This balancing suffering is not due to the law, the government, nor the authority of God, nor to His wisdom and holiness embodied in these, nor to anything outside of Himself and other holy moral beings, *as Persons*, because no injustice can be done to, or suffered by anything else than moral beings. Nor is it due to the great community of God's realm, as what is called *public justice*, because nothing is due to the *whole*, except as it is to its several constituents; and if the penal suffering of sinners is not due to these severally, as the retributive equivalent of the ethical injustice suffered by each from them, for what is it due? That is, if retributive justice is not the basis and principle of all real *public justice*, what other basis and principle can it have? and how can there be any such thing? If punishment is not inflicted because sinners *deserve* it, and their endurance of it is *due* to God, and subordinately to the several constituents of the realm, and so to the organic whole, it is merely *protective of, or for the good of*, those constituents; and why not, then, if that good might be advanced by inflicting the same suffering on obedient subjects, discard the whole voice of conscience and demand of justice in that realm by inflicting it on them, and by even treating the wicked in the way which would be the proper reward of the righteous? If retributive justice be denied, there can certainly be no such thing as *desert* of either punishment or reward, and, instead of these being founded in the

nature and relations of God and other moral beings, they are purely arbitrary, and not justice at all. It therefore seems to us certain, that Christ made atonement for the sins of the whole world by substituting Himself to God for all its constituents that His sufferings and death might be instead of the penal sufferings and death which they severally deserved and must otherwise endure. And, as theirs must be to meet and satisfy the demand of retributive justice in and from the nature of God and of all other holy moral beings, strictly according to their actual ill-desert as God sees it, so those of Christ in their place must be to meet the same demand *provisionally* for them all, to rescue them from the *necessity* of meeting it themselves, and *actually* for all of them who, during their probation, will fulfill the necessary ethical conditions. He deserved none of them; nor did He assume the ill-desert of sinners to the least degree; but, moved by His infinite merciful love for them as moral natures, He voluntarily assumed to endure their deserved penal sufferings and death, not as punishment to Him of course, but as theirs, to save them from the *necessity* of enduring it, and from *actually enduring it*, if they truly return to God. In doing this, He perfectly fulfilled the matter of the law, which is moral love, and thus did all possible for its end, which is the highest possible pleasure and glory of God and good of all His loyal subjects; and so its justice, which is the basis and bulwark of the love and greatest possible good of God and all His loyal society. We thus see clearly how it secured the true ends of public justice and vastly more—how its immediate effect was in *and upon God Himself*, and its consequential effects were *in and upon His rational creatures*—how it *reconciled* Him to the world of sinners, and opened the way for Him to do all possible to have it made known to and effective on them to *reconcile* them all to Him—how it was an *expiation and propitiation* (ἱλασμὸς) *to God*, not to the realm of creatures, for the sins of the whole world—how, therefore, God can be *just* and the *justifier* of all who believe in Jesus—how it is the all-sufficient *foundation*, besides which none can lay any other, for the remission or forgiveness of sins through faith in Christ's name—and how, as well as why, "it pleased God in Him, having made peace through the blood of His cross, by Him to reconcile all things to Himself; by Him, I say, whether things on earth or things in heaven" (Col. 1:20). It *provisionally* met the demand of justice against human sinners in God and in all holy beings in all worlds and forever; and *actually* meets it against all who will believe through all time. "All that was contrary to us, God took out of the

way, nailing it to the cross, and having spoiled principalities and powers, He made a show of them openly, triumphing over them in it."

That Christ's sufferings and death were purely substitutional, by the design of the Father and the Son, for the penal sufferings deserved by sinners and due from them to God and His whole realm, is demonstrated by the whole array of Scripture passages which we have examined in the preceding pages relating to them; and we add nothing here to their invincible testimony. That they were to meet the demand of retributive penal justice is not only also clearly taught, but is, in the nature of the case, intrinsic in substitution. That Christ endured the infliction of the essential penal sufferings deserved by sinners in their stead, is in its nature substitution. "He was made a curse [one devoted to all He suffered] for us," and "sin [a sin-offering], that we might be made the righteousness of God in Him"—that is justified.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Scriptural Doctrine of Forgiveness and Justification.

§ 272. WHY GOD CANNOT FORGIVE ANY SINNER INDEPENDENTLY OF THE ATONEMENT.

God and all created moral beings are such because the nature of each contains and enjoins upon itself the law, and thus *by nature they are in and constitute* one universal, eternal social-moral society, of which, by the nature of the case, He is Head, the Ruler or Administrator of that law, which, by its quality of justice, retributive just because it is ethical, is the sole compacting bond of that society, and constitutes a universal moral system. It is therefore a preposterous conceit, that God can, by any moral possibility, do the absolutely anti-natural, anti-moral, anti-social, anti-systemic, anti-just, ethically or retributively, anti-benevolent, anti-governing, anti-accountable, arbitrary, reasonless act of pardoning, forgiving, remitting the sins of a single sinner, even should he repent, which none ever would do, on any ground whatever, except that of an atonement, which perfectly meets *for* him the demand of ethical justice *to* God and the whole loyal society by meeting that of retributive justice *against him.* Were this conceit true, God could not have even a parody of a government, but would be *a consummate non-resistant to sinners,* never inflicting punishment upon them, even if peers or, if possible, worse, of Herod, miscalled the Great, of Nero, of Pope Alexander VI., of his son, Cæsar Borgia, of Philip II., of Spain, of the Duke of Alva, and the myriads of both sexes of like kind along down the centuries; but, leaving them wholly to the mere natural consequences of their sins, absurdly called retributions and punishment, for penalty, He, according to Bushnell, must persistently enter into sympathy with them in undergoing these consequences and go to cost for them in order to propitiate Himself to

them!* The whole conception of God's designing and adopting such a factitious method of propitiating Himself towards sinners, we boldly repel as unethical, repulsive, and even ridiculous, especially when connected with the denial that He was under any necessity of justice, law, government, or moral system to inflict any punishment whatever on all or any of them, even the worst, the natural consequences of their sins being all they ever would suffer in any event, and these being incapable of arrest or abatement by any self-propitiation of His. According to this notion, instead of His wrath (ὀργή) against sinners being the demand in Him, as Ruler, of the law or its justice for their punishment for violating it, it is simply an ebulliency of passion or emotional anger in Him as a mere Person; and to cool this off, and propitiate Himself into sympathetic and kind feeling or good-humor towards them, He devises and practices upon Himself this farcical method of self-imposture! Think only of an omniscient Being as in reality either in such an emotional passion or trying to trick Himself out of it into sober reason, judgment and benevolence respecting them by such a preposterous process of self-deception! Think how this notion of propitiation in its setting must appear to the omniscient One Himself!

§ 273. FORGIVENESS OF SINS NOT A PERSONAL MATTER TO GOD.

In the Work of Bushnell, last referred to,† we find the following: "The forgiveness of sins, * * * is a purely personal matter, in which the Fatherhood love and feeling and the offended holiness of God are concerned. The proceeding here is intelligible and simple, because the forgiveness in question is to be a strictly Personal Settlement, that and that only. * * * All wrongs, taken as personal offenses, are yet violations also of law, and forgiveness, being personal, has no power, of course, to right the injuries of broken law. The law, too, being impersonal, cannot, of course, forgive anything itself; or any way compound its own wrong; neither is it conceivable that God, as administrator of law, has any power to annul the fact of such wrong, or the fact of a damage done by it to the law. Forgiveness, we thus find, puts a man personally right with God, but it does not put him right with law, and it is not easy to see that anything can. The retributive consequences of violated law are running still in his nature; only so far reduced as the moral dis-

(*) Forgiveness and Law, Chap. I.

(†) Forgiveness and Law, Chap. II., pp. 93, 94.

orders of his nature are rectified, and the blight of his transgressions removed by the health-restoring efficacy of the regeneration. Made partly or completely whole, he will be partly or completely clear of the penal effects of the law, and never till then. At this single point and so far, forgiveness has to do with law, and law with forgiveness, and I really do not see that they have a single point of contact anywhere else; except as the law continues to press the enforcement of a life that can fitly be forgiven."

This passage is a medley of inherent inconsistencies, all at war with the correlation of evangelical tenets it is aimed to supplant; but our special reason for quoting it is its statement in the first two sentences, that "the forgiveness of sins is a purely personal matter," "a strictly Personal Settlement, that and that only." This notion, with its grounds and implications, we have, for all the reasons shown, called a preposterous conceit. For those reasons, and those shown in Part I. of this Work, we have denied that, if God acts according to the law and moral system, *He can have a right to forgive or to remit the sins of any sinner, even if repentant, which none ever would be, as a merely Personal act*, or except as a Ruler, for the following reasons: 1. Sin is not merely a personal matter between them, but one between every sinner and the total moral society, God as its Head and Ruler included. Were the two the only ones existing, it seems possible that God might then forgive him, if truly repentant, as His so doing would be a simply personal matter, provided others were never to exist, or to know the fact, if they should. But the existence of a single one more would radically change the case. By every principle of their social-moral nature, the law in it, and the moral system which these would create, He would be bound to be their Ruler, and, as the Administrator of that law and system, and especially if He designed ever to increase their number, and that those added should ever know what He had done, if one of the two should sin, to do ethical justice to Himself and the other by inflicting retributive punishment on him according to his actual ill-desert, as known by Him. We mean, of course, if a redemptive measure with its involved gracious probation were not provided for him. If one were provided, and he refused to embrace it, he would deserve and God would inflict a proportionately severer punishment upon him when his probation closed. If they should both sin, the same principles and conditions would apply to both, as if only one did, except that, if God did not design to create others, nor interpose a redemptive measure, there would seem to be no end to be attained by inflicting

deserved punishment upon them beyond abandoning them forever. But, if He designed to create others, and that they should know His course with these two, then they would really be in a moral society and system, and must be dealt with accordingly, and if He had no redemptive measure for them, He must punish them precisely as they deserve; or, if having such a measure, they do not embrace it, He must punish them proportionately more severely at the close of their probation. His obligation to do such justice must increase in proportion to every increase of the number embraced at any successive point in the universal and eternal society and system. By creating them, however many, he constituted them into this moral society and system with Himself in, over, and forever responsible to all loyally in them to maintain them by administering the law in perfect accordance with its social-moral character, which consists in its requiring pure moral love to Him and to all the ever-obedient as ethical justice to Him and them, which includes punitive retributive justice to all in sin at the end of their probation. Civil justice in a state to law-keeping citizens includes retributive justice to wrong-doers and criminals. With these invincible truths before us, how can it possibly consist with them or be true, that "forgiveness is purely" or at all, "a personal matter," "a strictly Personal Settlement?" 2. It certainly cannot as it respects either God or any sinner. (1) As to God, in forgiving a sinner, He is doing an act which necessarily pertains to a Ruler only. Neither does He stand related to a sinner, nor a sinner to Him, as merely private. He is not only the Author and fundamental member of the universal and eternal society, but, by infinite obligation, He is its Ruler, having made it by creating every one in it with His law in him, and with conscience to uphold it by its judicial decisions; and therefore He cannot act as a mere private member of it, irresponsible to it all, with any one, especially any sinner of it, in any matter whatever which involves or affects in any way the rights, dues, interests, and concerns of all or any in it. For, as its Ruler, He necessarily *represents* all and each *in it*, as well as *Himself* in all such action; and forgiving sins or sinners is just such. For sin is violation of the law, of the moral system it constitutes, of the universal moral government, of the moral nature of God and all other moral beings, and therefore of the rights, dues, interests, and concerns of all the society, and thus, in principle, of ethical justice throughout its entire and eternal extent; and the demand of ethical justice from God to the society, including Himself, is for retributive justice upon every

sinner. Hence, it cannot possibly be a private, but must necessarily be an official, public act of God as Ruler to forgive any sinner. Rulers can only pardon or forgive violators of law which is public action; and they can never do it righteously as a mere personal matter or settlement, which it never can be, but only in harmony with the general rights and good, which is supremely true of God. (2) As to sinners, as forgiving is replacing them, freed from liability to deserved, retributive punishment from God as Ruler, and with perfect title in the universal society, all whose rights, dues, interests, and concerns, God's as Ruler and also as a Person included, they have violated, by what possibility can it be a mere personal matter in the case of each of them, or not an act which necessarily and most profoundly concerns the total moral society and system throughout the universe and the everlasting ages? For, if God's act of forgiving one is purely a personal matter or settlement with him, it is not one done by Him as Ruler at all, nor one to its object as necessarily in and accountable to that society represented by Him as its Ruler, but one which, in the relations of both to that society, He can have no possible right to do, as it would be in direct conflict with His law, as it is in His own and all created moral natures, with the universal moral system it constitutes, with His Rulership or moral government, and so with all justice and all well-being. It would be sheer injustice to each one in that society, Himself included, since, by thus exempting him, without any reparation whatever or regard to it, as must be done if forgiving him is purely a personal matter, from retributive justice, merely on condition of repentance, He would refuse to do ethical justice to all in it; and thus, *discarding* ALL *administrative justice*, He would reduce His law to mere advice, annul His government, disintegrate the universal moral society and system, replace all His governmental administration with everlasting, anti-moral non-resistance to sinners however enormously criminal, and wage irreconcilable war with all the intuitions and affirmations of moral reason and conscience in all moral natures existing and to exist in all futurity. To express the whole in brief, as God and the sinner are both in the universal society and system, and He is its Ruler, representing it all in forgiving sinners, simply because that is a social-moral act—one which concerns the society because it replaces them in it, restored to all the rights, dues, interests, and concerns which, by their sins against His law and government over it, and so against Himself as Ruler, they had forfeited, and had thus made their forgiveness necessary.

what an elephantine absurdity it is to say that "forgiveness is a purely personal matter," "a strictly Personal Settlement, that and that only?" But this absurdity is the logical offspring of one even larger, if possible, the one that the natural consequences of moral action are its retributions. In Chapters III. and IV., Part I., of this Work, we have not only shown the superficial, mechanical and groundless character of this notion, but its direct antagonism to both moral psychology and Scripture, to the law and the universal social-moral society and system constituted by it, or by moral reason which gives, and conscience which upholds, it, and of course to all justice, Christianity and the true character of God. It is the prolific dam of other absurdities, of which one is, that God can forgive sins or sinners at all, if this notion is true.

§ 274. WHAT FORGIVENESS IS, AS TAUGHT IN SCRIPTURE.

In all our Lord's sayings recorded in the Gospel, He never, but once, uses any other Greek verb than ἀφίημι which means *to dismiss; to let go* from one's power, so from obligation to one's self; *to remit* a debt, offense, or the like; then, *to remit sin or sins, transgressions*, etc., that is, *their penalty or punishment;* which, as all capable interpreters agree, is, *to pardon, to forgive sins* or *sinners;* nor did He ever use any other noun than ἄφεσις, which means *dismission*, that is, *deliverance*, etc., from service, captivity, etc.; hence, *remission*, that is, *pardon, forgiveness of sins*. His Apostles, Peter (Acts 2:38; 5:31; 8:22; 10:43), James (5:15), and John (I. John 1:9; 2:12), use the same verb and noun *only* to express the same meanings. Paul uses this same noun *only* to express this same meaning (Acts 13:38; 26:18; Eph. 1:7; Col. 1:14; Heb. 9:22; 10:18), but another verb than ἀφίημι, once excepted (Rom. 4:7). The difference between the English meanings of the verbs *to pardon* and *to forgive*, and of the nouns, *pardon* and *forgiveness*, does not exist between them, therefore, if used to translate this verb and this noun, or in expressing or teaching the Scriptural meaning of the one or the other. Whichever of these verbs is used, it can neither include nor exclude a shade of meaning different from that of the Greek verb, and so can never mean to *justify, to make righteous*, in any sense; and whichever of these nouns is used, it must mean exactly what this Greek noun does, and so can never mean *justification*, or *righteousness* in any sense. That verb signifies only the rectoral act of God towards a truly repentant, believing sinner of dismissing, letting go, remitting his sins in the precise sense of pardoning or forgiving them.

The act does not undo his sins, nor arrest any of their natural consequences, nor effect personal renewal to obedience and righteousness in him; but it fully exempts him from the penalty or positive punishment his sins deserve from God, restoring him to His favor, and from nothing else. In no other sense can sin or sins be the object of this Greek verb, or of any of the English verbs used to translate it, than that of remitting the penalty or penalties of it or them, which is a common one through all Scripture; and, in no other sense, than this of exemption from the penalty or punishment deserved by sin or sinners can either the Greek noun, or pardon, forgiveness, or remission of sins, used in translating it, be better than pure nonsense. Hence, this Greek verb and the noun are positive proof in themselves, that neither our Lord, the Apostles, nor Mark and Luke believed the natural consequences of sin its penalty or retributive punishment; and, as they doubtless agreed on this point with the Jews of that day, the Sadducees excepted, this verb and noun equally prove that neither then, nor, we confidently add, ever, back to the patriarchs, did that people believe the perverting fiction. For, by what possibility could either sins, *as actions*, or their natural consequences be dismissed, sent away, let go?—could pardoning, forgiving, remitting sins be, instead of an *act* of God *as Ruler*, exempting the sinner from their penalty by setting it aside, as mankind generally have always attested it is, a Divine *process* of renewing and sanctifying, which *begins* by arresting a few and modifying some more of these consequences of the sins of the past life, *advances* by very slowly adding to the arrests and modifications as a rule, and currently *saves* from those only which persistent sin would have induced, but leaves all the unarrested old ones and those of sins still sundrily committed, like sores, ulcers, and cancers on the body, eating into the moral nature? If any of these inventions against the simple truth expressed by either the Greek verb or noun, or any of the English words used to translate them, be accepted, both these Greek and these English words are wrenched away from the only real meanings they ever had, and forced to express contrary ones which they never had, and which thus expressed by them are really nonsensical.

§ 275. FORGIVENESS DOES NOTHING IN THE FORGIVEN, BUT IS WHOLLY AN ACT FOR HIM, RELIEVING HIM FROM PENALTY.

Of the baneful effects of these perversions of the meanings of these words, one is, that, if they mean, instead of exemption from

the infliction of deserved retributive punishment, conservation from committing sin itself, then *sins* are made nothing of, never are, will be, nor can be forgiven in the sense of having their penalty set aside, for their natural consequences never can be in this, or any true sense. Let us understand this matter. To forgive or to remit sins is not a process operated *in* the forgiven. It is an *act* of the forgiver done *in* himself *in favor* of the forgiven, not *in* the forgiven at all. On the contrary, he is required to effect or act the change of repentance *in himself* for his sin or wrong done as *a condition*, antecedent of course, of being forgiven or the object of this favor; and he must abide in that change afterwards to keep the favor. In different form, forgiveness or remission of sins is a voluntary change *in* the forgiver towards the forgiven, by which he ceases to hold and treat him as guilty, and does the contrary; but it is no change whatever *in* either the person or the character of the forgiven, either when acted or ever afterwards. Besides the change of disposition in the forgiver towards him, the act effects one *in their relations*, by which the forgiven is exempted from the punishment he deserves from the forgiver, whether a private person or a ruler; and this expends and ends its whole potency. This is all as true respecting forgiveness by God as by man, as our Lord plainly assumed.* In the petition—"And forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors," we have in the words "debts" and "debtors" a certainty added to that of the verb *forgive* itself in each of the two clauses, the two constituting a double demonstration, that forgiveness is doing nothing whatever *in* the forgiven, but is an act exempting him from the punitive treatment he *deserves* from God or from man, and *owes* to suffer for as if in payment of a *debt*. It cannot possibly exempt him from the *wrong acts* he has done against God or man, nor from their natural consequences, nor from anything whatever, besides the positive punitive treatment he deserves for them from the forgiver, God, man, or both. To attempt to make it exempt from anything else is to be the slave of a theory, to juggle with language, and to trifle with Scripture and man's endless interests.

§ 276. MEANING OF THE GREEK VERB, RENDERED TO JUSTIFY, AND OF ITS KINDRED NOUNS AND OTHER WORDS.

What is shown in the two preceding paragraphs respecting the Greek verb and noun considered in them, and their proper meaning, leads to some notice here in immediate connection of the other

(*) Mat. 6:12, 14, 15; 9:5, 6; 18:21-35; Luke 17:3, 4.

Greek verb δικαιόω, *to justify*, and its kindred nouns and other words, and of the relation of these to those. The meanings of these evidently include, but go vastly beyond, those of the former, and constitute a very important addition to the rest of revelation, one which the illustrious mind of the Apostle Paul was inspired by the Holy Spirit to perceive, grasp, and express, as from the Lord Himself, in his Divinely philosophical Epistle to the Romans, and somewhat also in that to the Galatians. What is this addition? and what is its importance? It is the explicit teaching of the New Testament, that all forgiveness by the Father is *in*, *through*, or *for the sake of* Christ, or is done by Christ Himself as Redeemer.* But, although implied, it is nowhere distinctly said that it is in perfect harmony with the demands of justice, as both ethical and retributive, in the law, or that it is not contrary to, or wholly irrespective of it. Yet this is a point of vital importance to be authoritatively and decisively settled by revelation; for it involves the question, whether, in forgiving sinners, even as just stated, God or Christ acts exactly according to, or in designed violation or disregard of, the perfect justice, ethical and retributive, required by the law as the basis of all moral love, righteousness, and good in the total, everlasting society and system which it constitutes; and so really whether either Person, or both as *One*, acts morally, extra-morally, or anti-morally in forgiving sinners; whether with or against all moral nature, including His own, as containing and affirming the law; whether for or against the preservation and perpetuation of all involved in the moral system; and so whether God has a moral government, and is just and holy in His benevolence, so that His character is in absolute agreement with His eternal law. Any forgiveness inconsistent with the justice of the law, both ethical and retributive, is of necessity *immoral;* and any notion of it which makes it a mere non-rectoral, personal act of God towards the repentant sinner, or one regardless of justice, is one of Him as committing a supremely immoral act, a universal injustice and outrage. As there is no justice, except that enjoined and demanded by the law, forgiveness must be fundamentally immoral, if not done in perfect consistency with ethical justice to the universal loyal society, and so with the law, the moral system, and the most complete good possible of all loyal to God in the universe and in the future without end.

(*) Acts 5:31; 13:38; Eph. 1:7; 4:32; Col. 1:14; I. John 1:9; 2:1, 2.

§ 277. WHY FORGIVENESS CAN ONLY BE ON THE GROUND OF THE ATONEMENT.

Now, it is a most precious fact, that God, Father, or Son, forgives the sins of all who truly turn to Him from them in faith. But, although forgiveness fully exempts its recipient from deserved penalty and restores to God's favor, yet this comes very far short of all involved in or connected with it when He forgives sinners. It is, indeed, the common understanding among men that it does this for its objects, when acted by them in their social, domestic, civil, and even governmental relations without reference to the strict demands of the moral law and system, or to any redemptive substitutional ground. But, on account of the relations of sinners to the universal society and system, including God, who is its Ruler, and of the demand of the ethical justice of the law *to* that society, still loyal *against* them for retributive justice upon them, it betrays a suprisingly plentiful lack of comprehension of the necessary, intrinsic polity of the moral system and government of God, to suppose it possible for Him to forgive sinners according to this understanding, without ruinously violating that polity, and doing infinite injustice and wrong. Such forgiveness would be a destructive stroke at the law, the universal moral system and government, all moral nature, and everything holy, just, and good in the universe. Justice must somehow be met, and its demands against sinners perfectly satisfied for them potentially, or God can never rightfully, never, except with utter injustice and wrong, forgive a single one of them. God has met and thus satisfied them for all by the atonement of Christ, which fact proves that they were an insurmountable barrier, even to Him, in the way of His forgiving any without it, and so unchangeably remain. Consequently all forgiveness by Him is solely on the ground of the atonement, and is thus in absolute harmony with the eternal justice of the law and the moral system. Whenever, therefore, to forgive or to remit sins, or forgiveness or remission of sins is ascribed to God or to Christ in Scripture as done to exempt their actors from their just punishment, it is always necessarily implied, that it is done entirely on the ground stated, and of course is purely grace to them, but not violation or disregard of the law, as it would be without an atonement. The forgiving act thus includes putting the forgiving one perfectly right with the demands of the justice of the law against him, so that he is as free from them as if he had never sinned. The act is grounded wholly on the perfect substitutional ethical justice done by Christ to the universal

loyal society, God included, by His atonement, which completely met and satisfied the demand of the retributive justice of the law against him, and also procured the Holy Spirit, by whose agency to secure his regeneration as the condition of fitness for his justification, and with Him all the other incomputable treasures of His grace in time and forever to all that believe.

§ 278. WHAT PAUL USED THE GREEK VERB, RENDERED TO JUSTIFY, AND ITS KINDRED NOUNS AND OTHER WORDS TO EXPRESS.

Now, to express this complete restoration to harmony of relation with the whole justice of the law against sinners, on the ground of the perfect satisfaction of its demands against them by the atonement, on condition of their turning from sin in the way required, the Divinely guided Apostle found the Greek verb, δικαιόω, *to justify*, with all its kindred nouns and other words Providentially prepared and adapted to discharge the high and holy function. This verb no more than ἀφίημι can possibly signify, in the active voice, *to make righteous in character* in its New Testament, especially its Pauline use, because it includes the meaning of ἀφίημι, which, as shown, has no reference whatever to changing or mending character, but only to freeing from punitive retribution. From the nature of the case, therefore, the Divine act expressed by this verb, which occurs about *forty times in the New Testament*, does not make its object righteous in character by regeneration, or any effect *in* him, but only in a purely *forensic* or *judicial sense*, which consists in *pronouncing* or *declaring* him perfectly *righteous* or *just* as related to the demands against him of the *justice* of the law as retributive, because by the atonement of Christ, applied to him with forgiveness, they have been perfectly met and satisfied for him, and are now no more against him than if he had always obeyed. Thus, on the substitutional basis of Christ's atonement, he is by grace through faith declared and treated *as just* in relation to the justice of the law, *because he is so.* But this act is never done for any persisting in sin, but always and only in immediate connection with the Holy Spirit's finished work of regeneration, which includes the first exercise of faith, by which the soul is united to and spiritually in Christ.

§ 279. THE ADJECTIVE δίκαιος SPECIALLY NOTICED, AND THE NOUNS AND ADVERB KINDRED.

It is instructive as well as important to notice briefly the adjective δίκαιος and the nouns and the adverb kindred to it and to this

verb. Even a glance at them will show how fundamentally the redemptive system of salvation through Christ and on the ground of His atonement not only consists with, and is adjusted to, but maintains and includes the justice of the law, both ethical and retributive, in absolute integrity, as the grand and only social-moral intertie between moral beings, binding them to universal reciprocity of pure, just, and holy moral love with each other and with God. A law with justice left out would be no moral law, but an unjust imposture on the intelligent universe, which could be only a universal chaos of anarchy. It matters not whether δίκαιος is from δίχα or δικη, though we think it from the latter, which means *right, justice, jus;* it means *righteous, just, justus,* especially in Scripture (Heb. *tsedeq*); and *righteous* and *just* are exactly synonymous, and, in the New Testament, are indifferently used in rendering this Greek adjective, the former *thirty-seven times,* the latter *thirty-three.* In four of the five times it is applied to Christ, it is rendered *just,* in one, *righteous* (Acts 3:14; 7:52; 22:14; I. Pet. 3:18; I. John 2:1), and, in II. Tim. 4:8, He is called "the righteous Judge." Either of these words instead of the other would mean precisely the same as it does in any of these five places; and the same would be the case in any of the *sixty-five other places,* if reasons of style permitted a change. But, as a rule, we prefer *just* as the most definite and expressive of the two. The core-meaning of every ethical Greek word formed from δικη is *justice,* as it is of every such Hebrew word from צֶדֶק, *tsedeq,* of every such Latin word from *jus,* of every such German word from *recht,* of every such English word from *right,* and of every such word in any other language, ancient or modern, from the corresponding root-word in it. Christ is called "the just" "the righteous," in the passages referred to above, not only as peerless among men in His perfect obedience to the law and the will of His Father, but as provisionally fulfilling, in His freely assumed Mediatorial relations to God and man as man's Redeemer, by His obedience unto, and in His voluntarily endured sufferings and death, all the requirements of the law He had come under for mankind in sin (Gal. 4:4; Mat. 3:15), and all the demands of its justice against them by His atonement. The designation, ὁ δίκαιος, *the just* or *the righteous,* is doubtless taken from Is. 53:11, צַדִּיק, *the righteous one,* rendered ὁ δίκαιος in the Sept.; for it is there used with direct reference to His having made the atonement. In I. John 2:1, it is evidently used with the same reference, as it is followed by—"And He is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for *the sins* of the whole world;" and, in

Acts 3:14; 7:52, and I. Pet. 3:18, it also seems plain from the connections, that Peter, like John, uses this designation by the great evangelical prophet with the same reference. Ananias also, in his words to the just converted Saul (Acts 22:14), adopted it from the same place, and uses it with the same reference. It should certainly be noticed here, not only that this designation singles out our Lord as perfect and peerless among men in fulfilling all requirements of justice as ethical, and all its demands as penally retributive for the salvation of men, but that it is one which sentimentalists would never have given Him. Given by them, it would be—the sympathizer—the pitiful—the merciful—the loving—the benevolent—the tender brother, or some like one, which would express His fellow-feeling with, and yearning disposition towards, mankind; whereas ὁ δικαιος, *the just*, or *righteous*, has none of these meanings, nor any like them, expressive of His feeling, affection, or disposition towards them as sinners, or at all, but simply, that He is the one who transcendently does, vindicates, and maintains justice. All mere sentimental flummery is debarred from even its threshold. He is the righteous one specially because "He bore the iniquities of men," "is the propitiation for them," "once suffered for them," "has been killed," "has been betrayed and murdered." It is an essential point in the true Scriptural doctrine of the atonement, that *Christ was the Divinely constituted representative of mankind*, and, *as such*, obeyed and suffered and died for them; and the consideration of that point will add light and force to the preceding. But, before considering that, we must notice other Greek words formed from δικη.

§ 280. MEANINGS OF THESE GREEK WORDS.

Δικαιοσύνη means *righteousness*, the state of being righteous or just in agreement of character or of judicial relation with the essential quality of the law as righteous or just. It belongs to those only of men who receive it by faith as a gracious gift from God (Rom. 4:3, 5, 6, 9, 11, 13, 22; 5:17; 8:10; and elsewhere). Δικαιωσις means *justification*, the judicial justifying act of God, which sets a believing sinner right, straight, square with the demands of the retributive justice of the law against him, and puts him in the state of righteousness, δικαιοσύνη, (Rom. 4:25; 5:18). Δικαίωμα means a righteous or just decree, judgment, or requirement (Luke 1:6; Rom. 1:32; 2:26; 8:4; Heb. 9:1, 10; Rev. 15:4; or, as in classic Greek, *a righteous or just act or deed, an action of justice, the amendment, rectification, or making good of, a wrong* (Rom. 5:16, 18; Rev.

19:8, New Ver.). In Rom. 5:18, it clearly has this classic meaning; for its connection in the verse requires this, and its meaning there is plainly included in that of ὑπακοη in verse 19 (Phil. 2:8; Heb. 5:8; 12:2). Its meaning in verse 16 must, it seems to us, be essentially the same—*an act of righteousness*, as in the margin of the New Version. The adverb δικαίως means *justly, rightly, with strict justice* (Luke 23:41; I. Pet. 2:23). This verb and these other words formed from δικη were used by the Greek ethical philosophers who held justice to be the root and sum of all virtue; and, as used in the New Testament, and especially by Paul, are translations of the Hebrew verb and other words corresponding, and exactly represent their meanings, as a comparison of the Lexicons clearly shows. The truth clearly demonstrated by the uses of the verb and kindred words under consideration in each of these languages of Scripture is, that justice is the fundamental quality of the law, and of obedience to it, and can never be discarded, nor in the least disregarded by God, nor cease to be the basis of morality, of the moral system, of moral government, of moral love, and of all true moral philosophy and theology.*

§ 281. MEANING OF THE EXPRESSION δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, RIGHTEOUSNESS OF GOD.

The expression, "righteousness of God," is used by the Apostle Paul in Rom. 1:17, where he states the theme of the Epistle, and in 3:21, 22, 25, 26; 10:3. From all these passages, taken in their connection, it is manifest that, by the expression, he does not mean God's *personal righteousness* of character, as some suppose. For, in them, he sets this "righteousness of God" in direct antithesis to a supposed righteousness of the law, one of works or deeds of man in supposed obedience to it, and called our own; and he denies that any of mankind ever did or can have it, and asserts that they all may, and are required to have God's by faith without works, that all who believe have it, and that it is the only righteousness possible for man. Instead of its being that of God's character which is essentially identical with His holiness, it is one which He originated and provided purposely for fallen and guilty man—one of which He is the Author (θεοῦ, gen. auctoris), one which did not exist till He originated it in and through our Lord Jesus Christ. His personal

(*) For the meaning of the Greek verb and words from δικη, see Exegetical Notes in Lange's Com. on Romans, on Chap. 1:17; 2:13; 3:20, 24, especially those added by Dr. Schaff—also, on Gal., Chap. 2:16, of the Lange Series, and No. 2, (b) of Doc. and Ethical.

righteousness is eternal, and consists in His eternal harmony with the justice, matter and end of the law in His own uncreated nature. He created man in His own image, and therefore having the same law in *his* nature, who, because he was finite and dependent, was necessarily subject to Himself, as his moral Governor. And when, by the fall of Adam, the race were all constituted sinners, God's personal righteousness by absolute harmony with this eternal law in Him, caused Him, instead of summarily destroying it in its head, to spare and continue it, as it had caused Him, foreknowing the fall, to devise the plan of redemption for it in and through Christ, who, crucified, Paul declares to be "the power of God and the wisdom of God." But, acting by the same law, He will finally execute the penalty of it, as in and over men, upon all of them who shall remain incorrigible. But no special actings ever done or to be done by Him are His absolute personal righteousness, being only manifestations of it. There is a clear distinction between the righteousness of character or heart, and that of acts or courses. The former is back of, and the moral ground or fountain of all the latter; and, in itself, is *executive* of nothing; while the latter is wholly that of executive acts, courses, and measures for the special ends to secure which they are acted. God's personal righteousness is not maintained with any *special* reference to mankind or any other order of creatures, or to the special benefit of any, but has equal relation to all; and there is no ground on, or way in, which it can be communicated, or reckoned to any of mankind for justification. It is absolutely incommunicable in any sense to any creature; and therefore it cannot be "the righteousness of God" intended by the Apostle. For, (1) this is reckonable "unto all, and upon all of them that believe;" (2) it was originated and provided in and through our Lord Jesus Christ with reference to the benefit of men, but with none to any other creatures; (3) it was designed to be to all receiving it by faith instead of the perfect, personal righteousness which they would have had by perfect obedience, which they all lacked; (4) it was to be to all so receiving it a gift of pure grace for their justification; (5) it did not therefore include anything in God's personal character, and was wholly gracious for salvation; (6) it consists entirely in the perfect obedience of Christ unto death (Rom. 5:19) or unto a righteous act (Rom. 5:18); (Phil. 2:8) in making atonement for the sins of the world. This is the righteousness of God intended—that provided by Him for men who neither have nor can have any other.

§ 282. THE RELATION OF THIS RIGHTEOUSNESS OR OBEDIENCE OF CHRIST TO MEN.

This is the core-question concerning the matter of justification; and it is profoundly important to understand it. It is said by some that the obedience of Christ was His own in the same sense in which man's would be his, if he had perfectly obeyed—that the obligation on Him to obey was the same as it is on other men; and therefore could not be for men any more than a perfectly obedient man's would be. This view we once adopted, and held for some years; but many years ago a thorough investigation of the matter compelled us to reject it, as inconsistent with Scripture, with the doctrine of the atonement, and with all the relation of Christ to men as a Saviour; and to hold instead that *His obedience was no more for Himself than His atoning sufferings and death in it were, but was equally for man.* One radical reason for holding this is, that, as we think we have conclusively shown, He did not come to stand in the same relation to mankind in which any other of them since the first man ever has stood or ever will stand, but to be the supernatural Head and religious representative of them all with God, the Father, as Ruler and Administrator of the law. He left "the glory He had with the Father before the world was" (John 17:5, 11, 22; 10:30; 14:9, 10; Phil. 2:6), and "became poor" (II. Cor. 8:9), by coming incarnate, under the law, and obeying under it unto death wholly and therefore *representatively* for men as the one Mediator between God and them* His relation to them was thus entirely *peculiar, special, official,* and so therefore was *all* His action in it. A second reason no less radical is, that He was under no obligation of justice to do any part of all this for mankind. Before beginning it, He was, equally with the Father, not only under no law, rule, or authority out of Himself, but was Ruler, as He was Creator, of all creatures. His love of all rational creatures, was identical with the Father's, being wholly in accordance with the eternal law in the Divine nature. It was *owed* and rendered to all the sinless of them by *natural right,* and to all the purely obedient of them by *moral right also;* and so *by an obligation of justice.* But, while the obligation in Him was to render perfect moral love to them, which is a thing of the heart or will, that on Him *to act* as Ruler, or to fill any office, was only to stand and act in a *special, outward, executive relation;* and, as such action is not necessarily intrinsic in moral love, but

(*) Mat. 20:28; Luke 19:10; John 3:16, 17; Rom. 5:18, 19; Gal. 4:4; I. Tim. 2:5, 6; Heb. 2:9, 10, 14, 15; I. John 4:14.

only according to relations and conditions, He was free, for the sake of accomplishing a greater good, to abdicate His rulership in the universe and all "the glory He had with the Father before the world was," and to "take upon Him the form of a servant" "under the law," to be "made in the likeness of men," and to "become obedient unto death, even the death of the cross"—all not for Himself, but wholly, exclusively, in immediate purpose and aim, *for mankind*—that is, to become their repesentative with the Father, and to do and to suffer for them all He did *as such*. As He, without the slightest obligation of justice *to them*, and moved solely by His pity for and merciful love towards them, vacated His "form of God," and became incarnate and "under the law," as God's positive, authoritative rule of action for men with its enforcing sanctions, both to obey it, and to meet the retributive demand of its justice against them, to redeem and save them, His obeying in this servant-form was as entirely for them as were His sufferings and death. In both alike He acted for and represented them with and according to the will of the Father, which He put Himself under, to represent and act for them in obeying it as well as in suffering its penalty against them. As He came under it for this special, *official* purpose, and as it neither had, nor thus acquired any *authority* over Him, except what He thus gave it for this definite, official purpose, He could neither obey it, nor suffer and die under it for any other reason than that He was the Divinely constituted and appointed official representative of the fallen race.

§ 283. THE MERIT OF CHRIST FOR HIS OBEDIENCE WITHOUT LIMIT AND FOR ALL WHO WILL BELIEVE.

Omitting now to consider all involved in His obedience as man's representative, this is certainly true respecting Him in it, and His merit acquired by it was measureless, and, like it, was, of course, for them *provisionally* in connection with Himself, so as to invest every one of them, who receives Him as a Saviour, with an everlasting title to participate in its deserved rewards, even to be joint-heirs of God with Him. As His representative substitution of Himself in His sufferings and death for them, liable to the penal sufferings deserved by their sins, met the demand of retributive justice in the law against them, so His representative obedience for them met the demand of ethical justice in it *provisionally* for the obedience of *all*, *actually* for it of all who receive Him; so that both these demands of it against mankind were perfectly met by Him as their repre-

sentative with God in the two modes indicated. His obedience, like His atonement, was rendered *to God* for them as sinners; and while His obedience, *as such*, was not and could not be transferred or ascribed to any of them, its *effect in and upon God* towards all of them who believe in or receive Christ was such that its *merit or desert* of God's favor and reward can be ascribed, accounted, reckoned, imputed to them, so that they can be treated *as if* it was their own. Thus the demands of the law and its justice are absolutely met and maintained by Christ for men; and God, in all His merciful and gracious traatment of them, not only so treats them for Christ's sake, but in perfect accordance with the law and its justice, and so in absolute righteousness. Christ, therefore, representatively fulfilled a perfect righteousness according to the law and its justice, both ethical and retributive, for all men *provisionally*, for all who believe *actually*, so that "God can be strictly just, and yet the justifier of him that has faith in Jesus," and those justified "are not under the law, but under grace." Thus, as Paul shows in Rom. 5: 14–19, Christ is the contrast of Adam as related to mankind. They were both heads and representatives of the race and acted for it. In so acting, they were both on a *legal probation*. Adam fell in his, and brought all men into sin and condemnation, so that He and they were utterly lost, for aught they could or would ever do. Christ stood in His, and by His obedience for them, consummated in making an atonement *to God* for them, by which He fully redeemed them from the *necessity* of suffering the punishment to which they were condemned, He equally met the whole ethical demand of the law upon them for their life-long, perfect, personal obedience, provisionally for them all, actually for all of them who believe, so that God can, *in absolute justice*, not only *forgive*, but *justify*, pronounce *just* or *righteous*, according to the law, every one of these, *as if* they were faultlessly obedient themselves, and can justly confer on them the rewards merited by that perfect obedience of Christ as if they were merited by like obedience of their own. Such is this righteousness of Christ provided by God, and so "the righteousness of God;" and this only is meant in all the places where this expression occurs.

What, then, must be the value, virtue, and merit of Christ's obedience through His entire life of probation under the law as the representative of our fallen race, culminated in voluntarily substituting Himself in His sufferings and death for them to rescue them from the necessity of suffering the penalty of the law? Merit or desert of reward for and according to obedience is intuitively

affirmed by universal conscience; and His, therefore, must be great beyond all finite measure or conception—desert of the greatest possible reward that even God could give. What reward, according to the Scriptures, did He actually receive from the Father? (1) The resurrection of his body from the dead (Is. 53:10; Ps. 16:9, 11; Acts 2:24–32; 13:32–37). (2) Its endowment with all possible perfection and glory (Phil. 3:21; Rev. 1:14–16). (3) His exaltation to the throne at the right hand of God, all power in heaven being given to Him, and all creatures made subject to Him (Ps. 2:6, 8; 110 throughout; Dan 7:13, 14; Mat. 11:27; 28:18; John 3:35; 13:3; Eph. 1:20–23; Phil. 2:9, 11; Heb. 1:3–13; *et al*). (4) His being made the final Judge of men and angels (Mat. 25:31–46; John 5:22, 27; Acts 10:42; 17:31; Rom. 14:10, 11; II. Cor. 5:10; Jude 14:15). (5) His being made heir of all things (Rom. 8:17; Heb. 1:2; and all passages stating what God has given Him). (6) His being, as incarnate still, the object of the worship of the angels as well as of the redeemed (Phil. 2:10; Heb. 1:6; Rev. 5:12, 13). (7) His being the giver of the Holy Spirit for His offices on men (John 14:16, 17, 25, 26; 16:7–15; Acts 1:4, 5, 8; Luke 24:49; Acts 2:2–18, 33). (8) The Father's justification of all regenerated by the Spirit on the ground of His obedience and His atonement made in it—His adoption of them as His children, making them Christ's brethren, coheirs with Him and partakers of His power and glory—His raising them from the dead by His Spirit in the image of Christ, having bodies like His in glory—and all signified by their being united to Him, His members, His body, and His wife. All these and more, we are told, are embraced in the measureless reward to Christ by the Father as the Ruler of the intelligent universe. Oh, that believers would think with faith what momentous things are theirs and before them!

§ 284. ALL CHRIST'S REWARDS DUE HIM BY MORAL RIGHT AND JUSTICE; ALL DONE FOR MEN GRACE.

As Christ went through a purely legal probation under the law, and perfectly obeyed it throughout, according to the connected merit-principle, He absolutely deserved, and so had a moral right to, all the rewards He received and ever will receive, so that they were due to Him as pure justice—are wholly according to the law and its perfect justice. Of course, He had and has an absolute right to do with them as He will in His holy love and wisdom. But, in no sense are any of all the things He does or secures for men either as sinners or as believers deserved by them, so that they have

no right of their own whatever to them from Him or from God, but deserve the contrary. Their sin has both forfeited all right to His favor and deserved subjection to punishment, so that all they receive better than punishment is absolutely of grace. But, because all things are given to Christ by justice, He has a right by the law to give what He will to believers; so that there is no inconsistency with nor disregard of the law in all His bestowments of grace upon them, though sinners deserving to suffer the penalty of the law, solely because by His representative obedience and His atonement made for them to God in it, He not only perfectly met all its demands upon and against them, but turned it and its justice to Him, as their representative, entirely in their favor and made them His allies and servitors for their good.

§ 285. JUSTIFICATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRECEDING.

Such is the *rationale* of the relation of the obedience or righteousness of Christ or of God to believers; and we can see no good ground for any objection to it. In it we have essentially the whole matter of justification. Paul, guided by the inspiring Spirit, penetrated to the foundation of the relations of man as a sinner to the law and to God as its Administrator, and saw what was necessary to *restore him to all right* RELATIONS *to both. Justification on the grounds stated is that restoration, and the only one possible for sinners.* It is not something done *in* a man, but it is done *for* him; not *subjective*, but *objective;* not any action or morality of his, *but the action and morality of God for him*, utterly incapable of doing anything to restore himself. It is called *forensic* and *judicial* to express the fact that it is done for him by God as Ruler and Judge, as an *act* of judgment, which absolves him from the necessity of suffering the penalty of the law deserved by his sins on the ground of Christ's atonement, and places him in the relation to the law and to God of one perfectly obedient on the ground of the perfect obedience of Christ for him as his representative in addition to His atonement. It thus restores him to all the objective relations to the law and government of God and to God Himself, which pertain to the perfectly obedient—nay, even to Christ Himself, his representative, as far as he, a creature, is capable of being in them. It is an act of absolute grace in God, a gift by grace (Rom. 5:15–17); and, on the part of its object, "it is of faith, that it may be by grace" (Rom. 4:16). It is, therefore, vastly more than mere *pardon* or *forgiveness*, although this, in itself, is inestimably great grace, as it frees its

object from liability to the penalty he deserves for his sins. But justification towers above this by perfectly restoring its object to all the relations to the law and government of God, to God Himself, and to Christ, which we have stated; and we must believe it is perpetual. Doubtless, pardon, forgiveness, remission of sins is never acted, except as included in or part of justification. It is entirely distinct from both regeneration and sanctification. While it is an act of God done *for* its object and not *in* him, they are both works of the Spirit *in* their object—the former finished when the new-birth is accomplished; the latter, initiated by regeneration, continues through life, or the probation of life. That no justified person can live in habitual sin is sufficiently shown in a preceding place concerning regeneration; for, in this, the Holy Spirit initiates a new heart or moral action of the will, involving that of the entire moral nature, the intelligence, the sensibility, and the conscience, the core of which action is faith. In sanctification He continually nourishes cherishes, quickens and strengthens this heart and carries on His work in it by taking the things of Christ and showing them to the renewed and illuminated eyes of the mind, till at death the process is finished. The 6th Chapter of Romans and the 8:1–16 refute all the foolish objections to the doctrine of justification by faith alone or "without works" (Rom. 3:20–22, 28; 4:2–6; and numerous other places), which have been repeated from the Apostles' day to this, among which is, that "it gives license to continue in sin." Were it not "by faith without works," not one of our race ever could be justified, because not one responsible actor of it ever did or could do any works of real obedience to God or moral love to man without this very faith of justification, which alone "works by love, purifies the heart, and overcomes the world." No morality without it has any root of real moral love to God or man, and is commonly from mere policy, interest, training, habit, or hypocrisy.

§ 286. SENSE IN WHICH WHAT WE HAVE SHOWN INVOLVES THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.

If one says—"Why, what you have presented involves the old doctrine of imputation, that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to believers," our reply is the following: What we have shown is the *rationale* of justification, as we understand it to be clearly taught and involved in the teachings of Scripture. With us, the question never has been, and certainly not in this work, what any formula of doctrine, old or new, asserts, but what is the Scriptural truth taught

on any point which is purely one of Scripture. We have often designedly avoided the use of terms, though Scriptural, which have been made theological shibboleths between the holders and the opposers of particular tenets, and have been used for generations in controversies frequently far less holy than ardent. But having carefully shown the teaching of Scripture on this matter of justification, so that readers can see for themselves what it is, we now declare our full conviction that, in the proper Scriptural sense of the term, justification is by imputation. For, in that sense, imputation is reckoning, accounting to one or more, not what is not, but what is in fact really true.* Abraham's faith was not in itself righteousness, but was imputed, reckoned, accounted to him *for* it, unto it; and the same is true of the faith of all believers in Christ. God holds them all as *righteous*, square with the law and its justice, and so with His government, in the *forensic* sense; and He holds them so not in fiction, but in fact, not in disregard of the law and its justice, but in perfect accordance with them, because Christ has met all their demands for them; not therefore *immorally*, but absolutely *morally*. It is from His pure mercy and grace to them, that God pardons, forgives, remits their sins, justifies them; but He does not do this without perfect regard to the law with its justice and to the universal and eternal moral system constituted by it. He does it not as an independent, infinite Person totally unbound by these and acting as He pleases in the arbitrary sense; for He is a *moral* being, having the law in His eternal nature, and having created all other such natures with it in them. He, therefore, is not out of, but in the universal moral society and system with them, and cannot act morally independent of, or without perfect regard to these—that is, to the law with its justice by which these are constituted. Hence, it is not, cannot be a merely Personal matter for Him to pardon, forgive, remit sins, or justify any one, but is necessarily a governmental matter strictly according to the law, and therefore *moral*, while to do it as a mere Person would be utterly, absolutely *immoral*. Consequently, as no sinner has any righteousness of his own, and yet every one must have the perfect righteousness required by the law and its justice relationally in order to recognition and acceptance by God as in harmony with Himself, His law and justice, and the holy society and system, there is no other possible or conceivable basis, on which any one can be so recognized and accepted than

(*) For the sense of this term, see the 11 places of its occurrence in Rom. 4; and II. Cor. 5:19; Gal. 3:6; James 2:2, 3.

"the righteousness of God," provided by Him for guilty men—the absolutely perfect legal obedience of Christ, and His atonement made in it for the sins of the world, which He executed throughout for them as their Divinely constituted representative. Pardon, forgiveness, remission all mean the same one thing, being, as we have shown, simply different translations of the same Greek word; and this one thing is setting aside the penalty of the law deserved by the sins of its recipient, and relates to the atonement *only*, as its basis; but it is always only a part of justification, separately expressed for easier common apprehension. But justification signifies the whole done for one when he believes in Christ, not only his exemption from the penalty for his sins, which only puts him square with *the retributive demands of the justice of the law*, but his endowment *forensically* with the perfect righteousness of God, or of Christ, his representative, in place of the perfect obedience to the law, always *owed* by him as ethical justice to God and His moral society, but never rendered by him. It thus puts him perfectly square with the law in every sense, taking him from under it, and putting him under grace for the sanctification of his heart and character and for all good. What else is or can this be than what Scripture calls imputing, reckoning, accounting to one? Representation and this imputation necessarily go together and imply each other, so that, if either of them is true, the other is, if either false, the other is. If Rom. 5:12–19 teaches the truth of the relations of Adam and of Christ to mankind, the representative relation of Christ to them is true, and so must the imputation of His perfect righteousness to believers be. Justice to Him demands this to them. It is for us, therefore, to take Him to ourselves by faith in all His representative relations, and to know that we are thus perfectly united to and in Him, "for we are members of His body, of His flesh, and of His bones," as Paul says in that admirable comparison in Eph. 5:22–32 of the Divinely designed union of husbands and wives with the far stricter one of Christ and His Church. If we consider what our Lord taught of the union between Him and believers (John 14:20, 25; 15: 1–7; 17:21–23, 26), and what Paul taught, besides that just quoted, respecting it (Rom. 12:5; I. Cor. 6:15; 12:11-27; Eph. 1:23; 4:12-16; Col. 1:18, 24), we will see how real and vitally important it is. If it and all we receive from Him in it are sequels of our justification by faith which puts us on the basis of Christ's perfect righteousness, what else is justification in fact than the imputation, or reckoning to us of that righteousness, which squares us with the law and its justice?

CHAPTER XXIV.

The dwarfing, derogatory effects of the so-called Moral View of the Atonement.

§ 287. NO ESSENTIALLY NEW THEOLOGY CAN EVER SUPPLANT THE EVANGELICAL.

The clamor of many in our times is for a new theology. It is asserted, sometimes at least in no remarkably pious way, that the old is outgrown, effete, doomed to total rejection by all intelligent, thinking people, and deserves submergence only in the everlasting Lethe, to which the callers for a new one seek to consign it. But they seek in vain; for it is neither going into Lethe, nor to be supplanted by any new or old rival. There is no Sampson to wrench away and carry off its everlasting gates, nor to pull down its august temple; for its defender is one whose more than Atlantean shoulders not only sustain the weight of the whole heaven of holy truth, but of the monarchy of earth and the universe. The old theology is the system of evangelical truth and fact taught in the Bible, full-orbed, exclusive of all mere speculative subtractions, additions, substitutions, or notions of men. It is, in essential constitutive parts, the system found in the Bible, especially since the Great Reformation, by the main succession of its candid and competent readers and interpreters, embracing the most capable and qualified by natural endowments and highest scholarship and learning of our race, whose whole lives have been most assiduously devoted to its investigation, and who, though working separately, in different places, denominational connections, and times, and not seldom differing strenuously on minor points and statements, have yet, with wondrous unanimity, substantially agreed in these essentials. We think it no little temerity for any in our times to assume that this whole illustrious succession down centuries have misunderstood and mistaken its teachings as to any of these essentials, and that now at

length they, with such comparative capability as they should know themselves warranted to claim, are competent to dash in against this unanimity of centuries, to shatter and rout it respecting all or any of these radical points, and to establish the contrary. We think this the more, when, instead of bringing forward some really scholarly exegesis of Scripture, or some iron-clad argument from it, from sound reason, or from the nature of the law and the moral system, they mostly distort what they assail with caricature, and then perhaps crying—"I don't believe it, and I won't believe it"—endeavor to strike it into common rejection. But how does their believing or not believing any truth affect it in the least? Who "that is of the truth" cares whether they believe it or not, except as it affects the supreme interests of their souls or those of others? Their believing it or not does not make a hair of its head white or black, even in probability; nor does it make any contrary notion of theirs true or even probable. It is, however, of buttressing and commending importance to any essential tenet, that the most resplendent succession through centuries of the most competent minds of our race have believed it; not because their doing so adds in the least to its truth or Scriptural worthiness of belief, but because their unanimity concerning it indorses it as not contrary to, nor unworthy of, but accordant with, and embraced by, the minds, the reason, the scholarship, the learning of such a matchless procession down so many generations. All the modern rejecters of any such tenet and asserters of its opposite are comparatively of slight importance in the balance against this mighty unanimous procession, still in progress and marching on to the intellectual and moral conquest of mankind. In the course of this work, we have abundantly shown the measureless superiority of the Old or Evangelical Theology over any so-called New Theology in all its essential constituents and aspects—especially over the miscalled Moral View of the Atonement and all that it involves. We here, in concluding this work, recall attention, in a kind of summing up, to what we think we have established respecting this superiority. The advocates of that view constantly assume that their conception of the love of God for mankind, is vastly higher and richer than the common one of evangelical theologians and churches, and that this common one sets it forth dwarfed and obscured:

> "As when the Sun, new-risen,
> Looks through the horizontal misty air,
> Shorn of its beams; or, from behind the moon,
> In dim eclipse, disastrous twilight sheds
> On half the nations."

§ 288. THE CONCEPTION OF GOD'S LOVE, IN THE SO-CALLED MORAL VIEW, ESSENTIALLY UNTRUE.

We deny this assumption, and retort it against their own, as a very poor moon substituted for the glorious sun. The love it ascribes to God is void of justice, righteousness, holiness, and therefore of real morality, because, according to it, His love does not radically consist in the action of His will in absolute conformity to the everlasting law with its all-embracing, all-binding justice, and so to the moral constitution and system of the universal society, which must include Himself, and which He must be under infinite obligation to govern according to the law, in order to protect and secure the rights, dues, interests, and concerns of the whole as far as possible. His love, therefore, is regardless of the law with its justice, of the moral system and society, of all the rights, dues, interests, and concerns of all in that society as assailed and injured by human sinners, and is intrinsically immoral—a love which, if He is a moral being, and therefore necessarily in and over that society, He can have no possible right to render to these or any sinners, as it is at war with that whole society and the moral system in which it is as certainly as all the globes of the material universe are in a physical one. Such love is merely a product of sympathetic sensibility, affectional emotion towards mankind in their bad condition, a condition consisting wholly in the mere natural consequences of their own sin. It is totally indifferent and blind to their sin, except as the occasioning cause of those consequences to them personally. It makes nothing of it as against God and the whole moral society under Him, as utterly *unjust* to Him and them, both by robbing them of their natural and moral due of moral love and all its effects from them, and by all the direct wrong and resultant injury it does to them—and it makes nothing of the demand of justice, both as ethical to God and the whole moral society and as retributive to them, that they should be positively punished as they deserve; and it demands that God and all moral beings cognizant of them shall go beyond the part of mere non-resistants to them, and shall act towards them all the detestable flummery of entering themselves sympathetically into all their bad condition, going to cost for them, and turning themselves into their ridiculous, sentimental, apologists and advocates. In itself, this kind of emotional, naturally affectional, sympathetic love has no moral character, good or bad, because it is of the mere sensibility, in view of the bad condition of

its objects irrespective of its cause, and not of the will in conformity to the obligations of the universal, social-moral law, which alone is moral love. But, when this love is set in opposition to the really moral, and God's love is assumed to consist in it, it is making His, or Him in it, not only unmoral, but positively immoral. He is not all sensibility, nor ruled by His sensibility. He is a moral nature, having infinite moral reason, with the eternal law in and from it, and conscience; and His will must be absolutely ruled in all His moral action by this nature. His emotions, affections, and sympathies are all entirely subordinate to His moral reason and conscience, which affirm and guard the law with its justice, as the rule of action for Himself and all moral natures. They are not His love, but they move Him to act out His love to all its objects in all ways consistent with His infinite justice and wisdom; for His love is the absolute conformity of His will to, or accordance of it with the law in and from His eternal moral reason or nature. The matter required by the law—that is, by the moral reason or nature which *is, or contains and issues it*, is pure and perfect moral love to all moral beings who have not excluded themselves from among its objects; and the end of this love is the greatest possible real good of its objects according to their rights and dues, unless forfeited, their characters, their relations, and their deserts. It therefore involves, from the whole nature of the case, corresponding emotions towards them, whether of complacency, affection, sympathy, pity, indignation, or anger, as it also does corresponding intellectual action; but its whole moral essence is perfect good-will to all moral beings as stated, and so it is necessarily concrete and social. It is not, nor can it possibly be, the essence, being, nature, mind, person of any being, God or creature; and to made God's Essential Being and His love identical is, to us, mere jumbling indiscrimination and absurdity.* By the proposition, "God is love," the Apostle can mean nothing else than that God's entire moral activity, disposition, character is love, is absolutely righteous good-will with all its correlated emotions according to what is exactly true of its several objects.† As this love is perfectly according to and consistent with justice, which is the bond of the universal moral society, it is not confined to mankind only, but extends alike to all moral beings. We thus have the true conception

(*) Against Braune's comment on I. John 4:8, in his Comm. on the Epistle, Lange's series, the authorities he adduces, the added note of his translator, and Alford's specimen of reasoning quoted by him.

(†) Ps. 105:4, 5.

of God's love; and, in contrast with the "false forged" one above—

> "Nor sense to ecstacy was ne'er so thralled,
> But it reserved some quality of choice
> To serve in such a difference."

It is glorious beauty in contrast with consummate moral deformity. If the former is true, there can be no moral system; if the latter is true, it is as certain that there is one, universal, and eternal, as that there is one of the material universe.

§ 289. FARTHER SHOWING THAT THIS VIEW DWARFS AND DEPRECIATES IT TOWARDS MANKIND.

There is another way to see how this view depreciates the love of God, as it relates to mankind. The love of any being is only known by others as it is manifested; and the measure of it in the manifestation is in exact proportion to the obstacles to be overcome in making it, and the consequent degrees of self-denial and self-sacrifice it costs to make it. According to this view, there were no obstacles in the way of God's making His, arising from the demands of justice, both as ethical to Himself and the universal and eternal society, and as retributive against mankind as sinners, or from His eternal law and government, for Him to overcome; nor, since His anger and wrath against them were merely emotional and personal to Himself, could these hinder His forgiving and favoring them, if they would only repent; nor, if all love is intrinsically vicarious, as it is according to this view, could His angry emotions against them bar Him from acting it towards them to any degree He thought best, to bring them to repentance. The only great obstacle in His way, then, was the subjective state of sinners. But if the other obstacles which we have mentioned existed in addition to this, this was really the least of them all; and the self-denial and self-sacrifice of both the Father and the Son for overcoming this, if possibly supposable consistently with Scripture concerning their purpose, which they absolutely are not, would have been an incomparably *inferior manifestation* of love for men, than if they were to overcome those others. If asked—*how inferior,* when they were the same in either case? we answer that they could not be the same in either case. For, in the latter case, Christ denied and sacrificed Himself only as a martyr and to produce a kind of scenic impression on those cognizant of what He acted and suffered; and the Father only sent Him to act and suffer thus to produce it. His sufferings were such only as men could inflict and cause; and the dread and terror He ex-

pressed and showed from seeing the final ones at hand * are utterly unaccountable, if they were only such and for that purpose, if He was not one of the greatest cowards among martyrs or men. He was infinitely far from a coward; and His sufferings incomparably greater than those of any martyr or mere man from the hands of men. They were from His being the representative substitute of human sinners *as such*, not to produce any impression whatever *on them*, but *on God only and His relations to them*—from His suffering in their stead to expiate their sins and thus to propitiate God to them—from the chastisement of their peace being on Him—from His "bearing their sins"—from "the iniquities of all being laid on Him"—from His being "stricken for their transgression"—from His "making His soul an offering for sin," an "offering and a sacrifice to God for them"—from "the Father's not sparing, but delivering Him up for us all, for our trespasses"—from His being made a curse for us, to redeem us from the curse of the law"—from "the Father's bruising and putting Him to grief," and subjecting Him to all He endured, not to produce any impression on men, but for their trespasses against Himself, that He might consistently, justly, righteously save them from suffering the retributive punishment which they deserve and justice demands, if they comply with the prescribed conditions. Hence the trouble, amazement, agony of our Lord's soul, immeasurably surpassing all His bodily sufferings until His death; for He doubtless suffered all that such a person could suffer, which He certainly did not and could not, if only a martyr. Hence, too, the infinite self-denial and self-sacrifice of the Father in giving, delivering up, not sparing His own only-begotten Son to endure all this appalling suffering. Thus each acted His part according to the arrangement of the Godhead in the plan of redemption; and thus each, in absolute voluntariness, *manifested* His love for mankind, the world, in and ruined by sin. Who, then, that has eyes, can fail to see that the so-called Moral View immeasurably reduces and dwarfs the manifestation and demonstration of the greatness of the love of each, of God, for mankind, sinking it to a comparative shadow? It is perfectly futile to attempt to bridge over the vast chasm of difference between them by substituting words for things in order to magnify the little—to attempt to aggrandize this comparative dwarf into the whole of God's manifested love for man by clothing it with such rhetorical robes as the following,

(*) John 12:27; 13:21; Luke 12:50; Mat. 26:38, 39, 42, 44; Mark 14:33-36; Luke 22:42-44; Heb. 6:7.

as one lately gone did in a single sermon, in which He contemned the one only atonement—"the nature of God," "the nature of His heart," "His majestic loving and forgiving nature," "His heart-power," "His love-power," "the power of His nature," "His loving, glowing heart," and other like expressions, along with the assertion, that "God never had anything against sinners." A molehill cannot be made a mountain in any such way.

§ 290. THIS EFFECT ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD'S LOVE FOR MAN MORE MANIFEST FROM ITS LIKE EFFECTS ON THAT OF OTHER TRUTHS.

1. On the conception of the law. By denying its positive, retributory penalty, and making the mere natural consequences of violating it its only penalty, it denies that justice belongs to its nature. It denies that it does as *ethical*, which binds all to each other and to God, and God to them, to render its matter of pure moral love in constant reciprocity, as *due* to and *owed* by each by virtue of their common moral nature; and it denies that it does as *retributive*, which demands that each shall be rewarded or punished as he deserves. It therefore denies the social-moral nature of the law, because then its matter of moral love is not mutually *due* nor *owed* by ethical justice, and so impliedly that it is injustice or wrong to any or all of them to withhold it and to exercise only its opposite of selfishness against them, and that this deserves any penalty. Hence, whether any one renders love to or selfishness against others or God is purely his own concern. He has perfect liberty to do either; and, if he does only the latter, no other one, God or creature, has any right or reason to complain, or to hurt him for it. The precept of the law—"Thou shalt love" is only *advice;* and lays no obligation upon him. How he sins, if he does not take it, is more than we can see; for, if the law has no intrinsic quality of justice, how can God have any right to *invent* justice, and to impose it upon him by His mere arbitrary will, and thus to constitute an arbitrary law and government; and, if He did, what obligation could it create, or what except mere fear of Him as omnipotent? No; his only concern with it is to decide whether it is best for him to act according to the advice or not in view of the mere natural consequences, as he can foresee them, of each kind of action. This is all there is of the law according to this view; and if it is made thus insignificant and contemptible by it whose fault is it? The notion that the natural consequences of moral action are its retributions can come to nothing else. But the truth concerning the law is, that God has

declared it both by creating moral natures with it in them, and by inserting it in His inspired revelation; and He has declared its eternal positive retributions with it. It is as really a manifestation of His love for mankind as His measure of redemption is, and is as unchangeably such.

2. This view, of course, makes a moral government of God impossible. For, if justice is not an intrinsic quality of the law, and it consequently is not social, but what we have seen; and if the natural consequences of sin are its only punishment, there is no rational sense in which He can have a moral government and be a Moral Governor. What function of a Governor or Ruler does or can He fulfill? None; but His rulership would, like Angelo's in the play, be "the very cipher of a function

> "To fine the faults, whose fine stands in record,
> And let go by the actor."

If the law has no positive sanctions, He can administer none, and is reduced to the quiescent state of the lazy god of Epicurus—a state in which, if He is a moral being, and so necessarily in and over the universal moral society, He can have no possible right to be. He could only sit still, look on, and see the natural machines, working out all the rewards and punishments of so-called moral action. How could these automatic mills, grinding out their natural grists, be in any sense a government? and what glimmer of a manifestation of love could there be in Him for the *mills* in constructing them such, and then indifferently watching their grinding operations? Could the mills *pray* to Him with the least hope for an answer?

3. This view takes away all measure of God's estimation of the value and importance of obedience and of the evil and pernicious nature of sin. For, it is plainly impossible that His estimation of either can be greater than the law with its automatic sanctions represents. If the law has no positive sanctions administered by God, the only legitimate inference is, that He does not care enough for obedience, and is not disturbed enough by sin of whatever degree, to add any such sanctions to the mechanical, consequential grindings out of rewards and punishments, and so to augment the motives to obedience and against sin, and show that He does not regard them and their actors as on par by the proof of His positive action, what shadow of love, then, can be ascribed to Him for them? What care or concern? His manifested estimate of obedience and of sin is His manifested estimate of the well-being and of the ill-being consequential from them; and how can He make any such mani-

festation, if He adds and administers no positive sanctions of reward and punishment, but leaves all to mere natural consequences? To talk of His being a God of love on this theory is simply ridiculous.

§ 291. THE EFFECTS OF THIS VIEW ON THE ESSENTIAL TRUTHS AND FACTS EMBRACED IN THE REDEMPTIVE MEASURE.

1. It denies God's *justice*, leaving not a rack of it behind. How can He be just, if, having created moral beings with the same social-moral law in and from their natures which is in and from His own, and so in a moral society and system with Himself, of which He is necessarily Head and Ruler, He nevertheless has not annexed to it and does not administer any positive retributive sanctions of reward for obedience and punishment for disobedience, as it, the moral system it constitutes, the affirmations of moral reason and conscience, and the rights, dues, interests, and concerns of the universal moral society with one voice demand, and so has no moral government? He merely sits idly, leaving the automatic mills to grind their grists of consequences which they do not do according to any rule of justice, as we have before shown. Yet the holders of this view, while denying justice to be an intrinsic quality of God's law and nature, with characteristic inconsistency unconsciously assume that He is somehow bound by its demands, in declaring, as they often do, that, if He should punish sinners, as evangelical believers hold He must and will incorrigible ones, He would be unjust. As if there could be injustice and He commit it, if justice is not an intrinsic quality of His nature! If justice is simply a thing of His will, as mercy is, as advocates of this view assert, there can be no kind of obligation on Him ever to act it or not to act the opposite; so that He can neither act justly nor unjustly, rightly nor wrongly, because He has no standard to act by. What will can make, it can unmake, or never make; and there is no moral action in either case. But, if justice is a quality of God's eternal nature, He has no option about complying with its demands, more than about being benevolent, but must everlastingly execute them, both ethically and retributively.

2. How does this view affect the *mercy* of God? According to the evangelical doctrine, His mercy, as a disposition, was the great moving cause in Him for originating and executing the entire redemptive plan. Both the origination and the execution of this plan were entirely of His own will, free from the least obligation of justice *to* mankind, as they had no rights whatever to make any such

obligation upon Him to do them for them. His purpose in devising the measure was not to set aside or violate justice or any of its demands in the least degree, but to meet it perfectly by accomplishing its end, which is that of the eternal law. This could only be done by the incarnation, perfect obedience, and atoning sufferings and death of our Lord. It was pure mercy only that moved the Father to give Him to become, do, and suffer all He did—that moved the Son to His execution of the whole—and that moved the Holy Spirit to all done by Him. Thus it was pure mercy only that moved each Person of the Triune Godhead to all the infinite self-denial and self-sacrifice of executing the part He did, according to the everlasting arrangement between them, of the stupendous measure for the salvation of lost men; and it was and is *in its total exercise* the antithesis of *justice as retributively punitive*, while it was perfectly fulfilling its demands and ends *as ethical*. Well may Scripture speak of its riches—call it rich, great, abundant, tender; and magnify it by strongest expressions, as that by which sinners are saved from wrath, or punitive justice, and obtain the whole of salvation. But it is such only as the prime and mighty *mover* of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit to all their executions to rescue men from eternal perdition and to raise them to glory. But, according to this so-called Moral View, mercy is no antithesis at all of punitive justice against human sinners, and no mover of Godhead to fulfill the demands of ethical justice to the universal and eternal moral society with God in it, as necessary to render the salvation of any of those sinners from punitive justice consistent. It is a mere sympathetic impulsion of God's interest in and concern for them alone, as if entirely separate from that society, and it from them—from any connection with it in a moral system—from any demands of the universal law and its justice against them, or of God's government over them, and as if they had no guilt, no desert whatever of punishment from Him as its administrator; so that this impulsion alone, thus confined towards them, as if unfortunates in a bad condition by the natural consequences of their conduct (for how can it be called sin?), urged Him, or Christ to go through all He did simply as *a kind of show-manifestation to them*, to affect their *feelings*, and thus to *win* them from their self-injuring conduct, and so to stop its sorrowful stream of natural consequences to them *personally!* Such is the paltry stuff of this falsely called moral view—falsely called, because there is not a glimmer of real *moral* quality in it. Its whole fictitious essence is utterly anti-moral, both in itself and

in what it opposes and seeks to supplant. Like the poodle of Faust, it is Mephistopheles in disguise, silken-coated, but a deceiver and tempter to ruin. It rejects the whole teaching of Scripture as to the design of the sufferings and death of Christ, as to their direct end which was not in men at all, but in God, and as to the greatness, grandeur, and glory of the love, the absolutely moral love of God, Father, and Son in them, and substitutes for the inconceivably great and glorious whole rejected, what?—its own sentimental, anti-moral self! It is like the bramble in Jotham's parable asking all the trees to put trust in its shadow.

3. *Grace*, the illustrious daughter of mercy, fares no better at the hands of this hostile view. Grace is entirely concerned with mankind as sinners, deserving no favor from God, but retributive punishment only for their sins. It is God's merciful love for them as moral natures specially exercised towards them in opposition to their deserts and the demands of retributive justice against them. All the gifts and favors ever bestowed upon them are its largess to them—none of them ever deserved. With what opulence of expression is it described in Scripture. God's bestowments upon men in and through the redemptive measure are not only "the riches," but "the exceeding riches of His grace." They embraced the Father's gift of the Son, the Son's of Himself, and the gift of the Spirit by them both; and the entire part performed by each of them. They embraced the Father's forgiveness of sins and the complete justification of all that believe; His adoption of them as His heirs and co-heirs with Christ; their sanctification by the Spirit; their resurrection in the likeness of Christ; and all their exaltation and glory forever. But, according to this view, neither did the Father give His Son, nor the Son Himself, to meet any demand of retributive justice for the punishment of sinners, and thus to open a way for the access of grace to them, because they neither deserved any inflicted punishment, nor was there any demand of justice for it. Hence, the gift of the Son by the Father and of Himself by the Son were solely to make an *impression on them* by *a show-manifestation* of love for them to *win* them from sin to love the manifesters in return. What a vast shrinkage and havoc of grace does this involve! Consider the case. 1. If sin deserves no inflicted punishment from God, and there was no demand of justice in Him for its infliction on sinners to be met in order to allow access of grace to them, how can it approach equality of greatness and richness with what it must be, if He must Himself meet that demand against them before

He could directly exercise it to them? especially, if vastly greater self-denial, self-sacrifice and suffering were necessary in this case, as we have shown these must have been? 2. If *sin has no penalty, and its natural consequences are the sinner's only evil from it, there can be no such thing as pardon, forgiveness, remission of sins, or as justification, and no grace of God in acting these; for these consequences cannot be removed by these Divine acts, but by regeneration and sanctification of the Spirit only.* Thus the whole grace of God to human sinners, aside from what may be in *the assumed show-manifestation*, is abolished and destroyed by this ravaging view, which is none at all of the atonement or of Scripture; and, as His mercy and grace are merely modifications of His love towards human sinners, which is only a part of it towards all moral beings in the universal and eternal moral society and system, what an appalling reduction and diminution of its measureless immensity must the belief of this view cause in the estimation of it of all who adopt it. Nor this only, but, as if by some dire magic, all the shapes immense of the Divine truths and facts of Christianity, which are not exterminated outright by this noxious view, are shrunk to smallest dwarfs, like the host of fallen angels, as Milton tells, when crowded into Pandemonium; and, with their diminution, their very essence is metamorphosed and perverted.

§ 292. HOW THIS VIEW AFFECTS MOTIVES AGAINST SIN AND TO OBEDIENCE—TO REPENTANCE AND FAITH.

All these *motives*, of course, suffer equally at the hands of this invented view. Some of the most weighty, it exterminates at sight as Herod slew the innocents of Bethlehem; and all the remainder of them shrink to puniness under its accepted presence. All those from justice and positive retributions from God, causing fear, it extinguishes at once. Whatever sin, vice, or crime men may commit, however enormous, it says to them—"God will inflict no punishment upon you for it; and to fear it is to wrong Him. There is no punitive justice in Him to inflict its scourge upon you hereafter according to your deserts. Far be that from Him, the God of love, your Father, though universal conscience should roar its appalling cry for it against you. He will never hurt any one, but will forever enter Himself into all your bad condition and woes from the natural consequences of all your sins, vices, or crimes, whatever their grade. Not only to common sinners, but to the stalwarts of them, to the deepest-dyed murderers, the most enormously vicious, the most

fiendish monsters of Adam's race, I have this one lullaby of love to sing—'Cheer up, dear souls, one and all, you have no punitive retribution from God to fear, whatever you may be or do. Your consciences, with their sense of guilt, and even gnawing remorse and prophecies of pain, are liars; and, if you can stand *them*, you may persist in your careers of sin and wickedness as long as you list in this life, fearless of anything but the natural consequences of your course and deeds as far as God is concerned, and sure of His sympathy with you in those consequences, the more the worse they are, although He constituted you purposely to have them as retributions, if you should live in sin and enormity. But He has made a show-manifestation to those cognizant of it of His love for them, to draw them from evil lives to love and please Him; and, if you yield to this attraction, abandoning sin at any time, it will end or mitigate the bad retributive consequences of your past, prevent such in future, and cause good new ones. Some even say, that, if you do not yield to it in this life, He will extend your probationary time to do so without end, so that you may do it, if you will, at any time in the endless future; and that, as is fair and just, He equally extends that time to all who have not heard of Him, that they may yield to Him in some age to come. It is *mediæval;* it is Calvanistic; it is *traditional;* it is *illiberal* to believe the old notions of justice, atonement, etc. You need not, therefore, be in any hurry to repent, but may take your time, and all will be well at last.'" So essentially runs this invented lullaby of balderdash, this worse than fabled Siren song of old, were it true. What does it with the motives to repent and believe in Christ, so enshrined in the offers of forgiveness, remission of sins and justification on condition of acting them? By making these Divine acts of grace impossible, it sweeps the motives from the offer of them out of existence, because these acts of grace are impossible on the merely natural-consequence theory. What other motives then remain? As we have shown in a former place, those from those consequences of sin, as experienced, are too feeble to deter from sin, and, besides, have no adaptation or tendency to bring any one to love God or man. Equally ineffectual are those from the example of Christ in itself, not a mortal, we believe, having ever been converted by them. As to those from the show-manifestation of the view, which was made, not to save men from deserved punishment and to be a ground for their forgiveness and justification, but solely for an *impression* on them of the love of God for them, though sinners, by which to win them from sin and to love and obey

Him in return—a manifestation so utterly lacking any high, universal moral scope and aim, so totally divorced from any relation to justice, to the universal law, and to the moral system and government of God—so perfectly incapable of harmonizing with the teachings of Scripture concerning the stupendous scope of aim and effect of the one which God actually made, how can they at all compare in magnitude, weight and potency to affect human souls in sin, with those of the real one? How can they, so dwarfed or paralytic, ever confront and conquer the depravity of the world? The mottoes on the banner borne aloft by the adherents of this view are chiefly these—"No positive punishment from the God of love. No atonement to Him to save men from it. The natural consequences of sin its only retributions. God ever entering Himself into the bad condition of sinners from the natural consequences of their sins and going to cost for them. Their probation indefinitely extended after this life." On some are added—"No hell. No eternal punishment, which is only another name for eternal torture or torment, which we call it to make it odious. God bound to save all." The richest rhetoric of human tongues cannot, by the grandest regimentals in which it can clothe them, make conquering champions of the motives furnished by these mottoes or this view, nor hide their inherent impotence to subdue the strength of man's selfishness, and bring him to the true submission to God of faith, and to its consequences of love and obedience. *But the truth is, that neither Christ Himself, nor His whole manifestation of love, obedience, and atonement, ever regenerated a single sinner.* This is done by the Holy Spirit only with the truth as instrument. He is sent by the Father and the Son on the basis of the atonement of Christ *to* God for the sins of the world; and He alone brings any of mankind to accept the great salvation offered to all on the same basis.

§ 293. THIS VIEW LIMITS THE OBJECTS OF PRAYER AND THANKSGIVING.

We notice only one example more, though others might be added, of the bad effects of this view—its limitation of the objects of prayer and thanksgiving. No intelligent person, holding it, can pray for the pardon, forgiveness, remission of his sins, or for justification for himself or others, since, according to it, no such thing is possible and the terms are totally meaningless. They can only mean, as we have shown, the freeing of the object or objects of them, by a gracious act of God, from liability to the retributive penalty for the sin of which the one or more are guilty. While justifica-

tion signifies more than this, it always includes it as an essential of its meaning. It is folly, therefore, to say that any of these terms can mean freeing them from the natural consequences of sin, because they follow it by a necessity of nature. Only liability to positive penalty can be set aside by the Divine act expressed by either of these terms. But, if there is no such penalty and no liability to it from the hand of God, how can sinners be freed from it? and what but pure nonsense is it to ask Him to pardon, forgive, remit the sins of, or justify one's self, or any others? If, then, believers in this invented view would not wantonly trifle with God, when their consciences condemn them for their sins, instead of praying to God to exercise mercy to them in the act signified by all these terms, they must positively refuse to do it, and only ask Him to *righteous* them—that is, to sanctify or purify them! Of course, they can never thank Him for having done the mercy of this four-named act, so much enjoined and spoken of in all Scripture, and in the New Testament by our Lord, His Apostles and others; nor can they thank our Lord for having made His atonement to God for their sins, and having thus ransomed, redeemed, bought, saved them by His blood, His death, from their sins, the penalty they deserved, from "wrath," "indignation and wrath, tribulation, and anguish," from "the sentence on all to condemnation," from "eternal punishment," from all signified by the whole throng of Scriptural teachings and expressions concerning the only direct object of His sufferings and dying for men. Nor can they exercise faith in the Father or the Son for any of these things. But we here dismiss this ill-invented view, which, if in the questions of Job—"Where shall wisdom be found? And where is the place of understanding?" we substitute morality for wisdom and theology for understanding, must answer each of them as the deep and the sea did his—"It is not in me."

§ 294. THE PRECEDING SHOWINGS AGAINST THIS VIEW EQUALLY VALID AGAINST ALL VIEWS WHICH DENY JUSTICE AND THE ATONEMENT.

We trust the readers of this Chapter will recognize that what we have shown in it against the miscalled Moral View essentially applies to every other view which rejects the real atonement made by Christ for the sins of the world. For no other, more than it, can possibly consist with what we have shown is the total, uniform, explicit teaching of Scriptures respecting the real one; nor respecting the love of God for man and His mercy and grace towards him;

nor with what this real one involves and assumes respecting the law, and a universal and perpetual moral society and system constituted by it, or by universal moral reason or nature, which contains and issues it to all; nor with what it involves and Scripture teaches respecting God's rectoral relations to the law, to mankind as sinners and moral natures, and to that everlasting society and system; nor with the demands of moral reason and conscience, expressed and manifested all over the world, for justice, both as ethical and as retributive. Denial of the atonement is negation of all these, and makes all the acting and course of God towards men independent of the law and the society and system it creates, which, if He is a moral being, they cannot be, and so makes all His doings towards men actings by mere lawless, arbitrary *will*. Unless, therefore, all sinners are to perish forever by both the natural consequences and the retributive punishment of sin, *the atonement is the very center and keystone of the entire moral system, and a denial of it is a denial of that system, and of the possibility of its existence.* It is intrinsically infidelity, not merely respecting the whole Gospel and the whole love of God for man in it, but, as really, respecting the law and its justice. It is necessarily anti-moral, as infidelity always is; and when men turn *liberals*, and do what their assumed designation chiefly means, throw away the Word of God, His inspired revelation to man; throw away what it, especially the Gospel, contains and declares as absolutely true concerning Christ and His atonement to God for the *sins* of the world, that is, to save them from the retributive punishment those sins deserve, and concerning the love of God in giving Him to do and suffer for them all and as He did thus to save them; and throw away all it teaches, especially from Christ and His Apostles, concerning the everlasting punishment in *Gehenna* of all who, having knowledge of the Gospel, will not comply with its requirements—when their *liberalism* has thus thrown Christianity and the whole moral system of which it is the center away from them, and they feel, think, talk, write, and take sides with the openly illiberal and bigoted adversaries of these against those who stand stanchly by them, it is not for intellectual, but for anti-moral reasons that they become such and do so; for no sane man can throw away the purely, absolutely moral for real moral reasons. Nor will he do it for any intellectual reasons, for there can be no valid ones. *It is the moral state of the will that determines the action of the intellect respecting all essential morality.*

§ 295. THE QUESTION OF THE PERPETUITY OF FUTURE PUNISHMENT.

We think we have abundantly shown, both by the whole scope of this treatise and by specific arguments in it here and there, that future punishment will be endless. But there is a special way of looking at the case, to which we here ask attention. It is, that, if the race had been continued after the fall, and if the redemptive measure had not been designed and Christ had not come according to it to save them, mankind must all have been dealt with exactly according to the law. In that case, how could their punishment ever have had an end? There is no possibility that it could. But let us suppose its duration would have been limited, and that Christ would have come to save them from it. He could then only have saved them from it during the time set for its continuance, as beyond it they would not be liable to it, but *justly* free from it. Of course, He could only be their Saviour during that time—a limited Saviour. But, in all Scripture, there is not an intimation either that their punishment or His salvation from it has any limit to its duration. Its invariable teaching respecting both is the exact opposite. Christ, then, came to save them from endless punishment, and nothing less; and He, therefore, is not an *abridged, temporary Saviour, but an absolutely endless one.* If the punishment, to which they are all liable, is limited in duration, there was no *necessity* for Him to suffer in order that any might be endlessly blessed, as all would be so, of course, after their punishment would end. Nor would there be a *sufficient reason* for His coming to save them from it, if *temporary*, at such measureless cost to Him, to the Father, and to the Holy Spirit; for since their punishment would at longest be brief compared with the eternal blessedness to follow it, the cost of saving them from it would vastly exceed the gain. But, if the punishment, to which all were liable, was endless, the necessity and reason for all Christ suffered to save them were *absolute.* In the light of this presentation of the case, what is the meaning of the words *forever, everlasting, eternal* in Scripture when used to express the duration of future punishment? Clearly, if used to express its duration for all, if Christ had not come, they could mean nothing else than that it is *endless,* just as they do when used to express the duration of God, or of the spiritual life which Christ gives, or of anything the nature of which is unending, This we insist is the *primary, radical, proper* meaning of these words, especially of the Greek word αἰώνιος in the New Testament, which in the New Version is properly uni-

formly rendered *eternal;* so that, whenever used to express the duration of objects which have an end, they are always used in a *secondary* or *figurative* sense. This is manifest, because they, particularly the Greek adjective named, are never applied to objects of very brief continuance, but only to such as last so long that, to imagination, they *seem* endless, as to mountains, hills, cities, and similar ones. It is because their primary meaning is endless, that they can be and are used thus figuratively to signify long, though limited duration; and it is to reason entirely amiss to argue that the derived, figurative meaning is the primary and proper one in direct opposition to fact, and that, when applied to punishment, they do not mean endless. To be consistent, these reasoners should maintain that, when applied to God, Christ, the life He imparts, and to other such objects, they do not mean endless, but merely long-continued duration. In the light of the foregoing, the question is, did Christ come to save men from endless punishment, inevitably certain to them if He had not come? Common sense and Scripture can only answer, *Yes.* Another question is, did He abolish the liability of all men to this punishment, so that no condition is to be fulfilled by them to escape it, or only *provisorily* and *conditionally?* And the only answer of Scripture and common sense is, *No.* For, if there is a moral system, as there certainly is; if the law with its perfect justice is not abrogated, as it certainly is not, because it is in and from the nature of God and of all moral beings; if God is in and Ruler of the universal moral society, as He certainly is; if the Bible unvaringly, positively requires from all sinners repentance toward God, and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ as conditions of forgiveness and salvation—then Christ did not come to save a single responsible actor of our total race *unconditionally,* and never will. All who do not fulfill the conditions remain under liability to suffer, and, if they die under it, will suffer endless punishment; and no attempt to limit the meaning of αἰώνιος, eternal, or of any other word or expression signifying the same can ever consist with exegesis, learning, logic, or the nature of the case. Those who will not accept the salvation offered by and from Christ by fulfilling its conditions will not only suffer what they would, if He had not come, but, in addition, what they deserve for rejecting it and Him. No sentimental folly will ever change these conditions and solemn facts. For, we add, if Christ had come to save men *unconditionally* from this punishment, He would be the chief of all sinners Himself, the arch-enemy of the law and its justice, both ethical and retributive, and so of its matter of moral love, of God's Moral Government,

of His character, and of all good in the universe. We add further that, if the terms mentioned are used figuratively, and mean only limited duration, when applied to punishment, the same must be true of them when applied to its contraries—salvation, redemption, life, and the like, because their meaning in the latter case exactly equals it in the former. Whoever blots out Gehenna, as taught by Christ and His Apostles, blots out salvation and Heaven.

We finish this Work by saying that the Church of Christ neither needs, nor will or can have a new Theology, because the old is not of man, but of God—not what Augustine, Luther, Calvin, Wesley, or any other man has taught, but what the Bible teaches. No so-called Theology, essentially differing from the old evangelical one, will ever be true, because it will always be built on the sand of some speculation or theory originated by sentimentalism, naturalism, or false assumption. Lacking any real moral essence and system, it will mainly consist of negations of the true one; and negations never have any real life in them. Positives, built on the solid rock of inspired revelation, not wrested, but rightly interpreted, will stand forever, and will forever hold and mold the Church. The real Church will cleave with unyielding tenacity to the Bible and its ever-precious contents as they are, vitally articulated to each other. Above all, will it cleave to the manifested love of God, Father, Son, and Spirit, in the great measure of redemption, and to the dear Christ who bought it with His own blood. "No man, having drunk old wine, straightway desireth new: for he saith, The old is better."

FINIS.

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